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Abstract 
FINANCING MIX OF NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
by YILMAZ Gi'TNEY 
This study analyses the financing decisions of listed non-financial corporations in France, 
Germany and the UK over the period 1969 to 2000. These countries represent satisfactorily 
different financial structures of their classes, i.e., Latinic, Germanic and Anglo-Saxon 
traditions, respectively. Thus, this thesis attempts to shed light on the impact of institutional 
differences (accounting and taxation systems, bankruptcy laws, corporate governance 
structure) on corporate financing mix policies. The empirical investigation comprises three 
main themes; capital structure (debt versus equity), debt maturity structure (short-term versus 
long-term debt), and debt ownership structure (public versus private debt). It is obvious that 
factors influencing financial strategies of firms change overtime and firms are expected to 
adjust themselves to their target financing structure according to random events. For these 
reasons we use dynamic panel data and choose Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) as 
an appropriate estimation procedure for our autoregressive-distributed lag modeL GMM 
methodology overcomes the problems of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, normality, 
simultaneity and measurement errors, which are common for studies usingfirm-level data. 
The empirical evidence shows that corporate financing decisions are determined by both 
firm-specific (profitability, tangibility and maturity of assets, growth, quality, size, liquidity, 
payout policy, corporate tax rates, and earnings volatility), and market-related factors (term 
structure of interest rates, market equity premium, interest rate volatility, stock return 
volatility, stock price performance). However, the strength and nature of the effect of these 
factors are dependent on the financial environment and tradition of the countries of interest. 
Therefore, our research argues that financing mix decisions of firms are not only the product 
'-
of their own characteristics, but also the outcome of environment and traditions in which 
they operate. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One can regard non-financial corporations as the transformation units dealing with factor 
inputs conversion into intermediate and final goods and services. These output values are 
expected to have higher value than the input values. Firms' operations need to be 
financed for this objective by means of various forms that differ with respect to their 
characteristics such as contractual conditions, control rights and marketability of 
transferable claims among agents. Researchers have shown that firms' real performance 
and their economic market value may be heavily conditioned on their fmancing decisions 
and opportunities. This possibility can be considered as the fundamental impetus as to 
why financing pattern of corporations has been paid attention by financial policy makers 
and academics. 
In real life, there are variations in firms' capital structure, i.e., the composition of 
debt (fixed-interest loan capital) and equity (share capital). Furthermore, one can 
recognise the differences with respect to their debt maturity structure, i.e., the proportion 
of short-, medium-, and long-term debt to total debt. Another perspective is firms' debt 
ownership structure, i.e., the proportion of private- or public debt to total debt. The 
following questions have been a matter of debate for many decades: Does the financing 
mix of corporations matter? Put it differently, is there any optimal mix of financing 
structure that maximises the enterprise value or minimises the cost of capital? If the 
answer is affirmative, then, what factors determine this optimal level? These questions 
serve a pivotal role in this study. 
Why do we need to study this subject? We believe that comprehension of the interaction 
between firms and outside investors is important due to its various corporate sector-wise 
and society-wise benefits. If one happens to discover the intuitions behind the arguments 
discussed above, managers will supply financing for the investment opportunities at the 
minimum cost; investors' savings in the financial markets will be guaranteed to yield 
maximum return given minimum risk; and financial and institutional regulations will be 
established accordingly for the efficiency of the economy. 
The starting point of this research is Modigliani and Miller [1958] who contend 
that capital structure of a firm has no impact on its market value given perfect capital 
markets assumptions. However, if one is to relax the 'frictionless capital markets' 
assumptions, financing decisions of firms might not be irrelevant, i.e., financial structure 
matters, as argued by up-to-date vast accumulation of related studies. For instance, the 
existence of bankruptcy costs, transaction costs, agency costs as being market 
imperfections may lead to some optimal financial policies. This study aims to 
empirically investigate the main determinants of financial decisions of corporations. In 
the literature, most of the empirical evidence is based on the financial data of US firms. 
Clearly, the studies focusing on a single country cannot perceive the effect of diversity of 
cultural and economic factors on firms' financial policies. According to the tradition, 
there is a distinction between Anglo-Saxon countries (USA, UK, and Canada) and other 
major economies (France, Italy, Japan and Germany) in the sense that the former are 
considered to have low-levered firms and the latter to have high-levered firms. 
Furthermore, agency costs and indirect bankruptcy costs tend to be higher in Anglo-
Saxon countries, where there is lack of long-term relationship between firms and 
creditors and of long-term objectives ofbusiness management. 
In this international study, France, Germany and the UK are chosen as they seem 
to represent satisfactorily different financial structures of their classes. The UK is in the 
classification of Anglo-Saxon tradition, where there are comparatively large numbers of 
publicly listed companies and occurrences of hostile takeovers for market for corporate 
control due to potentially large agency conflicts. Germany is in the classification of 
Germanic tradition (e.g., Austria, the Netherlands), where corporate decision making and 
restructuring are made through the involvement of universal banks and financial holdings 
and the capital markets are not effective with relatively low amount of listed companies. 
Lastly, France is in the classification of Latinic tradition (e.g., Italy, Spain), where 
corporate ownership structure can be characterised by family control, financial holdings, 
state ownership and cross-shareholdings, and agency problems are internalised unlike in 
Anglo-Saxon tradition. Thus, we believe that our international empirical evidence will 
shed light on the impact of institutional differences (accounting and taxation systems, 
bankruptcy laws, corporate governance) across countries on financing decisions of 
corporations. It aims to contribute to the literature in this respect. 
It is obvious that factors influencing firms' financial strategies change overtime. 
Therefore, it would be necessary but not sufficient to examine the differences in firms' 
financial structure only across firms. To explain time-varying observed differences in 
financial structure of firms is another issue to be investigated. It is important to 
comprehend whether firms react to new circumstances that occur in fmancial markets 
and how quick they are in adjusting themselves to their target financial structure 
according to random events. Once lagged values of dependent and independent variables 
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are incorporated into the analysis, a more complete picture of dynamism in corporate 
behaviour can be achieved. Thus, we adopt an autoregressive-distributed lag model, by 
which we are able to examine the determinants of financing policies, the speed of 
adjustment process to desired optimal financing mix, and to provide the static long-run 
relationship between dependent and independent variables. As another contribution to 
the literature, hence, this study investigates whether firms have optimal financing 
policies. In order to accomplish these objectives, we use dynamic panel data with the 
estimation method of Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM), which is believed to be 
the most appropriate procedure for our purpose. Furthermore, GMM methodology 
utilising appropriate instrumental variables overcomes the problems of endogeneity, 
heteroscedasticity, normality, simultaneity and measurement errors, which are common 
for studies using firm-level data. Endogeneity problem should be investigated as it is 
likely that random shocks affect both dependent variable and independent variables at the 
same time. It is possible that observed relations between a financing policy and its 
proposed determinants indicate the effects of that policy on the latter rather than vice-
versa. Consequently, this thesis also makes a contribution in terms of the newly-
developed methodologies used in the analysis and controlling for endogeneity which is 
ignored by almost all studies. 
In the end, the findings of this study reveal that there are considerable differences 
in financing patterns of corporations in France, Germany and the UK. Therefore, our 
research argues that financing-mix decisions of firms are not only the product of their 
own characteristics, but also the result of environment and traditions in which they 
operate. More importantly, we find that supposedly effective and strong German 
corporate governance mechanism does not seem to be as successful as conventional 
wisdom suggests in mitigating agency problems and information asymmetries. 
The outline of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 reviews first the fundamental themes 
of capital structure arguments that debate whether the proportion of debt to equity has 
any impact on firm value under market imperfections. Second, in the framework of 
recent developments, the discussion of debt maturity irrelevance is provided, i.e., 
whether short-term debt is superior to long-term debt or there are any factors that 
determine optimal corporate debt maturity. Third, factors affecting firms' choices of 
differences debt sources (public or private), are reviewed. The last section provides a 
discussion of dynamic debt use in renegotiations between borrowers and financiers. This 
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issue seems to be relevant in real life in case of corporate financial distress since it may 
lead to bilateral opportunistic incentives through strategic decisions. 
Chapter 2 investigates the financial and institutional features of France, Germany and the 
UK. It appears that in such countries having similar capital markets and financial 
institutions, financial structure of firms might vary across these countries. On the other 
hand, in such countries having different financial institutions, fmancial structure of firms 
might be quite similar in these diverse capital markets (Rajan and Zingales [1995]). 
Subsequently, financial researchers have made considerable effort to obtain the 
underlying reasons for these differences. It is contended that the efforts to explain 
differences in financial structures of corporations across countries with respect to tax 
differentials alone have generally failed as there is little relation between tax incentives to 
use different forms of financing and observed proportions of capital raised. It could be 
due to the convergent inflation rates at lower levels that reduce the tax systems 
distortions. Instead, recent arguments tend to suggest institutional factors for the financial 
structure heterogeneity across countries. International differences regarding the financing 
patterns of corporations may not be independent from the institutional features. These 
factors may be related to financial structure affecting the degree of risk to creditors 
associated with high leverage. For instance, Hoshi et al. [1996] investigate the financial 
structure of Japan, where there is an organisation of firms' network, keiretsu. They find 
that those firms that are not the members of keiretsu will probably cut back investment 
when they have not sufficient cash flows. Accordingly, one would argue that this specific 
institutional factor is likely to influence the financial policies of the Japanese firms. The 
authors also indicate that firms in industrial groups having close relationship to their 
banks, suppliers and customers perform better than others and even get more help in 
times of financial distress. However, such financial coalitions might have incentive to 
make inefficient decisions at the expense of other shareholders. In order to capture the 
potential effects of institutional differences on firms' financing policies, we will analyse 
the characteristics of main components of capital markets in France, Germany and the 
UK. 
Chapter 3 reviews the existing econometric methods for dynamic panel data 
analysis. There are many areas and relevant theories in finance and economics that 
should be focused on using dynamic panel data due to their nature. One can discover the 
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dynamics of adjustment process more systematically through this way. This chapter will 
first discuss the adjustment process with a model using first-differences technique. Then, 
it will be extended in the framework of error-correction mechanism. The following 
section will elaborate the alternative estimation methodologies so as to obtain the most 
appropriate econometric procedure that provides consistent and efficient estimates for the 
models. For this purpose, we will discuss the properties of Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), Anderson-Hsiao Instrumental Variable technique, and GMM methodology 
interacted with models in levels and first-differenced equations. Having decided the 
superiority of GMM in dynamic panel data studies, there will be further discussion of 
how to improve the GMM results by using additional instruments. Finally, this chapter 
attempts to find out why we have chosen the GMM methodology to be the best 
estimation technique for our empirical purposes (see Arellano and Bond [1991], Arellano 
and Bover [1995], and Blundell and Bond [1998]). 
In Chapter 4 we aim to investigate the potential determinants of corporate capital 
structure. Despite the numerous capital structure papers accumulated after Modigliani 
and Miller' [1958] seminal study, the theory of capital structure has still been one of the 
intensively debated topic in corporate finance literature. Modigliani and Miller [1963] 
argue in their second paper that firms may maximise their market value with a capital 
structure using no equity. These controversial arguments have led the researchers to 
examine this issue in a more realistic way. The general tendency seems to argue that 
optimal capital structure involves balancing the corporate tax advantages of debt 
financing against the present value of bankruptcy costs and agency costs. The empirical 
findings of the trade-off theory do not bring about any consensus. The presence of other 
factors in the optimal capital structure debate, e.g., personal taxes and principal-agent 
conflicts, makes the debate even more complicated. Hence, it is still worth working on 
this issue as Myers [1984, p.575] states "How do firms choose their capital 
structures ... We still don't know". One should find out why the observed debt ratios of 
firms are typically around 20-30 % despite the tax advantage of debt financing, i.e., the 
disadvantages of debt financing, which seem to outweigh this tax advantage, should be 
detected. Thus, with further empirical analyses, it would be possible to shed light on this 
puzzling issue of corporate finance by reconciliating the present controversies. 
Moreover, further investigation on international capital structure seems necessary as 
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some researchers report significant differences in capital structure of firms in developed 
countries (McClure et al. [1999] and Wald [1999]). 
We analyse the potential determinants of corporate debt maturity structure in 
Chapter 5. Firms should decide the maturity of the new debt when they choose debt-
financing rather than equity-financing. It appears that not much is known about the 
maturity structure of debt financing, relative to the research on corporate capital 
structure. Merton [1974] and Stiglitz [1974] theoretically show the irrelevance of 
corporate debt maturity structure under perfect market conditions. Why firms use both 
commercial papers and bonds to finance their assets and investment opportunities does 
not seem to be fully understood in the literature. Debt maturity structure is important to 
firms, since a badly chosen maturity might lead to inefficient liquidations of their even 
profitable projects. However, firms may also use it as a signalling mechanism in an 
imperfect market to provide information about their quality, credibility and future 
prospects. 
The literature tends to suggest short-term debt use as it mitigates asymmetric information 
and agency problems. One strand of debt maturity theories is interested in tax arguments: 
Brick and Ravid [1985] contend that when the yield curve is upward sloping long-term 
debt is optimal since gain from leverage due to interest tax shield is accelerated. Another 
line is based on information asymmetries: Flannery [1986] and Kale and Noe [1990] 
predict that high-quality firms choose short-term debt to signal their type. Diamond 
[1991 b, 1993] shows that even low-quality firms would issue short-term debt due to 
liquidity risk and only medium-rated firms issue long-term debt. Another line focuses on 
contracting costs arguments: Myers [1977] contends that short-term debt alleviates 
underinvestment problem if it matures before growth options are exercised as there 
remains an opportunity for lenders and firms to re-negotiate. Barnea et al. [1980] argue 
that short-term debt may diminish asset substitution problem since the value of short-
term debt is less sensitive to changes in firms' asset value. It is also predicted by 
asymmetric information arguments and contracting costs hypothesis that firms match the 
maturity of their assets and liabilities. 
There exists no empirical debt maturity study in an international context. In an attempt to 
fill this gap, this chapter explores cross-country differences in firms' debt maturity 
decisions in the framework of tax, contracting-costs, signalling, liquidity risk, and 
maturity-matching hypotheses. 
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In Chapter 6 we attempt to discover the potential determinants of corporate debt 
ownership structure with reference to bank debt use. Privately-placed debt is argued to be 
the most important source of external financing for small firms due to their limited 
access to capital markets, transaction costs and information asymmetries. However, one 
should examine why firms use private debt financing even they have access to public 
debt markets, and why they resort to both types of debt financing. 
The literature based on moral hazard and adverse selection argues that monitored bank 
loans are different from public debt as banks have cost advantage in lending and have 
more information about the prospects of firms. Fama [1985] argues that bank debt is like 
inside debt, which may mitigate underinvestment problems due to information 
asymmetries. Therefore, firms with potential agency conflicts are contended to benefit 
more from issuing private debt rather than non-monitored public debt. Second line of the 
literature is based on the liquidation and renegotiation arguments. Financial distress costs 
of public debt in renegotiations are generally higher than those of private debt, and public 
debt agreements are more difficult to renegotiate and emphasise more on the liquidation 
of distressed firms. Thus, such firms are predicted to avoid issuing public debt. Finally, 
transaction costs hypothesis states that there are economies of scale in issuing substantial 
amount of public debt. It follows that only large firms are likely to benefit from the cost 
advantage of public debt. 
The following findings seem sufficient to emphasise the relevance of such a 
topic: James [1987] finds that announcement of bank loan issuance causes positive 
abnormal stock returns and the evidence of firm-bank relationship increases firm value. 
Datta et al. [2000] obtain that change in debt ownership structure can influence 
shareholders' wealth as they report a significantly negative share price response to public 
debt-IPO announcements. In addition, James [1996] finds that debt-mix is relevant for 
distressed firms to be able to alter their capital structure through non-court restructurings. 
Finally, Cantillo and Wright [2000] state that 'understanding how firms choose their 
lenders may unveil the mechanism through which recessions and booms propagate and 
persist in the economy'. 
There is only one international paper examining the choice between private and public 
debt (Esho et al. [2001]). In fact, Rajan and Zingales [1995] argue that the difference 
between market-based and bank-based countries can be obtained in the debt ownership 
structure. In an attempt to fill the gap, this chapter explores cross-country differences 
with respect to debt replacement decisions of corporations. 
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Overall, our research detects that the relationship-type of dependent and 
independent variables with respect to direction and degree tends to be country-
dependent. This general finding can be attributed to the differences in corporate 
governance mechanisms and institutional features of the countries which are presented in 
Chapter 2. In summary, the main contributions of this thesis are as follows: It uses 
dynamic panel data, GMM methodology is performed to control for endogeneity and 
simultaneity problem, the presence of any optimal financing mix is investigated, and the 
theories of corporate financing policies are tested in an international context. 
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"He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who boards ship without a 
rudder and compass and never knows where he may be cast. " 
Leonardo da Vinci, 1452-1519 
2. CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES 
AND THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses first the fundamental themes of capital structure arguments that 
debate whether the proportion of debt to equity affects firm value under market 
imperfections, which do not exist in Modigliani and Miller's [1958] (M-M) capital 
structure irrelevance theory. In the context of recent developments, second, the discussion 
of debt maturity irrelevance is provided, i.e., is short-term debt superior to long-term debt 
or are there any firm-specific components that determine optimal corporate debt 
maturity? Third, the factors affecting the choice of firms between different financing 
sources, mainly public or private, are examined. Last section provides a discussion of 
dynamic debt use in renegotiations between lenders and borrowers in case of corporate 
financial distress as it causes bilateral opportunistic incentives if decisions are taken 
strategically. 
2. 2. THEORIES OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
In this section, it would be convenient to present firstly the famous propositions of 
Modigliani-Miller. They mainly state that value of firms in a frictionless and tax-free 
capital market is in fact independent of the mix of debt and equity. The efforts to 
introduce a role for financial decision making have focused on challenging the major 
premise on M-M theory. Because it can be possible that the amount of future cash flows 
of firms may be altered by financial decisions in the market. On the other hand, despite 
the corporate tax advantage of debts why firms' debt ratios are still low has been puzzling 
the corporate finance researchers (e.g., Berens and Cuny [1995], Miller [1977], Myers 
[1984]). On this direction, we will divide the main capital structure theories into four 
categories as being 'bankruptcy costs, tax-based, agency costs, and asymmetric 
information arguments" in order to show how deep the controversies of capital structure 
theories are. 
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2.2.1. MOD:U:GLIANI AND MILLER (M-M) PROPOSITIONS 
In their seminal paper that initiated the modem capital structure theory, Modigliani and 
Miller [1958] argue that market value of a firm is independent of its financial structure 
conditioned upon some assumptions. They mainly attempt to explain how a theory could 
be used to answer the cost of capital question in constituting investment theory of firm 
under uncertainty. The cost of capital is basically regarded, by the economic theories, as 
the interest rate on physical assets whose streams are surely known. Furthermore, optimal 
investment level is attained where market interest rate is equal to the marginal yield on 
physical assets. They highlight the importance of risk in assessing cost of capital in an 
uncertain environment where the profit maximisation and market value maximisation 
criteria are not equivalent to each other. In this case, only subjective individual utility 
functions can be used to evaluate different financing decisions giving different profit 
outcomes. It is not appropriate to analyse the investment opportunities normatively. For 
instance, a management cannot determine truly the risk preferences of its shareholders in 
the context of discriminating 'risk-adjusted' or 'certainty-equivalent' yield with market 
rate of interest. On the other hand, what makes the M-M propositions path breaking is 
their alternative approach based on market value maximisation as it has an operational 
and objective meaning of cost of capital and investment theory. Thereafter, the 
investment evaluation criterion is such that if the project is to raise market value of the 
firm's shares it is worth undertaking it, because otherwise its return would be less than 
the firm's marginal cost of capital. 
Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963] consider, directly or indirectly, a number of 
assumptions for their hypotheses: 
i) Risk-free debt and risk equity are the only alternatives that firms use for their 
financial policies. 
ii) Capital markets are frictionless. 
iii) There are no wealth and personal taxes but corporate tax exists. 
iv) Individuals can borrow and lend at risk-free rate. 
v) All firms are in the same risk class. 1 
vi) The cash flow streams are perpetuities as there is no growth. 
1 This assumption can be considered as the key point of the M-M model as it implies that firms' shares 
within given risk class have both the same probability distribution of expected returns and the same 
expected return. As firms within a risk class differ from each other proportionately, one can argue that firms 
are perfect substitutes for each other; that is, there are no arbitrage opportunities. 
10 
vii) There are no signalling opportunities as there 1s no asymmetric information 
between corporate outsiders and insiders. 
viii) Since the managers' aim is to maximise shareholders' wealth, there are no agency 
costs. 
ix) There are no bankruptcy costs. 
In their first proposition, M-M [1958] show that "market value of the firm is 
independent of its capital structure and is given by capitalising its expected return at its 
related risk class, i.e., average cost of capital of the firm is independent of its capital 
structure and equal to capitalisation rate of its equity stream class". It can be shown 
algebraically, with their language, that 
xj 
V.=S+D=-
1 
1 1 Pk 
(2.1) 
Where, j stands for firm and k for risk-class. V, S and D represent market value of firm, 
market value of common shares and market value of debts, respectively. X is the 
expected value of earnings before interest and taxes. Pk is equity stream's capitalisation 
rate. 
Following the argument, M-M's second proposition states that "a share's expected yield 
(i) is equal to related capitalisation rate for equity stream in its class, plus a premium 
related to financial risk equal to debt to equity ratio times the spread between the 
premium (r) and interest rate charged for outstanding debt". This proposition could also 
be shown algebraically that 
D. 
i1 = Pk + (pk- r)-1 (2.2) sj 
In their second paper, M-M [1963] include the taxation to their analysis while discussing 
the effect of corporate taxes on the firm valuation. Instead of saying that the firm's 
market value in each class must be proportional in equilibrium to its expected returns net 
of taxes, they show this time that 'arbitrage conditions' will make values within any class 
a function of both expected after-tax returns and tax-rate with the degree of leverage'. 
That argument would bring about an extreme solution of almost 100 percent debt 
financing for investment opportunities due to exemption of interest payments for debts 
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from taxable income by the firm's corporate tax burden. In order to show the first 
proposition of M-M algebraically with their language, the following equations can be 
used. 
Vu = (1-r)X 
pr 
(1-r)X rR 
VL = +-=Vu +rDL 
pr r 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
Where, V u, V L are the present value of an unlevered firm having all equity and the value 
of levered firm, respectively. DL is the permanent level of debt. r is the marginal 
corporate income tax rate. R is the interest payment for debt; p is the discount rate for 
unlevered firm of equivalent risk. r is the rate at which the market capitalises the sure 
stream generated by debt, or the ratio of RIDL. 
Thus, the value of levered firm is equal to the value of unlevered firm plus the present 
value of the tax shield of outstanding debt. If corporate tax is zero, the value of both firms 
becomes identical to each other. Then, MM-1 states that the value of the firm is 
completely independent of financial decisions in the absence of any market 
imperfections, specifically corporate taxes. 
Apart from the restrictions mentioned above, Stiglitz [1969] also determines several 
limitations of M-M arguments: first, they depend on the existence of risk class whose use 
seems to imply objective probability distributions over possible state occurrences. 
Second, they are based on partial rather than general equilibrium analysis. Third, whether 
these propositions are valid for competitive markets is not clear. Fourth, it is also not 
clear that how the possibility of bankruptcy affects the validity of the propositions. 
Under the light of these limitations, the M-M findings simply allege that the firm's value 
is independent of the mix of debt and equity. Because if the firm's value could be 
changed altering financial mix of debt and equity, this would create a pure arbitrage 
opportunity by earning higher rate of return without changing the risk at all. As Ross 
[1988] argues, suppose that one firm is purely capitalised with equity and other with both 
debt and equity and further suppose levered firm is more valuable than unlevered one. 
Then, buying an equal percentage share oflevered firm's debt and equity would cost less 
than the same percentage share of unlevered firm, but it would lead an outsider investor 
to require exactly the same cash flow! Such an arbitrage possibility would increase the 
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price of levered firm's equity and lower the price of unlevered firm's equity until two 
firms had the same value. Consequently, when a firm increases its debt to equity ratio its 
value does not change as the risky cash flow pattern in the capital market can be 
duplicated elsewhere in the economy at zero cost.2 
Taking the practical applications of corporate finance into account, one can say that the 
assumptions of M-M theory are too unrealistic to be considered. Some authors (e.g., 
Stiglitz [ 197 4]) support the idea that whether they are important or not, the theoretical 
importance of the theorem is not diminished. Stiglitz suggests first to assume a world 
without transaction costs, tax distortions and other frictions, then to observe whether in 
these circumstances firms ignore their financial structure. In other words, the M-M theory 
is essential to understand both under which conditions capital structure is irrelevant and 
whether we might have an optimal capital structure in practice. The extreme predictions 
of the M-M analysis, yet, have led the researchers to investigate why firms do not have a 
hundred percent debt in their capital structure. Therefore, in the following sections, by 
relaxing these assumptions we will discuss and question the validity of the M-M theory in 
a more realistic conjuncture. We, then, attempt to shed light on the fact that why firms' 
capital structure do not contain only debt due to tax advantage of debt financing by some 
potential cost of being highly-indebted. 
2.2.2. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND BANKRUPTCY COSTS 
The M-M theory does not consider bankruptcy, in a way the firm may not be able to earn 
its obligations with certainty, which makes their proofs problematic. If financial markets 
know that a firm has a positive probability of going bankrupt, it will undergo higher 
nominal interest rates to be charged for its debt obligations. Optimal capital structure, 
here, may not exist if an individual borrows collateral securities and if he forfeits the 
securities in case where his return from securities becomes less than his borrowings 
(Stiglitz [1969]). That is, their proofs are valid in complete and perfect capital markets 
. 
where firms are price-taker and there are no bankruptcy penalties. According to the 
general consensus, the optimisation of capital structure involves a trade-off between the 
present value of tax rebate associated with a marginal increase in leverage and present 
value of the marginal cost of the disadvantages of leverage. 
2 Heins and Sprenkle [1969], furthermore, agree with the M-M hypothesis that arbitrage will drive the 
market values of the two firms together but they argue that M-M's illustration for arbitrage process is 
wrong. 
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In their single period model in a complete market, Kraus and Litzenberger [1973] 
introduce corporate taxes and bankruptcy penalties by considering them as market 
imperfections that are central to capital structure theory. In the model, the firm's 
financing mix determines the states where the firm earns its debt obligation and receives 
its tax savings due to deductibility of interest charges. They regard the determination of 
specific debt level such that resulting states (solvency, insolvency) give the maximum 
firm value as the problem of capital structure formulation. They also show that market 
value of levered firm identical to the unlevered firm's market value, plus corporate tax 
rate times its debt amount, less the complement of corporate tax rate times present value 
of bankruptcy costs. Hence, one can say that the mix of debt and equity matters if the 
capital markets are incomplete and imperfect. 
In order to discuss the trade-off between bankruptcy costs and tax savings, there should 
be a considerable magnitude of bankruptcy costs. This issue was examined by Warner 
[1977] by working on 11 railroad bankruptcies occurred between 1933-55. He measures 
bankruptcy costs, on average, as about 1 percent of the firm's market value prior to 
bankruptcy, which is too low as compared to Baxter's [1967] 20 percent level, referred to 
his personal bankruptcies data. Warner claims that ratio of direct bankruptcy costs to the 
firm's market value appears to decline as the firm' value raises. These differences, yet, 
reveal the fact that not all bankruptcy costs are measurable direct costs as some of the 
omitted indirect costs may be substantial in determining optimal capital structure (Warner 
[1977], Altman [1984]). 
With respect to bankruptcy costs components, Kim [1978] lists several items; first, 
depending on whether bankruptcy takes the form of reorganisation or liquidation, there 
may be either shortfall or indirect cost of reorganisation. Second, arising in the course of 
bankruptcy proceedings, various administrative expenses must be paid to third parties. 
Third, firms lose tax credits, which they would have received if they had not gone 
bankrupt. Since he alleges that optimal capital structure is a meaningful concept only if it 
can be shown that optimal debt is strictly less than debt capacity, then, shareholder 
wealth maximising firms should search for optimal capital structure rather than simply 
maximise their borrowings3• 
3 Turnbull [1979] also finds that optimal capital structure always occurs before the firm's debt capacity, 
which is defined as the maximum amount of credit that lenders will extend to the firm. He uses a simple 
option model since the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is misspecified and misleading in an economy 
where corporate interest expenses are tax deductible (see, Gonzales et al. [ 1977]). 
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On the other hand, Haugen and Senbet [ 1978] show that all costs related with liquidating 
or dismantling the assets of unprofitable firm are not related to capital structure or the 
firm's state. They further contend that any cost associated with bankruptcy, or ownership 
transfer, must be limited to lesser of (a) cost of bankruptcy and (b) cost of avoiding the 
transfer. The authors argue that truly significant "penalty" costs to bankruptcy are more 
appropriately attributed to liquidation, which is a capital budgeting decision that should 
be considered independent from bankruptcy event. Consequently, they conclude that in 
the existence of rationality and absence of systematic errors in pricing by capital market, 
liquidation decision is best considered as being independent of firm's state of its capital 
structure. It follows from this point that present value of expected costs associated with 
terminating the firm's operations are also unrelated to degree to which the firm employs 
financial leverage, accordingly, these costs should not play a significant role in 
determining optimal capital structure in the context of these restrictions.4 
Miller [1977] argues that introduction of corporate and personal taxes do not refute 
capital structure irrelevance hypothesis in the absence of bankruptcy costs. With the 
assumption of the existence of bankruptcy costs, the "tax shelter-bankruptcy" hypothesis 
determines the firm's optimal capital structure as a function of business risk, future 
earnings' distribution, taxes and default costs. Indeed, according to Castanias [1983], a 
shift in the distribution of earnings increases the probability of bankruptcy will induce a 
firm to hold less debt in its financial structure. This gives us to have a testable 
implication, which can be the existence of an inverse cross-sectional relationship between 
leverage and probability of bankruptcy. Castanias, based on his empirical work, gives 
credit to tax shelter-bankruptcy model and supports the inconsistency of Miller's 
irrelevance argument. 
The puzzle that why firms or industries occasionally change their debt amounts and how 
the firms ascertain the debt levels still lead researchers to explore possibly other 
determinants of capital structure. After the emphasis of Williamson [ 1988] on the relation 
between debt capacity and the assets' liquidation value, Shleifer and Vishny [1992] work 
on the issue of asset sales and liquidations to illuminate the cross-sectional differences of 
leverage. Their market-based approach implies that liquidated assets of bankrupt firm are 
underpriced in recessions and thus proposes that asset illiquidity might be an important 
cost of leverage. It also explains how asset illiquidity reduces the optimal amount of debt 
4 Haugen and Sen bet [ 1988] reconfirm their original idea that bankruptcy costs are unlikely to be effective 
in valuation and operation of the levered firm provided capital markets perform well. 
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in the capital structure; as more debt causes costly liquidation and avoids inefficient 
investment, we might obtain an interior debt level by means of balancing these costs and 
benefits. 
Consequently, since liquid assets are effectively better collateral, one can argue that those 
firms having more illiquid assets would have relatively less debt capacity. Shleifer and 
Vishny conclude, also supporting Miller [1977], that optimal capital structure of a firm 
depends on the leverage of other firms in its industry. It is implied that an industry might 
have optimal debt capacity even when the individual firm does not, which emphasises the 
role of industry rather than the economy. 
In the end, it seems that there is no an overall consensus on the bankruptcy costs effects 
to the theory of optimal capital structure despite the numerous works due to, for example, 
their different measurement methods in quantifying bankruptcy costs and confusion of 
bankruptcy costs with liquidation costs. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy costs seem 
significant enough to threaten the validity of hypotheses of capital structure irrelevance. 
2.2.3. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND TAXES 
Later, Modigliani and Miller [1963] include corporate tax effect to their analysis. This 
time they suggest an almost 100 percent debt financing as an optimal capital structure 
condition because of the deductibility of interest payments on indebtedness from 
corporate gross income in calculating net taxable corporate earnings. Since then, fmance 
specialists have made steady progress to envisage more realistic and comprehensive 
models of the relationship between tax system and capital structure decisions. One of the 
first reactions to M-M [1963] is the study of Robichek and Myers (R-M) [1966], who 
argue that market value of firms is an increasing function of leverage for firms with little 
or no debt but then ultimately declining if debt is used too much. Figure 2.1 illustrates a 
comparative picture of these arguments. In Panel (a), the M-M [1958] hypothesis argue 
that firm value is invariant with leverage if corporate tax rate is zero. However, R-M 
argue that there is no unique point of optimum leverage but the firm should not exceed 
the point (DIE)m, that is, firm value is unaffected by moderate amounts of leverage but 
will decline with high leverage. In Panel (b), M-M [1963] suggest % 100 debt financing, 
if possible. R-M, on the other hand, argues that there is a point (or range) of optimal 
leverage at point (DIE)* due to expected bankruptcy or reorganisation costs. 
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Figure 2.1: The Relation Between Market Value of Firm (V) and Leverage (DIE): 
A Comparison ofModigliani-Miller (MM) and Robichek-Myers (RM) Hypothesis. 
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comorate income taxes 
This controversy has gained a new dimension with the introduction of personal 
taxes by Miller [1977]. While re-examining the tax advantages of debt financing in his 
more sophisticated model, Miller determines the gain from leverage, GL, for the 
shareholders in a firm holding real assets by the following equation; 
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(2.5) 
Where, rc is the corporate tax rate; Tps is the personal income tax rate applicable to 
income from common stock; TPB is the personal income tax rate applicable to income 
from bonds; BL is the market value of levered firm' debt level. 
Hence, if neither of these taxes exists, the gain from leverage would disappear giving the 
same standard M-M no-tax result. If the equation Tps =rPB holds, the gain from leverage 
would be provided only by corporate tax, rcBL, implying a 100 percent debt financing. 
In his fashionable version of optimal capital structure, Miller argues that even in a world 
in which interest payments are fully deductible in calculating corporate income taxes, in 
equilibrium, the firm's value will still be independent of its capital structure! He thinks 
that the great emphasis on bankruptcy costs in the framework of optimal capital structure 
has been misplaced since the proposition of the trade-off between tax gains and 
bankruptcy costs has no sufficient practical implications by giving the examples of giant 
but low-levered firms. Miller truly asks if optimal capital structure is simply a matter of 
balancing tax advantages against bankruptcy costs, then, why observed capital structures 
show so little changes overtime. During the heydays of economy, the debt-equity ratios of 
firms tend to fall and these ratios vary substantially and persistently across industrial 
sectors. At this point, Miller demonstrates the reason for including the effect of personal 
taxes, as an another explanation to capital structure puzzle, by the fact that the failure to 
close disequilibrium gap cannot convincingly be attributed to bankruptcy costs or agency 
costs of debt financing5. 
In the analysis, Miller asserts that when the tax rate on income from shares is less than 
the tax on income from bonds, the gain from leverage disappears wholly or even becomes 
negative in the equation (2.5). This is because investors hold securities for their 
'consumption possibilities' they acquire and thus will assess them in terms of their yields 
net of all tax drains. Specifically, the gains of corporates will be offset by the loss of 
bondholders, as they will have to pay on their interest income obtained from debt 
5 Earlier to these arguments, Brigham and Gordon [1968] fmd that investors are not indifferent between 
leverage on corporate and personal basis. On the other hand, a recent study by Graham [ 1999] reports that 
personal taxes do not completely cancel out the advantage of using corporate debt although they reduce the 
motivation of debt fmancing. Furthermore, Bamea et al. [ 1981] generalise Miller's bond market equilibrium 
by including cost functions for tax avoidance and agency cost of debt, and argue that capital structure 
affects firms' market value. 
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borrowings. Thus, the market will not give an opportunity to the firms to increase their 
value by substituting equity for debt (or vice versa) in equilibrium, which can be defined 
by the intersection of interest rates and quantity of bonds outstanding. Miller, 
consequently, concludes that there will be an equilibrium level of aggregate corporate 
debt, i.e., optimal debt-equity ratio for a corporate sector as a whole but the firms 
individually will not have an optimal debt-equity ratio6• 
Afterwards, DeAngelo and Masulis [1980] show that the existence of non-debt corporate 
tax shields, e.g., investment tax credits and depreciation deduction is sufficient to refute 
Miller's leverage irrelevance theorem, which is quite sensitive to realistic and simple 
modifications in the corporate tax code. In their model, these realistic tax code notions 
imply a unique interior optimal capital structure decision for 
individual firms in the market equilibrium by considering all supply side adjustments. 
More strikingly, they support the idea that introduction of bankruptcy costs, agency costs 
or other leverage-related costs are not necessary fundamentally for the existence of 
optimal capital structure. Thus, Miller's firm level irrelevance ofleverage propositions do 
not hold with positive corporate tax shield substitutes for debt since market prices will 
adjust until in market equilibrium, accordingly each firm will have a optimum debt to 
equity ratio. DeAngelo and Masulis favour the existence of unique interior optimum 
because there is a constant expected marginal personal tax disadvantage to debt while 
positive tax shield substitutes suggest that the expected marginal corporate tax benefit 
decreases as leverage is added to the capital structure. Eventually, the expected marginal 
corporate tax benefit just equals the expected marginal personal tax disadvantage of debt 
at unique optimum. Their model predicts that firms will select a debt level, which is 
negatively related to the level of available tax shield substitutes for debt. 7 
Their leverage optimality condition can be shown as follows: 
av p [ {s s' } ] 
-[B.]= : "c JII(S)dS+(l-0) JII(S)dS -TJJPD =0 
aB (1 - 'r PD) s' sl 
(2.6) 
6 Later, Hodder and Senbet [1990] generalise the Miller analysis to international equilibrium characterised 
by differential international taxation and inflation and obtain Miller-type equilibrium. They show that there 
is no optimal capital structure for individual firms provided they engage in international tax arbitrage 
transactions. 
7 Yet, their hypothesis is not supported by the empirical studies of Bradley et al [1984] and Titman and 
Wessels [ 1988], among others. One could explain this contrary (positive) relationship with the Secured 
Debt Hypothesis developed by Scott [1977], and Stulz and Johnson [1985]. 
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Where, TPD and Tp£ represent constant marginal personal tax rates on debt, and equity, 
respectively; rc is marginal corporate tax rate. PD(s) and PE(s) are current market prices 
per unit dollar of before personal tax debt and equity income to be delivered in state (s), 
respectively; P E, Po are the current market prices of before personal tax expected equity 
and debt cash flow, respectively. 8 is maximum fraction of gross tax liability shielded by 
tax credits; II(s) is probability of occurrence of state-s. B is the face value of debt. 
Furthermore, If the investors are risk-neutral with homogenous beliefs, then, 
(2.7) 
That is to say, for relatively low levels of leverage, less than B*, the marginal value of 
debt is positive since it is highly probable that extra debt acquisition can be fully used so 
as to decrease tax liabilities of the firm. It is because this corporate tax reduction is more 
than higher personal taxes paid on additional debt. However, for relatively high levels of 
leverage exceeding B *, marginal value of debt turns out to be negative as additional 
personal tax liability of debt occurs. Then, DeAngelo and Masulis eventually conclude 
that the firm's optimal leverage (B*) will maximise the current market value of the firm, 
V=D +E. 
In addition to these arguments, Modigliani [1982] discovers serious difficulties with 
Miller's framework due to its tendency to bring about unstable comer solutions: For 
instance, if the supply of debt has costs, then, the intersection of demand and supply can 
only be at a specific point where debt is valuable at the margin. This means that, contrary 
to MM theory, leverage is a serious issue of financial policy. It is also clear that as capital 
gearing increases the riskiness of shares also increases as bankruptcy risk comes to 
agenda by preventing the ultimate benefits of debt financing. Therefore, one can say that 
taxes seem to play an important role not to be disregarded in the choice of financial 
leverage8. 
8 Concerning our present work dealing with the international perspectives of leverage puzzle at the same 
time, Swoboda and Zechner [1995] derive capital structure equilibrium in a multinational setting. They 
show that firms in countries with relatively higher corporate tax rates and inflation rates have a comparative 
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2.2.4. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND AGENCY COSTS 
As the firms are run by self-interested agents, the separation of ownership and control 
results in several types of agency costs. According to Jensen and Meckling (J-M), [1976], 
that managers hold less than 100 percent of the residual claim creates the conflict of 
'managers-shareholders'. Moreover, since equityholders get most of the return from an 
investment financed partially by debt, another conflict between 'equityholders-
debtholders' persists. If there are some deficiencies of debt tax shields, and bankruptcy 
costs in explaining optimal capital structure, the existence of agency costs might stand for 
this optimality condition. In their original incentive argument, J-M elaborate the idea that 
it is possible to attain an optimal capital structure by trading off the agency costs of debt 
against the benefits of debt. Similarly, if the firm goes bankrupt the manager will no 
longer be able to enjoy the benefits stream, so, he does not want to spend all the money. 
By this way, one can detect another trade-off between a higher stream of private benefits 
versus a higher risk of bankruptcy. Additionally, payment on debt reduces free cash flow 
available to the managers for perquisites use; high levels of debt force managers to spend 
more time actively managing the firm and less time enjoying activities that do not raise 
shareholders' wealth. J-M highlight the importance of agency costs by quoting that 
'neither bankruptcy costs nor the existence of tax subsidies can explain the use of 
preferred stock or warrants which have no tax advantages and there is no theory which 
tells us anything about what determines the fraction of equity claims held by insiders as 
opposed to outsiders'. They, therefore, suggest that given increasing agency costs with 
higher propositions of equity and higher propositions of debt, an optimal mix of debt and 
equity exists even in a taxless world having no bankruptcy costs as it minimises total 
agency costs. J-M conclude that agency costs of external equity are assumed to decrease 
as percentage of external equity decreases and agency costs of debt are assumed to 
increase. Thus, the interior solution is between 0 and 100 percent. If agency costs of 
external equity are very low, then, optimal capital structure can hold in the trade-off 
between tax shield benefits of debt and it agency costs. Scott [1976], on the other hand, 
shows that optimal financial mix might be related to collateral value of the tangible assets 
owned by firm against secured debt. 
In terms of optimality, Myers' [1977] paper is similar to J-M's. He considers the 
suboptimal investment policy as an agency cost induced by risky debt, which was not 
advantage issuing debt and should thus be more highly leveraged. Since stochastic earnings tend to make 
international tax shields risky they result in firm-specific interior optimal debt levels. 
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particularly discussed by J-M. According to his observations, in case of the possibility of 
bankruptcy in near-future, equityholders suffer from the lack of incentives to contribute 
new capital even to invest in value-increasing projects. It is because all the investment 
costs are borne by equityholders whereas the debtholders capture the returns from 
investment. Hence, larger debt levels bring about rejecting the more value-increasing 
projects, thereby resulting in an underinvestment problem. 9 This problem is essential for 
firms with growth opportunities as too much debt decreases their value. Myers suggests 
that issuing risky debt decreases the firm's market value in some states of nature where it 
passes up valuable investment opportunities with positive NPV. The reduction in the 
firm's market value is burdened by existing stockholders. He, then, argues that if there is 
a tax advantage of debt financing, the optimal capital structure should be based on the 
trade-offbetween this benefit and the costs of the suboptimal future investment strategy, 
which are the results of agency costs of risky debt financing. 
Grossman and Hart [1982] also focus on incentive effect of debt financing. They argue 
that the ex-ante conflict between equityholders and management can be mitigated 
because ofthe possibility ofbankruptcy. Managers will voluntarily choose debt financing 
so that the funding net of the cost of investment can be available for their private 
consumption. Further, if their allocated cash flows are limited managers avoid 
overinvestment by not taking on negative NPV -projects. Then, managers will face with a 
trade-off between bankruptcy probability and less money for their consumption perks. 
That's why the investment is financed with both debt and equity even if the financing 
policy is determined by the management. 
Once managers have decided to use debt, they accept this at the expense of the 
probability of losing their jobs in default, which J-M call this as the bonding mechanism 
of external debt causing the management to perform efficiently. Jensen [1986], then, 
argues in his managerial incentives-based Free Cash Flow Theory (FCFT) that debt 
reduces the agency cost of free cash flow in excess of required funding for positive-NPV 
9 Myers proposes some patterns to mitigate this underinvestment problem: a) Rewriting the debt contracts, 
b) Renegotiating the debt contracts, c) Shortening debt maturity, d) Restrictions on dividends, and e) 
Monitoring and protective covenants. Furthermore, Smith and Warner [1979] propose restrictive bond 
covenants; Green [1984] suggests warrants or convertible debt; Stulz and Johnson [1985] argue that 
secured debt collateralisable with tangible assets can be used; and Bergman and Callen [ 1991] suggest debt 
renegotiations to mitigate the underinvestment problem. 
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projects 10. It is contended that managers have the incentive and opportunity to undertake 
wasteful projects due to excess (free) cash flow, which is called overinvestment problem. 
His control hypothesis for debt creation alleges that managerial discretion of exploiting 
extra funds will be reduced especially in organisations having low growth opportunities 
with large cash flows. As higher leverage might cause firm bankruptcy, Jensen contends 
that the trade-off between marginal cost and benefit of leverage implies an optimal 
financing policy. 
As Haugen and Senbet [1988] point out, even a well functioning market fails to overcome 
agency problem and this fact necessitates the existence of complex contracts, for 
example, convertible-callable bonds which can be explained on the basis of their 
capability to mitigate conflicts of interests between stockholders and bondholders. They 
accept that bankruptcy costs should play an insignificant role in the valuation and 
operation of the levered firm. Although the market cannot discipline managers to avoid 
the risk-associated costs with the risk incentive problem, management could be 
disciplined without cost by the help of complex contracting, conversion privileges or 
executive stock options under various circumstances. In that sense, Haugen and Senbet 
argue that if the firm has a continuous opportunity to alter its risk by changing its 
production function method, it will move to an optimal risk level and incur the optimal 
agency costs after trading this cost off against the debt's tax benefit or the equity's 
agency cost. 
The discussions on the capital structure puzzle have mainly been based on debt 
tax shields, debt selection signalling firm quality and agency cost of debt. Focusing on 
reorganisation versus liquidation, Harris and Raviv [1990] give, alternatively, importance 
to informational and disciplining role of debt. Their theory is based on the idea that debt 
makes sure the management disciplined with useful information, which is essential for 
investors in deciding whether to liquidate the firm or reorganise it. The managers are 
reluctant to liquidate the firm in any case and do not want to provide information to 
investors. Harris and Raviv believe that the optimal amount of debt is determined by 
trading off the information value and opportunities to discipline management against the 
potential investigation costs. According to this model, the firms having high liquidation 
10 Zwiebel's [1996] model assumes the same benefits of debt with FCFT theory; but the prediction of 
'excessive debt may cause managers to forgo good projects' in FCFT is not supported by his model as all 
good projects are always undertaken. 
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values (tangible assets, lower investigation costs) will be highly levered and will have 
relatively high market values despite the probability of default. 
According to Stulz [1990], optimal financing policies can reduce the costs shareholders 
bear due to overinvestment of management depending on both the cash flow distributions 
in each period and their present value. In his model, managers are always willing to 
invest all existing funds even if paying out cash is better for investors. This causes the 
reduction of funds for future profitable investment as the 'free cash' exhausts. Therefore, 
Stulz argues that one can attain an optimal capital structure by trading off the benefits of 
debt in preventing investment in value-increasing projects against the cost of debt in 
preventing investment in value increasing projects. This fact implies that for the firms 
having potential growth opportunities through profitable investments we expect relatively 
lower debt levels, confirming Jensen [1986], as compared to mature industries lacking 
good investments. Stulz concludes that capital structure is not irrelevant because it 
reduces the agency costs of managerial discretion causing overinvestment and/or 
underinvestment costs. 
There are other models concemmg with the conflict of bondholders and 
shareholders: Bondholders would prefer firms' less risky projects to finance them. On the 
other hand, shareholders might prefer extremely risky projects. If the risky project is 
successful, the bondholders can be paid-off on the maturity of debt; if not, the firm will 
default. In the end, shareholders will have nothing to lose due to their limited liability and 
bondholders will be left with a valueless firm. This case or game, in which managers are 
forced by shareholders to take on riskier project at bondholders' expense, causes an asset 
substitution problem. 
In the end, it again seems that the existence of agency costs is prone to invalidate capital 
structure irrelevance arguments under more realistic conditions. 
2.2.5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND liNFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
The M-M theory suggests that there is no systematic relationship between the value of the 
firm and financing decisions in a world of symmetric information; market knows the 
random return stream of firm and values this stream to set firm's value. However, 
financial markets are characterised by informational asymmetry differences 
simultaneously between all economic agents in terms of two cases. In case of moral 
hazard, the principal and agent have the same information up to a point, thereafter the 
principal cannot observe the action that agent made. In case of adverse selection, the 
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agent can make use of the information valuable to principal but the principal cannot 
observe it although they both know that the information favours the principal. Therefore, 
several models have been developed to understand whether debt- equity ratio signals 
information about the return distribution. If we assume that financial markets are not fully 
aggregating; market prices do not reflect all publicly available information, then, it could 
be possible that managers elect to use financial policy decisions to convey information to 
market. 
Ross [1977] contends that a high-value firm's management can be directed to depend 
heavily on debt financing through an incentive-based compensation contract. According 
to Ross, what is valued in the market is perceived stream of the returns for the firm. 
Managers will choose to set up unambiguous signals to public concerning firm's future 
financial activities. 11 The unsuccessful (low-quality) firm cannot mimic these signals 
since they do not have enough cash flows to back them up and because managers have 
incentives to 'tell the truth' in the context of bankruptcy probability and management 
compensation. He, thus, concludes that there would be no signalling equilibrium in 
financial leverage without the existence of sufficient incentive for managers to tell the 
truth. If very rich signals can be communicated with complex managerial incentive 
schemes, then, Ross (theoretically) implies that by changing capital structure and 
managerial incentives constantly, the market can be provided with perfect information. 12 
Miller and Rock [1985] also argue that capital structure changes convey information 
about firms' future cash flows. 
Furthermore, Leland and Pyle [1977] consider a better-informed entrepreneur 
about the distribution of returns than the outsiders. They say that in equilibrium the 
entrepreneur's equity position in his project, which has been identified as valuable, is 
related to project's value. However, this resulting equilibrium is apparently different from 
the models neglecting asymmetric information. Contrary to M-M [1958, 1963], they 
imply that value of the firm increases with the share of firm owned by the entrepreneur 
and capital structure of firm will not be irrelevant even in a taxless world. The model 
assumes that both lending and debt are at riskless rate in rational expectations signalling 
11 The model assumes that, unlike investors, managers know the true distribution of firm returns. Financial 
markets are expected to react positively to the new debt issuance increasing the share's market value, which 
is a motivation for managers. However, due to high debt ratio the firm may go bankrupt. It is also assumed 
that debt level, bankruptcy probability, profitability and firm value are all positively-correlated. 
12 Ross [1977] argues that his incentive-signalling model should not only be attributed to capital structure 
determinants of firms but also to the capital asset pricing models and option pricing models to have a more 
realistic theory of corporate finance. 
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equilibrium. Firm debt is determined as the residual amount necessary to finance the 
project. The debt-equity ratio is uniquely determined in this equilibrium. Leland and Pyle 
show that the debt value will fall as risk increases, i.e., greater project variance implies 
lower optimal debt even there are no bankruptcy costs! An unconditional regression 
between the debt value and firm value reveals a positive correlation; more debt will raise 
the firm's value. However, this fact does not invalidate the M-M theory, they say, since 
there is a statistical but not a causal relationship between firm's value and debt, which 
comes about because a higher debt amount goes in hand with a higher share of equity 
owned by entrepreneur. They conclude that the debt-equity ratio should not matter in a 
regression conditioned on that entrepreneur's share but the use of its signal will be 
positively correlated with the firm's value. 
In their classical paper, Myers and Majluf [1984] analyse a model in which the 
firm's capital structure is established and its shares are publicly traded. They mainly 
argue that due to adverse selection, there are chronic problems in raising outside equity. 
This is based on the idea that if investors are not adequately informed than current fum 
insiders about the value of the firm's total assets, then the market may misprice the 
equity. If the firm can issue default-free debt it does invest in positive-NPV projects; if 
the debt is not riskless the firm may not always benefit from positive-NPV projects. 
Myers and Majluf believe that asymmetric information about a firm value is a stronger 
determinant of financing behaviour than asymmetric information about risk. The model 
asserts that if the manager is acting in the interest of old shareholders, then no new equity 
from new shareholders can be raised when there is no investment to be undertaken. The 
manager will be willing to issue new shares provided that shares are 'overvalued'. 
Paradoxically, if the market knows that the equity is overvalued, there will not be any 
trading of the shares! 13 In this analysis, debt financing is preferred to equity financing 
even when debt is not riskless. Because of the empirical support, it is said that security 
prices decline when new issue is raised in the framework of adverse selection.14 Hence, if 
the firm is still issuing equity at the expense of lowering its stock price, this means that 
given manager's private information, a new project is undertaken because the firm was 
overvalued. This action favours the present shareholders, which they explain this by an 
13 The seminal paper of Akerlof [1970] emphasises this adverse selection problem, which shows how 
markets can break down when potential buyers cannot be convinced of the quality of the product ('lemon') 
they are offered. 
14 Krasker [1986], e.g., shows that the larger the stock issue, the worse the signal and the decline in firm's 
stock price. 
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information effect. Namely, the issue would not matter in itself but it renders a signal for 
investment decisions. Myers and Majluf proposes to resolve asymmetric information by 
the help of the fact that if the firm uses its available liquid assets to finance positive-NPV 
projects, then all positive-NPV projects should be undertaken since no new equity is 
issued. The model further implies that firms should retain sufficientfinancial slack (cash 
and marketable securities holdings) for their future valuable investment opportunities in 
order not to be negatively affected by the informational asymmetries. In the end, they do 
not provide a general optimal dynamic issue strategy although the model deems old 
shareholders as better-off for ex-ante optimal financial policies. 
Closely related to these issues, Myers [1984] proposes a 'Pecking Order Theory', 
where the investment opportunities will be financed first internally, then with debt (low 
risk choice) and finally with equity (riskier choice). In this theory, firms adapt their target 
dividend payout ratios to their investments but there is no well-defined target debt-equity 
mix explanation owing to two kinds of equity; external and internal. According to 
Pecking Order Theory, the most profitable firms generally borrow relatively less because 
they do not need outside financing not because their debt ratios are high. 15 The benefits of 
interest tax shields are in the second-order effect and debt ratios change when the internal 
cash flow is not balanced in this theory. In this dynamic framework, more profitable 
firms in an industry with relatively slow growth rates will have low debt-equity ratios. 
However, unlike in intra-industry differences, the theory is less successful in explaining 
inter-industry debt-equity ratio heterogeneity. Therefore, one can emphasise that Pecking 
Order Theory has no certain target debt ratio (no optimal capital structure), contrary to 
Static Trade-of/Theory, in which a firm's optimal debt ratio can generally be attained by 
trading off the benefits and costs of borrowing. Here, the main balancing component of 
interest tax shields as a cost is bankruptcy. In the Static Trade-off Theory, the firm having 
more tangible assets and taxable income should have higher target debt ratios. And, if 
there are no adjustment costs for capital structure, then, each firm should 'always' be at 
its target ratio. In practice, however, there are costs and lags to adjustment, and the firms 
may not quickly respond to random events to implement their optimal debt-equity 
15 In their recent paper, Shyam-Sunders and Myers [1999] reconfirm the power of Pecking Order Theory in 
explaining capital structure differences across firms based on their main empirical results. They argue that 
the pecking order is an excellent first-order guide to explain corporate fmancing behaviour especially for 
mature corporations. Due to unanticipated cash requirements of corporations, the frrms might not comply 
with Pecking order. Thus, their results suggest that frrms may borrow when anticipated cash deficits are to 
occur. As a reaction to this study, Chirinko and Singha [2000] contend that neither Pecking Order nor 
Trade-off theory can be empirically assessed due to some serious difficulties. 
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ratios. 16 Myers confesses two clear inadequate points of his theory: First, the modified 
pecking order theory depends on sticky dividends, but does not give any reason for their 
stickiness. Second, it fails to explain well that when and why equity shares are issued. 
Nevertheless, the theory seems to help explain sufficiently the observed corporate 
behaviour. 
In an environment, where there is asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers, Williamson [1986] constructs a link between equilibrium credit rationing and 
financial intermediation. He does not identify all potential buyers as identical since some 
get loans and others not but it is not due to moral hazard or adverse selection. Instead, 
Williamson argues that costly monitoring of borrowers by lending agents implies that 
debt contracts are optimal, which means that there is a possible credit-rationing 
equilibrium because of an asymmetry in the payoff functions of lenders and borrowers 
given risk neutrality. 
Blazenko [1987], in his managerial performance based paper, shows that with symmetric 
information, managers always use equity, like in the M-M world where shareholders are 
indifferent to fmancial leverage. Narayanan [1988] tries to explain the use of debt in a 
different manner. In situations, where there is informational asymmetry in which the 
outsiders are less informed about the quality of the firms than insiders, the use of dent by 
profitable firms keeps the inferior firm out of the market without the stipulation of 
distinguishing firm quality levels. By this elimination, the average quality of firms 
remaining in the market increase, which, in the end, will benefit these remaining firms by 
mitigating the adverse effects of asymmetric information. Like in the model of Myers and 
Majluf, Narayanan shows that when informational asymmetry concerns only the new 
project's value, one might have overinvestment. Also, when the firm's share is 
underpriced by the market, it prefers debt to external equity. 
In brief, the discussions above give sufficient theoretical background to understand the 
existence of optimal capital structure even though there is no an apparent consensus on 
this issue. A possible explanation could be that signalling efficiency can be specifically 
important in settings where bankruptcy is costly. Some firms may signal their values very 
efficiently by preferring raising capital with equity, whereas some firms that fmd 
signalling too costly will prefer debt to equity. 
16 At this point, Myers notes that 'any cross-sectional test of fmancing behaviour should specify whether 
firms' debt ratios differ because they have different optimal ratios or because their actual ratios diverge 
from optimal ones'. 
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2.2.6. PRODUCT -INPUT MARKET INTERACTIONS 
This approach assumes that a firm's financing decisions are related to its specific industry 
environment, e.g., its relationships to the rival firms, suppliers, and customers. Apart 
from debt -equity capital related costs, Titman [ 1984] proposes that agency costs are 
important for contracts between the firm and its customers or employers. In his two-
period model, the firm can be viewed as a nexus for contracting relationship between the 
firm' different classes of security holders and its customers, workers and suppliers. He 
demonstrates that a value-maximising firm's optimal liquidation policy is not, in general, 
time-consistent. In this context, it could be assured that equityholders continue to operate 
the firm with relevant capital structure selection when there is no bankruptcy, and that the 
firm is bankrupt and controlled by bondholders who decide to liquidate the firm in those 
states of nature. The optimal policy is consistent only in those states with liquidation. 
Titman's model predicts that the firm which can potentially impose high costs (e.g. 
computer and automobile sectors) on their customers and business associates in the event 
that they liquidate choose relatively low debt-equity ratios, unlike those which impose 
relatively low costs (e.g., hotels and retailers) choose relatively high debt-equity ratios. 
Thus, capital structure can be used to commit equityholders to an optimal liquidation. 
In Brander and Lewis' [1986] model, limited liability effect is modelled such that 
shareholders of levered firm benefit when fixed payments to debtholders are lower than 
operating income. They discuss the relationship between corporates' capital structure and 
their strategy when competing in the product market. It is argued that oligopolists with 
relatively high leverage will increase risk through more aggressive output policy and 
monopolists are shown to have less (long-term) debt in competitive industry than 
oligopolists have. 
Maksimovic and Titman [1991] show that producers' reputation for high-quality non-
unique and non-durable goods cannot be kept when the firm goes bankrupt. It is argued 
that firms producing high-quality products tend to be less levered. This in turn implies 
that increased probability associated with debt will cause firms to sell low-quality 
products rather than high-quality ones. Thus, the authors emphasise both the influence of 
product range on capital structure and vice-versa. 
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2.3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: DEBT MATURITY AND SOURCES OF DEBT 
FINANCING 
Financial economics has also made notable progress in illuminating the other aspects of 
financial decisions of corporations aside from the choice between debt and equity and its 
mixture. Recent studies show that the maturity structure of corporate debt, the issue of 
debt renegotiation and source of financing should also be given importance. 
2.3.1. THE MATURITY STRUCTURE OF DEBT 
It seems we have come to the point that not only the issue of the amount of future cash 
flows of firms to be paid out to debtholders instead of shareholders but also that of the 
timing of future payments to debtholders has been another financial concern. 
Consequently, the topic of debt maturity choice deals with whether firm value is affected 
by issuing long or short-term debt. 17 
While explicitly contending the capital structure irrelevance hypothesis, M-M [1958] also 
implicitly assert the irrelevance of debt maturity. Then, in the absence of market 
imperfections (especially adverse selection and moral hazard problems), Merton [ 197 4] 
explicitly confrrms the irrelevance hypothesis that firm value changes neither with short-
term nor with long-term debt. Stiglitz [1974] obtains the same conclusion by assuming no 
bankruptcy, perfect bond markets and given product-market decisions of firms. His 
general equilibrium model implies that individuals will alter their equity and bond 
holdings to offset the changes caused by firms, which will result in the irrelevance of debt 
maturity. However, with the existence of market imperfections maturity structure of debt 
may not be irrelevant. The following section discusses this issue by relaxing the 
unrealistic assumptions. 
2.3.1.1. Agency Costs Approach 
This approach, also called Contracting Cost perspective, predicts that ownership 
structure, firms' asset structure, financial operations and market access are related to the 
debt maturity structure of firms. 
Morris [1976a] argues that ifthe covariance between the firm's net operating income and 
interest rates is sufficiently high, then using short-term debt may cause total interest costs 
to be variable rather than being fixed, thus reducing the firm's operating leverage and 
break-even point. He further suggests that short-term (variable rate) debt may reduce the 
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variance of net income and hence reduce shareholders' risk thereby increasing equity 
value. 18 
In some cases, (especially) firms having substantial growth opportunities may pass up 
positive-NPV projects due to the conflict between bondholders and shareholders. Myers 
[1977] argues that short-term debt mitigates this underinvestment problem if it matures 
before growth options are exercised since there remains an opportunity for lenders and 
borrowers to re-contract. As another way to reduce the investment inefficiency, he 
proposes the matching principle of firms' assets to their liabilities because by this way 
debt repayments are harmonised with decline in existing assets' future value. 19 
Smith and Warner [1979] argue that restrictive debt covenants reduce moral hazard 
problems of debt. Thus, it is better for risky firms to place such covenants in their debt 
agreements. 
Barnea et al. [1980] show how debt maturity structure and call provisions can be used to 
resolve agency problems of debt due to asymmetric information, underinvestment and 
risk incentive problems. They argue that shortening debt maturity and inserting call 
provisions in bond issues help curtail agency problems. The authors also argue that 
agency problems disappear if debt matures before the expiration of investment options, 
which follows the implications of option pricing considering equity as an option. Their 
strategy, then, is to roll over short maturity debt claims because this position reduces the 
incentives for risky asset substitution due to relatively insensitivity of short-term bond 
prices to shifts in assets' risk?0 
According to Ho and Singer [1982], although long-term and short-term debt have the 
same priority if default occurs-since it is paid earlier-short-term debt with relatively high 
priority is more beneficial for financing new investments. Fama [1990] contends that debt 
reduces contracting costs of firms that choose both the level and maturity structure of 
17 See Ravid [ 1996] for a comprehensive theoretical and empirical survey of debt maturity structure. 
18 These results, however, are valid assuming that term structure of interest rates, investment and leverage 
decisions are given in a partial equilibrium analysis. 
19 Debt of maturity shorter than asset life may be more risky as sufficient cash flows might not be generated 
from the asset. Debt of maturity longer than asset life may also be risky as it is not certain that necessary 
cash flows will be obtained to service the debt after asset retirement (Morris [1976a]). This type of hedging 
£olicy allows us to know the cost of financing the asset over its life. 
0 It follows that as smaller firms are more likely to suffer from such agency conflicts and to have relatively 
more growth opportunities with less tangible assets, they should use more short-term debt to mitigate 
agency costs (see, Smith and Warner [1979] and Whited [1992]). Titman and Wessels [1988] argue that 
larger firms generally do not have any problem to access to capital markets. Barclay and Smith [1995] 
argue that smaller fums choosing bank over public debt owing to lower flotation costs will have more 
short-term debt. Furthermore, Smith [ 1986] argues that regulated firms will have relatively longer debt 
maturity structure since managerial discretion of using assets is restricted more for such fums. 
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debt by centralising monitoring services with reliable creditors. If the firm is considered 
to have uncertain growth prospects, it has access to only short-term debt. 
Flannery [1994] examines the capital structure of financial intermediary firms financing 
relatively illiquid and informationally intensive securities. He argues that short-term 
deposits provide steady market value as their terms are frequently renegotiated to reflect 
current riskiness of the bank. Therefore, bondholders' wealth expropriation by 
shareholders, which could be done by changing leverage or asset risk, is mitigated. He 
also argues that the best way for banks to eliminate the distortions caused by leverage is 
by issuing short-term debt without considering the matching principle. Houston and 
Venkatamaran [1996], on the other hand, focus on the benefits and limitations of bank 
loan commitments allowing firms to adopt more efficient liquidation policies to develop 
an optimal debt maturity model based on shareholder-bondholder conflict. They argue 
that although commitment financing is superior to short-term debt financing but it is not 
first-best one especially when firm's assets have a low but positive value and there exists 
considerable residual uncertainty about terminal cash flows. Despite the benefits of 
commitment financing (e.g., reducing agency costs of debts and costs of sub-optimal 
liquidations), they demonstrate that long-term debt is preferred when ex-ante value of the 
project is high and when projects have high liquidation values. 
Leland and Toft [1996] examine optimal capital structure of a firm determining both the 
maturity and amount of its debt in the context of endogenous bankruptcy. They argue that 
potential agency problems imply firms with higher asset risk will shorten their optimal 
debt maturity and reduce the optimal debt amount. The reason is that the benefit of 
optimally use of long-term debt against short-term debt falls in case of higher risk while 
agency costs of long-term debt remain greater. Leland and Toft, thus, favour the use of 
short-term debt in order to eliminate asset substitution problem in the presence of longer-
term debt. In another study, Leland [1998] focuses on how ex-post flexibility in choosing 
risk affects leverage, yield spreads and debt maturity. Confirming Bamea et al. [1980] 
and Myers [1977], among others; he contends that ex-post optimal strategy of debt 
maturity is to use short-term debt as the existence of agency costs restrict debt maturity. 
2.3.1.2. Asymmetric Information Approach 
In this approach, the signalling models of debt maturity structure focus on the signals 
implied by debt maturity choice. Investors deduce private information held by borrowers 
from these signals. In adverse selection models which imply a bias toward short-term 
debt, maturity is chosen to minimise private information effects as private information is 
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not revealed. In Flannery's [1986] model, managers ofthe strongest firm will issue more 
short-term debt than will managers in weaker firms. He argues that if transaction costs do 
not exist, the debt market has a pooling equilibrium in short-term debt with no long-term 
debt issuance even assets have long maturity. It is because low-quality (bad) firms can 
mimic the debt maturity choices of high-quality (good) firms without any cost. This, in 
turn, implies that low (high)-quality firms are over (under)-valued by the market. 
However, if positive transaction costs persist, a separating equilibrium occurs, where 
high-quality firms would prefer short-term debt as a good signal to the market. Then, 
low-quality firms choose long-term debt if they can bear the rollover cost of short-term 
debt.21 Furthermore, in the absence of transaction costs, Kale and Noe [1990] extend 
Flannery's model and indicate the existence of a separating equilibrium where good firms 
prefer short-term debt and bad firms prefer long-term debt. Moreover, Titman [1992] 
develops Flannery's [1986] separating equilibrium that good firms borrow short-term and 
bad firms borrow long-term. He argues, using sequential equilibrium concept, that 
because of the interest rate uncertainty and financial distress costs, good firms may be 
driven into a pooling long-term equilibrium. If swaps are allowed, he suggests that good 
firms can avoid interest rate uncertainty by swapping short-term for long-term debt and 
default premium is also avoided by separating from bad firms. 22 
Diamond [1991b] models the debt maturity structure choice as a tradeoff between a 
borrower's desire to issue short-term debt and its liquidity risk of losing non-assignable 
control rents if lenders become unwilling to refinance as a result of current bad news. The 
model implies nonmonotonic relationship between debt maturity and bond rating that 
highly-rated firms choose to issue short-term debt, very low-rated firms have no choice 
but short-term debt, and medium-rated firms issue long-term debt. Short-term fmancing 
creates the risk of excessive liquidation such that a solvent but illiquid firm may be 
unable to obtain refinancing due to potential bad news. Diamond further argues that even 
borrowers knowing that their credit rating will probably improve can prefer long-term 
debt, unlike Flannery [1986] who argues that all borrowers choose short-term debt unless 
short-term debt brings higher transaction costs. In his another study, Diamond [1993] 
21 The reason is that if debt markets cannot distinguish between good and bad firms, good firms are 
reluctant to issue long-term debt as they think that their long-term debt may be underpriced, and 
accordingly bad firms prefer more overpriced long-term debt. 
22 In another study, Mitchell [ 1991] shows that firms facing asymmetric information choose shorter 
(medium-term) callable bonds for fmancing of their high-quality projects with or without sinking fund 
feature. In the absence of asymmetric information, long-term, callable and sinking fund bonds are 
preferred. 
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develops his earlier framework by modelling how borrowers having private information 
about their credit prospects determine seniority and maturity of debt. Again, short-term 
debt is shown to be optimally senior to long-term debt, which is also relevant to increase 
debt capacity. He argues that a good borrower will be disadvantaged if he issues only 
long-term debt as good-bad borrowers cannot be distinguished. Yet, short-term debt 
financing may cause (inefficient) liquidation; thus good firms generally prefer a 
combination. Consequently, there exists a tradeoff between the control rents which might 
cause a premature liquidation and the sensitivity to new information allowing the 
borrower to borrow on better terms. 
In his credit rationing-based study, Sharpe [1991] compares short-term and long-term 
commitments. For instance, repeated short-term financing incurs some costs such as 
interest rate risk, issue cost and the fear of credit rationing. Furthermore, while long-term 
debt limits inefficient liquidations, short-term debt can better reflect new information as it 
is more flexible for renegotiations. Although Sharpe discusses the trade-offs between 
these maturity structures, an optimal structure is not implied. 
Rajan [1992] focuses on the choice between bank debt and arm's length debt considering 
effort incentives. He asserts that firms' owners having public debt outstanding will 
continue some investments that could be given up with the debt. Optimal liquidation 
policy is assumed to be based on private information?3 Rajan argues that optimal 
maturity of bank debt will be negatively (positively) related to the owner's (bank's) share 
from bargaining. The owner may have to forgo much of the profit in the good state 
causing him to exert less effort. Nevertheless, he argues that short-term debt may become 
optimal provided this problem can be mitigated by increasing the owner's share from the 
profit. 
Houston and Venkatamaran [1994] state that much of the current literature has only 
focused on the choice between short-term and long-term debt. Alternatively, they 
investigate a practical fact why firms may also choose to simultaneously issue multiple 
debt claims with different maturities. If short-term debt is issued, debt cannot be re-
financed in some states even the continuation is optimal. Issuing long-term debt causes a 
moral hazard problem since managers will be reluctant to liquidate the firm even it is 
optimal. Then, the cost of sub-optimal liquidation creates a trade-off between short and 
23 Rajan and Winton [1995] also discuss the relationship between debt maturity, and accuracy of private 
and public information: even short-term debt is worth monitoring when the public signal is very imprecise. 
However, short-term debt dominates if the signal is extremely precise. 
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long-term debt if (costly) renegotiations do not exist. Therefore, due to the existence of 
renegotiation costs and bankruptcy probability, the authors show that an optimal 
liquidation policy can be provided through a choice of combination of short and long-
term debt ex-ante?4 
Goswami et al. [1995a] examine the effect of informational asymmetries on the design of 
debt contracts with a view by explaining these features of debt financing. Their analysis 
ascertains that coupon-bearing long-term debt with dividend covenants is optimal when 
asymmetric information of long-term cash flows is substantial and coupon-bearing 
uncovenanted long-term debt is optimal when asymmetric information of near-term cash 
flows does matter. They argue that issuing short-term debt is optimal only when 
asymmetric information is uniformly distributed overtime, and long-term debt can 
minimise mispricing and hence be preferred even dissipative costs do not exist.25 In 
another paper, Goswami et al. [1995b] model a firm's debt maturity problem using 
signalling game framework and assuming no transaction costs. They show that, based on 
several Nash sequential equilibria, debt maturity decision is related to credit rating and 
sensitivity of cash correlation to firm type. First, when good firms show a sufficiently 
high positive correlation between cash flows relative to bad firms, good (bad) firms issue 
short (long)-term debt in a separating equilibrium. Second, when correlation of cash 
flows of both firms are similar to each other, short-term debt is issued in a pooling 
equilibrium. Third, if cash flows of good (bad) firms are independent (highly correlated), 
long-term debt is issued in another pooling equilibrium. More recently, Go swami et al. 
[1997] examine the effect of cash flow distribution on debt maturity under asymmetric 
information. They show that a unique short-term debt pooling equilibrium occurs if the 
degree of intertemporal cash flow correlation is fairly insensitive to expected output. 
However, if the degree of correlation increases with expected output (cash flow), a 
separating equilibrium occurs, where issuing short-term debt conveys a positive signal; if 
it decreases, a long-term debt pooling equilibrium occurs. The authors argue that the debt 
maturity decision is crucially related to relative sensitivities of long-term and short-term 
debt to liquidity risk. 
24 Titman [ 1984] also suggests a mix of securities which precommits corporations to an optimal liquidation 
~olicy. 
5 These implications are in contrast to Flannery [ 1986] and Diamond [1991 b] as they argue that if 
asymmetric information exists, the ex-ante determinations of debt contract originate no advantage. 
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2.3.1.3. 'fax I Bankruptcy Costs Approach 
Finance theory has also shed light on how, why and when taxes can have different 
implications concerning different debt maturities since Modigliani and Miller [1963] 
firstly recognised the tax advantage of debt financing. At earlier, Morris [1976b] attempts 
to show an optimal debt maturity state where firms minimise the present value of interest 
payments and flotation costs. He argues that optimal maturity decreases with interest 
rates when flotation costs are increasing function of maturity. Later, Brennan and 
Schwartz [1978] argue that short-term debt is optimal since optimal leverage decreases 
with increase in maturity, assuming the value of all-equity firm follows a Gauss-Wiener 
(GW) process26• They find optimal leverage to be related to optimal maturity such that 
longer maturity is assumed to increase firm value by decreasing leverage provided 
transaction costs are zero. Thus, issuing debt and redeeming it continuously would be 
optimal, which defers principal (not coupon) payment precipitating bankruptcy and also 
benefits from tax savings. However, Boyce and Kalotay [1979] show that debt maturity 
structure will affect firm's value if both personal and corporate tax rates differ, and the 
term structure of interest rates is not flat. They argue that if interest rates are expected to 
decline (rise), firms should borrow long-term from lenders with high (low) tax rates. 
Specifically, if the term structure is rising, then, they conclude that long-term debt is 
optimal. Brick and Ravid [1985] extend these two models and argue on the one hand that, 
assuming the term structure of interest rates is upward sloping, long-term maturity is 
optimal since long-term bonds' coupons are currently higher than short-term bonds' 
coupons and thus gain to leverage is accelerated.27• 28 Thus, issuing long-term debt 
reduces firms' expected tax liability and consequently increases firm's market value. On 
the other hand, the authors also demonstrate a debt maturity irrelevance in which specific 
26 The authors attempt to compute the value of unlevered firm which follows a stochastic process: 
V = V(U,t) and dU/U = Jldt + adz, where dz is GW process such that E[dz] =0 and E[dzf=dt (Jl is 
instantaneous expected rate of return; a is instantaneous variance of return). 
27 Expectations Hypothesis implies that in early years the interest expense of long-term debt is higher than 
that of rolling short-term debt and the interest expense is less in later years if the yield curve is upward 
sloping. However, short-term debt becomes optimal if the curve is downward sloping. For a useful 
discussion of the term structure of interest rates, see Brick and Ravid [1991 ], Campbell [ 1986], Campbell 
[1995] and Cox et al. [1981]. 
28As a caveat, Brick and Ravid [1985] hold leverage constant to see the effect of debt maturity. Some 
studies (e.g., Morris [1976a, 1976b], and Boyce and Kalotay [1979]) also assume that market value of debt 
is constant concerning different maturities. However, one can argue that when debt maturity changes, 
leverage may also change (see, Leland [1994], and Stohs and Mauer [1996]). Wiggins [1990] sets a 
maturity date, then calculates the optimum leverage for that maturity to avoid the problem of simultaneous 
setting of optimal maturity and leverage. 
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tax code may make maturity neutral by allowing deductibility of opportunity loss of 
bonds. 
In their continuous time-model using option valuation framework, Kane et al. [1985] 
endogenously determine an optimal debt maturity structure in the context of bankruptcy 
costs, debt issue flotation costs, and personal and corporate taxes. Their initial implication 
is similar to Brennan and Schwartz [1978]. That is, firms will repeatedly roll over short-
term debt thereby maximising tax advantages of debt provided transaction costs and 
probability of bankruptcy are almost zero. Relaxing the assumption, then, the authors 
suggest an optimal debt maturity that incorporates a tradeoff between the per-period tax 
advantage of debt, and bankruptcy and flotation costs. They argue that optimal maturity is 
negatively associated with tax advantage of debt and the volatility of firm value, and 
positively correlated with flotation costs. It is because firms increase their maturity as the 
tax advantage of debt decreases to assure that the remaining tax benefit is not less than 
amortised flotation costs. 
Lewis [1990] challenges the view of Brick and Ravid [1985] and contends that taxes, 
which are assumed to be only market imperfections, will have no impact on firm value if 
optimal leverage and debt maturity are determined simultaneously rather than 
sequentially. The model assumes that taxable income is determined at both corporate and 
personal level with respect to interest expense. Hence, he argues that there is no 
distinction between short and long-term debt, and different default risk levels are 
assumed to have no additional bankruptcy costs. Later, Brick and Ravid [1991] extends 
their previous tax-based argument to allow for the presence of stochastic interest rates. 
They demonstrate, under return to maturity hypothesis, that long-term debt will be 
optimal for wide range of cases; increasing, flat and even sometimes in decreasing term 
structure. The intuition is that aside from accelerating tax benefits, uncertainty introduces 
a capacity factor always favouring long-term debt: while short-term debt lower debt 
capacity due to re-financing problem, this factor may outweigh tax advantage short-term 
debt. 
Wiggins [1990] argues that as volatility of firm value increases firms may have to 
lengthen debt maturity because the (tax-deductible) default risk premium per-unit time on 
debt becomes more sensitive to volatility at longer maturities.29 As the model sets a 
29 Roll [1971] combines CAPM with term structure of interest rates and fmds a positive relationship 
between risk coefficient and term to maturity, implying upward-sloping term structure, on average. 
Although maturity diversification is implied to be optimal, the author does not derive an optimal maturity 
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maturity date, the problem of simultaneous determination of optimal leverage and 
optimal maturity is avoided. Then, debt's tax shield on long-term debt becomes 
incrementally higher than that on short-term debt.30 
Kim et al. [1995] argue that corporate debt maturity policy affects investor tax-timing 
options to tax-trade corporate securities. They establish that a long-term debt maturity 
strategy maximises investor tax-timing option value in a multi-period model with interest 
rate uncertainty. Their analysis predicts that the firm lengthens debt maturity as interest 
rate volatility increases and as the slope of the term structure increases. 
Leland and Toft [1996] contend that longer-term debt is more favourable as it better 
exploits the tax advantages of debt as bankruptcy tends to occur at lower asset values. 
However, they state that as longer-term debt creates an asset substitution problem, 
optimal debt maturity is determined by the tradeoff between tax advantages, and agency 
and bankruptcy costs. The authors further contend that higher bankruptcy costs induce 
higher maturity and the firms with high asset risk will decrease maturity and debt levels. 
In brief, the models discussed above seem to be successful with their strong arguments in 
explaining why firms have different debt maturities. The general tendency favours short-
term debt as it mitigates asymmetric information and agency costs, particularly 
underinvestment problems (Myers [1977]); reduces shareholders' risk thereby increasing 
equity value (Morris [1976a]); its rollover can curtail asset substitution problem (Bamea 
et al.[1980]) and maximises tax advantage of debt (Brennan and Schwartz [1978]); and 
signals firms' high quality (Flannery [1986], Diamond [1991b]). There are several studies 
favouring long-term debt as it can decrease firm's tax liabilities and thus increases firm 
value (Brick and Ravid [1985]); minimises asymmetric information induced mispricing 
of debt (Goswami et al.[1995a]); and if the project with high liquidation value has a high 
value ex-ante (Houston and Venkatamaran [1996]). On the other hand, Houston and 
Venkataraman [1994] suggest the mix of long-term and short-term debt financing if 
bankruptcy costs and liquidation costs exist. 
model. Likewise, Morris [1976a] shows that CAPM type risk measurement will be affected by debt 
maturity but he does not supply an explicit optimality condition. 
3
° Kane et al.[l985] obtain an opposite relationship between optimal maturity and asset risk as they assume 
that government recaptures interest tax shields in bankruptcy, which offsets the tax benefits of default 
premium. 
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2.3.2. THE OWNERSIDP STRUCTURE OF DEBT 
Corporate finance has also examined the corporations' choices of funding. Firms can be 
provided with indirect credit by financial intermediaries (e.g., banks) and, direct credit by 
the (short-term) money markets and (long-term) capital markets? 1 The question why 
firms choose a specific debt source, private debt from financial intermediaries or public 
debt from these debt markets, has led the financial researchers to investigate this subject. 
As there are many choices of debt financing, firms are expected to contrive a way of 
optimally designing debt ownership structure. One can examine this issue in major three 
arguments. 
2.3.2.1. Information and Monitoring Costs Arguments 
It seems difficult, with the existence of a large number of investors, to envisage this issue 
by the theory of efficient incentive contracts initiated by Grossman and Hart [1982] as it 
is assumed that investors can develop efficient strategies. In this vein, Diamond [1984] 
discusses the importance of diversification within the intermediary as a key for possible 
net advantage even in a risk-neutral economy as it reduces the cost of providing 
incentives for delegated monitoring. He argues that more efficient external financing 
would be possible if the intermediary acts in the interest of investors. This delegated-
monitoring model asserts the cost advantage over other lenders in producing and 
transferring information by intermediaries and thus assumes a positive role for their 
existence since they resolve free-rider and information-duplication problem. 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor [1984], beside this, identify the conditions sufficient for the 
existence of financial intermediation in the form of diversified information brokers. They 
demonstrate that information reliability can be improved provided information producers 
form coalitions. 
It is argued that banks can mitigate asymmetric information problems of private 
firms as they are special in gathering and processing information.32 Fama [1985] argues 
that there must be some reasons why (typically small) borrowers pay higher interest rates 
on bank loans than on open market securities with equivalent risk (why they bear banks' 
31 The existence of indirect credit markets is argued to be due to asymmetric information as a market failure 
(Leland and Pyle [1977], Campbell and Kracaw [1980] Diamond [1984], Boyd and Prescott [1986], 
Williamson [ 1986]). 
32 Myers [1977] argues that asset substitution and underinvestment problems can be mitigated through ex-
post monitoring. Fama [1985] contends that overall contracting costs can be reduced by continual bank 
monitoring. Slovin et al.[1992] show that especially small firms likely to suffer from information 
asymmetries will increase their market value by issuing bank debt. 
39 
cost of reserve requirement). He suggests small firms prefer bank loans creating lower 
information costs as information production costs for public debt is too high for them. 
Moreover, the signals of short-term bank loans concerning firm-specific credit worthiness 
can lower the information costs of other contracts. Accordingly, it is efficient for large 
firms to produce information for their shareholders via using public debt relatively easily. 
James [1987] also argues that banks provide some exclusive facilities not available from 
other lenders, such as maturity, size and default risk of borrowers. He states, another 
reason for the uniqueness of bank loans: a positive stock price reaction (larger abnormal 
performance) to the new bank loan announcement is found relative to straight public or 
private debt announcement, for which James further reports significantly negative 
abnormal returns if they are to be used for bank debt retirement. 33 
Yosha [1995] contends that high disclosure costs of revealing sensitive information from 
firm financing transactions to rival firms can be mitigated by using private debt, i.e., 
bilateral financing is preferred to multilateral one. Hence, firms having potentially 
valuable growth opportunities do not prefer public debt at the expense of setting their 
rivals into action with, supposedly, the presence of high-quality projects to their rivals. 
2.3.2.2. Liquidation and Financial Distress Arguments 
Berlin and Loeys [1988] discuss the firm's choice between covenanted loan contracts 
(bonds) without monitoring and loan contracts (bank loan) with monitoring enforcement. 
The former cause too many good projects to be liquidated and the latter allow too many 
bad projects to be re-financed. As bondholders have insufficient incentive to directly 
monitor on their own, instead, they hire a delegated monitor service to ensure a more 
efficient liquidation policy. The authors argue that firms can obtain an optimal choice by 
trading off the inefficiencies of harsh bond covenants and the agency costs of hiring a 
delegated monitor. Furthermore, they emphasise several predictions: rigid covenants 
cause premature liquidations of firms having low liquidation values, thereby forcing such 
firms to use public bonds. Plus, bank debt use is negatively correlated with credit quality, 
agency costs of delegated monitoring, and precision of firm's financial indicators. 
Similarly, Berlin and Mester [1992] evince the harshness of privately held debt covenants 
with the argument that they may cause even profitable investments not to mature due to 
their renegotiation flexibilities. They predict, nonetheless, high credit risk corporations to 
33 Hull and Moellenbemdt [1994], later, confirm this negative association. 
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rely more on private debt as such firms benefit from rigid covenants due to lower interest 
rates and especially renegotiation options. 
Hoshi et al. [1990] and Gilson et al. [1990] argue that banks have relatively more 
information-based experience toward firms in (costly) financial distress as compared to 
debtholders. 34 In their debt restructuring model in which public debt is a major 
impediment to out-of-court restructuring, Gilson et al. [1990] show that firms with 
relatively more intangible assets issue private bank loan to avoid liquidation through 
private renegotiation. However, the renegotiations will be less successful to resolve 
financial distress if the outstanding debt structure has distinct classes. In Detragiache's 
[1994] model, firms optimally fmance investment with both public and private debt, 
which are perfect substitutes except private debt can easily be renegotiated in insolvency 
states while public debt cannot. The option to renegotiate is beneficial ex-post, since the 
firm can prevent inefficient liquidation, but ex-ante it may worsen asset substitution. 
Therefore, large firms use public debt for flotation costs reasons and some private debt if 
inefficient liquidation costs are high. Similarly, small firms issue private debt for flotation 
costs reasons and some public debt to mitigate potentially greater risk-shifting problem. 
Gertner and Scharfstein [1991] argue that debt composition may affect the 
outcome of financial distress and ability of debt restructuring, and thus develop a model 
of a financially distressed firm with public and bank debt. They analyse implicit 
renegotiation with public debtholders among whom there are coordination problems, 
when firms offer cash and new securities in exchange for original public debt. It is shown 
that financial distress may cause inefficient operating policy even exchanges are possible 
and banks are perfectly informed. To increase efficiency, firms should issue senior debt 
such that these seniority covenants should materialise the exchange offer and strip public 
debt of its covenant. Asquith et al. [1994], likewise, examine the ways in which 
financially distressed firms attempt to avoid bankruptcy through private and public debt 
restructurings, mergers, capital expenditure reductions and asset sales. They argue that 
the structure of firms' liabilities affects the probability of bankruptcy; specifically, the 
firms with more complex public debt structure and secured private debt are more likely to 
34 Hoshi et al. [1990] find that firms in Japan with close ties to their banks are less likely to be liquidated 
than those with no such ties. Peterson and Rajan [1994] find that small firms borrowing from multiple 
banks are charged significantly higher rates, thus suggest such firms a concentrated borrowing to increase 
availability of fmancing and decrease fmancing costs. It is implied that banks prevent such firms from 
being financial distressed by mitigating adverse selection and moral hazard problems through close and 
concentrated monitoring. Similarly, Slovin et al. [1994] contend that banks have a comparative advantage 
in processing private information acquired through bank-borrower relations. 
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seek bankruptcy protection. The authors find the combination of secured private debt and 
many subordinated public debts as seemingly being obstacles to out-of-court 
restructurings; here, the ability to restructure public (not private) debt determines the 
avoidance from bankruptcy. They conclude that the composition of debt structure is very 
important in affecting outcome of financial distress as well as capital structure 
decisions. 35 
Thakor and Wilson [1995] examine the effect of bank capital requirement on 
borrowers' financing choices. They mention a tension between the 'benefits' of bank as 
interim-efficient outcomes can be maintained through restructuring which is unavailable 
in capital markets owing to coordination problems among multiple creditors and higher 
'costs' of banking financing due to bank capital requirements. If these requirements 
increase, loan interest rates rise holding the probability of debt restructuring of fmancially 
distressed firm constant and bank's uniqueness in credit allocation decreases since banks 
become more reluctant to restructure the debt. Therefore, they assert that especially 
growth-oriented firms which target long-term borrowing to recover from distress will 
shift to capital markets due to higher bank capital requirements. The firms with no future 
growth-options shift to the same direction as well, while the intermediate-quality firms 
choose bank financing. 
Moreover, James [1996] investigates the relation between bank debt restructurings and 
the composition of public exchange offers in financial distress. He argues that bank 
participation in restructurings can be effective in resolving information and holdout 
problems which prevent debt exchange offer. The dependence of public debtholders' 
behaviours on bank actions may be related even if such problems do not exist. In that, 
secured banks lenders are unlikely to provide debt forgiveness unless their claims are 
paired as their secured status implies that they are expected to be less flexible against 
distressed firms. Yet, if the firms are in severely greatest distress of debt reduction 
necessity, then, bank concessions becomes more likely to avoid bankruptcy. Then, bank 
concessions may appear in conjunction with public bondholders' concessions due to 
'share the pain' hypothesis. As a wealth transfer is implied by senior bank' unilateral 
concession, banks might not do it unilaterally if the firm has outstanding public debt. 
Hence, the bank participation through offering debt forgiveness in restructuring has some 
35 In a related study, Houston and Venkatamaran [1996] argue that loan commitments are useful since they 
provide firms with a pre-arranged source of fmancing enabling them to continue operations without being 
liquidated. 
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impacts on the resolution of information and holdout problems impeding public debt 
exchange offers. James predicts that banks can be flexible in restructurings for firms with 
public debt, and this flexibility increases with the proportion of total debt held by bank 
and reduction public debt and decreases with senior debt being offered. Thus, one can 
argue that the mix of public and private debt is assumed to be significant to avoid 
bankruptcy of distressed firms, which may diminish the importance of expected 
bankruptcy costs and agency costs in capital structure decisions. 
2.3.2.3. Reputation and Borrowers' Incentives Arguments 
The more recent studies consider the role of firm reputations on the choice of source of 
corporate debts. Diamond's [1989] model, which analyses the joint effect of moral hazard 
and adverse selection, is one example focusing on the firm's reputation for choosing 
projects returning positive net present value to repay the debts. The model argues that, if 
initially there is prevalent adverse selection, reputation effects will be insufficient to 
mitigate the conflict between lenders and borrowers with short-track records. However, 
the sufficiency can be obtained by long-track record of repayments without default 
resulting a good reputation. If a firm is known as having strong capacity to repay its debts 
based on historical payment performance, then, it can borrow at relatively low rates. 
Consequently, for the sake of being known as reputable firm in debt payments, older and 
more established firms find it optimal to select the safe, or at least, less risky projects to 
increase market value of the firm. Therefore, Diamond predicts that firms with short-
track record borrow from relatively flexible financial intermediaries to have a reputable 
long-track record and the ones with high bond rating and long-track records will directly 
borrow from open markets to pay less interest on their bonds. 
In his more recent paper, Diamond [1991a] provides a theory of bank loan demand 
(considering public debt choice) and of the role of monitoring in cases where reputation 
effects are important. According to Diamond, borrowers with higher credit ratings have a 
lower cost of capital and such a rating should be available in reserve not to miss the 
opportunity of higher present value of future profits. Thus, in order to have high credit 
ratings, the firms should rigorously select their debt levels, or, the mix of debt and equity, 
in line with minimising cost of capital and establishing a good reputation of debt 
repayment for future references. Diamond contends that as banks are expected to alleviate 
moral hazard through monitoring, (particularly small and new) firms first use bank loans 
and then resort to publicly trade loans after gaining good reputation from successful bank 
loan repayments. However, while Rajan [1992] gives credence to bank control benefits, 
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he asserts that banks can also distort borrowers' incentives, as they may not rollover the 
short-term debt of ongoing unprofitable investment. Thus, firms sometimes diversify 
away from bank financing even banks offer to lend more. Although better informed 
banks can prevent inefficient liquidations, Rajan argues that costs of bank loans are not 
well understood in that banks' bargaining power after the launch of project may create 
bank credit costs. For instance, if the borrower has only one bank as a (short-term) source 
of finance, he might be enforced to share some of the project's surplus to continue 
borrowing.36 Consequently, a fundamental tradeoff emerges between informed bank debt 
and uninformed arm's length funds as firms attempt to optimally restrict the banks' power. 
Hoshi et al. [1993] argue that banks efficiently monitor firm managers as they have 
incentives to continue unprofitable investments. However, managers of the firms with 
more profitable investment opportunities find it costly to invest in unattractive 
opportunities. In this case, using public debt is optimal as monitoring is not necessary. 
That is, they predict a positive correlation between asset tangibility and public debt. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri [1994a] develop a model in which banks get an 
endogenous incentive through the capability of having reputation acquisition to allocate 
larger amount of resource to gather information about financial distressed firms than 
bondholders do, as banks stay in the debt markets for longer-periods. The model assumes 
that 'lenders look for sound borrowers and borrowers look for sound lenders to help them 
in hard times. 37 The authors demonstrate that firms optimally prefer bank loans to public 
debt despite higher bank interest rates if their assessment of probability of being bankrupt 
is relatively high, and if the perceived probability of bankruptcy is low they issue public 
debt to exploit relatively low interest burdens. It is further shown that corporations 
willingly pay higher interest rates for bank loans provided these banks have greater 
reputation for flexibility in cases of financial distress?8 In addition, Ozkan [1996] argues 
that banks attempt to form reputation by inefficiently liquidating even the firms having 
temporary financial difficulties. The model considers the reputation as a commitment 
device allowing banks to credibly threaten borrowers that they will be liquidated once 
36 This point is also empirically confirmed by Houston and James [1996], who argue that banks can create 
costs when borrowing is concentrated with a single lender. They also contend that bank information 
monopolies impose offsetting costs of bank fmancing benefits. 
37 Note that in Diamond's [1991a] model, the focus is reputation acquisitions by borrowers; here, the 
authors focus on reputation acquisitions by banks. Moreover, unlike Rajan [1992], and Berlin and Loeys 
[1988], they assume that lenders find it worthwhile to monitor. 
38 In their another study, Chemmanur and Fulghieri [1994b] develop a model of reputation acquisition by 
investment banks and show that moral hazard problems can be alleviated through the ability of fmancial 
intermediaries to get a reputation for honesty. 
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they default on their debt obligations. Correspondingly, banks' optimal lending policies 
are determined by the tradeoff between establishing a reputation, known as being tough 
against defaults at the expense of losing some parts of debt and interest income; and 
rescheduling the debt contracts to increase the repayment proportion at the expense of 
weakening the position against future defaults. 
In conclusion, this section gives some insights about the relationship between capital 
structure and the source of debt (mix of public and private debt). The related models 
propose strong relationships between source of finance, and debt restructurings of 
financially distressed firms in line with reducing asymmetric information and avoiding 
premature liquidations. There are some implications which do not directly refer to 
optimal capital structure. First, small firms uses unique bank loans as they are relatively 
more flexible in renegotiations and have some other facilities (Fama [1985], James 
[1987]); and to avoid disclosure costs (Yosha [1995]). Second, high-credit risk firms 
issue private debt to benefit from low interest rates (Berlin and Mester [1992]) and so do 
the ones with more intangible assets to avoid liquidation (Gilson et al. [1990]). Third, 
large firms issue public debt to employ their flotation costs advantage (Detragiache 
[1994]). Fourth, firm-specific characteristics may stipulate the combination of public and 
private debt against financial distress (Asquith et al. [1994], Thakor and Wilson [1995), 
James [1996]). Fifth, small firms first use bank loans to get a reputation by regular 
repayments and then resort to capital markets for lower interest burdens (Diamond 
[1991a]). 
2.3.3. BARGAINING-BASED THEORIES AND STRATEGIC USE OF DEB'f 
It is argued that the corporate bankruptcies are costly both to the shareholders of firms 
and to the creditors as they cause significant deadweight costs.39 Therefore, both parties 
find pragmatic reasons and opportunistic incentives to renegotiate in case of borrower's 
default. Minimising the bankruptcy costs or agency costs to maximise firm value is 
traditionally done by ex-ante capital structure decisions. However, dynamic nature of 
strategic debt use with opportunistic modifications ex-post has been given relatively less 
attention.40 One exception is the study of Bergman and Callen [1991] who provide a debt 
39 See, for example, Kraus and Litzenberger [1973], Scott [1976], Kim [1978]. Furthennore, Haugen and 
Senbet [1978,1988] argue that debtholders and equityholders will fmd it beneficial to negotiate infonnally 
to avoid such costs. 
40 Welch [1997] states that the significant size of the market for legal services implies negotiation and 
bargaining over power 'rent-seeking' is a fact of corporate life. 
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renegotiation model of bargaining game between equityholders-oriented management and 
debtholders. The managerial discretion of suboptimal investment decisions as a 
threatening way through enervating firm value would be optimal if it is unlikely that the 
firm will have sufficient returns for debt repayments. It is found that even solvent firms 
find such opportunistic behaviours optimal if the firm value falls below a certain cutoff 
level. On the other hand, lenders can predict this behaviour when the firm increases the 
debt face-value while keeping the same investment plan. Since this will create a 
disadvantageous situation for lender in highly potential renegotiations, firms will be 
constrained with an upper bound on debt amount or debt capacity, which is less than firm 
value and inversely related to shareholders' bargaining power. Assuming tax-advantage 
of debt financing, the authors predict an interior optimum capital structure that pushes the 
debt level to the debt capacity even in the absence of realised bankruptcy costs. Another 
prediction is that leverage is positively related to corporate tax rate and tangibility, which 
means high-tech and service sectors with relatively high intangible assets will have less 
debt financing as compared to capital-intensive sectors. 
Another exception is the study of Hart and Moore [1994] which focuses on a case 
where an entrepreneur with a profitable project cannot be forced ex-ante to provide 
sufficient surplus for promised future payments as s/he has the opportunity to repudiate 
the contract by withdrawing her/his human capital. Hence, this study endogenises the 
non-pecuniary benefits of control with entrepreneur's bargaining power to quit. The 
authors distinguish between physical assets (project capital) and human assets 
(entrepreneur's human capital, e.g., special skills) which cannot be replaced without costs. 
If the entrepreneur repudiates the contract, s/he loses control of the project's physical 
assets and the creditor can (not necessarily efficiently) liquidate them. It is argued that, 
then, renegotiation potentially creates gains as the assets are worth more in combination 
with the entrepreneur than in any other use. Assuming perfect certainty concerning the 
project's return stream and its liquidation value, and only one creditor, they argue that 
there are continuous optimal debt contracts in the form of renegotiable short-term 
contracts or non-negotiable long-term contract. 
In their more recent model, Hart and Moore [1998] examme the role of debt in 
persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows rather than diverting the project returns, 
unlike in the previous model in which an entrepreneur could quit by withdrawing his/her 
human capital. If s/he defaults, the investor can seize and liquidate the project assets in 
which case they can renegotiation the contract. It is assumed that there exists neither ex-
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ante nor ex-post asymmetric information between the entrepreneur and the investor 
concerning contract terms. Yet, many variable interests e.g., project returns, asset 
liquidation, cannot be verified by outsiders (e.g., courts). The authors argue that 
symmetric information between these two groups does not necessarily bring first-best 
efficiency by renegotiation. If the entrepreneur cannot find a way (e.g., sufficient cash 
flows) to compensate the investor for not liquidating the assets where the value of 
retaining the assets exceeds their liquidation value, inefficient liquidation occurs as the 
investor thinks that s!he will default again. It is argued that every dollar that investor gets 
is a dollar that the entrepreneur cannot reinvest, and the entrepreneur must be given 
maximum resources in good states (high return) provided the investor is repaid and the 
investor's payoff must be maximised in bad states (low return). For instance, bargaining 
power of the investor to liquidate the assets can be reduced if the entrepreneur has low-P 
(promised repayment) value strengthening his/her position to continue using the assets in 
exchange for small repayments in good states. High-T (size of loan) value is also 
advantageous for the entrepreneur as s/he gets extra liquidity in bad (default) times. 
Therefore, the authors propose some optimal debt contracts through the tradeoff between 
the size of loan and its promised repayment. 
Similarly, Berglof and Thadden [1994] examme the problem of financial 
contacting and renegotiation between a firm and outside investors when the firm with 
collateralisable assets cannot commit to future repayments. They show that firms prefer 
to have multiple investors who separate their claims across time and states (one investor 
holding secured short-term claims and another junior long-term claims). It is because ex-
post bargaining position of an investor having short-term claims is weaker if s/he also 
holds long-term claims. Their bargaining-based theory assumes that the firm's capital 
structure affects potential future negotiations and this anticipation may have impact on 
financial decisions. The tradeoff between the motivation of discouraging ex-post 
renegotiation (strategic default) and the motivation of preventing inefficient liquidation 
(liquidity default) results an optimal financial contracting and as well as endogenously 
determined optimal cost of financial distress. The theory asserts that capital structure is 
irrelevant if only firms' bargaining power is zero when creditors extract all ex-post 
surplus from firms. It is important to note that this analysis is based on the assumption 
that the firms has all the bargaining power in ex-post renegotiation (outside influences are 
constant) as it limits the lenders' payoffs of liquidation proceeds and produces motivation 
for firms to behave strategically ex-post. 
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Giammarino [1989], on the other hand, models the resolution of financial distress 
as a noncooperative game of incomplete information played by a firm and its creditor. 
The objective is to determine whether financial distress-related costs will be avoided 
through costless renegotiation. He argues that the bargaining problem remains important 
since enforcing the contracts is costly and agents are asymmetrically informed even debt 
contracts are assumed to be complete in a specified state-contingent resolution. He 
concludes that bondholders will not trust equityholders and thus need a costly arbitrator 
for an appropriate reorganisation, which means that financial resolution will be costly. 
Perotti and Spier [1993] examine the bargaining role of high leverage in the 
dynamic conflict between shareholders and more senior claimants (creditors, employees, 
suppliers). They show that underinvestment effect can be used as a bargaining tool to 
force the senior claimant into renegotiation by the shareholders as they can change their 
incentives to invest through substituting-junior debt for equity. This strategy is especially 
relevant when firms have low current profits and future investment is needed to ensure 
the workers' full payment. Shareholders can retain a large proportion of positive 
investment returns by threatening (retiring equity through a junior debt) not to undertake 
positive-NPV projects if unions do not accept lower wages. This ex-ante strategy of risk-
bearing is assumed to be efficient as high leverage generates value redistribution while 
ex-post renegotiations cause inefficiency. The model suggests this strategy to the 
industries currently not profitable but have strong future investment options. In case of 
the absence of both growth options and current profitability, high leverage does not create 
strategic use as controlling investment does not induce much surplus. 
Bester [ 1994] analyses the relationship between prospects of future debt 
renegotiation and creditors' security interests at contracting-date assuming asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers. He argues that the relationship between 
lenders and borrowers is strategically affected by the initial terms of debt contract as such 
terms indirectly determine the likelihood of renegotiation and the terms of renegotiated 
contract. The absence of precommitment prevents the borrowers in default from being 
bankrupt, which in turn necessitates a renegotiation to prevent an ex-post inefficient 
outcome and then borrowers think that creditors might forgive some part of the debt 
instead of imposing bankruptcy. Therefore, Bester argues that lenders cannot distinguish 
whether borrowers may strategically default or they are really unable to repay since 
borrowers assume that default will not always be penalised by bankruptcy. Hence, to 
mitigate this cheating motivation, Bester proposes a secured debt with collateralisable 
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assets and existence of bankruptcy imposition by lenders to have an optimal limited 
liability arrangement. By this way, the deadweight costs of inefficient liquidation is 
reduced since creditors will be inclined more that borrowers do not behave strategically 
with unrealistic defaults and thus the option of taking over the firm is considered to be 
less profitable as compared to partial debt forgiveness. The model predicts that high-risk 
firms will prefer to offer secured debt with collateral to their creditors and these bilateral 
motivations may cause welfare to increase. 
Furthermore, Bolton and Scharfstein [1996] examine corporate debt structure 
regarding ideal number of creditors, allocation of security interests among creditor and 
type of voting rules based on an optimal but incomplete contracting framework. They 
argue that debt contracts mitigate the strategic default motivations by providing lender 
with a right to liquidate firms' assets if default ever occurs. The tradeoff between benefits 
of preventing strategic default and costs of inefficient liquidation creates an optimal debt 
contract, which can also be obtained by appropriate selection of voting rules and security 
interests. As debt structure affects the sale price of firm's assets after default, it has also 
repercussions both on the manager's incentive to default strategically and firm's expected 
liquidation value. The liquidation value can be lower in case of multiple creditors since 
they seek to find a second-best user of these assets, thus causing the firm to pay more for 
the assets. However, as the manager will have to pay more to creditors to avoid 
liquidation if there are many creditors, multiple sources of borrowing can discipline 
managers by reducing their payoffs from strategic default. Consequently, the authors 
mainly conclude that /ow-credit quality firms should, optimally, borrow from single 
creditor, give only one creditor a security interest and have voting rules facilitating the 
asset sale completion or debt restructuring to maximise liquidation values. On the other 
hand, high-credit quality firms should, optimally, borrow from multiple creditors, give 
each equal security interests and have voting rule providing some creditors with block 
sales to reduce strategic default motivation. The model implies that low-credit quality 
firms with highly complementary assets in noncyclical industries should issue bank debt 
and the firms with opposite characteristics should issue public debt. 
Mella-Barral and Perraudin [1997] also analyse the opportunistic behaviour of 
firms and argue that shareholders may behave strategically by forcing concessions from 
bondholders and reducing the originally-contracted interest payments in financial 
distress. Their standard-continuous asset-pricing model assumes no tax advantage of 
debt-financing and costless renegotiation that avoids bankruptcy and agency costs. They 
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argue that shareholders can persuade bondholders to accept the coupon payment-related 
offer of take-it-or-leave-it if risky debt and positive bankruptcy costs exist. However, 
when direct bankruptcy costs are virtually zero, shareholders can do no better than in the 
absence of renegotiation even if they maximum bargaining power to enforce the offer. It 
is shown that debt capacity is determined by the assets' expected liquidation value in that 
attainable debt level is negatively correlated with liquidation value. In addition, in his 
continuous time pricing model of dynamic debt restructuring, Mella-Barra! [1999] 
discusses a moral hazard problem such that debt contacts do not induce ex-post optimal 
timing of default to coincide with ex-ante optimal time to sell-off the firm. He shows that 
bargaining power between creditors and borrowers is a key factor in corporate asset 
pricing as it can change bonds' risk premium and potential loss in firm value in 
liquidation. Thus, it directly affects the ex-ante ability of firms to borrow. 
In a different approach, Fulghieri and Nagarajan [1996] investigate the strategic 
role of high leverage and bankruptcy threats in deterring entry into generally 
monopolistic or collusively oligopolistic markets based on infinite-horizon entry games. 
The model asserts that moderate levels of leverage may not have significant value for 
strategic advantage for an incumbent in the monopolistic market, emphasised particularly 
in airline and retailing industries. However, bankruptcy threats due to high leverage can 
pre-empt the entry to potential competitors with strategic advantages. The model has two 
empirical implications: first, the incumbent's debt levels may be higher in profitable 
industries where either the cooperative or monopoly profits tend to be high. Second, 
leverage tends to be high if costs induced by price wars are high or if discount rate is low 
especially in concentrated industries where bond covenants are less restrictive. The 
overall results imply that the agency costs of leverage must be traded-off against its 
strategic advantages in product markets. 
Bolton and Scharfstein [1990] provide a theory of predation based on agency problems in 
financial contracting.41 The model focuses on strategic debt use where the penalty for 
nonpayment of debt is not asset liquidation but cutting the future finance by creditors. 
They argue that firms cannot costlessly commit to terminate their rivals funding in a 
competitive environment. A tradeoff between deterring predation (rivals' incentives to 
prey) and mitigating incentive problem is argued to occur, i.e., discouraging predation by 
41 Since this study is also related to the interaction between product-market competition and the capital 
market, referring to the studies of Brander and Lewis [1986), Maksimovic [1988) and Maksimovic and 
Zechner [ 1991] would be useful. They mainly argue that investors can use capital structure to induce 
managers to compete more aggressively subject to the impact on product-market equilibrium 
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reducing the sensitivity of refinancing decision to the firm's performance ts 
counterbalanced by the worsening incentive problem. 
To conclude, bargaining-based theories of capital structure mainly analyse the 
strategic advantage of debt to the firm's equityholders. One can summarise their 
implications as follows: First, the anticipation of potential future negotiations can affect 
the optimal capital structure choice (Berglof and Thadden [1994]). Second, firms' 
opportunistic behaviour may put an upper limit on debt capacity (Bergman and Callen 
[ 1991 ]). Third, strategic debt use has also benefits aside from tax advantages, such as 
deterring new entrant in the market (Fulghieri and Nagarajan [1996], Bolton and 
Scharfstein [1990]); forcing concessions from debtholders (Mella-Harral and Perraudin 
[1997]); changing the seniority of claims on firms (Perotti and Spier [1993]). Fourth, ex-
post bargaining may cause optimally a wedge between short-term and long-term 
borrowers (Hart and Moore [1994], Berglof and Thadden [1994], Houston and 
Venkatamaran [1994]). 
On the other hand, one can take a step further by arguing that strategic information 
bargaining models are not sufficient enough to explain the observed capital structure 
variations of firms. In fact, Welch [ 1997] asserts that as a result of the inability of these 
theories, Conflict Theory pioneered by Hirshleifer [1994], which assumes a mechanistic 
outcome as a response to 'lobbying' activity, can be another framework to understand the 
insights about observed bargaining. 
Another point, strategic debt use can be jointly analysed with the maturity and seniority 
structure, capital structure, and debt ownership structure of corporations, which are not 
seemingly separate issues as argued by Fama [1990] and Park [2000]. 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
Since the celebrated capital structure irrelevance theory of Modigliani and Miller [1958], 
capital structure puzzle has remained to be enigmatic. Following this theory under some 
unrealistic assumptions, researchers have relaxed these conditions by including market 
imperfections to examine it more realistically. According to Static-tradeoff theory, capital 
structure is shown to be relevant in affecting firm value with an optimal capital structure. 
This optimality is attained by trading off the benefits of debt finance (tax deductibility of 
interest payments) with its costs (agency costs, expected costs of financial distress). 
Pecking Order theory, on the other hand, argues that there is a financial hierarchy in 
which firms first use internal retentions, then debt and lastly external equity. 
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Put capital structure puzzle aside, a series of papers has investigated other ambiguous 
issues related corporations' financing decisions. On one hand, strong arguments have 
emerged in explaining why firms have different debt maturities. The general tendency 
favours short-term debt as it mitigates asymmetric information and agency costs, 
particularly underinvestment problems; reduces shareholders' risk; its rollover can reduce 
asset substitution problem and maximises tax advantage of debt; and signals firms' high 
quality. There are several studies favouring long-term debt as it can decrease firm's tax 
liabilities and thus increases firm value; and minimises asymmetric information induced 
mispricing of debt. On the other hand, there are some arguments rendering insights about 
the relationship between capital structure and the source of debt. The related models 
propose strong relationships between source of finance, and debt restructurings of 
financially distressed firms in line with reducing asymmetric information and avoiding 
premature liquidations. The models provide some implications. First, small firms uses 
unique bank loans as they are relatively more flexible in renegotiations and have some 
other facilities; and to avoid disclosure costs. Second, high-credit risk firms issue private 
debt to benefit from low interest rates and so do the ones with more intangible assets to 
avoid liquidation. Third, large firms issue public debt to employ their flotation costs 
advantage. Fourth, firm-specific characteristics may stipulate the combination of public 
and private debt against financial distress. Fifth, small firms first use bank loans to get a 
reputation by regular repayments and then resort to capital markets for lower interest 
burdens. 
As being another perspective, bargaining-based theories of capital structure mainly 
analyse the strategic advantage of debt to the firm's shareholders. They briefly imply the 
followings: First, the anticipation of potential future negotiations can affect the optimal 
capital structure choice. Second, firms' opportunistic behaviour may put an upper limit on 
debt capacity. Lastly, strategic debt use has also benefits aside from tax advantages, such 
as deterring new entrant in the market; forcing concessions from debtholders and 
changing the seniority of claims on firms. 
In the end, it is apparent that there are conflicting implications stemming from the 
various arguments concerning capital structure, debt maturity structure and debt 
ownership structure discussed so far. In what follows, there needs to be a series of 
elaborate empirical studies to evaluate the validity of these arguments in a systematic 
manner. 
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3. CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL TRADITIONS 
OF COUNTRIES 
3.1. INTRODUC1'ION 
It is interesting to note that in such countries having similar capital markets and financial 
institutions, the capital structure of firms might vary across these countries. On the other 
hand, in such countries having different financial institutions, the capital structure of 
firms might be quite similar in these diverse capital markets (Rajan and Zingales [1995]). 
Being aware of that fact, financial researchers have made considerable effort to obtain the 
underlying reasons for these differences. It is argued that the efforts to explain differences 
in financial structures of corporations across countries in terms of tax differentials alone 
have generally failed as there is little correlation between tax incentives to use different 
forms of financing and observed proportions of capital raised42• The reason could be the 
converging inflation rates at lower levels, which mitigate the tax systems distortions. 
Instead, the recent explanations tend to suggest institutional factors for the financial 
structure heterogeneity across countries. International differences in the extent of 
financial leverage might depend on the institutional factors related to financial structure 
affecting the degree of risk to creditors associated with high leverage. For instance, Hoshi 
et al. [1991, 1996] examine the financial structure of Japan, where there is an 
organisation of firms' network, called keiretsu. They find that those firms that are not the 
members of keiretsu will probably cut back investment when they have not sufficient 
cash flows. Thus, one can say that this specific institutional factor may well affect the 
financial policies of the Japanese firms (Corbett, [1987]). In their more recent study, 
Hoshi et al. show that those firms with close relationship to their banks, suppliers and 
customers in industrial groups perform better than others and even get more help in times 
of financial distress. However, as White [1989] argues, such financial coalitions might 
have incentive to make inefficient decisions at the expense of other shareholders. 
In addition, Schmidt et al. [1999] investigate the role of banks in Europe to find whether 
such institutional differences exist and change overtime, and whether there are common 
tendencies toward disintermediation and securitization in France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. They find a trend toward increased specialisation by banks in lending 
operations differing from country to country and argue that a transition from bank-based 
42 See, e.g., Fukao [1995], Mayer [1990], Mayer and Alexander [1990] and Remolona [1990]. 
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to a market-based financial system might increase the efficiency of entire financial 
structure. 
In order to capture the potential effects of institutional differences (accounting rules, 
corporate tax structures, bankruptcy procedures and corporate governance systems) on 
financing policies of the firms, in this section we will analyse, and then compare, the 
characteristics of main components of capital markets for France, Germany and the UK. 
3.2. THE DOMINANT FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF COUNTRIES 
If we examine the financial systems of countries around the world, there exist some 
striking differences in terms of their financial institutions, corporate laws, taxation 
systems, governance mechanisms and so forth, in conjunction with their economic 
performance. One can classify these fmancial structures into three main categories43 • 
i) Market-oriented Systems: There is an arm's length relationship between the creditors 
and companies and most of the corporate financing is done through relatively more 
efficient capital markets44 • The disclosed information about firms is reliable and can be 
found in fmancial markets by the diverse investors. Managers do not have control over 
the information processed by creditors. 
ii) Bank-oriented Systems: Generally, there is a close tie between companies and their 
external financiers (banks and other financial institutions) who supply most of the capital 
needs of firms. Thus, banks have some active interests in corporations' structure by 
having representatives on the board of directors. The information with respect to the 
fundamentals of the firms is ofhigh quality, but not higher than it is in the market-based 
systems. Managers (insiders) have strategic advantage over the information processed by 
creditors (outsiders). 
iii) Underdeveloped Systems: Financial institutions, financial markets, accounting 
systems and corporate governance mechanisms have yet not developed. The information 
based on their rating agencies or financial analysts is not reliable and information 
transmission in the economy is poor. Corporate financing is mostly done through banks 
and other fmancial institutions. 
43 See Allen and Gale [ 1995], BerglM [ 1990], Berkovitch and Israel [ 1999], Corbett and Jenkinson [ 1996], 
De Bondt [1998], DemirgU~-Kunt and Levine [1999], Mayer [1988, 1990, 1998] and Moerland [1995], 
among others. 
44 Mayer [ 1999] suggests that arm's length relation can be measured by bank-ownership of corporate equity, 
which is 6%, 13%,2% in France, Germany and the UK, respectively, during the period 1980-1990. 
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In this study, France and Germany and the UK were chosen, as we believe that 
they represent satisfactorily different financial structures of their classes. The UK is in the 
classification of Anglo-Saxon tradition (e.g., USA, Canada), where there are 
comparatively large numbers of publicly listed companies and occurrences of hostile 
takeovers for market for corporate control due to potentially large agency conflicts. 
Germany is in the classification of Germanic tradition (e.g., Austria, the Netherlands45;), 
where corporate decision making and restructuring are made through the involvement of 
universal banks and financial holdings and the capital markets are not effective with 
relatively low amount of listed companies. Lastly, France is in the classification of 
Latinic tradition (e.g., Italy, Spain), where corporate ownership structure of the firms can 
be characterised by family control, financial holdings, state ownership and cross-
shareholdings, and agency problems are internalised unlike in Anglo-Saxon tradition (See 
Moerland [1995]). Moreover, Cobham and Serre [2000] argue that the French financial 
system is different from their counterparts in the Anglo-Saxon countries as corporations 
have more autonomy and control over the allocation of financial resources. 
It is argued that agency costs and indirect bankruptcy costs are less in Latinic and 
Germanic countries than in Anglo-Saxon ones due to ownership structure of firms, and 
their close and long-term relationship between external financiers46• Borio [1990] 
contends another classification and argues that the Anglo-Saxon countries are relatively 
low-levered as there has been both comparatively early stock market developments in 
these countries and the availability of external equity finance has been limited due to 
some institutional impediments47 • He calculates market value of 'net debt-to-total assets' 
ratios of non-financial corporations in France, Germany and the UK as 0.53, 0.75 and 
0.16, respectively, taking the average ofvalues in the period 1970-87. A related argument 
by Friedmann et al [1984] notes that traditional institutional investors like pension funds 
or mutual funds were not present in Germany in 1980s, unlike in the UK where the 
central government policies are less effective in influencing firms' debt ratios. 
Until recently, restrictions on non-bank finance in Germany were significant in 
that issuance of commercial paper and longer-term bonds were discouraged by the 
requirements of the issue authorisation procedure and the securities transfer tax48 • 
45 See Rad and Stekelenborg [2001]. 
46 Indeed, Borio [1996] reports that the proportion of long-term credit to total credit in the corporate sector 
is 78 % for Germany, 73 % for France and 50% for the UK. 
47 See also, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic [1996]. 
48 Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, March 1992. 
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Furthermore, secondary trading of equities and equity issuance were historically subject 
to various taxes. As a result, bank loans were advantageous as a way of external financing 
with comparison to issuing equities. Germany is, thus, known as bank-oriented country 
since the role of its universalised banks is substantial in constituting the financial system 
of Germany. Indeed, the close relationships between the concentrated banks and 
industrial firms are generally regarded as a distinctive feature of the German economy 
(Edwards and Fischer [1994], Edwards and Ogilvie [1995]). As a result ofthese close and 
long-term relationships, German firms can benefit from lower cost of interest on short-
term bank loans as well as greater debt capacity as compared to British firms (Fukao 
[1995])49• Underlying this view, one can argue that the German system of investment 
finance has institutional features which might be the best way of dealing with the 
problems of asymmetric information that are unavoidable when investment is financed by 
external funding sources. What is more, in their international survey, Frankel and 
Montgomery [1991] discuss that apart from dealing with corporate borrowings, banks in 
Germany are also engaged in equity investments both for their own accounts and for 
custody accounts. Therefore, German banks have not only discretionary investment 
authority but also the exercise of proxy voting rights (representation on companies' 
supervisory boards), which makes them very strong in corporate control (see, Immenga 
[1979]). By this way, banks cause the firms to run efficiently because of their ability to 
monitor and control the management on behalf of shareholders (large debtholders can 
also be large equityholders to ease agency problems). Accordingly, as the bank-based 
German financial structure is assumed to reduce asymmetric information problems, it 
should enable banks to supply more external borrowing to firms at a lower cost, and 
hence to stimulate investment50• 
Baums [1999] notes that Deutsche Bank, Dresner Bank and Commerzbank hold 16% of 
about 231 positions reserved for the stockholders on the supervisory board of 24 non-
financial industrial companies constituting DAX-30 Index. However, he argues that this 
should not mean that these firms are bank-oriented because of the factors (the co-
determination regime and the network of personal interlocks among all publicly held 
49 However, Lichtenberg and Pushner [1992] show that such relationships may also have costs due to the 
potential reduction in profitability and efficiency of finns. It is also widely known that the decisions 
maximising the value of (bank) loans often reduces the market value of equity. 
50 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic [1996] confinn this argument as they fmd a positively significant 
relationship between size of banking sector and leverage. 
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firms) mitigating the role ofbanks. Moreover, Franks and Mayer [1996] find no evidence 
that either banks or large blockholders act on behalf of other shareholders. 
On the other hand, the UK is known as a market-based country, where the banks 
are supposed to be less closely involved with the firms for supplying external funds than 
are in Germany51 • In market-oriented systems, there exist numerous diverse investors 
having no direct access to corporations' information. One can say that the development of 
active stock market in the UK can be caused by the requirement of the disclosure of much 
more information than it is the case in Continental Europe and Japan (Prowse [1994]). 
Considering these two polar cases, Yafeh [1997] argues that France seems to be a 
middle case in the bank-oriented and market-oriented financial structures. In addition, 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro [1998] show that the ownership dispersion is low in Germany, 
medium in France and high in the UK. Since 1945 all the major French banks have 
experienced periods of state ownership and this nationalisation was justified in 1982 on 
the grounds that small and medium-sized firms were at a persistent disadvantage and that 
the banks were reluctant to finance strategic industrial sector. Since 1986 the movement 
towards private ownership has been justified but still the state has retained large stakes, 
directly or indirectly, in the privatised banks (Howells and Bain [1999]). Edwards and 
Fischer [1994] argue that there is no a relatively strong long-term relationship between a 
bank and a firm for enabling the bank to recognise the nature of business of the individual 
firm so as to assess the risk of its loans in the United Kingdom, as compared to 
Germany52• Instead, in the UK, the perceived relationship is a short-term horizon causing 
the bank to have difficulties in mitigating agency costs of external borrowing due to lack 
of institutional arrangements. Unlike German banks, the UK banks have no direct 
involvement in the supervisory boards of firms owing to a number of regulatory 
restrictions (Frankel and Montgomery [1991]). This would eventually imply that the UK 
banks might be more reluctant to support the firms for their investment opportunities. In 
what follows, there will be some quantitative illustrations in a comparative pattern to 
understand the precision of these statements. 
51 Prowse [ 1994] notes that German banks may lend up to 50 percent of their capital to any borrower 
whereas, in the UK, exposures exceeding 10 percent are subject to close examination by the authorities. 
52 A recent evidence by Schmidt et al [1999] emphasises that British banks have fairly recently transformed 
themselves into universal banking conglomerates, whereas the large German banks have already been truly 
universal banks for quite some time. 
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Table 3.2.1: Net Sources of Finance in France, Germany and the UK (in%). 
France 
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 
Internal 60.9 67.4 65.6 84.7 92.1 
Bank Finance 36.0 31.5 37.4 30.3 22.8 
Bonds 2.5 2.4 0.4 1.4 5.6 
New Equity 6.6 9.0 6.0 6.9 2.1 
Trade Credit -1.0 -3.5 -3.5 -2.9 -3.4 
Capital Transfers 1.1 2.2 1.8 3.9 6.9 
Other -04. -2.0 -3.8 -22.1 -24.7 
Germany 
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 
Internal 68.6 82.8 79.8 89.1 71.8 
Bank Finance 15.7 8.2 11.1 9.3 16.9 
Bonds 1.9 -2.8 -2.1 0.4 -2.8 
New Equity 0.7 0.5 -0.5 2.4 -3.1 
Trade Credit -1.4 -1.5 -2.8 -1.8 2.1 
Capital Transfers 6.3 9.5 9.7 8.4 9.6 
Other 8.3 3.2 4.7 -7.9 -0.9 
United Kingdom 
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 
Internal 98.2 102.3 115.4 81.0 81.2 
Bank Finance 26.1 6.8 12.4 29.9 0.2 
Bonds 3.3 -1.3 2.0 8.8 6.3 
New Equity -7.3 -3.3 -7.6 -20.6 12.4 
Trade Credit -0.2 -2.6 -3.1 -0.6 1.0 
Capital Transfers 6.2 2.1 1.6 0.4 -0.4 
Other 2.3 -3.2 -12.2 -0.8 8.7 
Source: Corbett and Jenkinson [ 1996, 1997] for Germany and the UK; 
Cobham and Serre [2000] for France. 
Table 3.2.1. shows that the proportional amount of internal financing for investment 
opportunities has risen and always been the most dominant way of raising capital 
overtime in France. In addition, bonds and equity raised only by public companies are not 
of importance overtime in Germany. Furthermore, bank borrowing ratios in Germany are 
unstable during 1970-94 being relatively unimportant in aggregate. This finding 
contradicts the conventional wisdom that Germany is a bank-based economy. On the 
other hand, again, the internal sources have always been the mostly resorted way to 
finance the investment in the UK. Interestingly, the amount of bank finance has generally 
been more in the UK than in Germany. More strikingly, there has been a negative 
contribution of new equity issuing to fmance physical investment during 1970-89 in the 
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UK probably due to equity use (not source) in takeover actions, which contradicts the 
conventional wisdom that the UK is a market-based country53 • For these reasons stated 
above, it would not be straightforward that Germany is a bank-based and the UK is a 
market-based country since in both countries internally generated retentions are quite 
dominant sources of fmance. Considering three countries, France has the lowest internal 
financing \ highest equity financing (not UK) during 1970-1984. Another interesting 
point, France, not Germany, has the highest bank-financing ratios during 1970-94. Only 
in 1990-1994, the UK has the positive net equity issuance, which is also highest across 
sample countries for this period. 
Table 3.2.2: Gross and Net Financing Proportions of Private Non-financial Corporations, 
1970-87. (Source: Borio [1990]). 
France Germany United Kingdom 
gross net gross net gross net 
Retained Earnings 39 74 65/58 83/74 68 108 
Share Issues 8 9 2 1 5 1 
Direct Investment 2 0 1 -1 1 -6 
Total Debt 51 28 32 15 27 10 
credit institutions 22 26 20 12 20 14 
securities 2 2 1 0 2 3 
trade credit 19 -2 2 -2 2 -2 
other 7 2 10 5 2 -5 
Residual -11 1 1 -14 
Memorandum item 
depreciation n.a. n.a. 54 70 66 106 
These figures are obtained after subtracting the accumulation of fmancial assets from the change 
in fmancialliabilities. 
53 Similarly, Mayer and Alexander [1990] argue that, large UK firms raise more equity finance in their 
more developed stock market than German firms do to associate them with acquisitions. Since net equity 
issuing is the same in these countries, the UK firms should raise more debt fmance. Furthermore, Mayer 
[1988] reports that new equity was raised more in Germany and France than in the UK to finance domestic 
investment. 
59 
Table 3.2.3: Unweighted Average Net Financing ofNon-financial 
Enterprises1, 1970-1985 
France Germany The UK 
Retentions 
Capital Transfers 
Short-term Securities 
Loans 
Trade Credit 
Bonds 
Shares 
Other 
Statistical Adjustment 
61.4 
2.0 
-0.1 
37.3 
-0.6 
1.6 
6.3 
-1.4 
-6.4 
70.9 
8.6 
-0.1 
12.1 
-2.1 
-1.0 
0.6 
10.9 
0.0 
102.4 
4.1 
1.7 
7.6 
-1.1 
-1.1 
-3.3 
3.2 
-13.4 
1 Numbers are in percentages and unweighted as a proportion of capital 
expenditures and stock building. (Source: Mayer [1990]). 
If one is to scrutinise the differences across countries further, Table 3.2.2. and Table 
3.2.3. show that in all countries, seemingly as result of improvement in profitability, 
retained earnings have been the main sources of financing; followed by borrowing and 
issuing shares54• The low-levered British firms rely most on retained earnings and least 
on shares among others. On a both gross and net basis, French firms are mostly levered 
and British firms are leastly levered. Short-term borrowing has mostly been done by 
British firms (Table 3.2.3.), which confirms the idea that there is a short-term 
relationship between firms and creditors in Anglo-Saxon countries. In addition, Mayer 
[1990] reports that the most dominant source of external financing is bank finance in all 
countries, especially in France not in Germany. 
Consequently, although it is argued that debt is important in ensuring effective 
governance in corporations55, Mayer [1988] shows the weakness of this proposition with 
the fact that retained earnings are the most important source of finance of firms. Then, he 
asserts that studies based on comparative financial structures should regard high internal 
financing ratios as a demand (not supply) side problem in order to understand 
international differences. Thus, it would be useful to examine the investment expenditure 
of corporations in the context of their countries' growth rates and investment rates. 
54 This can be a supportive evidence of Myers' [ 1984] Pecking Order Theory. Besides this, Graham [2000] 
discerns a persistently conservative debt policy that large, liquid, profitable firms with low expected 
distress costs use debt conservatively because of the product market factors, growth options, low asset 
collateral, and planning for future expenditures. 
55 See, e.g., Grossman and Hart [1982] and Jensen [1986]. 
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Table 3.2.4: Non-financial Enterprise Sector Balance Sheet, as a% of annual GDP. 
(Source: Kneeshaw [1995]). 
France Germany United Kingdom 
1983 1993 1983 1993 1983 1993 
Assets: 
Tangible, total 156.6 137.6 150.3 145.2 107.9 123.7 
Fixed Capital 89.9 83.3 125.3 125.7 39.0 47.8 
Inventories 27.5 21.1 25.0 19.5 21.7 17.5 
Financial, total 48.4 189.3 46.4 69.2 43.9 61.6 
Debt Claims 8.3 18.3 24.8 33.4 12.7 15.2 
of which: Long-term 1.2 1.6 2.4 7.2 
Equity 34.0 169.7 13.2 18.1 8.3 19.0 
Liabilities: 
Financial, total 53.1 67.9 77.0 93.9 41.1 81.5 
Debt Claims 53.1 67.9 52.7 73.2 21.8 49.3 
ofwhich :Long-term 34.9 41.8 37.6 55.9 1.6 21.4 
Memorandum items: 
Equity 48.7 215.2 20.4 29.8 50.6 121.9 
Trade credit granted 42.4 49.3 7.5 5.7 19.4 14.7 
Trade credit received 40.2 39.4 4.6 3.5 20.3 15.5 
Table 3.2.4. reveals the cross-country differences in non-financial firms' internal 
financing capacity and in their external financing choices. These values indicate the 
differences in the cost of equity, short-term and long-term financing caused by country-
specific regulatory and institutional factors. The fixed-capital/GDP ratio of British 
corporations is considerably smaller than that of French and German ones (fixed-capital 
is useful collateral for borrowings). Furthermore, Debt-liabilities/GDP ratio is the 
smallest one in the UK, which confirms that British firms are relatively low-levered. The 
smallest Equity-liabilities/GDP ratio is in Germany, which might be evidence that 
Germany is not a market-based country. In addition, the lowest Long-term 
Liabilities/GDP ratio in the UK might confirm the argument there is a distant and short-
term relationship between the creditors and corporations in market-oriented economies. 
Consequently, it can be asserted that one cannot purely attain a country to a specific 
group of dominant financial structure due to contradictory figures discussed above. 
3.3. ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS ACROSS COUNTRIES 
3.3.1. Introduction 
Accounting systems can be seen as part of the socio-economic system of countries, which 
are determined by environmental factors. Thus, one should not be surprised to the 
differences in accounting systems as they develop through time as a result of distinct 
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economic, social and historical conditions of countries and adapt themselves to the new 
environmental factors. In general, accounting rules are oriented toward protecting 
creditors, employees and other stakeholders by restricting dividend payouts and 
conservative measurements of company's net assets, and marketable securities are usually 
evaluated at historical prices in France and Germany. On the other hand, accounting 
rules are oriented toward providing economic information to the investors in the market 
and marketable securities are usually evaluated at market prices in the UK (Fukao 
[1995]). 
3.3.2. Accounting Systems Compared 
In 1993, Daimler-Benz reported DM615 million net profit under HOB (German-GAAP, 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) but a DM1.84 billion net loss under US-
GAAP. This fact has naturally received lots of attention to focus more on different 
accounting systems around the world. Based on Table 3.3.1., one can understand why 
financial accounting values may vary substantially depending on the related accounting 
systems. Glaum [2000) argues that in Roman-Law originated German accounting 
system, there is a deliberate action to undervalue assets and overvalue liabilities in order 
to reduce 'accounting' earnings due to tax burden concerns. Thanks to wide scope of 
options, which are a few in Anglo-American accounting systems, German firms can 
pursue conservative valuation policies. As an example, reported profits of German 
corporations tend to be lower than if they would be reported using US-GAAP. Another 
example, German firms can capitalise the accumulated reserves later in less profitable 
years, which would smoothen the volatile profits. This is why profitability in Anglo-
American firms is more volatile and higher due to lack of fewer possibilities for 
accumulating hidden reserves. Indeed, Dietl et al. [1998] state that creditor protection is 
enforced by a series of principles that result in substantial hidden reserves, and reported 
accounting earnings often do not accurately reflect economic reality (true and fair view 
requirement is jeopardised). Furthermore, Ball et al. [2000) argue that code-law 
accounting standards (in Germany, France, Japan) give greater discretion to managers in 
deciding when economic gains/losses are included in accounting income. 
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Table 3.3.1: Traditional differences between German and Anglo-American56 
Accounting and its determinants (Source: Glaum [2000]). 
Dominating Accounting 
Principle 
Accounting Policy 
Owners' equity 
Profit 
Disclosure Requirements 
Capital Market Organisation 
Legal System 
Standard Setter 
Role of Taxation 
Dominant view of firms 
German Case 
Prudence Principle/ 
Determination Principle 
Numerous Options, 
Relatively wide scope 
Lower 
Less volatile, lower 
Limited 
Bank Dominated/ 
Low importance of 
private investors 
Code Law 
Legislature 
Financial and Tax 
Accounting closely 
interlinked 
Anglo-American Case 
Relevance/ 
Reliability 
Few options, 
Relatively little scope 
Higher 
More volatile, higher 
Extensive 
Securities-market 
dominated/ 
Greater importance of 
private investors 
Common Law 
Delegated to private 
Institution (FASB) 
Financial and Tax 
Accounting clearly 
separated 
Stakeholder Approach Shareholder Approach 
As Germany follows the tradition of Roman law it has a different focus than that of the 
US and the UK and its accounting standards are defmed by codified legal provisions 
contained in the Commercial Code' and 'Stock Act'. Accounting rules which are creditor-
oriented are strongly influenced by political groups, e.g., labour unions and banks 
(Mueller et al. [1997]). Besides, Choi et al. [1999] argue that financial accounting in 
Germany is completely subordinate to tax law. Available tax provisions can be used 
provided they are actually recorded for financial reporting purposes. Consequently, there 
is no distinction between financial statements prepared for tax purposes and those 
published in financial reports. That is, taxation depends on financial reporting in most of 
the EU member states including France and Germany. However, in the Anglo-American 
countries including the UK, fiscal (tax) rules and accounting rules are independent of 
each other. 
s
6 The author specifically compares Germany and USA, and he puts the USA into the tradition of Anglo-
American Case. 
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Table 3 .3 .2: Legal and economic factors, selected countries 
(Source: Guenther and Young [2000]) 
Country 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
UK 
us 
Law Type 
Code 
Code 
Code 
Common 
Common 
Anti-director 
Rights Index 
2 
1 
3 
4 
5 
External Cap'n 
to GNP 
0.23 
0.13 
0.62 
1.00 
0.58 
Market Cap'n 
to Sales 
0.29 
0.21 
0.63 
0.64 
0.67 
Debt/Asset 
Ratio 
0.16 
0.14 
0.08 
-0.01 
0.00 
Tax 
Conformity 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
As for explaining Table 3.3.2., giving fundamental implications about countries, 
accounting standards in common-law countries are based on GAAP, in which the 
influence from the public sector on both standard setting and enforcement is relatively 
small. The main objective is to meet the market demand for accounting information as 
accounting standards are originated in the accounting market. The third column is due to 
La Porta et al. [1997] who develop an 'index of antidirector rights' to measure a country's 
investor protections. The index aggregates shareholder rights, with 5 being the strongest 
protection and 0 being the weakest protection. Hence, the US has strongest shareholder 
protection while Germany has the weakest one. Accordingly, one can argue that due to 
the strong shareholders protection the UK and that US have large equity markets and 
large external shareholder populations. This can be confirmed by the fourth and the fifth 
columns. The two indicators 'external capitalisation to GNP' measures the ratio of the 
stock market capitalisation held by minorities in a country to the country's gross national 
product and the aggregate 'market capitalisation to sales' measures the median ratio of 
the stock market capitalisation held by minorities to sales for all non-financial firms in 
the country. Both of these measures are low for France and Germany relative to the US 
and the UK. The sixth column reports median debt/asset ratios for the different countries, 
relative to the US, to classify bank-oriented and market-oriented countries. France and 
Germany seem to be bank-dominated countries, unlike the UK and the US as being 
seemingly market-oriented countries whose debt/asset ratios are lowest. The last column 
shows that, to a large extent, reported accounting income is not affected by tax 
considerations in the UK and the US since fmancial accounting and tax accounting are 
separated. 
France's accounting system has been described as macro-uniformed, government-
driven, tax-dominated, and plan-based (Nobes and Parker [1995]). The development of 
French accounting has been characterised by the search for a consensus among various 
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interested parties. Fortin [ 1991] argues that the first official accounting plan was 
established in 194 7, motivated primarily by the need to 
i) develop better statistics for national economic planning, 
ii) appraise the results of economic policies of the government, and 
iii) prevent firms from avoiding taxes. 
Since the French government plays an important role in managing the country's resources 
and satisfying companies' needs for capital, financial accounting is oriented toward better 
decision-making by the government, and companies must follow uniform accounting 
procedures that are designed to demonstrate companies' compliance with the 
government's plans (Mueller et al. [1997]). According to Table 3.3.2., investor protection 
is weak for shareholders. This is also reflected in the small size of external shareholders 
in the capital market. The ratio of external capitalisation to GNP and the ratio of market 
capitalisation to sales are both low. Fortin [1991] states that financial accounting in 
France is heavily influenced by tax provisions as financial statements must meet the 
needs of tax authorities. 
In an earlier study, Doupnik and Taylor [1985] assess the extent to which 16 
westerns European countries conformed to a 'basic core of accounting practice'. The 
survey supports the view that many differences exist in accounting practices in these 
countries. Another related study by Emenyonu and Gray [1992] examines the extent to 
which accounting measurement practices in France, Germany and the UK are harmonised 
in terms of great effort exerted for EC accounting harmonisation. They test the 
hypotheses whether there are significant differences by large French, German and British 
corporations with respect to depreciation methods, stock valuation methods, methods of 
treating goodwill, methods of treating R&D expenditure and valuation bases for fixed 
assets. Again, the test results show that there are significant differences between these 
countries based on all the practices evaluated. 
Herrmann and Thomas [1995] conduct a similar research by considering eight EC 
countries including France, Germany and the UK. Their first conclusion indicates that 
accounting for foreign currency translation of assets and liabilities, treatment of 
translation differences and inventory valuation have some similarities. On the other hand, 
the second conclusion reveals that the policies related to accounting for fixed asset 
valuation, depreciation, goodwill, R&D expenditure, inventory costing and foreign 
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currency translation of revenues and expenses in these countries are not harmonised, i.e., 
have dissimilarities57• 
In addition, based on the study of Buijink et al. [1999] one could extract the 
following differences: As European countries have developed in different ways, one can 
expect that their financial accounting and tax accounting statements have some different 
causalities. As a consequence, the financial accounting and the tax financial statements of 
a company can be related in several ways in the EU. Germany and some other countries 
in the EU (Austria, Finland, Italy and Luxembourg) use the Maftgeblichkeitsprinzip 
(authoritativeness) principle. According to this principle, the financial accounting 
accounts are binding for the tax accounts. Hence, the tax accounts do not form an 
independent set of accounts, but are derived from the commercial accounts. In practice 
this often works out just the other way around, i.e., the commercial accounts will follow 
the tax accounts, because of the fact that companies strive to pay as little tax as 
possible 58• In countries where the authoritativeness principle is applied, differences 
between tax expense and taxes payable will arise only in special circumstances. In 
France, the relationship between the tax and financial accounting statements is fixed by 
an accounting plan that prescribes one general financial statement format for both the tax 
and financial accounting accounts. As a result, both accounts are the same. In the United 
Kingdom, tax and financial accounting statements are not closely related59• The financial 
accounting statements of a company should above all provide a 'true and fair view' of the 
company's assets, liabilities, financial position, and profit or loss. In contrast, the 
legislation for tax financial statements of a company is aimed at a fair distribution of the 
tax burden and often serves political goals. As companies want to pay low corporate 
income taxes, while at the same time trying to report high financial accounting income to 
shareholders, the use of separate financial statements may lead to higher financial 
accounting income than tax income. 
57 Archer et al. [1995] confirm this lack of harmonisation with their study about the areas of deferred 
taxation and consolidated goodwill. McLeay et al. [ 1999] argue that disharmony in countries' accounting 
Eolicy exists if economic conditions of countries are dissimilar. 
8 Eberhartinger (1999] notes that this principle is not a general rule requiring expenses to be included in 
the financial statement to be tax deductible. Rather, it states that in case the same option exists in the 
fmancial reporting and in the tax requirements, the choice made in the fmancial report is normative for the 
tax report. 
59 There are some advantages of closely related financial accounting and tax financial statements, such as, 
less administration costs, less confusion on what the real income figure is, Jess risk on conflicts (fines) with 
the fiscal authorities, and. prevention of conflicts with individuals or organisations entitled to part of the 
profit. 
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As the international differences between accounting systems seem very apparent, 
Guenther and Young [2000] investigate empirically how cross-country differences in 
financial accounting standards affect the relation between financial accounting earnings 
and real economic value-relevant events that underlie those earnings. They mainly find 
that the association between aggregate return on assets and the economic growth rate is 
high in the UK and the US, and low in France and Germany. The authors believe that 
these results make an important contribution to research in international accounting by 
providing evidence that the association between financial accounting earnings and real 
economic activity in a country is related in predictable ways to the legal and economic 
systems that underlie financial accounting standard setting and the demand for financial 
accounting information. Guenther and Young [2000] further argue that the high 
association for the UK and the US and the low association for France and Germany are 
consistent with expectations that accounting earnings in common-law countries having 
legal systems that protect external shareholder rights, countries with market-oriented 
financial systems, and countries where financial accounting rules are independent of tax 
rules better reflect underlying economic activity. 
Another recent study by Ball et al. [2000] examines the differences in the demand for 
accounting income in different institutional environments. Mainly, under code-law 
countries (e.g., France, Germany) the demand is influenced more by payout preferences 
of agents for labour, government and capital, and less by public disclosure as compared 
to common-law countries (e.g., the UK). They argue that asymmetric information is more 
likely to be resolved in code-law countries due to corporations' close relations with major 
stakeholders in terms of financial statement disclosures. Yet, agency costs of monitoring 
managers become less in common-low countries due to their enhanced 'transparent' 
disclosure standards in which the false signalling is penalised. Their empirical study 
shows that common-low accounting income exhibit significantly greater timeliness (quick 
incorporation of economic losses/gains, making leverage and dividend restrictions more 
binding, etc.) than code-law one. 
A further empirical study conducted by Ali and Hwang [2000] investigates the relations 
between the measures of value relevance of financial accounting data and some country-
specific factors based on 16 countries including France, Germany and the UK. The results 
show that the value relevance of financial reports is lower for countries whose financial 
system is bank-dominated (France, Germany); where private sector bodies are not 
involved in the standard-setting process; where the accounting system is originated from 
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Continental model; where tax rules have significant effects on financial accounting 
measurements; and where auditing services' expenditures are low. 
In brief, there exists a strong consensus arguing that international differences in 
accounting systems have not disappeared despite some efforts for harmonisation of the 
accounting principles. Thus, international financial researcher should be cautious in 
interpreting their results if they are using company accounts from different countries. It is 
because the different financial structures of countries might be partially due to 
differences in accounting principles60•61 • 
3.4. THE ROLE OF TAXATION SYSTEMS 
3.4.1. Introduction 
Taxation systems, as well as accounting systems, are related to the need to assess the 
operating results of institutions in an economy. Tax rules followed by policy objectives 
take their formation according to the economic conditions they pertain. The research 
conducted by Daly and Weiner [1993] about corporate tax harmonisation reveals the fact 
that, despite some measures, significant tax obstacles to cross-border activities and wide 
differences in taxation between European Community still exist. The institutional 
differences make the rate for tax purposes, depreciation rules, the tax treatment of losses, 
stock and other expenses, the taxation of capital gains, the definition of corporate tax 
base, etc., differ significantly between countries. As a consequence, the authors depict the 
variations in corporate tax revenues among countries, which can be realised by examining 
Table 3.4.1. 
60 A study by Deutsche Bundesbank in 1994 about the capital structures of frrms in Germany and other 
European countries reveals that the differences in accounting standards helps to explain a substantial 
amount of the observed differences in capital structure. In that, book-value based capital structures differ 
more than market-value based capital structures. 
61 Friderichs et al. [1999] argue that there are markedly differences between corporate accounting policies 
in Germany and France in some aspects. They state that the accounting discrepancies related to the 
disclosure of assets and liabilities, and the valuation concepts, to some extent, can be eliminated. However, 
it is argued that substantial differences still persist despite the major efforts of harmonising the balance 
sheet data by readjustments and recalculations. 
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Table 3 .4.1.: Corporate Tax Revenues in 1991, selected countries. 
(Source: Daly and Weiner [1993]). 
Country 
France 
Germany 
UK 
EC (unweighted) 
Corporate Taxes 
(% ofGDP) 
2.0 
0.7 
3.2 
2.6 
Total Taxes 
(% ofGDP) 
20.4 
12.5 
27.8 
25.0 
Corporate Taxes 
(% of Total Tax Revenues) 
9.7 
5.3 
11.5 
10.2 
Furthermore, Haufler and Schjelderup [2000] report that statutory corporate tax rates 
have been reduced considerably in many OECD countries while effective marginal tax 
rates have remained stable over the past decade. Due to different taxation systems in 
terms of capital allowances, tax rates and tax bases, they argue that one can envisage the 
strategic transfer pricing and profit shifting activities by multinational corporations. Thus, 
as recognised by theoreticians and analysts, it is likely that the basic construct of taxation 
systems of countries differing can influence corporations' financial and investment 
decisions. 
3.4.2. Corporate Taxation in the UK62 
3.4.2.1. Overview 
Since 1973, the UK operates a partial Imputation System of corporate taxation (CT), 
under which individual shareholders receive a credit for their share of part of the tax paid 
by the company. Such credits can be regarded as offsetting the shareholder tax liability. 
Part of the corporate tax liability on distributed profits is imputed to shareholders, which 
is considered as a prepayment to shareholders' personal income tax. This system was 
introduced to replace the previous classical system as it involved the double taxation of 
dividend income. 
A UK company is liable to corporate tax on all of its profits (income and capital gains). 
Unlike individuals, corporations are not subject to capital gains tax (CGT). However, 
they are liable to pay CT on their chargeable gains computed under the same rules as for 
CGT. A chargeable capital gain does not arise on the disposal of an asset eligible for 
capital allowances unless the proceeds of sale exceed acquisition cost. Claiming a capital 
loss is not possible for such an asset. Gains due to the sale of certain business assets may 
be rolled over provided further purchases of business assets are made, hence deferring the 
62 This section is based on the studies of KPMG [1998]; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu [1999]; Acker et al. 
[1997], and La Porta et al. [2000]. 
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gain until the disposal of the new asset. The old and new assets must be used for the 
purpose of corporation's trade, and must fall within certain specified categories. Other 
provisions give relief on the transfer of a UK trade between companies resident in 
different EC member states. Relief can also be given on the transfer by a UK company of 
trade carried on elsewhere in the EC. Asset transfers between group companies are 
deemed to be made at a price which results neither a loss nor a gain. Capital losses are 
computed in the same way as gains. 
3.4.2.2. Deductions 
In general, tax relief is available only for expenses which are exclusively and wholly 
incurred for the purpose of corporation's trade or in the case of an investment company as 
management expenses. Further items are available to be specifically excluded from relief 
or where adjustment must be made to the accounts figures for tax purposes. 
Capital expenditure is not deductible, nor is any depreciation charge made for account 
purposes. Capital allowances (tax depreciation) are given on a wide range of fixed assets 
at specified rates. Expenditure is normally treated as incurred on the same basis for 
account purposes, yet, there is legislation to prevent undue acceleration of allowances. 
Capital expenditure for which allowances are given includes the following: 
a) Machinery and plant (in the past this was not, in general, statutorily defined, but 
Finance Act 1994 introduced legislation which attempts to define plant). The 
allowance is 25% of the reducing balance of expenditure. For expenditure incurred 
after 25 November 1996 on long-life assets (i.e. assets with an expected working life 
when new of 25 years or more) the allowance is 6% of the reducing balance (subject 
to exceptions and transitional provisions). 
b) Ships (a 25% allowance with special provisions for postponement if desired). Finance 
Act 1995 introduced a relief which allows balancing charges on ships to be deferred 
in certain circumstances where the ship owner reinvests in new shipping within 6 
years of disposal. 
c) Industrial buildings and hotels (4% of cost). 
d) Industrial and commercial buildings in a designated 'enterprise zone', where 
expenditure is incurred within ten years of the designation (or within the following 
ten years under a contract entered into during the first ten years): a 100% allowance; 
e) Scientific research (100%), patents and know-how (25% ofthe reducing balance). 
f) Mines and oil wells (10% or 25% of reducing balance depending on the nature ofthe 
expenditure). 
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3.4.2.3. Dividends and Distributions 
The related basic principles of dividends are as follows: 
a) A company pays corporation tax on all its profits (including capital gains), whether 
distributed or undistributed. 
b) Until 5 April 1999 a resident company distributing profits to its shareholders in the 
form of a dividend had to account to the Inland Revenue for advance corporation tax 
('ACT') at the rate of 114 (or 20% ofthe gross amount) (for the years to 5 April1998 and 
5 April 1999). ACT has now been abolished with effect from 6 April 1999. 
c) ACT on dividends paid during an accounting period (irrespective of the year in 
respect of which they are paid) would be set off against the company's corporation 
tax liability for that accounting period up to a limit of20% of taxable profits (for the 
years to 5 April 1998 and 5 April 1999). 
d) A UK resident who receives a dividend is normally entitled (for the year to 5 April 
2000) to a tax credit of 1/9 of the dividend (or 10% of the aggregate of the dividend 
and the tax credit). For individuals the aggregate of the dividend and the tax credit is 
liable to income tax, but the normal basic rate liability of 23% is reduced to 10% for 
dividend income. The result is that the tax credit discharges this liability leaving only 
a higher rate liability of 32.5% (where relevant) to be paid (i.e., an additional 22.5%). 
For the year to 5 April 1999 a UK resident was entitled to a tax credit of 1/4 of the 
dividend (or 20% of the aggregate of the dividend and the tax credit). For individuals 
the aggregate of the dividend and the tax credit was subject to the lower rate of 20% 
for dividend income. This tax credit discharged the lower rate liability leaving a 
higher rate liability to be paid. An individual was able to reclaim the tax credit if it 
was in excess of his eventual liability but this is no longer possible after 5 April 1999. 
e) . For companies the dividend is not subject to corporation tax, but prior to 6 April 
1999 the tax credit could effectively be set off against the recipient's own liability to 
account for ACT on dividends paid. 
The term 'distribution' can include a number of matters other than a dividend, such as the 
transfer of assets to a shareholder at an undervalue, and certain payments of interest or 
premiums; e.g., interest in excess of a commercial return. 
In addition, interest paid to a 75% overseas affiliate will be treated as a distribution in 
cases of thin capitalisation. These rules (which were introduced in Finance Act 1995) will 
generally apply regardless of the provisions of the relevant double tax agreement. There 
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is no necessity under the UK's tax system to determine the period out of the profits of 
which the dividend is paid; the relevant question is the year in which it is paid. 
Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) paid by a company in respect of distributions 
made before 6 April 1999 during an accounting period could be set off against the 
corporation tax liability on its profits for that period. The ACT set off for an accounting 
period could not exceed the ACT which would have been payable if a 'franked payment' 
(i.e., a qualifying distribution plus ACT) equal to the profits of the period were made by 
the company at the end of that period. Double taxation relief was allowed before ACT 
set-off, which could give rise to surplus ACT in companies with significant amounts of 
foreign income. 
Surplus ACT is ACT in excess of the amount which can be set against the 
company's corporation tax liability for an accounting period. The company could 
claim to set off all or part of the surplus against its corporation tax liability for any 
accounting period beginning in the six preceding years, more recent accounting periods 
having priority over more remote ones. Any surplus ACT which was not dealt with as 
above may be carried forward and set against future corporation tax liabilities, subject to 
the rules regarding 'shadow ACT' discussed below. In certain circumstances, ACT (not 
only surplus ACT) could be surrendered to other companies in the same group. There was 
anti-avoidance legislation to deny the benefit of surplus ACT carried forward or 
backward in certain cases, where there was a change in the ownership of the company 
together with a major change in the nature or conduct of the business. This legislation 
also countered arrangements under which a group could purchase a company with surplus 
ACT, and transfer assets to it shortly before their sale, in order to set the ACT against the 
tax arising on the chargeable gain. Following the abolition of ACT from 6 April 1999, 
surplus ACT which had accumulated at that date may be used in subsequent accounting 
periods, subject to a restriction under a "shadow ACT" regime which, broadly, requires a 
company to calculate the ACT which would have been payable if the system had not been 
abolished, and then to utilise that "shadow ACT" against its corporation tax liability in 
priority to real ACT brought forward. 
There is also Franked investment income (Fll) which is dividend income (or other 
qualifying distributions) received by a resident company from another resident company, 
and comprises the amount of the dividend together with the related 'tax credit'. 
Foreign income dividend scheme: Finance Act 1994 introduced a foreign income 
dividend (FID) scheme for dividends paid on or after 1 July 1994. This was abolished 
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from 6 April 1999. Under the scheme, a company could opt before payment of a dividend 
for it to be treated as a FID. ACT would then be payable on the dividend in the normal 
way, but if it was subsequently established that it was payable out of foreign source 
profits, any amount of the ACT which proved to be surplus in the period would be repaid. 
A company could match a FID with the foreign source profits of its current or 
immediately preceding accounting period or, if those profits were insufficient, out of the 
foreign source profits of any subsequent accounting period, or provided certain 
conditions were met, out of the foreign source profits of any of its 51% subsidiaries. 
Shareholders who received a FID were treated as receiving income which had borne 
income tax at 20%. This satisfied the liability of lower rate and basic rate taxpayers (at 
the reduced 20% rate then applicable to dividends) but higher rate taxpayers were liable 
to pay an additional 20% (to bring the total up to the 40% higher rate). The FID did not 
carry a tax credit, so no refund was available to tax exempt shareholders. Like an 
ordinary dividend, a FID received by a UK company did not form part of that company's 
taxable profits. Neither, however, did it form part of its FII available for offset against 
franked payments in accounting for ACT. If a company both received and paid FIDs, it 
had to pay ACT only in respect of the excess of payments over receipts, and any surplus 
of receipts was available for carry forward to the following period. 
3.4.3. Corporate Taxation in Germany63 
3.4.3.1. Overview 
Germany operates the Two-Rate Taxation System in which the corporate tax rate on 
earning distributed as dividends is less than on retained earnings. The aim is to alleviate 
the tax advantage of retentions in the classical system. As in the imputation system, the 
taxes paid by corporations can be credited by shareholders to offset personal taxes. 
In a detailed manner, the German corporation tax system, Korperschciftsteuersystem, is 
based on a full tax credit system with a split tax rate regime, a standard rate for retained 
earnings (currently 45 % plus 3.38 % solidarity surcharge) and a reduced rate for 
distributed profits (currently 30 %plus 2.25 % solidarity surcharge). The full tax credit 
system was introduced in 1977 in order to avoid the problem of double taxation for 
distributed profits, firstly at the level of the company through corporation tax and 
additionally at the level of the shareholder through personal income tax. 
63 This section is based on the studies ofKPMG [1998], Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu [1999], Federal 
Ministry of Finance of Germany [2000], and La Porta et al. [2000]. 
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Corporations are treated as taxable entities and are subject to corporation tax, 
Koerperschaftsteuer. The corporate income tax is completely integrated with the income 
tax so far as dividends which are distributed to resident individual shareholders are 
concerned. This means corporate income distributed to resident individuals bears only the 
income tax at the tax bracket applicable to the individual's total income and that the 
corporate income tax burden is completely eliminated. The corporate income tax is a 
separate and self-contained tax and not just a withholding tax on corporate income. The 
corporate income taxpayers are the AG, the GmbH, the KGaA, co-operatives, mutual 
insurance companies, and comparable foreign entities. Tax may also apply to 
unincorporated associations and conglomerations of property, such as foundations which, 
in certain respects, may resemble a trust under Anglo-American law. Corporations 
resident in Germany are subject to taxation on their worldwide income (unlimited tax 
liability). Corporations not resident in Germany are subject to taxation on income from 
sources in Germany (limited tax liability). 
The underlying philosophy of the German tax system can be described by the pay out-
take back principle: the higher rate for retained profits should provide an incentive to 
firms to distribute earnings which subsequently, by using the allocational function of 
capital markets, should try to reabsorb the distributed amounts via capital increases. 
3.4.3.2. Deductions 
In general, a corporation can deduct all expenses incurred by it in conducting its business 
operations, irrespective of whether they are ordinary or necessary. Nevertheless, in the 
case of related parties, the tax authorities will closely scrutinise expenditure to see 
whether such expenses reflect arm's length standards and whether they are paid on the 
basis of a clear-cut written agreement between the parties. In addition, certain expenses 
are allowed, while other expenditures are specifically disallowed. 
Allowable deductions: Organisation expenses incurred as a result of forming a 
corporation or increasing its capital may not be capitalised. Rather, they are deductible in 
the year incurred, to the extent that they exceed premiums paid on capital stock. 
Organisation expenses include accountants' and lawyers' fees and registration fees. These 
deductions are only allowed if so stated in the articles of association including the gross 
amount of these expenditures. Salaries and other compensation for services by 
shareholder employees are deductible. 
The compensation paid, has to be at arm's length, or a constructive dividend may be 
imputed. Rental expenses may be deducted as incurred. Interest payments are generally 
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deductible unless they relate to tax exempt income. Interest payments to related parties 
may be disallowed to the extent that the rate is not at arm's length. Interest payments to 
non-resident shareholders holding more than 25% of the company's share capital may not 
be deductible under the thin capitalisation rule of sec. 8a Corporate Income Tax Act. 
Payments to silent partners and on profit-participation loans are deductible. Under the 
thin capitalisation rule, payments to non-residents could also be disallowed as deductions 
and treated as constructive dividends. Repair and maintenance expenses are deductible in 
the period incurred. Repairs that, in effect, result in a new asset, have to be capitalised. 
Depreciation is, in general, allowed in the case of tangible or intangible fixed assets with 
a useful life of more than one year. Land and investments in other corporations cannot be 
depreciated, but may be written down to a lower (going-concern) value. The goodwill 
acquired for consideration can be amortised on a straight-line basis over 15 years. The 
basis for amortisation is the last balance sheet value before beginning the depreciation. 
Depreciation is based on acquisition or production costs. Accepted methods are straight-
line method, declining-balance method, or units-of- production method. A taxpayer may 
change from the declining- balance to the straight-line method, but not vice versa. Rates 
under the declining-balance method may not exceed 3 times the applicable straight-line 
rate, or 30%, whichever is less. Except for buildings, depreciation rates are not fixed by 
statute, however, the Federal Ministry of Finance publishes guidelines of useful lives. 
Typically accepted straight-line rates are: 
a) Buildings and factories, 4%; Office buildings 2% or 2.5% ( 4% in 1985 and subsequent 
years where the building permit was applied for subsequent to 31 March 1985; the 
declining-balance rates decrease from 10 to 2.5%, from 7 to 1.25% and from 5 to 1.25% 
in cases where the building is located in Germany and is built by the taxpayer or acquired 
within the year of completion; which rates apply depends on the actual acquisition date/ 
date of application for the building permit and whether the building serves residential 
purposes; 
b) Plant and equipment, 5 to 20%; Machinery, 10 to 20%; Motor vehicles, 20 to 25%. 
3.4.3.3. Dividends and Distributions 
A two-rate imputation system is followed in Germany to eliminate the economic double 
taxation of distributed profits. A company must pay corporate income tax at an effective 
rate of 30% on the amount of its profits distributed as dividends and, additionally, a 
solidarity surcharge of 5.5% on the amount of the corporate income tax (the total tax 
burden is 31.65%). From those dividends, the company must deduct withholding tax at 
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25% plus a solidarity surcharge on the withholding tax of 5 .5%. Dividends are grossed up 
by 3/7 for tax purposes and the individual can claim credit for up to 3/7 of the dividend's 
cash amount. Resident shareholders that receive dividends from a resident company must 
include in their taxable income the actual amounts received, grossed up by a tax credit for 
the under-lying corporate income tax, the 25% withholding tax, and the 5.5% solidarity 
surcharge on the withholding tax. All three taxes, excluding the surcharge on the 
corporate income tax, are creditable against the shareholders' own corporate income tax 
liabilities. Dividends received from non-resident companies must also be included in 
taxable income. Dividend payments deemed to be distributions of foreign-source income 
do not trigger an increase of corporate income tax in the payer company's sphere. This 
treatment applies both when the shareholder is a domestic or foreign company and when 
the shareholder is an individual. When the recipient is a corporation subject to unlimited 
taxation, the revenue is still regarded as foreign-source income, thereby allowing a tax-
neutral distribution of foreign-source income within German group companies. However, 
dividends received by a resident individual are still subject to the personal income tax 
rate of the shareholder. 
Foreign dividend withholding taxes levied on the distribution to the German company 
are, in general, creditable against German tax payable. Additionally, if the German 
recipient company has held at least 10% of the shares of a foreign active business 
company for at least twelve months, a credit is given for the foreign corporate income tax 
levied on the profits out of which the dividend was paid, subject to various restrictions. 
This rule may also apply to distributions from second-tier foreign associates. If, however, 
a double tax treaty between Germany and the country from which the dividend was paid 
applies and the resident recipient company owns a substantial interest in the non-resident 
company (usually 25% or more, but reduced to 10% under German domestic law), 
dividends from the non-resident company are exempt from German taxation, and no tax 
credits are then available. If dividends are exempt from corporate income tax under a tax 
treaty or domestic law, 15% of the gross dividend received is deemed to be a non-
deductible expense and is therefore subject to corporate income tax. 
Shares received as a result of a capitalisation of free reserves do not constitute taxable 
income for the shareholder. A capitalisation of profits instead of reserves, however, does 
constitute taxable income. 
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3.4.4. Corporate Taxation in France64 
3.4.4.1. Overview 
After following several reforms, the French corporation tax system, impots sur les 
societes, developed in 1993 into a 'full tax credit' system. A partial imputation system was 
effective between mid-1960s and that time. 
The French tax system is based on a territorial basis of taxation. Thus, industrial and 
commercial profits are subject to French tax only if earned in France or if a tax treaty 
attributes the right to tax the profits to France. Activities performed abroad by a French 
company, i.e., through a foreign branch, are not subject to corporate tax in France. 
Accordingly, no tax credit is available in France for foreign corporate tax paid abroad, or 
tax losses realised abroad by a branch or a permanent establishment. In addition, ordinary 
tax losses of companies may be carried forward or carried back, whereas net long-term 
capital losses may only be carried forward. 
Under the current version of the French corporation tax system, dividends and retained 
earnings are subject to a standard tax rate of 33.3 %. As a countermove to that, the 
shareholder receives a tax credit of 50% of the dividend which corresponds to the 33.3% 
corporation tax already levied at the company level. 
3.4.4.2. Deductions 
A deduction is available for all purchases made during the fiscal year, even those not paid 
at the end of the financial year. As a general rule, all expenses which meet each of the 
three following conditions are deductible: 
a) Incurred in the interest of the company or required for the business operations. 
b) Correspond to an effective charge and justified by supporting documents 
c) Lead to the diminution of the equity. 
Examples of expenses which qualify as deductible general expenses include: 
a) Rent. 
b) Repairs (except for those which increase the capital value of the goods repaired), 
tools, light equipment and software whose unit value is under FF 2,500 including 
VAT. 
c) Salary expenses and related social security and pension contributions. 
d) Taxes, except for corporate income tax, yearly company tax, CSG, CRDS, company 
car tax and penalties. 
64 This section is based on the studies of Deloitte Touche Tohrnatsu [1999], Delbreil et al. [2000], 
Friderichs et al. [1999] and KPMG [1999]. 
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e) Financial expenses, except for, interest paid to shareholders which is subject to 
various limitations. 
Expenses resulting from transactions with affiliated non-resident parties are 
deductible only if based on the arm's length principle. This applies, for example, to 
purchases from an affiliated company and to fees or royalty payments. France is now 
strictly applying the OECD recommendations on transfer prices between affiliated 
companies. Management services are often subject to close scrutiny. The French tax 
authorities have recently made further comments on transfer pricing which strengthen the 
authorities' position and give information on the documentation which a French company 
is obliged to show a tax auditor if requested. 
Depreciation: Assets should be depreciated on the basis of their expected useful life 
and sound commercial usage. In order to be tax deductible, depreciation must fulfil the 
three following conditions: 
a) The depreciated items must be assets accounted for as such and are effectively subject 
to depreciation, which excludes intangible assets such as goodwill. 
b) The depreciation is designated to compensate the reduction in the value of the assets. 
c) The depreciation must be effectively accounted for. 
Goodwill and trademarks cannot be depreciated as their value does not decrease with 
time. However, a reserve may be established should special circumstances arise. It is 
possible to use the double-declining balance method of depreciation for certain categories 
of assets, including; . equipment used for industrial operations, manufacturing and 
transportation of goods,. handling equipment, safety devices, certain office equipment, 
scientific and research equipment, storage and warehouse facilities (with the exception of 
the buildings themselves). Such assets are eligible for the declining balance method if 
they are new, and their expected useful life is at least three years. 
3.4.4.3. Dividends and Distributions 
When a corporate shareholder of a French company receives a dividend, it is entitled to a 
tax credit (avoir fiscal) which is equal to 45% (50% until 1998) of the dividend received. 
The rationale behind this is to alleviate the double taxation which results from taxation at 
the corporate level and at the shareholder level. 
Dividends paid by a French company to its shareholders carry an imputed tax credit 
(avoir fiscal) equal to 50% of the amount distributed to individuals and 45% of the 
amount distributed to corporations (other than those subject to the affiliated privilege 
regime). 
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The avoir fiscal in certain circumstances renders the distributing company liable for the 
dividend equalisation tax precompte mobilier. Dividends paid by a subsidiary to a parent 
company holding at least 10% of the capital of the subsidiary, are not subject to corporate 
tax at the parent company level apart from a disallowance of expenses equal to 2.5% for 
accounting period ending since December 31st December 1998. Consequently the parent 
company does not benefit from the avoir fiscal. Dividends paid to non-residents may be 
subject to a 25 % withholding tax. 
3.4.5. Corporate Taxation Systems Compared 
In order to observe the relevance of different tax systems, there should be classification of 
tax parameters such as interest payments, dividends and capital gains affecting after-tax 
income stream of financial investors. The amount of after-tax income that investors 
receive depends on the form of distribution. Taking the studies of Modigliani and Miller 
[ 1963], and Miller [ 1977] into account, one can differentiate the tax advantages of debt 
subject to dividend earnings in (3.1), retained earnings in (3.2), and retained earnings 
without capital gains in (3.3) [ Tc1 is corporate tax rate, Tdt is dividend tax rate, rp1 is 
personal tax rate, Tcg is capital gain tax rate]. 
[1 - (1- T cl )(1- T d1) /(1- T pi)) 
[1 - (1 - T cl )(1 - T cg ) / (1 - T pi ) ] 
[1- (1- T cl) /(1- T pi)) 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
International comparisons of the role of taxes on capital structure may be difficult as the 
complexity of different tax codes, such as tax exemption, tax exhaustion and non-linear 
tax schedules, raises some problems. Despite these difficulties, there exist some 
important studies. Rajan and Zingales [1995], for instance, present a comparative tax 
treatment for the G-7 countries. The substantial differences of tax advantage of debt 
subject to tax parameters between Germany and the UK are examined in the study. As an 
implication, a tax-exempt investor in Germany is stated to use more debt than the one in 
the UK. Furthermore, investors in the United Kingdom prefer retained earnings to 
external borrowing, as compared to ones in Germany. Analysing the financial structure of 
the industrial countries, Borio [1990] also finds that borrowing is superior to all equity 
forms and retained earnings dominate new issues on the basis of statutory income taxes, 
except in Germany where for income tax reasons alone financial investors would be 
indifferent between debt and equity while retained earnings would be inferior to both. 
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In their recent international study, La Porta et al. [2000] calculates the tax preference of 
dividends. They report that there is a considerable difference among countries especially 
between the UK and Germany because of their different taxation systems. In addition, 
considering France, Germany and the UK, Mayer [1990] reports that although Germany 
has the highest tax incentives in debt-to-retentions and new equity-to-retentions, the 
observed highest related financing ratio is in France, which implies that tax incentives 
cannot solely explain the observed financing patterns. 
Swoboda and Zechner [1995] derive a capital structure equilibrium in a multinational 
setting. They argue that firms in countries with relatively higher corporate tax rates and 
inflation rates have a comparative advantage of issuing debt and should be more highly-
levered. According to Swoboda and Zechner, as being different from in the UK, the 
German tax system comprises not only corporate tax and income tax but also other taxes 
which may affect the firms' financial decisions: For instance, the German general 
property tax incorporates shares, bonds, saving accounts, real estate and notably finn's 
equity. Municipal tax rates (16 %, on average) on corporate income are deductible. The 
property tax is not deductible from the taxable income; since only the equity is taxed, this 
tax can lead firms to borrow more. Likewise, Nobes and Parker [1995] state that the 
international differences in corporate income tax bases (taxable income) and tax systems 
are very great, which could lead to several important effects on investment plans, 
dividend policies and capital raising methods. For example, in the UK, capital gains are 
added to taxable income and dividends from firms in the affiliated tax group are not 
taxed. In Germany, capital gains are also added to taxable income in full and dividends 
are fully taxable. 
Buijink et al. [1999] study the differences between European Union member 
states in terms of corporate average effective tax rates (ETRs) based on consolidated 
financial statements between the period 1990-1996. They find that the use of tax credits 
differ substantially and effective tax range is more centred than statutory tax range among 
EU member states. In that, while the UK is in the medium level of difference between 
ETRs and STRs, Germany is in the large differences level. In addition, companies having 
high international sales have higher ETRs in the UK, possibly because of the usage of 
worldwide tax basis for UK tax code. The situation is opposite in Germany as tax 
incentives are provided more for international sales. Another statistical implication shows 
that there tend to be no systematic links between finn characteristics and effective tax 
rates within EU states. However, Mayer [1990] argues that the role of taxation 
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differentials should not be considered in financing decisions even he knows that Germany 
has an exceptionally high rate of taxation on retentions. 
As Rajan and Zingales [1995] note, whether taxes are considerably effective in capital 
structure decisions depends heavily on the assumptions about marginal investor's tax rate 
in the context of personal taxes. More importantly, in order to obtain some possible 
conclusions about the role of taxes in affecting firms' financial decisions, one should 
determine a proxy for effective tax rate as accurate as possible regarding the institutional 
differences65 . 
3.4.6. International Perspectives in Taxation Rules and Financial Reporting66 
In general, there are similarities between French and German taxation systems 
(continental approach) in affecting financial reporting. However, the different historical 
developments cause some considerable differences which have direct influence on debt-
equity ratios, asset ratios and profitability. In fact, financial reporting is authoritative for 
taxation in Germany, a fact rooted to the late 19th century fiscal laws. In France, fiscal 
laws were effective in the absence of detailed accounting rules until middle of 20th 
century. Although there is the problem of deferred taxation67 in the UK, in Germany and 
France company profits and tax profits differ only slightly. In France, expenses have to 
be accounted for in the financial statement in order to be tax deductible but there is no 
such a requirement in Germany. Unlike in Germany, French corporations traditionally do 
not draw up a separate statement; instead, they pragmatically adjust the commercial profit 
to measure taxable income for more tax benefits. In Germany, tax-driven depreciation 
may be deducted from the asset value and assets which have been written down in earlier 
years for economic reasons need not be written up again once the reason for their creation 
has ceased to apply. This can cause substantial tax-induced undervaluation of the assets 
and overvaluation of liabilities of German firms owing to the prudence principle. 
Furthermore, according to Stock Company Law, Aktiengesetz, by means of the reversal of 
the authoritative principle, German companies can reduce the distributable profits in 
which there is a partial tax exemption (Haller [1992]). Here, the aim is to promote 
65 As emphasised by Buijink et al. [1999], statutory tax rates (STRs) only provide an incomplete 
representation of differences in corporate taxes. For a complete representation of taxes, STRs and tax 
credits should be integrated, which would warrant the inevitable use of effective tax rates. 
66 This section is mainly based on the studies ofDelbreil et al. [2000], Eberhartinger [1999], Frydlender and 
Pham [1996], Lamb [1996], and Pfaff and Schrijer [1996]. 
81 
investment as corporations are forced to reinvest the untaxed parts of their profits. In 
France, however, the influence of taxation is always identifiable. In the UK, commercial 
income is not binding for taxation. In terms of the connection between accounting and 
taxation, and true value distortion of balance sheets, France is in between the highest case 
of Germany and lowest case of the UK. 
Whereas the German system systematically tends to promote profit distribution via the 
pay out-take back mechanism, the French system clearly provides incentives for a direct 
retention of profits at the company level by reducing tax rates (e.g., from 50 % in 1987 to 
33.3 % in 1993). In Germany, the respective reductions in corporation tax rates were 
introduced in 1990 but did not reach the low French level in terms of distributed profits 
(45% against 33.3 %). As a result, the spread between the retention rate and the top rate 
of income tax was much less pronounced and hence did not provide strong incentives for 
the improvement of the capital structure of German businesses, unlike in France. French 
system taxes profits at an identical rate, irrespective of whether profits are distributed or 
retained. Contrary to Germany, it was conversely conceived by subjecting distribution to 
the higher corporation tax rate than profit retention. This can be regarded as an additional 
evidence that the French system is primarily designed to promote the direct retention of 
corporate profits without bypassing capital markets. 
3.5. INSOLVENCY CODES ACROSS DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
3.5.1. Introduction 
An insolvency and debt recovery procedure is one of the aspects of financial architecture 
in an economy. These procedures comprise informal rules for enforcement of debt 
contract, formal laws, liquidation, bankruptcy and rehabilitation of distressed firm. 
National bankruptcy rules mainly incorporate the reorganisation and liquidation of a firm, 
and informal workout arrangements. It is fairly possible that these formal laws markedly 
differ in terms of theoretical and practical implications across different economies. In 
fact, national jurisdictions on bankruptcy procedures are very different, so that the 
existing insolvency proceedings can be divided into pro-creditor and pro-debtor related 
systems. 
67 It is the case where taxable income is lower than commercial income before tax because of timing 
differences; higher taxes are paid in later years to equalise the resulting tax expenses. If taxable income is 
higher than commercial income, less taxes will be paid later. 
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Pro-creditor related systems are systematically oriented towards the protection of 
creditors due to a debtor default. Such type of proceedings is mainly concentrated on the 
liquidation of the debtor's assets and the distribution of the proceeds realised to the 
creditors involved. Thus, these insolvency regulations are currently classified as 
liquidation procedures. Pro-debtor related systems, in contrast, are designed to save 
defaulters and their employees from the viewpoint that the creditors. That type is 
customarily called a restructuring or rehabilitation insolvency procedure, as the 
maintenance of economic activity together with the goal of finally rehabilitating the 
ailing enterprise and safeguarding the jobs at risk, has priority over the detrimental effect 
on creditor rights (Friderichs et al. [1999]). 
In the end, cross-country differences in the level of capitalisation and leverage of 
companies tend to depend directly on the legal conventions related to the priority and 
degree of protection of creditors' rights provided by the national insolvency procedures. 
Consequently, the existence ofbankruptcy laws differing from country to country should, 
undoubtedly, also be considered in financial decisions and debt contracts. 
3.5.2. Overview of Insolvency Law of the UK68 
Prior to the 1986 Insolvency Act, there possible routes were available: Liquidation, 
receivership or administrative receivership and voluntary reconstruction. With 1986 
Insolvency Act, which contains guidelines for both liquidation and reorganisation, an 
additional procedure was incorporated requiring the appointment of an administrator. 
Although this act is intended to encourage reorganisation of failing firm, the absolute 
priority is generally preserved and creditors are well-protected even in cases of the 
strongest rehabilitation processes. Strict sanctions are applied to directors of failed firms 
in that courts may impose personal liabilities to a director who has traded wrongfully. 
Banks are discouraged from participating in informal corporate rescues as a consequence 
of these sanctions stating that company's banker will also be liable in unlawful trading 
provisions. 
The liquidator is appointed by any creditor to supervise the distribution of funds to 
creditors and an orderly winding up of the business. The receiver appointed by a secured 
creditor only must have a particular type of security on the firm's assets. A receiver is 
appointed over a particular asset whereas an administrative receiver is appointed over the 
68 This section is mainly based on the studies of Franks et al. [1996], Franks and Torous [1996], Fukao 
[1995] and White [1996]. 
83 
firm's all assets. Although the liquidator and the receiver can deal with same company at 
the same time, the liquidator's appointment will generally prevent the receiver managing 
the firm as an ongoing concern as a decision. Since the decision has to be made quickly 
with insufficient data, liquidation is chosen as a potentially inefficient option in general. 
If it is clear that the firm has no going-concern value, e.g., if net cash flow is not positive, 
then the receiver will sell the assets. The responsibility of liquidator is to all creditors in 
order of priority of their claims whereas the receiver is responsible to repay the creditor 
who appointed him/her. The power of the receiver to maintain the firm as a going 
concern is greater than that of the liquidator. 
A workout can be an alternative to formal reorganisation through the insolvency 
legislation, in which case the firm's problems are resolved with the agreement of the 
principal creditors. However, the agreement is subject to approval by the court. On the 
other hand, the powers of the receiver are significant as s/he does not require permission 
from the court or from the other creditors for his/her actions. 
3.5.3. Overview of Insolvency Law of Germany69 
In general, German bankruptcy law contains a liquidation process whereas there exists no 
strong reorganisation process. It is difficult to rehabilitate a failed firm due to strong 
protection of collateral. Formal court proceedings are sought to be avoided thereby 
private arrangements among creditors and management. 
The current German insolvency procedure distinguishes between bankruptcy proceedings 
and composition proceedings. The objective of the judicial composition proceedings is to 
avoid bankruptcy by reaching a composition agreement. As 'composition proceedings' 
play virtually no role in Germany today, the German insolvency regulations can 
essentially be classified as a liquidation procedure. 
Judicial composition proceedings can only be set up with the request of the 
debtor. Unlike bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor's assets remain free from expropriation 
and continue to be administered by him/her. Before composition proceedings can be 
instituted a composition proposal has to be made which guarantees fulfilment of at least 
3 5 % of the claims of the creditors with whom a composition is being sought (at least 40 
% in the case of payment terms of more than one year). All creditors who are entitled to 
separate and recover property belonging to them from the debtor's estate or who are 
entitled to separate satisfaction from the asset are excluded from composition proceedings 
69 This section is mainly based on the studies of Delbreil et al. [2000), Franks et al. [ 1996], Friderichs et al. 
[1999), Fukao [1995] and White [1996]. 
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because their claims have to be satisfied in full in advance. Due to these preferential 
rights, the assets remaining hardly ever suffice to meet the statutory composition quotas 
of creditors who do not have preferential rights to the debtor's estate. Consequently, 
composition proceedings usually develop into bankruptcy proceedings. 
Bankruptcy proceedings can be initiated upon the application either of a creditor 
or of the debtor himself if he is insolvent or (in the case of legal persons) over-indebted. 
However, bankruptcy proceedings are initiated only if the available assets suffice to cover 
the cost of the proceedings or if the creditor pays a corresponding advance. The 
proceedings are terminated if it becomes apparent that the available assets do not suffice 
to cover the cost of the proceedings or if all the creditors agree not to seek a declaration 
of bankruptcy. Once bankruptcy proceedings are initiated, the debtor is deprived of 
access to and control over all his assets that belong to the estate, although his rights of 
ownership and possession are not affected. The liquidator appointed to administer the 
bankruptcy proceedings controls and manages the debtor's assets in his/her place. In 
parallel with this the court issues instructions to secure all the available assets, i.e. it 
places a general ban on sales of assets and seizes all the goods it can find. Any 
attachment or debt enforcement orders in favour of individual creditors are suspended for 
the duration of the bankruptcy proceedings. All that the creditors concerned can do for 
the time being is to ensure that their claims are recorded in the schedule of creditors. 
One can note that even if bankruptcy proceedings are set aside, the creditors whose 
claims have not been satisfied are free to assert their outstanding claims against the 
debtor without restriction since under German bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor is not 
freed from his residual debt. Furthermore, under the German insolvency procedure the 
claims of creditors are protected to a very large extent by the legal concepts of separation 
and separate satisfaction from the asset. 
3.5.4. Overview of Insolvency Law of France 70 
In France, the bankruptcy law of 1985 favours the rehabilitation of corporations through 
reorganisation rather than liquidation. Due to this strong emphasis, the position of 
creditors is relatively weak as compared to that of employees. Even secured creditors are 
generally forced to accept large reductions in the value of their claims in the commercial 
courts (tribunal de commerce). If the court believes that the mismanagement has caused 
the failure, the managers may be asked to make up the shortage in the net assets. 
70 This section is mainly based on the studies of Delbreil et al. [2000], Friderichs et al. [ 1999] and Fukao 
[1995]. 
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The fundamental theme of the French restructuring insolvency procedure is to save the 
ailing enterprise. The maintenance of economic activity and hence the safeguarding of the 
jobs involved is the second most important goal, whereas satisfying creditors comes only 
in third place. Despite the marked strengthening of creditors' rights introduced by the 
reform of 1994, creditor interests remain explicitly subordinated under French insolvency 
proceedings. 
The structure and sequence of the proceedings of French insolvency law show 
that it is adapted primarily towards preventing liquidation. A law introduced in 1985 
created a special early warning procedure to be applied whenever an enterprise is 
manifestly in financial difficulties. This procedure is composed to draw the management 
board's attention to imminent financial problems without notifying a third party. The 
same law introduced a procedure for the enterprise to reach an amicable settlement with 
its creditors by way of a voluntary composition agreement (eased payment terms and 
partial debt forgiveness) to avoid debt enforcement through a court. If the enterprise fails 
to reach a friendly settlement with its creditors and is no longer able to meet its 
obligations and is technically insolvent, the restructuring insolvency proceedings can be 
initiated. Following a preliminary examination by a court, an adjudication on the 
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings is given. As a result either the liquidation of the 
enterprise is ordered or an observation phase is initiated. At the end of the observation 
period a business and social assessment of the enterprise is presented containing a plan 
for restructuring or liquidation. The judicially approved restructuring plan lays down the 
modalities either for the continued operation of the enterprise by the debtor or its sale to a 
third party. However, a plan for continued operation is approved only ifthere is a genuine 
prospect of restructuring the enterprise and satisfying the claims of its creditors. The debt 
owed to the creditors is restructured. 
Debtholders agree to write off a fraction of their loan and may also agree to reschedule 
payments. By contrast, if the sale of the firm is ordered, the firm as such disappears. The 
debt and equity are totally written off. The assets of the firm are sold. The price paid by 
the company rescuer is used to repay the creditors, who cannot necessarily expect their 
claims to be satisfied in full or even in part. They share in the proceeds of the sale in 
accordance with their creditor ranking. The same priority ranking prevails in the case of 
liquidation which the court orders when there is no hope of rescuing the firm. On 
completion of the liquidation procedure, the debtor is discharged from his/her remaining 
liabilities. Unpaid creditors may take individual legal action against the debtor solely in 
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the event of fraud or personal bankruptcy. Debts are paid in the following order; senior 
preferential creditors, secured creditors, unsecured creditors, holders of subordinated 
debt, shareholders. 
A new law on the prevention and treatment of difficulties influencing businesses 
was passed in 1994. It introduced two main changes to bankruptcy law: 
a) Modernisation of the procedure, including greater transparency and tighter ethical 
standards for business reorganisations and disposals. 
b) Restoration of creditors' rights and hence of the confidence of credit institutions, often 
justified by the need to encourage business lending. 
The second aspect of the reform took the form of an extension of creditors' powers during 
the procedure by allowing them to take individual action and by improving the situation 
of creditors holding security interests on property. As well as introducing measures in 
favour of secured creditors, the law also tried to improve the lot of unsecured creditors. 
The new law caused uncertainty as to the future value of guarantees and hence of bank 
loans, bringing a number of banks about to stop lending to small and medium-sized 
businesses (SMEs). The increase in the number of business failures gave rise a 
corresponding increase in administrative costs resulting from the requirement to assert 
claims, two-thirds of them in connection with leasing business. Moreover, the 
observation period introduced by this law meant that creditors had to wait longer before 
they could recover leased assets and collateral for loans. The increase in risk borne by 
credit institutions led to a rise in the cost of borrowing for businesses. In addition, the 
banks, faced with deteriorating operating accounts, tightened their selection criteria, 
contributing further to a slowdown in lending. 
3.5.5. Insolvency Laws Compared 
In general, German bankruptcy laws allow for liquidation, but not for reorganisation; and 
collateral is strongly protected. On the other hand, in order to protect employment, 
French bankruptcy law (at least of 1985) emphasises through rehabilitation. In the UK, 
both reorganisation and liquidation are provided by bankruptcy law. As Frankel and 
Montgomery [1991] argue, there are apparent differences between Germany and the UK 
in terms of bankruptcy procedures: Bankruptcy laws in the United Kingdom penalise 
banks that form close relationships with a customer; if the customer envisages financial 
problems, the provisions impose greater losses on the bank than on other lenders. 
However, in Germany, these laws support banks against such potential losses; banks 
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often take responsibility for orgamsmg creditor coalitions for financially distressed 
companies. In Germany, a debtor is expected to present a schedule planning the 
insolvency of the firm within fifteen days of learning it, this code can be regarded as quite 
creditor friendly (Rajan and Zingales [1995]). 
Edwards and Fischer [1994] state that German insolvency law does not distinguish 
between personal and corporate bankruptcies, in contrast to the United Kingdom. As 
assets serve as collateral for loans and can be sold outside independent of legal 
bankruptcy or court procedures, a strong position is given to secured creditors in 
Germany. They further argue that German legal framework for dealing with insolvencies 
makes survival of a firm very difficult. That is, the fact that reorganisation of a firm 
having financial problems is very difficult due to lack of conviction of the management's 
quality, the secured creditors have rights to foreclose on assets collateralised for their 
claims. 
Edwards and Fischer discuss the evidence on German bank behaviour and argue the 
assumption that banks are capable of reducing the cost of fmancial distress and 
bankruptcy via close control and monitoring of the firms' management in fmancial 
difficulty are not supported by the evidence. 
Franks and Torous [1996] examine the UK Bankruptcy Code in comparison with the US 
and assert that the highly credit-oriented UK bankruptcy laws might cause too many 
'premature liquidations'. They discuss that there are incentives for firms in the United 
Kingdom to reorganise privately although the current legislation does not provide 
sufficient incentives to reorganise voluntarily. Thus, one can debate that there are 
stronger incentives to keep the firms as an ongoing concern in Germany than in the 
United Kingdom even if it is worth more in liquidation (see, Raj an and Zingales [1995]). 
Balz [1999] states that a unitary proceeding with a very large measure of creditor control 
over key issues in the course of proceeding can provide the most flexible and 
economically sensible legal framework for insolvencies in Germany. Frankel and 
Montgomery [1991] argue that the Insolvency Act of 1986 of the UK makes a fmancial 
firm liable with wrongful trading provisions for any of its directions contradicting the 
objective of minimising potential losses of the firm's creditors. 
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Table 3.5 .1: A Comparison of the Main Characteristics of the Insolvency Process in the 
UK and Germany, selected columns. (Source: Franks et al. [1996]). 
Characteristics 
Control Rights 
Solvency Requirements 
Automatic Stay Against 
Creditor Claims 
Renegotiation of Liabilities 
Constraints on Firm as a 
Going Concern 
New Financing in 
Reorganisation 
Preservation of Residual 
Claims of Equityholders 
Direct Costs 
Private Benefits of Firm's 
Shareholders 
United Kingdom: Receivership 
Creditors in control: board of directors 
steps down. Receiver has strong powers 
over the firm except concerning secured 
assets. 
Firm cannot meet payments to creditors. 
Penalties for directors who trade while 
firm is insolvent 
None is receivership. 
No discretion in receivership. 
Secured creditors can liquidate even 
if firm is worth more as a going 
concern to all creditors. 
Constrained because new fmancing will 
probably come from senior creditors and 
its junior to existing claims. 
Equity unlikely to have claim 
in receivership. 
Lower because i) short period and 
ii) court is not involved 
in the process. 
Takes no account of the private benefits 
of the distressed firm's stakeholders. 
Germany: New Code 
Creditors committee in control. 
Creditors vote on the proposed 
plan. 
Firm cannot meet payments to 
the creditors. Overindebted. 
Automatic stay for unsecured: 
minimum of three months for 
secured. 
Renegotiation may take place 
with all creditors. 
All creditors vote on plan. 
New finance can be arranged. 
Deviations can be proposes but 
must be agreed by a creditors' 
vote. 
Creditors have the ability to 
shorten procedure, but court 
heavily involved. 
May play an important role in 
the restructuring of the 
distressed firm 
Franks et al. [1996] describe the insolvency codes of Germany, the UK and the 
US and compares their efficiency based on some benchmarks. By examining the Table 
3.5.1., one can realise the clear differences between insolvency codes: 
i) Control Rights: In the UK, absolute control is given to the secured creditor in 
receivership over the asset his/her debt has a lien. This prevents receivers appointed by 
creditors from using asset to maintain the firm as a going concern. The debtor has few 
controls in insolvency. 
In Germany, no participation of secured creditors is required in compulsory liquidation 
(Konkursordnung) or composition proceedings (Vergleichsordnung). Therefore, the 
rights of insolvency administrator (raising new senior financing, maintaining the firm as a 
going concern, staying unsecured claims) are voided by secured creditor's right to take 
possession of assets. 
ii) Solvency Requirements: If there is a default on the debt covenants (requirement of 
minimum financial ratios, e.g., debt-equity ratio), the creditor can appoint a receiver in 
the UK. The receiver can exercise his/her control rights provided an administration right 
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is given by the court under the conditions that a) the firm cannot pay its debt and b) the 
whole or part of the firm may survive as a going concern or liquidation is not efficient. In 
Germany, statutory bankruptcy proceedings start if the firm is overindebted (book value 
of liabilities is greater than market value of assets) such that it will not meet its 
obligations even in the future or cannot repay its creditors. Due to strict entry 
requirements of composition proceedings, their use is seldom. Another reason for rare use 
is that as most assets are collateral secured creditors' cooperation is needed to enter 
composition. As a result, German bankruptcy laws may lead to more going concerns of 
corporations. 
iii) Automatic Stay Against Creditors' Claims: The receivership code in the UK holds on 
automatic stay provisions and secured creditors may lead premature liquidations by 
repossessing their assets. As the administrator represents all the creditors in the UK, the 
potential conflicts in receivership are mitigated. In Germany, there is a three-month 
automatic stay against all claims. 
iv) Management of Liabilities: In the UK, quite little discretion in renegotiating the 
distressed firms' liabilities is given to the receiver who represents the interests of only one 
creditor. However, as there exists court-administered process to obtain the creditors' 
agreements concerning new financing arrangements, the court-appointed administrator 
holds more discretion in managing liabilities. In Germany, the insolvency administrator 
can redeem a creditor's claim in cash to prevent the potential asset repossession. 
Therefore, a renegotiation of all claims against the distressed firm is permitted by 
German bankruptcy laws. 
v) Liquidation versus Going-Concern Value: In the UK, the receiver may liquidate a firm 
without the approval of the court or other creditors. Thus, inefficient liquidations are 
likely to occur due to given emphasis on creditors' rights. Although the current German 
code allows secured creditors to take possession of the firm's assets in the form of the 
firm's termination, the insolvency administrator has still effective powers to keep the firm 
as a going-concern. 
vi) Bankruptcy Financing: In the UK, the receiver can raise additional funds junior to the 
existing loans to finance the distressed firms continuing operations during bankruptcy. 
Yet, especially large firms try to avoid court-administered process due to difficulties of 
arranging new funds and lack of automatic stay. Consequently, underinvestment 
problems might occur due to lack of incentive of raising junior new financing. It is also 
possible to raise new financing in current German Code. 
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vii) Deviations From Absolute Priority: The adherence to the priority and speedy 
settlements of claims is allowed in the UK Code. The deviations are substantial in 
workouts (especially with bank creditors) whereas no deviation in receivership is found 
based on the empirical study of Olsen [1996]. In Germany, large deviations may occur 
particularly in favour of unsecured creditors. Recontracting can be reflected in wealth 
transfers between the parties measured as deviation from absolute priority. In this vein, 
although to little extent, the UK receivership system leads recontracting, which is not 
encouraged in German system. 
viii) Direct Costs of Each System: In the UK, the lack of communication between the 
receiver and creditors makes the receivership process relatively fast, sometimes it takes 
only several weeks. As it stipulates the agreement of creditors to any plan of 
reorganisation, administration takes longer in the UK. In essence, the UK code was 
developed to reduce bankruptcy costs. On the other hand, in Germany, the current 
liquidation process can be very costly and lengthy as unsecured creditors cannot easily 
terminate the proceedings. The new German code allows creditors to liquidate the 
distressed firm after the compulsory stay of three-months. In the UK, the low costs are in 
favour of large firms and small firms are disadvantaged because of economies of scale. In 
Germany, legal and administrative costs tend to be low at the expense ofunderinvestment 
problems. 
ix) Private Benefits of Creditors and Other Stakeholder: In Germany, as the debtor stays 
in control, private benefits become significant in resolving financial distress. Externalities 
are taken into consideration by insolvency administrators due to the existence of 'social' 
prestige and benefits of keeping the German firms as running in the business. In the UK, 
the private benefits of stakeholders are not given importance. 
In the course of emphasising the significance of the different bankruptcy 
procedures in affecting capital structure of firms, Berkovitch and Israel [1999] provide 
optimal bankruptcy laws in terms of fundamental differences across economic regimes. 
They propose, on the one hand, an optimal bankruptcy law for developed countries with a 
bank-oriented system (e.g., Germany) where information acquisition technologies are 
well-developed and most of the financing is done through banks, can be attained with the 
inclusion of a 'creditor' chapter only. On the other hand, an optimal bankruptcy law for 
developed countries with a market-oriented system (e.g., the UK) where information 
acquisition technologies are well-developed and the financing is mostly arm's length, can 
be attained with the inclusion of both 'creditor chapter and debtor chapter'. As for 
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underdeveloped countries (e.g., Brazil, Thailand) having poor information acquisition 
techniques and concentrated financing, again, the inclusion of both 'creditor chapter and 
debtor chapter' is suggested. In case of potential inefficient liquidations, more protection 
is given to managers in underdeveloped countries than in market-dominated systems by 
including debtor chapter. 
What Rajan and Zingales [1995] state is not in contrast with the hypotheses ofBerkovitch 
and Israel [1999] in that virtually all ofthe G-7 countries have a creditor chapter whereby 
the creditor can file for bankruptcy, the debtor loses control and the firm is liquidated by 
a third party. In France, the bankruptcy code consists of a creditor chapter only whereas 
in the UK there also exists debtor chapter whereby debtor files for bankruptcy and stay in 
control during the bankruptcy proceedings. German Code seems not clear in terms of the 
effectiveness of debtor chapter as both debtors and creditors can file for liquidation and 
only debtor can file for reorganisation. 
White [1996] examines comparatively the bankruptcy procedures of US and 
Europe (France, Germany, and the UK): At least a mandatory period of six months under 
a court-appointed outside administrator is required for liquidation decisions of French 
firms. If liquidation is decided, then bankruptcy judge appoints a liquidator to sell the 
firm's assets. It is again bankruptcy judge who adopts rehabilitation plans if decision is to 
save the firm. Hence, creditors in France have little dominance on the reorganisation 
process. However, liquidation generally occurs outside of bankruptcy with non-collective 
procedure in Germany and in the UK. As filing for bankruptcy in Germany is costly, 
bankruptcy courts reject many bankruptcy petitions owing to the fact that firms have 
insufficient assets to afford to the costs. The primary objective of French bankruptcy code 
is to 'safeguard the business' and maintain the firm's operations. To aid the failing firms to 
reorganise is emphasised most by French bankruptcy code among the German and British 
ones. 
Recently, Friderichs et al. [1999] compare the insolvency procedures of France 
and Germany. In contrast to the provisions of French insolvency law, certain categories 
of creditors in Germany (especially the banks) enjoy extensive protection against bad 
debt losses in the event of bankruptcy since, by making use of the provisions of current 
bankruptcy legislation, they can limit their default risk to a large extent (not least to the 
detriment of unsecured creditors) by establishing liens to real property and movable 
goods. In France, a comparable protection from bad debt losses in the event of 
bankruptcy exists only for the simple reservation of ownership and (at least following the 
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reform of 1994) for creditors with rights of lien. As a consequence, the insolvency losses 
of French banks are considerably larger than those of their German competitors. If the 
growing trend towards the over-securitisation of lending risks that has been evident in 
recent years is also taken into account, the real loss rates sustained by German institutions 
is probably even lower. Yet, the downside of the extremely creditor-friendly provisions 
of German insolvency legislation is that the bankrupt's estate is systematically depleted 
by the right to separation and the right to preferential satisfaction enjoyed by privileged 
creditors, with the result that fewer than 0.5 %of insolvency cases lead to composition 
proceedings in more than 70 % of cases. 
3.6. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ACROSS COUNTRIES 
3.6.1. Introduction 
The separation of ownership and control in the corporations is the main theme of 
corporate governance to set to work. It generally deals with the divergence of interests 
between the managers and shareholders, misallocation of resources, under-performance 
of firms to get optimal performance out of managers. Corporate governance systems are 
markedly important in economic life as they influence the mechanism of the returns on 
investment by firm's external financiers and growth rates in real output. According to the 
conventional wisdom, the corporate governance systems operating in different countries 
are distinct. This can be attributed to the facts of different development of individual 
economies, factor markets, legal structures, public and private institutions. It is believed 
that the US and the UK corporate laws ensure that corporations operate for the benefit of 
shareholders whereas the Continental Europe (e.g., France and Germany) laws require 
that corporations operate for that of common shareholders, creditors, workers and the 
society. For instance, unlike for British managers, there is no duty for German managers 
to maximise the value of shares as they may and must consider the interests of 
employees, creditors and the community. Edwards and Nibler [2000] argue that corporate 
governance systems differ significantly even in developed countries. It is asserted that 
German corporate governance is designed more efficiently to reduce corporate 
governance problems (e.g., asymmetric information problems and monitoring costs) than 
the Anglo-American system. Moreover, in their survey article, Shleifer and Vishny 
[1997] conclude that the corporate governance systems in Germany, Japan and the USA 
are more effective than the other ones elsewhere due to the combination of large 
shareholders and a legal system protecting investor rights. Similarly, based on the study 
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of La Porta et al. [1998], one can contend that the quality of shareholder and credit rights 
are lowest in France; shareholder rights are highest in the UK; and credit rights are 
highest in Germany considering these three countries. 
The following sections discuss the different corporate governance structures based on 
their administrative structures, role of shareholders, market for corporate control 
mechanisms, management compensation and ownership concentration. 
3.6.2. The Main Corporate Governance Systems 71 
The variations in corporate governance systems can be attributed to the differences in 
how and why countries allocate power among participants in the firm as well as the roles 
of institutional investors, financial institutions, and markets in limiting managerial 
discretion and monitoring. A range of national differences in practice and law exists on 
these issues, e.g., the role of managers, lenders and labour; the effect of different qualities 
of capital markets in corporate performance. As a result, the following section will 
discuss the most dominant corporate governance systems in the world. 
3.6.2.1. The Outsider Model 
This model can also be called as capital market-based or shareholder-market model. The 
USA and the UK are typical countries for this model. The rights of shareholders 
concerning the control of company and shaping the board of directors are clearly 
supported by corporate laws in these countries. Regulations are formed to provide as 
complete information as possible to the market so that the investors can be equally 
informed about the current state of firms through this disclosure-based system to make 
precise decisions. As it relies on a liquid capital market with disciplinary mechanism, the 
heart of this system is the market for corporate control by buying shares and establishing 
a controlling majority and threatening with takeovers The discernible features of this type 
of model: 
1. Dispersed equity ownership with large institutional investors. 
2. Recognised dominance of shareholder interest. 
3. Strong emphasis on the protection of minority investors. 
4. Relatively strong requirements for disclosure. 
5. Dominant ownership of industry by institutional investors. 
71 This section is mainly based on the studies of Alcouffe [2000], Allen and Gale [1999], Boehmer [1999], 
Cunningham [2000], Franks and Mayer [1990], Fukao [1995], Krainer [1997], Nestor and Thompson 
[2000], Prowse [1994], Schmidt and Tyrell [1997]. 
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6. Borrowings from banks tend to be short-term and there IS "arm's length" 
relationship between banks and their corporate clients. 
7. Equity financing is relatively important with low debt-equity ratios and high 
equity-GDP ratios. 
8. Control of the firm is difficult due to the fragmentation of ownership among 
shareholders. Thus, in case of poor management and neglecting shareholders' 
value, hostile takeovers become common. 
9. The distant relationships between shareholders and relatively less permanent 
incumbent managers exacerbate the agency problems thereby leading poor 
corporate performance because of managers' short-term strategies. 
10. A large number of listed companies and relatively few cross-holdings of equity 
between companies. 
3.6.2.2. The Insider Model 
This model is also called network system or bank-labour model. France and Germany are 
included in this type of corporate governance. Here, the ownership and control are closely 
held by insiders who have long-term relationships with the firm. Insider group members 
are small in number and have some connections to the company. The basis of group is the 
combination of family interests, industrial concerns, banks and holding companies. 
Supervisory board, composed of representatives of the different stakeholders, performs 
the task of aligning interests and control the management. 
The discernible features of this type of model: 
1. Because of the close relationships, agency problems are relatively less important. 
Thus, cost of capital tends to be lower. 
2. There is relatively less institutionalisation in terms of owning corporations since 
such institutions face regulatory limits to invest in equity. 
3. There is a high dependency upon bank financing in corporate finance patterns of 
this bank-centred system. Thus, debt-equity ratios are high. 
4. Banks have more complex and longer-term relationships with corporate clients, 
unlike arms' length lenders. As the same bank can occupy seats as both 
debtholder and shareholder, the potential conflict of interests disappear. In 
general, capital markets are less developed. 
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5. Relatively weak requirements for disclosure persist due to selective exchange of 
information among insiders. 72 
6. Insiders can control the company by owning either an outright majority of voting 
shares or significant minority holding. 
7. Concentrated equity ownership with small institutional investors. 
8. Apart from shareholder interests, there exist wage-setting policies and worker 
protection. 
9. Market for corporate control plays a minor role and there are relatively many 
cross-holdings of equity. Thus, there are relatively few listed companies. 
3.6.3. The Governance Mechanisms 
3.6.3.1. Board of Directors 
It is common in all countries that the board of directors is responsible for monitoring 
management on behalf of shareholders to make sure that the company is run in their 
interest. However, the way that boards are structured and chosen differs substantially 
across countries. 
In Germany, there exists a two-tiered (board of managing directors and supervisory 
board) nature of boards to formalise the different roles of outside and inside directors. 
No one can be a member of both ties and cross-company board memberships are 
restricted. The supervisory board, as being controlling body, consists of people outside 
the current management while the management board consists of serving managers. 
Supervisory board appoints the management board and monitors business strategy of 
managers. Management board formulates and implements operating strategy and 
financing strategy of firms. The practical importance of directors' liability under 
German Law seems to be limited. As a distinctive particularity, banks representing both 
themselves and their trustees are almost always on the board and often provide the 
chairman. Informational problems are minimised by including former managers on the 
supervisory board. In firms with more than 2,000 employees, shareholders elect half the 
supervisory board and employees elect the other half. Thus, labour representation in 
management is strongest in Germany considering France and the UK. 
72 Kleimeier-Ros and Whidbee [2001) argue that despite the effort to limit insider trading (e.g., the 
collusion of managers and large blockholders), inefficiencies still exist in improving fmancial transparency 
in Germany. 
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In the UK, there is a single-tiered boards of structure meaning that shareholders directly 
elect the members of the boards of directors. These members are elected for relatively 
short periods (usually three years). They can be removed by the shareholders with a 
simple majority vote. As the share ownership is so diffuse, the board is effectively 
chosen by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). It is argued that British (broadly, Anglo-
American) boards might be more assertive in their monitoring role if they were 
restructured along the lines of German supervisory board. Due to the existence of large 
shareholders and creditors motivated to protect their investment in Germany, British 
Corporate governance is regarded as less successful and effective. 
In France, both single-tiered and two-tiered boards are allowed but single-tiered 
structure tends to dominate. In case of two-tiered structure, the members of the 
supervisory board are appointed by the shareholders' meeting and employees cannot 
elect members. The supervisory board appoints the members of the executive board. A 
member of supervisory board can be removed by a simple majority vote in the 
shareholders' meeting. In the case of single-tiered structure, shareholders can dismiss 
any director of the board. In both French and German two-tiered systems, the board of 
managing directors is more insulated from the pressures of shareholders than in British 
single-tiered structure. Furthermore, employee rights are greater in France than in UK 
but less than in Germany. 
Among European countries, France is characterised by comparatively strong power 
structure as the same person both presides over meetings and assumes general 
management control. There are sets of French companies in a hierarchical order of 
control tied together by complex financial links and controlled by a sole centre. 
3.6.3.2. Executive Compensation 
Appropriate compensation policies are useful in ensuring that managers pursue the 
shareholders' interests even if the board cannot completely dictate the managers' action. 
Management compensation is an internal device, which consists of paying management 
for their performance using, e.g., cash bonuses, salary revisions, stock options to 
provide an incentive to maximise shareholders' wealth. 
In German family-founded corporations, management has a clear incentive related to its 
own wealth to maximise value. However, management ownership in such firms not-
majority owned by individuals appears low. In the UK, management ownership seems 
fairly substantial, which makes managers be more entrenched and less responsive to 
shareholders interests than otherwise. In Germany, compensation of the member of the 
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supervisory board is determined by the shareholders and compensation of managing 
board by the supervisory board. In France, total compensation for directors or members 
of supervisory board is decided by shareholders ' annual meeting. Likewise, 
remuneration of the directors is determined by a shareholders' meeting in the UK. 
An empirical study, by Goodhart [1992], of salaries plus bonuses of the highest paid 
directors in the largest UK firms shows a weak relationship between executive 
compensation and corporate performance. In addition, Kaplan [1993a, 1993b] analyses 
the relationship between the turnover of top executives of largest firms in the USA, Japan 
and Germany in line with their stock performance, sales growth, net income and changes 
in pretax income. Income losses and poor stock returns are found to increase the 
likelihood of top management turnover in three countries. 
3.6.3.3. Corporate Ownership Structure 
The concentration of ownership and the identity of large shareholders constitute corporate 
ownership structure, which is important in determining how managers are disciplined. If 
a firm is diffusely held by a large number of shareholders, monitoring of management by 
shareholders becomes unattractive as the amount of stake per shareholder is small. On the 
other hand, if a firm is sufficiently concentrated by a few large shareholders, monitoring 
becomes worthy. If there is concentrated equity ownership, which is potentially more 
powerful than concentrated debt, firms tend to pay out more dividends. La Porta et al. 
[ 1999] report that, in countries where shareholders protection is high (especially the USA 
and the UK), publicly-traded company ownership is both widely held and the ownership 
by state and family do not exist, contrary to the countries where shareholders protection is 
relatively weak (e.g., France and Germany). Similarly, Modigliani and Perotti [2000] 
argue that a sign of strong shareholders protection (low voting premium) makes equity 
markets greater and reduces the dominance of bank lending. 
If we look at the statistics illustrated in the tables below, substantial differences 
can be realised across countries. First of all, the number of listed corporations and the size 
of their market capitalisation relative to the size of the economy have always been much 
greater in the UK (market-oriented country) than in Germany (bank-oriented country) and 
France (seemingly, in between) (Table 3.6.1). One can also say that the UK has more 
fragmented and less stable ownership structure than those of France and Germany where 
there are substantial deviations from 'one-share-one-vote' paradigm. 
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Table 3.6.1: Banking Sector and Stock Market Indicators of Selected Countries. 
(Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 2000-2001). 
Market Value Turnover 
Countries Capitalisation Traded Ratio 
$-billions % of GOP % of GOP 
1990 1999 1990 1998 1990 1998 1990 1999 
France 314.4 991.5 26.3 69.5 9.8 40.1 n.a 68.7 
Germany 355.1 1093.9 22.9 
The UK 848.9 2374.3 87.0 
51.3 22.1 65.2 139.3 144.9 
174.9 28.6 86.0 33.3 53.4 
Listed 
Companies 
1990 1999 
578 711 
413 741 
1701 2399 
Bank 
Credit 
% ofGDP 
1990 1999 
106.1 103.1 
108.5 146.9 
123.0 129.1 
Market Capitalisation: The share price times the number of shares outstanding. Value Traded: The total value 
of shares traded during the period. Turnover Ratio: The total value of shares traded during the period divided 
by the average market capitalisation (average of the end-of-period values for the current and past values) for 
the period. Listed Companies: The number of domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's 
stock exchanges at the end of the year. This indicator does not include investment companies, mutual funds or 
other collective investment vehicles. Bank Credit: Domestic credit provided by the banking sector. 
Moreover, because of virtual absence of restrictions on investors taking large equity 
shares of corporations, ownership concentration is much higher in Germany than in the 
UK (Table 3.6.2). Although it is argued that the larger the firm, the greater the cost of 
achieving a given fraction of ownership, this is not the case in Table 3.6.2. Hence, the 
low levels of concentration observed in the UK might be due to the legal and regulatory 
factors of large institutional investors (e.g., taking a large and active position in a firm 
might be costly). It is important to note that, in Germany where there is no effective 
market for corporate control, highly concentrated share-ownership can be a good 
motivation to monitor the firm due to agency problems 73 • 
73 According to Raj an and Zingales [1995], the effect of ownership concentration is not clear. Agency costs 
can be reduced by the existence of large shareholders on the board of directors however, since there might 
be some banks as shareholders, the firm may not resort to external borrowing but might be enforced to 
borrow from that bank. Yet, Frankel and Montgomery [1991] support the residual claimant of banks by 
holding equity to make value-increasing decisions. McConnell and Servaes [1995] find that the allocation 
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Table 3.6.2.: Ownership concentration of large non-financial corporations, selected 
countries (Source: Prowse [1994]). 
Germany The UK 
Mean 41.5 20.9 
Median 37.0 15.1 
Standard Deviation 14.5 16.0 
Minimum 15.0 5.0 
Maximum 89.6 87.7 
Mean Firm Size1 (US$-millions, 1980) 3483 1031 
Mean Firm Size2 (US$-millions, 1980) 1497 n.a. 
Measured by total assets. Measured by market value of equity. 
Sample: Germany; 41 non-financial corporations in 1990 and 
UK; 85 manufacturing corporations in 1970. 
Table 3.6.3 shows the role of institutional investors and distribution of share 
ownership among three countries. On one hand, the percentage of share ownership by 
insurance companies and pension funds is about five times greater in the UK than it is in 
other countries. The private pension funds having strong positions in the UK behave as 
fund managers and criticised to cause short-term investment and trading relationships. 
British institutional investors are also more influential in terms of their financial assets 
and their shares in the stock market relative to the size of the economy than German and 
French ones. On the other hand, most of the shares of German corporations are held by 
non-financial institutions rather than financial sector, where the position of non-financial 
sector is dramatically low in the UK74 • France is in the middle case in terms ofthe share 
of non-financial institutions. In France, there is high weight of family and State control 
over firms and the main categories of ownership is the firms' owners and non-financial 
companies. As for the banking sector, Germany has the highest percentage of share 
ownership, where, again, France seems to be a middle case where banks are neither the 
dominant investors in large non-financial enterprises nor the primary monitor. It is known 
that small enterprises owned and controlled mostly by family members and close 
business associates are dominant in France. Unlike in the UK, such types of shareholders 
are interested more in long-term relationship in Germany75• 
of equity ownership is more important for low-growth firms than high-growth ones in affecting corporate 
value. 
74 Allen and Gale [ 1999] argue that the data on concentration of ownership seem to understate the 
significance of the bank's effective position. It is because many bank customers keep their shares 'on-
deposit' at banks and allow banks to exercise their proxies on their behalf. Consequently, banks control a 
higher proportion of voting equity and have more representation on boards of large industrial enterprises. 
75 It is important to note that Edwards and Nib1er [2000] report sort of conflicting evidence that German 
banks play no role in fmns' corporate governance and German firms make very little use of bank loan 
finance. 
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Table 3.6.3.: Panel a) Distribution of Outstanding Listed Corporate Equity among 
Different Categories of Shareholders, selected countries (percent at year-end 1996). 
(Source: Nestor and Thompson [2000]). 
Owner France German~ The UK 
Financial Sector 30 30 68 
Banks 7 10 1 
Insurance Companies and Pension funds 9 12 50 
Investment Funds 11 8 8 
Others 3 9 
Non-financial Entreprises 19 42 1 
Public Authorities 2 4 1 
Households 23 15 21 
Rest of the World 25 9 9 
Total 100 100 100 
Panel b) Institutional Investor's Financial Assets in 1995. (Source: 
OECD [1997], Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook.) 
Countries US$-billion Percent of GDP Percent held 
in equities 
France 1158.8 75.3 22 
Germany 1132.2 46.1 12 
The UK 1788.7 162.3 69 
Panel c) Institutional investors' Share of Stock Market, percent in mid-1997. 
(Source: OECD Economic Surveys [1998]; The United Kingdom). 
France Germany The UK 
All institutions as percent of market 39.8 39.0 76.5 
Top-25 institutions as percent of market 14.4 9.5 31.9 
Top-25 institutions as percent of institutions 24.1 24.4 41.7 
Another difference stems from the level and form of impediments to corporate 
restructuring in these countries. In France, there are few impediments to shareholder 
control although some restrictions exist in the transfer of ownership due to government 
intervention and concentration of voting rights. In Germany, limitations on transferability 
of ownership are less highlighted but the transfer of control is restricted by the power of 
banks, workers and managers. In the UK, yet, the transfer of both ownership and control 
is slightly restricted by few impediments. 
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3.6.3.4. Market For Corporate Control 
The threat of an unwanted takeover is generally recognised an important mechanism by 
which capital markets ensure management discipline in maximising firms' value. A 
bidder, through a takeover, can pay more for the firm's shares than its current market 
price in order to control the company. Hence, it is believed that takeovers can facilitate 
the transfer of firms' control from inefficient to efficient management. There are three 
main ways by which market for corporate control can operate. First one is 'proxy contests' 
in which there is a group of shareholders trying to convince the remaining shareholders to 
act in cooperation with them and unseat the existing board of directors. 'Friendly mergers' 
is the second way, which occurs when both firms agree that their combination would 
value more. The last one is 'hostile takeovers', which occurs when there is conflict 
between the acquirers and acquirees over, e.g., the price that should be paid and the 
policy effectiveness to be implemented. 
Not surprisingly after all, there are considerable differences in the occurrences of 
takeovers across countries. One of the most striking differences between continental 
Europe and Anglo-American financial systems could be in the frequency of takeovers 
driven by management failure, as the market for corporate control is much more active in 
the latter system. Although the hostile takeovers are virtually unknown or rare in 
Germany and France, they are commonplace in the United Kingdom, where the presence 
of a well-developed market for corporate control induces firms to maintain higher 
dividend distributions in order to avert the danger of being taken-over. As being the 
evidence, Table 3.6.4 would be useful to quantify these statements. 
Table 3.6.4: The Market for Corporate Control Transactions 
for Different Systems (Source: Prowse [1994]). 
Germany The UK Rest of Europe 
Volume (US$-billions) 1 4.2 107.6 n.a. 
As a percentage of 
total market capitalisation 1 2.3 18.7 n.a. 
Hostile Takeovers2 n.a 37.1 9.6 
Leveraged Buyouts2 n.a 5.9 2.7 
Average annual volume of completed domestic mergers and corporate transactions 
with disclosed values, 1985-89. 
2 As a percentage of all attempted transactions, 1985-89. 
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Further evidence is reported in Table 3.6.5, which depicts large and increasing level of 
cross-border acquisitions. Overall, the UK is net purchaser of overseas firms during 
1987-88, Germany is a net seller of domestic firms during 1987-88 and France in balance 
in 1987 and net purchaser in 1988. Another difference is that while Germany and France 
have bought European firms, British firms have acquired North American firms. 
Table 3.6.5: Cross-border Takeovers for the UK, Germany and France (Source: Franks 
and Mayer [1990]). 
The UK Germany France 
North North North 
Years Total America Europe Total America Europe Total America Europe 
Sellers 
1987 138 32 83 269 54 190 178 43 127 
1988 230 40 155 360 83 250 235 51 170 
Buyers 
1987 427 256 156 137 43 85 194 58 133 
1988 767 390 260 180 53 109 372 82 277 
Franks and Mayer [1990] contend that there is a very different pattern of both ownership 
and control changes between France, Germany and the UK due to differences in 
regulation, company law, labour law, competition policy and stock exchange rules. On 
the other hand, they argue that the most important distinction between France, Germany 
and the UK does not lie in the level of takeover activity but in the nature, whether hostile 
or friendly takeovers. They state that in the UK, there is an active market in hostile 
takeovers, and there are more serious regulatory and institutional impediments to hostile 
acquisitions in Germany than in France. 
Mayer [1990] argues that, instead of the arguments 'taxation differentials and 
asymmetric information between managers and shareholders', the theories of 'corporate 
control' can best explain the differences between financial systems of countries. Thus, it 
would be important to find out the reasons for these differences. According to a common 
belief, the main reason is the more conductive legal impediments and regulatory 
restrictions on takeover attempts in France and Germany than in the UK. Beside this, the 
level of ownership concentration is higher in Germany than in the United Kingdom; that 
is why hostile takeovers are almost unheard in Germany where there are active owner-
investors. In addition, the existence of cross-shareholdings in Germany and France, and 
shareholder voting rules, the ability of large shareholders to monitor management and 
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strong labour participation in Germany makes it difficult to acquire the sufficient shares 
for a takeover. 
Control theories are also relevant to medium-sized firms, which raise appreciably more 
equity finance from stock markets in the UK than in Germany. Mayer also notes that 
large German firms enjoy a considerable 'degree of autonomy' for their financial 
operations thereby retaining a higher proportion of their self-generated funds than the 
large UK firms. He further argues that while large UK firms raise more new equity 
finance than large German firms, they also spend more of it on takeover activity. 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
It seems clear that France, Germany and the United Kingdom have specific financial and 
economic structures markedly differing from each other. While financial and tax 
accounting are interlinked in Germany, it is clearly separated in the UK in which the 
disclosed information reveals best about the economic reality of the firm. The value 
relevance and the outside demand of financial-accounting data is lower for French and 
German corporations. As for taxation, due to historical developments taxation systems 
have taken different implications in these countries. German Prudence system leads to 
undervaluation of assets and overvaluation of liabilities. The principles of tax 
deductibility and deferred taxation are sufficiently different to affect firm's financial 
ratios. Furthermore, it is the French bankruptcy procedures which mostly emphasise to 
safeguard the failing firm. In the UK, the direct bankruptcy costs tend to be lower and the 
design of insolvency procedures might cause premature liquidations. In Germany, it is 
difficult to rehabilitate the failing firm due to strong protection of collateral. Because of 
the two-tiered corporate governance system in Germany, labour management 
representation is strongest in this country. In the shareholder-based British corporate 
governance system, potential agency costs are higher than in Germany and France where 
there is a stakeholder approach. Although market for corporate control is important in the 
UK, there is a lack of long-term relationship between the firms and their creditors. 
Ownership concentration is much higher in Germany than in the UK where there are 
large institutional investors. On the other hand, the family and state control over the firms 
is highest in France. 
At the end of the comparative discussion of country-specific institutional factors 
in detail, it seems we have come to the point to assert that, apart from firm-specific 
factors, corporate policies are also influenced by the domestic institutional environments 
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where firms operate. Having investigated the financial structures of the countries, the 
following related empirical chapters will be good opportunity to assess how important the 
distinct financial structures are in affecting firms' fmancial strategies. 
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4. CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY FOR DYNAMIC PANEL DATA 
ANALYSIS 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In financial economics, there are many areas and relevant theories which should be 
investigated using dynamic panel data due to their nature. By this way, one can discover 
the dynamics of adjustment process more systematically in these areas. In this chapter, 
we will first discuss the adjustment process with an appropriate model using first-
differences technique. This will be further elaborated in the framework of error-
correction mechanism in the penultimate section. In the next step, there will be an 
elaboration of alternative estimation methodologies in order to obtain the best 
econometric procedure which will result in consistent and efficient estimates for the 
models. Specifically, we will discuss the properties of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
Anderson-Hsiao Instrumental Variable technique, and Generalised Methods of Moments 
(GMM) methodology interacted with models in levels and first-differenced equations. 
Having discussed the superiority of GMM in dynamic panel data studies, there will be 
further discussion of how to improve the GMM results by using additional instruments. 
In the end, this chapter aims to document why we have chosen the GMM methodology to 
be the best estimation technique for our empirical purposes. 
4.2. THE ADJUSTMENT MODEL 
In economic theory, there exist some flexible accelerator models which deal with, in 
equilibrium, whether there is an optimal, desired or long-run value of a dependent 
variable given explanatory variable(s). Consider the following simple model; 
(4.1) 
where Y1* is the "unobservable" desired level of Yt at timet. The disturbance term u1 is 
assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero and variance ci. As this target level 
is not directly observable, the following stock adjustment or partial adjustment model 
can be considered: 
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(4.2) 
or 
~=a~·+ (1-B)~-~ (4.3) 
According to this hypothesis, ~ - ~-1 is actual change and ~· - ~-1 is desired change. 8 
is the coefficient of speed or degree of adjustment, such that 8 > 0. Thus, the model 
assumes that the actual change in Y at time t is some fraction 8 of the desired change. 
Alternatively, one can state that the actual value ofY at timet is the weighted average of 
the desired value of Y at time t and actual value of Y at time t-1. Thus, the level of Y is 
adjusted overtime with the amount of underlying adjustment coefficient. If 8 > 1, 
optimality is not attained due to over-adjustment, and the lagged coefficient is not stable 
and diverging from its target value. If 8 < 1, the optimal level is not achieved due to the 
slower adjustment than required but the lagged coefficient is stable and converging to its 
target value. If 8 = 1, there has been a complete adjustment within one period and the 
target level is attained (see, e.g., Banerjee et al. [2000]). A positive and highly significant 
coefficient of the lagged variable can be regarded as the confirmation of dynamic 
specification. 
Substituting (4.1) into (4.3), we get (4.4); 
(4.4) 
More precisely, 
~=~+~~-~+~X, +e, (4.5) 
It is important to note that Et has the same properties with Ut. Otherwise, the existence of 
autocorrelation can cause downward bias in estimated adjustment speeds. Likewise, one 
might not distinguish between a model with strong (little) serial correlation and fast 
(slow) adjustment (see, Blinder [1986]). 
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4.3. A CRITIQUE OF ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES 
One can extend ( 4.5) by including k exogenous variables into this partial 
adjustment model and furthermore arrange it for panel data studies (t stands for time and i 
stands for an individual, say, firm): 
r;<,> = A,r;<,-I> + LA.kXkit +vi+ v, + "u 
k=2 
(4.6) 
Here, vi represents 'unobservable' individual firm-specific effects (e.g., performance of 
managers, reputation, capital intensity, growth opportunities) which do not change 
overtime. Similarly, Vt represents some effects (e.g., stagflation, interest rates, inflation 
rate, demand shocks) which are common to all firms and can change through time. Bit is 
the third component of the model's error term affecting individual i during time t. 
According to Hsiao [1985], OLS methodology would result in biased coefficients in (4.6) 
because of the assumptions that Vi is not directly observable, and of the correlation 
between unobservable firm-specific effects and regressors [Cov (Vi, xkit) # of6. Since yi(t-
1) is correlated with Vi, this would be another reason for the inconsistent estimation of 
coefficients. In order to get rid of these problems, one could take the first differences 
thereby eliminating time-invariant fixed effects (vi) and get (4.7). 
L1Y(it) = A.IL1Y;<,-I> + LA.kMku + L1v, + L1cu 
k=2 
(4.7) 
However, the OLS estimators (A,k's) are still inefficient because there is a correlation 
between L1Eit and L1 Yi(t-1) due to the terms Ei(t-1) and Yi(t-1t. OLS method leads to another 
estimation problem as it assumes that all the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. 
Yet, this is a naive presumption since the random events affecting the dependent variable 
is likely to have influence on the independent variables as well. For this case, Anderson 
and Hsiao (1982) propose instrumental variables (IV) technique such that L1 Yi(t-2) or Yi(t-2) 
can be used as instruments for L1 Yi(t-1)· It is because L1 Yi(t-2) or Yi(t-2) is correlated with 
76 Blundell and Bond [1999], for instance, also argue that the likely sources of bias in the OLS estimator are 
unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. 
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11 Yi(t-1) but not with 11Eit· If Eit is not serially correlated per se, the IV estimation results will 
be consistent. Yet, they might not be efficient estimators since IV technique does not use 
all the related moment conditions. 
Consequently, Arellano and Bond [1991] suggest another technique, Generalised 
Methods of Moments (GMM) with which they link the IV procedure to improve 
efficiency. They argue that GMM estimation utilises additional instruments arising from 
using the orthogonality conditions between the disturbances and the lagged values of 
dependent variable (see next section). In general, one can find a GMM estimator of the 
true parameter by finding the element of the parameter space which sets linear 
combination of the sample cross products 'as close to zero as possible' (Hansen [1982]). 
Thus, the advantage of GMM stems from the fact that it optimally exploits all the linear 
moment restrictions specified by the model78• It is argued that E(EitEit-1) in (4.7) is not 
necessarily zero but it is strictly assumed that E(EitEit-2) is zero as the consistency of GMM 
procedure (GMM-DIF) is based on the absence of second-order correlation in differences 
and that of first-order correlation in levels. Assuming that the disturbances are not 
correlated, it is expected that 11Eit is orthogonal to the past history of the variables x and y 
so that (Yit-2, Yit-3, ... Xit-2, Xit-3, .. .) can be used as valid instruments for 11Eit· If Eit follows a 
MA (1) process, the first valid instruments start from the third lag not from the second 
since the differenced disturbances follow an MA (2) process. As a result, it is essential to 
make sure that there is no higher-order serial correlation to have a valid set of instruments 
independent from the residuals, which can be investigated by the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions (see Sargan [1958] and Hansen [1982]). 
This two-step GMM methodology can control for the correlation of errors overtime, 
heteroscedasticity across firms, simultaneity and measurement errors due to the utilisation 
of orthogonality conditions on the variance-covariance matrix. 79 
77 As the introduction of the lagged dependent variable raises the problem of the simultaneity of this variable 
and the residual, Nickell [ 1981] reports that there is a potential downward-bias in the estimation of the 
autoregressive coefficient in panels with small number of time periods with the estimation bias of 1/T. 
78 Mairesse et al. [1999), for instance, ascertain three important possibilities as to why GMM estimator is 
preferred; i) random measurement error in the regressors, which probably causes downward bias in the 
coefficients of the variables inaccurately measured, ii) simultaneity between current values of regressors and 
disturbance term, which probably causes upward bias in the coefficients of the variables positively 
correlated, iii} endogeneity of the current value of regressors with respect to the past disturbances. 
79 Two-step GMM estimators, which use one-step residuals to construct asymptotically optimal weighting 
matrix, are more efficient than one-step estimators if the disturbances are expected to show 
heteroscedasticity in the large sample data with a relatively long time span. See Arellano and Bond [1991], 
Blundell and Bond [1998] and White [1982] for further discussion. 
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4.4. GMM SYSTEMS APPROACH (GMM-SYS) 
The studies following Arellano and Bond [ 1991] have shown that one could further 
improve and go beyond the standard-GMM methodology estimates by dealing with weak 
instruments problem. Arellano and Bover [1995] argue that the absence of information 
concerning the parameters in the levels-variables causes substantial efficiency loss in 
models estimated in first-differences using instruments in levels. Therefore, they propose 
to use instruments in first-differences for equations in levels in addition to instruments in 
levels for equations in first-differences. Furthermore, Blundell and Bond [1998] document 
that the extended GMM (GMM-SYS) estimator of Arellano and Bover [1995] reveals 
dramatic efficiency gains in cases where standard first-differenced GMM estimator 
performs poorly (e.g. for short sample periods and persistent data). In addition, Mairesse 
and Hall [1996] find that GMM-DIF specification results in unsatisfactory estimations 
using panel data for a large sample of firms with small number of time periods80• 
Blundell and Bond [1999] document that once lagged first-differenced and lagged 
levels instruments are included in the instrument set, one could reduce the finite sample 
bias substantially due to exploiting the additional moment conditions in this system 
approach. Their results with respect to production function application show that the 
instruments used by GMM-DIF estimator contain little information about the endogenous 
variables in first-differences, and lagged first-differences are informative instruments for 
the endogenous variables in levels. Under GMM-SYS technique, the model is estimated in 
both levels and first-differences (level-equations are simultaneously estimated using 
differenced lagged regressors as instruments). By this way, apart from controlling for 
individual heterogeneity, variations between firms could partially be retained. 
Following Blundell and Bond [1998], and Blundell et al. [2000], for the analysis of 
linear dynamic panel data model and the properties of estimators of the parameters, we 
have the following autoregressive-distributed form; 
(4.8) 
80 Earlier, Griliches and Hausman [ 1986] emphasised another problem of differencing concerning 
measurement error. They argue that differencing may exacerbate the bias because of errors in variables 
(EIV) as a result of decrease in signal-to-noise ratio. 
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for i = 1 , ... , N and t = 2, ... , T; N is large and T is fixed; lal < 1; Uit = lli + Uit is error 
components decomposition of the error term. This model has the corresponding 'common 
factor' restricted form (/h = -o.P 1) such that 
(4.9) 
Although we include Xit regressors into our empirical model, an AR(l) model with 
unobservable individual effects will be considered in order to examine the various 
estimators; 
Yu = o.Y;.r-J + 1/i + Vu 
The error component structure and other assumptions are as follows; 
E('IJ = E(v;J = E(vu'IJ = E(vuv;J = E(Y;Jv;J =0 
fori= 1 , ... ,N; t = 2, ... ,T and t ;t: s. 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
In case of first-differenced GMM estimator (GMM-DIF) there are 1ll<J = (T-1)(T-
2)/2 orthogonality conditions which are linear in a-parameter assuming the absence of 
serial correlation in Vit; 
E(Y;,,_/1u;,) = 0; for t = 3, ... , T and 2 s s s t- 1 (4.12) 
in which the moment restrictions can be written as E(Z'di~Ui) = 0; where ~ui is the (T-2) 
vector(~UiJ, ~Ui4, ... , ~UiT)' and Zdi is (T-2) x md matrix; 
Y;l 0 0 0 ... 0 
0 Y;l Y;2 0 ... 0 
zdi = 0 0 ... 
0 0 0 Y;l ... Y;T-2 
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or alternative illustration; 
Equations 
~yi3 =a ~Yiz + ~ViJ 
~yi4 =a ~YiJ + ~Vi4 
Instruments available 
yil 
The GMM estimator based on these moment conditions 'minimises the quadratic distance' 
Au'ZdWNZd'Au for some metric WN; 
where Zd' is mdxN(T-2) matrix {Z'dl, Z'd2,·· ., Z'dN}; 
Au' is N(T-2) vector (~u1', ~uz', ... , ~uN'). 
There are alternative choices for WN. In general, the optimal weights are given by; 
A 
I N ' A A [ ]-] WN = - LZd; D.u; D.u;' Zd; N i=l 
where ~u; are residuals from initial consistent estimator. 
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(4.13) 
As a result, two-step GMM estimator a is found by81 ; 
(4.14) 
Blundell et al. (2000] and Blundell and Bond (1998] show that the instruments 
used in the standard GMM-DIF estimator become 'less informative' in two cases; i) as the 
value of autoregressive parameter-a increases towards unity and ii) as the variance( ru), a2tt, 
increases relative to variance(vi1), a2v • To show this, they consider T = 3, in which the 
moment conditions of GMM-DIF reduce to single orthogonality condition and the 
moments estimator reduces to simple two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. The first 
stage is instrumental variable regression; 
L1Yi2 = 7rdY;J + r; fori =1, ... ,N 
If "a" in (4.10) or "var(17) I var(v)" is sufficiently high, then the least squares estimate of 
the reduced form coefficient (nd) can be made arbitrarily close to zero. Accordingly, the 
instrument Yit is only weakly correlated with !1 Yi2, which can be understood from the 
following; 
L1Y;2 = (a-1)Yu + 17; + v;2 fori =1, ... ,N 
As one expects E(Yil ru) > 0, the least square estimator ( a-1) is generally biased upwards 
(towards zero)82• Assuming covariance stationarity and letting k = (1- a)/(1+ a); 
81 In the first step of two-step GMM estimator, an initial positive semidefmite weight matrix is used to fmd 
consistent estimates of parameters. Then, an efficient weight matrix can be constructed to use for the 
asymptotically efficient two-step estimates, given the consistent estimates. As discussed by Arellano and 
Bond [1991], and Windmeijer [1998], the two-step estimated standard errors have small sample downward 
bias in dynamic panel data models and thus one-step estimates with robust standard errors are generally 
preferred. Under GMM-DIF estimator assuming homoscedasticity and no-serial correlation in the errors, an 
efficient weight matrix can easily be derived, unlike for the GMM-SYS estimator. For this case, the inverse 
of the moment matrix of the instruments as an initial weight matrix is commonly used. 
82 The concentration parameter of Nelson and Startz [1990] and Staiger and Stock [1997] is used by 
Blundell and Bond [1998] to identify the weak instrument problem causing bias and imprecise estimates. 
Furthermore, Blundell and Bond [1999] report that the GMM-DIF estimator is biased in the direction of 
Within Groups if the instruments are weak, implying the superiority ofGMM-SYS estimator. 
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k p lim .i d = (a - 1) 2 = (j' 
-"+k 2 
(j'l' 
Consequently, the bias term effectively scales the estimated coefficient on the instrumental 
variable Yi1 toward zero. It is found that 'plim nd' tends to zero as a tends to unity or as cr211 
I cr2v tends to infinity. Furthermore, IV performs poorly when the concentration parameter, 
-r, approaches zero and GMM-DIF estimator deteriorates as a approaches unity; 
In case of levels GMM estimator (GMM-LEV), consider the additional assumption 
of E(17;L1 Y;2) = 0. If this initial conditions holds, we have valid (T -2) linear moment 
conditions; 
E(u;tL1 Y;,t-I) = 0; for t = 3, ... , T (4.15) 
The moment conditions remain informative even a approaches unity and var(17) I var(v) 
becomes large (Blundell et al. [2000]). Under GMM-LEV, there are m1 = (T-l)(T-2)12 
moment conditions; 
E(!'l.Y;,1_ 8Uit) = 0; fort= 3, ... , T and 1 ~ s ~ t- 2 (4.16) 
in which the moment restrictions can be written as E(Z'uui) = 0; where Ui is the (T-2) 
vector(ui3, Ui4, ... , UiT)' and Zu is (T-2) x m1 matrix; 
114 
lif;2 0 0 0 0 
0 lif;2 lif;3 0 0 
Zu = 0 0 
0 0 0 lif;2 fiY;T-1 
The system GMM estimator exploits full set of (ms = [T + 1 ][T -2]/2) linear moment 
conditions in (4.12) and (4.15), which forms the basis for GMM-SYS. The calculation of 
GMM-SYS estimator can be done by a stacked system consisting of (T-2) equations in 
first-differences and (T-2) equations in levels for the period t = 3, ... ,T. These moment 
conditions can be written as E(Z's;qt} = 0, where qi = [liui ui ]'and ZuP is subset of Zu. 
zdi 0 0 0 
0 liY;2 0 0 [Zm 0] z - - 0 0 lif;3 0 
si- 0 Z{; -
0 
0 0 0 fiY;,T-1 
Consequently, in addition to the instruments available for the first-differenced equations, 
we also have the following extra instruments for the equations in levels83; 
Equations 
Yi3 = a Yi2 + lli + Vi3 
Yi4 = a Yi3 + lli + Vi4 
Yi,T = a Yi,T-1 + lli + Vi,T 
Instruments available 
83 The level instruments for all variables in level equations are not used since the level of dependent variable 
must be correlated with firm-specific effects and the potential correlation between explanatory variables and 
these effects are allowed. On the other hand, in autoregressive-distributed lag models, first-differenced 
115 
Therefore, the GMM-SYS estimator is the combination of GMM-DIF estimator 
and GMM-LEV estimator, i.e.; 
asrs = paDJF+ (1- p)aLEV-P (4.17) 
4. 5. THE DETERMINATION OF THE INSTRUMENT SET84 
Let us consider the model simplified from (4.8), which have additional regressors 
apart from lagged dependent variable. 
(4.18) 
The error components satisfy the assumptions in (4.11) and Xit is correlated with 
individual effects lli (uit = lli +vit). In order to determine the instruments for the estimation 
of a and ~. consider the following three cases: 
i) Xit is strictly exogenous if 
E(XisVit) = 0 for s = 1, ... ,T and t = 2, ... ,T (4.19) 
Apart from (T-1)(T-2)/2 moment conditions in (4.12), there are additional (T)(T-2) 
moment conditions for GMM-DIF estimator in the following: 
E(Xis~Uit) = 0 for t = 3, ... ,T and 1 ~ s ~ T (4.20) 
ii) Xit is weakly exogenous or predetermined if 
E(XisVit) = 0 for s = 1, ... ,t and t = 2, ... ,T (4.21) 
E(XisVit) i= 0 for s = t+1, ... ,T and t = 2, ... ,T (4.22) 
variables can be uncorrelated with such effects if there is a mean stationarity in the variables (Blundell and 
Bond [1998], Bond eta!. [1999]). 
84 This section is mainly based on Arellano and Bond [1991], Blundell and Bond [1998], Blundell et a!. 
[2000] and Windmeijer [1998]. 
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Apart from (T-1)(T-2)/2 moment conditions in (4.12), there are additional (T+1)(T-2)/2 
moment conditions for GMM-DIF estimator in the following: 
ECX:i.t-s~Uit) = 0 for t = 3, ... ,T and 1:S s :S t-1 
iii) Xit is endogenous if 
E(XisYit) = 0 for s = 1, ... ,t-1 and t = 2, ... ,T 
E(XisYit) :j:. 0 for s = t, ... ,T and t = 2, ... ,T 
(4.23) 
(4.24) 
(4.25) 
Apart from (T-1)(T-2)/2 moment conditions in (4.12), there are additional (T-1)(T-2)/2 
moment conditions for GMM-DIF estimator in the following: 
E(Xit,s~Uit) = 0 for t = 3, ... ,T and 2:S s :S t-1 (4.26) 
For GMM-SYS estimator, we should detect under which conditions both ~ Yit and 
~Xit are uncorrelated with lli· Consider the following process for this purpose; 
(4.27) 
If -r :j:. 0, then, Xit is correlated with lli and the covariance properties between Vit and eis 
indicate whether Xit is strictly exogenous, predetermined or endogenous. 
In ( 4.28), ~it will be correlated with lli if and only if ~i2 is correlated with lli· 
1-3 
A V I-2A V ~ SA 
IJ.Ail = P IJ.Ai2 + L.JP nei,t-s (4.28) 
s=O 
As we expect E(~Xi2 lli) = 0, the following initial conditions should be satisfied under the 
mean stationarity of Xit; 
(4.29) 
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Similarly, (4.30) shows that ~Yit will be correlated with lli if and only if ~Yi2 is correlated 
with lli· 
As we expect E(~ Yi2 TJi) = 0, the following initial conditions should be satisfied under the 
mean stationarity of Yi1; 
(4.30) 
Therefore, when Xit and Yit are both mean stationary, there are additional moment 
restrictions available for the equations in levels. For the GMM-SYS estimator, there are 
also additional moment conditions when both ~it and ~ Yit are uncorrelated with TJi, 
which depends on the way Xit is determined85 : 
If Xit is strictly exogenous or predetermined, 
E(Uit~ Yit-I) = 0; fort =3, ... ,T 
and 
E(Uit~it) = 0; for t =2, ... ,T 
If Xit is endogenously determined, 
E(Uit~it-1) = 0; fort =3, ... ,T 
(4.31) 
(4.32) 
(4.33) 
To summarise with a case, we would have the following moment conditions for 
GMM-SYS estimator ifXit is endogenously determined. 
E(Yit-s~Uit)=O;fort=3, ... ,Tand 2 :S s :St-1 
E(Uit ~ Yit-1) = 0; fort =3, ... ,T 
E(Xit-s~Uit) = 0; fort =3, ... ,T and 2 :S s :S t-1 
E(Uit~it-1) = 0; fort =3, ... ,T 
(4.34) 
(4.35) 
(4.36) 
(4.37) 
85 It is important to note that using too many instruments may result in small sample overfitting biases. 
Hence, it would be more appropriate not to use all available instruments in the later cross-sections. This is 
especially relevant for models incorporating endogenous variables. One could investigate this possibility by 
comparing the GMM and within-groups estimates (see Arellano and Bond [1991,1998]). 
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Apart from the restrictions in (4.35) and (4.37), moment restrictions based on other lagged 
differences are redundant for GMM-SYS estimator (see, Arellano and Bover [1995]). 
4.6. TESTING THE VALIDITY OF INSTRUMENTS 
As shown above, it is the relationship between disturbance term and regressors that 
construct the instrument set. As it is unlikely that the firm-specific characteristics 
(explanatory variables) are uncorrelated with past, present and future values of the 
disturbance term, the assumption of strict exogeneity of the variables would cause 
misleading results. It is also important to determine whether there are predetermined 
variables, in which case current shocks are uncorrelated with past values of the dependent 
variable, and with current and past values of the independent variables but have some 
effects from the lagged dependent variable. In order to allow for the possibility that current 
shocks are correlated with past and current values of the regressors, one should take the 
possibility of the endogeneity of the variables into account. This is a sensible assumption 
as the variables might be simultaneously determined. 
One can use a similar approach to Blundell et al. [1992], and Devereux and 
Schiantarelli [1990] to investigate these possibilities for GMM-DIF estimator. We analyse 
whether the regressors are predetermined or strictly exogenous with respect to the error 
term. Consider the model (4.7) with the inclusion of lagged regressors to present the steps 
to be followed. The valid instrument set will be Zit={Yn, ... ,Yit-2, Xikt.· .. , Xikt-d assuming 
Eit is serially uncorrelated and Xikt is predetermined such that E(Xkit ~>is) =f:. 0 for s < t and 
zero otherwise. If Xikt is strictly exogenous such that E(Xkit ~>is) = 0 for all s, t; then, all 
regressors are valid instruments and the instrument set becomes Zi1={Yit.---,Yis, Xikh···' 
XikT} for s=1, ... ,T-2. To determine the appropriate instruments, instruments dated t-2 are 
used for each regressor. Then, Xit-1 is added to the current instrument set to investigate the 
potential biases originating from the correlation between L\Eit and Xit-1· This procedure is 
performed for each regressor. If the estimated coefficient ofXit falls in the presence ofthe 
measurement errors, this downward bias is the result of the simultaneous determination of 
Eit-1 and Xi1•1. In this case, Xit-1 is not included to the instrument set. At the end of this 
repeated procedure, one can conclude whether or not there are predetermined variables. 
Therefore, the instruments dated t-2 are normally expected to be chosen for the related 
variable. However, in principle, including Xit-2 in the instrument set may also create 
measurement error as it appears as a regressor in the differenced equation. In such cases, 
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Xit-J would be more appropriate rather than Xit-2 as an instrument since the downward bias 
because of the measurement error in X outweighs the upward bias due to its possible 
endogeneity, i.e., simultaneous determination of Bit-1 and Xit-1 86• We can also investigate 
the possibility of strict exogeneity by including only Xit to the instrument set and conclude 
whether any regressor is strictly exogenous. 
At the end of this procedure, one can decide whether the instrument set is valid by 
examining Correlation tests and Sargan test. If Bit are serially uncorrelated in the model in 
levels, first-differenced transformation generates first-order serial correlation in Lleit. 
However, there should not be second-order serial correlation in order to rely on the 
implication of Sargan statistics. 
As we discussed previously, the standard statistics to test the validity of 
instruments under GMM-DIF is performed by using Sargan test (Sard), which is defined as 
where WN is optimal weight matrix and estimated ilu are the two-step residuals of GMM-
DIF estimator87. Sard is asymptotically chi-squared distributed with md-k degrees of 
freedom (md; number of moment conditions, k; number of estimated parameters) under the 
null hypothesis of instrument validity. The test procedure is the same for GMM-SYS 
estimator, Sard. Consequently, in order to test the validity of the additional level moment 
conditions which are utilised by GMM-SYS estimator, we can use the Difference-Sargan 
test asymptotically chi-squared distributed with ms-md degrees of freedom, which is found 
by; Difference-Sargan = Sar5-Sard. 
86 See, e.g., Blundell et al. [1992] and Bond and Meghir [1994]. 
87 Note that only the Sargan-test based on the two-step GMM estimator is heteroscedasticity-consistent (See 
Arellano and Bond [1991] for further discussion). 
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4. 7. SHORT -RUN AND LONG-RUN MODELS88 
Consider the following simple autoregressive-distributed model; 
(4.38) 
where Eit is the white noise error term. In this dynamic model, the coefficient "~ 1 " 
represents 'the short-run reaction of Yit to a change in Xit· Hence, it does not incorporate 
long-run implications. In order to examine long-term effects, the following static model, 
instead, would be useful. 
(4.39) 
Based on (4.38) and (4.39), one can determine the long-run relationship between X and 
Y by the related elasticity of Y with respect to X; 
(4.40) 
As we discussed in section 4.2, a1 should be less than unity so that the short-run 
model will converge to long-run equilibrium. However, the dynamic model has some 
problems. The first one is the potential multicollinearity between lagged and current 
variables due to the likely high correlation89• Secondly, as they are in levels, the variables 
are likely to be non-stationary causing potential spurious regression problem. As a 
remedy, one could take the first-differences of the dynamic model but this would result 
in the elimination of any information about the long-run solution. Therefore, one can 
conveniently reparameterise ( 4.38) in the error-correction mechanism (ECM) (see, Bean 
[1981]). After some rearrangements, the following error correction model separates out 
the short-run and long-run effects. 
88 See, e.g., BArdsen et al. [2001], Bond et al. [1999], Calderon et al. [1999], Harris [1995, 2000], and 
Pesaran and Smith [1995] for further discussion on the long-run and short-run models and their 
implications. 
89 As a technical note, high R2 but insignificant coefficients with low t-values could imply the possibility of 
multicollinearity. 
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(4.41) 
where Bo = ao I 1 - al . This error correction model can specify the desired long-run 
target level of Y taking short-run and long-run effects into account. In the long-run 
~ ~ 
equilibrium, [Y; ,_1 - 00 - B1Xi ,_1], one-period lagged value of the residual from 
' ' 
regression ( 4.39) as an empirical estimate of the equilibrium error term, should be zero. 
If it is not, it means Y is not at target level and we are away from optimal point, which 
implies the existence of costly adjustment process. The speed of adjustment can be 
detected based on the information through the estimation of ( 1 - a 1 ). It implies what 
proportion of the disequilibrium in Y in one-period is corrected in the next-period. If 
( 1- a 1) tends to move toward unity, the adjustment process is speedy in order to correct 
for the disequilibrium. If ( 1 - a 1) tends to move toward zero, then, the adjustment 
process toward long-run equilibrium is slow due to some substantial transaction costs. 
GMM-DIF results in downward bias in the estimates of the coefficients under the 
conditions that a approaches unity and var(17)/var(v) increases. This downward bias is 
especially crucial for adjustment models in which the coefficient of lagged dependent 
variable has long-run implications with relevant elasticities. Thus, GMM-SYS is 
proposed, which combines levels equations using lagged first-differences as instruments 
with differenced equations using lagged levels as instruments. In this estimator, 
deviations of the initial conditions from their long-run values are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with their long-run values as affected by individual effects. It is important to 
note that as we can do levels-regression in this system GMM, one should control for the 
presence of unobservable (say, country-specific, firm-specific) factors by using 
additional instruments. In addition, we cannot use the error terms obtained from the 
levels-regressions for correlation tests as they contain individual effects. 
4.8. CONCLUSION 
It is known that the estimated coefficients of the fixed effects models are 
imprecise as such models cause substantial loss in variability and also the variables that 
lack any change overtime cannot be precisely estimated. The OLS procedure is relatively 
weak in panel data estimations in which there is inherent heterogeneity problem and 
estimated parameters are assumed to be stable through the time period. On the other 
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hand, the estimations based on Within Groups and GLS Procedure are consistent only if 
the model contains neither lagged dependent variables nor endogenous independent 
variables, and the number of observations tend to infinity with fixed time-period. In the 
end, considering the problems of measurement errors, simultaneity bias and endogeneity, · 
it can be argued that the GMM estimation technique can be regarded as the best 
methodology of our interest for the dynamic panel data models. The traditional practice 
in dynamic panel data models' estimations is to use GMM-DIF estimator in which the 
first-differences are taken to eliminate the time-invariant unobservable individual effects. 
Recent studies, however, show that using system GMM approach that combines the 
differenced equation with the level equation will result in more efficient estimates than 
does GMM-DIF. The reason can be attributable to the fact that GMM-SYS estimator 
overcomes the problem of weak instruments while under GMM-DIF estimator the 
information of the instruments decreases as the series become more persistent. In the end, 
this system GMM approach controls for the presence of unobservable firm-specific 
effects and the endogeneity of explanatory variables without eliminating valuable 
information. 
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"There is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one". 
Stewart C. Myers (2001) 
5. CHAPTER 4: DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the accumulation of hundreds of capital structure papers written within over four 
decades after the pathbreaking paper of Modigliani and Miller [1958], the theory of 
capital structure has still been one of the most controversial issues in modem corporate 
finance theory. The controversy is mainly based on the idea whether optimal capital 
structure exists for the purpose of minimising weighted average cost of capital and 
maximising market value of the firms. 
The M-M propositions assert that the market value of firms is independent of their capital 
structure and the expected rate of return on equity share increases as debt-equity ratio 
increases under some unrealistic assumptions. In their second corporate tax-corrected 
paper, Modigliani and Miller [1963] argue that firms may maximise their market value 
with a capital structure formed only by debt. These conditional propositions have led the 
finance researchers to work on this issue in a more realistic manner in order to discover, 
if any, the optimal financial decisions. Although there is no overall consensus, the general 
tendency seems to argue that optimal capital structure involves balancing the corporate 
tax advantages of debt financing against the present value of bankruptcy costs and agency 
costs. The empirical findings of this trade-off theory are somewhat conflicting. For 
instance, although Bradley et al. [1984] find no strong clear evidence, Trezevant [1992] 
obtains supportive empirical results for the theory. The existence of other components 
incorporating in a possible optimal capital structure, e.g., personal taxes and principal-
agent conflicts, makes the debate even more complicated rather than mitigating it through 
both theoretical and empirical contributions (See Miller [1977], DeAngelo and Masulis 
[1980]). 
The present paper aims to investigate the main determinants of capital structure with 
empirical evidence. In their survey paper, Harris and Raviv [1991] generalise the main 
findings of the existing literature of capital structure determinants. Financial leverage is 
positively related to non-debt tax shields, firm size, tangible assets and investment 
opportunities; and negatively related to bankruptcy probability, R&D and advertising 
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expenditures, firm uniqueness in terms of production and profitability. Obviously, this 
generalisation is not homogenous enough as some conflicting empirical results prevail. 
Unfortunately, such comparisons have some shortcomings in the empirical literature 
because the time-periods, proxies for variables, the extent of data sets and the 
methodologies are different from each other. Consequently, in spite of the numerous 
papers based on the determinants of capital structure, it is still worth working on this 
issue. Because, as Berens and Cuny [1995] argue, we still do not know why the observed 
debt ratios of the firms are typically around 20 to 30 percent despite the tax advantage of 
debt financing. One must obtain the disadvantages of debt financing, which are probably 
outweighing aggregately this tax advantage. Thus, with further empirical analyses, it 
would be possible to shed light on this puzzling issue of corporate finance by 
reconciliating the present controversies. 
In the literature, most of the empirical evidence is based on the financial data of US 
fmns90. Obviously, the studies focusing on a single country cannot perceive the effect of 
diversity of cultural and economic factors on firms' financial policies. According to the 
tradition (e.g., Borio [1990], Mayer [1988,1990]), there is a distinction between Anglo-
Saxon countries (USA, UK, and Canada) and other major economies (France, Italy, Japan 
and Germany) in the sense that the former are considered to have low-levered firms and 
the latter to have high-levered firms. Furthermore, agency costs and indirect bankruptcy 
costs tend to be higher in Anglo-Saxon countries, where there is lack of long-term 
relationship between firms and creditors and of long-term objectives of business 
management (See, e.g., Borio [1996], and Edwards and Nibler [2000]). 
Further investigation on international capital structure seems necessary as some 
researchers (e.g., McClure et al. [1999], Wald [1999]) report significant differences in 
capital structure of firms in developed countries. In this international study, France, 
Germany and the UK were chosen, as they are supposed to represent satisfactorily 
different financial structures of their classes. The UK is in the classification of Anglo-
Saxon tradition, where there are comparatively large numbers of publicly listed 
companies and occurrences of hostile takeovers for market for corporate control due to 
potentially large agency conflicts. Germany is in the classification of Germanic tradition 
(e.g., Austria, the Netherlands), where corporate decision making and restructuring are 
made through the involvement of universal banks and financial holdings and the capital 
90 The main international studies of capital structure are by Booth et al. [2001], McClure et al. [1999], 
Rajan and Zingales [1995], Rutterford [1988], Toy et al. [1974] and Wald [1999]. 
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markets are not effective with relatively low amount of listed companies. Lastly, France 
is in the classification of Latinic tradition (e.g., Italy, Spain), where corporate ownership 
structure of the firms can be characterised by family control, financial holdings, state 
ownership and cross-shareholdings, and agency problems are internalised unlike in 
Anglo-Saxon tradition (See Moerland [1995]). Therefore, we believe that our 
international empirical evidence will analytically shed light on the impact of institutional 
differences (accounting and taxation systems, bankruptcy laws, corporate governance) 
across countries on capital structure choice of corporations. 
It is apparent that factors influencing firms' capital structure change overtime. 
Hence, it would be necessary but not sufficient to examine only the different debt-equity 
ratios across firms. To explain time-varying observed difference in capital structure of 
firms is a further issue to be investigated91 • It is important to understand whether 
corporations react to new circumstances that occur in financial markets. Another matter 
would be to identify how quick they are in adjusting themselves to random events 
towards their desired financing structure. Once lagged values of dependent and 
independent variables are incorporated into the model, a more complete picture of 
corporate behaviour dynamism can be achieved. Due to these reasons, we use dynamic 
panel data with the estimation method of Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM), 
which is believed to be most appropriate procedure for our purpose92• Furthermore, 
GMM methodology, which utilises appropriate instrumental variables, overcomes the 
problems of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, normality, simultaneity and measurement 
errors, which are common for studies using firm-level data based on balance sheets. 
Results reveal that there are considerable differences in financing patterns of 
corporations in France, Germany and the UK. It is found that firms, especially in France, 
tend to adjust their debt ratios quickly to attain their targeted capital structure. There are 
some findings common to all sample countries: The significantly negative association of 
leverage with profitability confirms the Pecking Order theory; earnings volatility has no 
significant impact upon firms' financing decisions; term-structure and share price 
91 Some celebrated studies, e.g., by Rajan and Zingales [1995] and Titman and Wessels [1988] do not focus 
on this issue, although they partially account for the leverage adjustment by taking the year-average of the 
explanatory variables. On the other hand, Fischer et al. [1989] and Jalilvand and Harris [1984] attempt first 
to study dynamic capital structure. Moreover, Marsh [1982] focuses on the deviations from long-term target 
debt levels. Recently, Hovakimian et al. [200 1] examine whether firms adjust toward a target debt ratio 
reflecting the costs and benefits of debt fmancing proposed by static tradeoff models. As another recent 
study, Goldstein et al. [2001] design a model for dynamic capital structure in a theoretical framework, and 
they emphasise the weakness of static models. 
92 See, especially, Baltagi [1995] and Hsiao [1985] for the discussion of the benefits ofthe panel data. 
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performance are negatively associated with leverage. However, our findings related to 
firm size, fixed-assets ratio, tax rate, dividend payout ratio, market-to-book ratio and 
market equity premium have different influence upon leverage across countries. Hence, 
the results indicate that the institutions and the degree of agency and monitoring problems 
varying across countries may lead to different consequences in firms' capital structure. 
More importantly, contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that supposedly effective 
and strong German corporate governance seem to fail to mitigate agency problems and 
information asymmetries. 93 
5.2. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE AND THE UNDERLYING THEORIES 
5.2.1. Proxies for Dependent Variable 
In order to test the null hypothesis of Modigliani and Miller, which argues that capital 
structure is irrelevant in perfect capital markets, two relevant different definitions of capital 
structure were used as a proxy. First definition is book-capital ratio; Book Value of Total 
Debt to Book Value of Total Assets. Second one is market-capital ratio; Book Value of 
Total Debt to Book Value of Total Debt plus Market Value of Equity. With these 
commonly used main definitions, one can test whether capital structure is independent 
from any financial factors listed below considering market imperfections, i.e., whether 
capital structure is random and no variable is significant. 
5.2.2. Proxies for Explanatory Variables 
The attributes below have been predetermined in terms of their explanatory coherence in 
testing the existing theories of capital structure and appropriateness to compare our results 
with other empirical fmdings. 
Although it is not easy to find exact proxies for the arguments discussed in the previous 
section, we argue that the present proxies covered in this empirical analysis have sufficient 
explanatory power to be taken into account. While analysing the empirical results, one 
should emphasise the fact that the nature of empirical studies of optimal capital structure 
differs in terms of time-period, firm characteristics, leverage definition, methodology and 
so forth. 
93 In fact, German-Japanese models of corporate governance seem to lose its arguments which favour them. 
, Although such economies were performing better in 1980s than the Anglo-American ones, it happened to be 
the reverse case in 1990s. {The Economist: Survey; Global Equity Markets, 5 May 2001). 
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5.2.2.1. Lagged Dependent Variable 
The inclusion of lagged dependent variable can have both short-term and long-term 
interlinks with other explanatory variables. It could be a benchmark to understand whether 
firms have optimal capital structure, and if any, the degree of divergence or convergence 
from (to) the target level may potentially be detected in the framework of adjustment costs. 
A recent study by Hovakimian et al. [2001] reveals that firms adjust their capital structure 
towards target debt ratios. Fama and French [2002] examine the capital structure models in 
the framework of the target leverage and mean-reversion leverage. Furthermore, Banerjee 
et al. [2000] argue that if the adjustment costs (legal fees, flotation costs etc.) are too high, 
then, dividend policy can be used to change the current capital structure without 
transactions in capital markets. MacKie-Mason [1990b] argues that firms targeting high 
debt ratios will have high lagged leverage. In this study, if the lagged coefficient is 
statistically significant, positive and below unity, then, one can conclude that firms tend 
not to change capital structure overtime. If it is greater than one, it implies firms do not 
have a target debt-equity ratio. 
5.2.2.2. Profitability 
The level of profitability of a firm indicates the amount of earnings to fmance its 
investment opportunities and to be distributed to shareholders as a past performance. 
According to the Pecking Order Theory (POT) (Myers [1984 ], Myers and Majluf [1984]), 
firms finance their investment first internally by their retained earnings, then by debt if 
retained earnings are not enough, and equity as a last resort when there are borrowing 
limits. That is, as greater availability of internal capital is acquired by more profitability, 
one should expect a negative relationship between leverage and profitability as being the 
proxy for internally generated funds. This theory does not assume an optimal debt-equity 
ratio since there are two types of financing; internal at the top and external at the bottom of 
the hierarchy. 
This inverse relation is also confirmed by Rajan and Zingales [1995]. They further argue 
that if debt is used mostly among alternatives and if dividends and investment are fixed in 
the short-run, leverage and profitability should again be negatively correlated. Moreover, 
Jordan et al. [1998] test the POT and find no supportive evidence for this hypothesis in 
general. As small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have restricted access to financial 
capital markets, however, they argue that capital structure of SMEs is consistent with a 
pecking order approach to financial structure. 
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On the other hand, Free Cash Flow Theory (Jensen [1986]) argues that debt reduces 
agency costs of free cash flow in excess of required funding for investment. An increase in 
the debt ratios of profitable firms can be a quality signal to the market due to information 
asymmetries. In addition, debt financing make sure the management disciplined in giving 
efficient investment decisions and not pursuing individual objectives due to bankruptcy 
probability (Grossman and Hart [1982], Harris and Raviv [1990], Williamson [1988]). 
Therefore, these arguments imply that there should be a positive association between 
leverage and profitability, which contradicts the findings by Kester [1986], Rajan and 
Zingales [1995], and Titman and Wessels [1988]. We define profitability as operating 
income (earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation; EBITD) to total assets. 
5.2.2.3. Non-Debt Tax Shields 
Modigliani and Miller [1963] state that the main incentive for external borrowing is the tax 
advantage of interest payments. In their analysis, DeAngelo and Masulis [1980] argue that 
the existence of non-debt tax shields such as depreciation deductions, depletion allowances 
can be sufficient to reject the theory of capital structure irrelevance. They further argue 
that, tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits can be considered as 
substitutes for tax benefits of debt financing. These features lead to market equilibrium, 
where each firm has an interior optimal leverage. Accordingly, firms with higher amount 
of non-debt tax shield will have lower debt levels. It implies that non-debt tax shields are 
negatively related to debt ratios since tax advantage of debt diminishes in this case. On the 
other hand, in their empirical analysis, Bradley et al. [1984] find a positive relationship 
between leverage and non-debt tax shields as contradicting the theory. They explain this 
contradiction by arguing that non-debt tax shields are an instrumental variable in securing 
assets of the firms; i.e., more securable assets may increase the debt ratio. We measure the 
non-debt tax shields by the ratio of depreciation to total assets to examine its effect on 
capital structure. 
5.2.2.4. Effective Tax Rate 
If we relax the assumption of M-M theory that corporate tax rate is zero and do not 
consider Miller's [1977] neutrality argument, we expect that firms having higher tax 
liabilities will use higher amounts of debt in order to benefit more from tax advantages of 
debt financing. Goldstein et al. [200 I] show that in a dynamic framework tax advantages to 
debt increase significantly when firms have the option to increase future debt levels. 
Therefore, there is a positive relationship between effective tax rate and debt ratio (Haugen 
and Senbet [1986], Swoboda and Zechner [1995], Taub [1975], Zimmerman [1983]). Yet, 
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this is true if firms have sufficient amount of taxable income. Another argument follows 
that the higher the corporate tax rate, the less is the finn's internal funds and the higher the 
cost of capital. Then, ceteris paribus, the fixed capital formation and the demand for 
external funds tend to decrease (Kremp et al. [1999]). In this case, although it is believed 
that taxes should have influence upon corporate financing decisions, the overall 
relationship between tax rate and leverage is ambiguous due to the complexities.94 The 
ratio of total tax charge to total taxable income is used as a proxy for effective tax rate of 
the corporations in this analysis. 
5.2.2.5. Market-to-Book Ratio 
This factor can be useful in measuring investment opportunities, proxy for intangible 
assets, of a finn since it can be regarded as extra value retained by investors into finn 
value. Whether the investment project will be successful in the future with positive-NPVs 
concerns the creditors, which in turn pushes the market-to-book ratios upward in the 
capital markets as higher quality projects will be preferred more. Johnson [1997], thus, 
suggests that the firms having high market-to-book ratios will probably have lower 
liquidation costs. In addition, Ozkan [1998] uses this ratio as a proxy for the expected 
liquidation costs. Generally, higher market-to-book ratios follow high growth options. 
Johnson [1997] highlights the problem of asset substitution in this conjuncture since the 
growth opportunities related to market-to-book ratios are deemed as intangibles in the 
sense that firms with proportionately more collateralisable tangible assets for secured debt 
would experience some difficulties in shifting to riskier projects. Rajan and Zingales 
[1995] discuss two main reasons for why there should be a negative relationship between 
market-to-book ratio and financial leverage according to the theory. First, it is expected 
that as the market-to-book ratio increases, so does the cost of financial distress. Second, 
firms prefer to issue equity when they think that the stock has been overvalued relative to 
its book value or earnings. In fact, Hovakimian et al. [200 1] argue that, if stock price is low 
relative to its earnings or book value, manager are reluctant to issue equity as it decreases 
book value or earnings per share. According to Ozkan [1998], higher growth opportunities 
for firms would mean higher expected liquidation costs, then, debt ratios would negatively 
associated with expected liquidation costs. Furthermore, Maksimovic et al. [1999] find that 
firms in a high (low)-growth industry have low (high) debt ratios due to market 
imperfections of external finance and information acquisitions. Titman and Wessels [1988] 
94 In fact, many studies, e.g., Ang and Peterson [1986], Bradley et al. [1984], Fischer et al. [1989], Titman 
and Wessels [1988] cannot fmd significant corporate tax effects on fmancial decisions. 
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contend that firms with greater growth opportunities suffer more from suboptimal 
investment policies as high debt financing causes wealth expropriation from bondholders 
to shareholders. What is more, this variable can be used as a proxy for underinvestment 
problem and agency costs, where Myers [1977] argues that firms with growth 
opportunities should use less debt in order to mitigate these problems. Thus, the expected 
relationship between market-to-book ratio and debt ratio is negative. 
However, one can argue that faster growing firms are less likely to be financially 
constrained due to their higher expected future profits. Furthermore, it is likely that such 
firms need excessive external financing for their investment opportunities. In this case, 
market-to-book ratio is positively associated with leverage (see, Kremp et al. [1999]). We 
define this ratio as the ratio of book value of total assets less book value of equity plus 
market value of equity to book value of total assets. 
5.2.2.6. Fixed Assets Ratio 
As the value of intangible assets disappears in case ofbankruptcy, the presence oftangible 
assets is expected to be sufficiently important in external borrowing as it is easy to 
collateralise them because of their credible characteristics (see, e.g., Harris and Raviv 
[1991] and Titman and Wessels [1988]). It is possible that issuing equity can be costly 
when the (insider) agencies have better information than outside shareholders. Thus, Myers 
and Majluf [1984] argue that selling secured debt would be advantageous for the firms. By 
this way, it can be possible to reduce agency costs since the debts secured with known 
tangible assets, which have alternative redeployable uses in defaults, will avoid these costs. 
Furthermore, according to Stutz and Johnson [1985], a firm's opportunity to engage in 
asset substitution is reduced by secured debt. For firms having more intangible assets, the 
costs to controlling capital outlays would be higher as its monitoring is more difficult to 
tackle with. Asset structure is important in case of liquidation in that tangible assets of 
insolvent firms are valued more than in intangible assets (Alderson and Betker [1995], 
Shleifer and Vishny [1992]). Similarly, Detragiache [1994] and Johnson [1997] argue that 
it is more difficult for firms holding secured debt to shift to riskier projects if they have 
more tangible assets. In that sense, the creditors, e.g., banks, might bring restrictions to the 
firms having relatively more intangible assets whilst supplying debt for their financing. As 
Scott [1977] asserts that a firm will issue as much secured debt as possible for its optimal 
capital structure, the general discussion converges to conclude that there is a positive 
relationship between debt ratio and fixed asset ratio. We define the fixed assets ratio as the 
ratio of net tangible assets to total assets to capture its potential association with leverage. 
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5.2.2. 7. Size 
In general, larger firms are more diversified and faces lower probability of bankruptcy, and 
thus may have higher debt capacity. Fama [1985] argues that the information content of 
small and large firms is not the same regarding the monitoring costs, which are relatively 
higher for small ones. Thus, well-diversified large firms are expected to have easier access 
to financial borrowing in the capital markets. Titman and Wessels [1988] explain the 
reason for the logarithmic transformation of sales; if it exists, size effect should mainly 
concern the very small firms. Numerous studies argue that size can be a powerful 
explanation for cross-sectional differences in debt-equity ratios (Johnson [1997], Marsh 
[1982], Michaelas et al. [1999]). It is generally accepted that size may be an inverse proxy 
for the probability of bankruptcy (Rajan and Zingales [1995], Warner [1977]). This is 
based on the idea that direct bankruptcy costs should not be neglected in determining the 
value of the small firms. Since the probability of bankruptcy is inversely related to size, 
such costs might not be effective for large firms whilst borrowing debt (Warner [1977], 
Ang et al [1982]). It follows that (more diversified) large firms can borrow more than small 
firms as they have low risk of default. In that sense, size is positively related to leverage. 
Yet, Rajan and Zingales [1995] state that if the costs of financial distress are low, this 
positive relationship should not be strong95 • In the context of asymmetric information, 
another argument states that large firms should have low debt ratios as issuing 
informationally sensitive equities would be more appropriate for them. Johnson [1998] 
confirms this by reporting a negative relationship between debt-ratio and size. 
On the other hand, one can think that size is also related to the cost of issuing equity and 
debt, then, the cost of issuing equity can be too high for small firms considering the capital 
market accessibility and economies of scale restrictions (Smith [1977], Marsh [1982]). 
Hence, it is possible that smaller firms rely on their internal sources or bank loans due to 
lack of maximum debt usage. In addition, Jordan et al. [1998] provide an alternative 
argument about agency theory by saying that 'equity-controlled firms have a tendency to 
invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from the bondholders, and thus agency costs are 
higher for the firms in growing industries. Although its relation to leverage is not 
sufficiently straightforward as well as the accuracy of proxy, size is generally agreed to be 
positively associated with debt. To capture the size effects on the capital structure of 
95 In fact, Chung [1993], Ferri and Jones [1979], and Kim and Sorensen [1986] cannot fmd a strong 
association between size and leverage. 
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firms, two alternative definition of the size of firms can be used; the logarithm of total 
sales or logarithm of total assets as a proxy. 
5.2.2.8. Earnings Volatility 
Corporations with high earnings volatility carry a risk of earnings level dropping below the 
level of their debt service commitment. This may result in arranging funds at high cost to 
service the debt or face the risk of bankruptcy. On the other hand, companies financed by 
equity may choose not to pay dividend during the period of financial difficulties. 
Therefore, firms with highly volatile earnings borrow the least and prefer equity to debt. 
This suggests an inverse relation between earnings volatility and leverage ratio. However, 
the potential cost of failing to service debt depends upon the source of debt and the 
relationship of the firm with its lender. A close relation between the firm and its lender 
reduces such costs. The cases of German firms fall in this category as they have close ties 
with the banks. Therefore, the effective cost of failing to service debt is expected to be 
relatively low for German firms. On the other hand, British firms raise loan capital from 
capital markets and have arms-length relations with lenders. Therefore, the cost of failing 
to service market debt is high. For these reasons, the British firms are expected to be more 
concerned with earnings volatility than their German counterparts while deciding their 
capital structure. We measure earnings volatility as the first-difference of earnings minus 
average ofthe first-differences. 
5.2.2.9. Dividend Payout Ratio 
In most empirical studies of capital structure, dividend policies of firms have not been 
taken into account. However, in a world with market rigidities (e.g., taxes, agency 
conflicts, information asymmetries) one may expect the relevance of dividend policy to 
firm value and capital structure decisions. In fact, Miller and Rock [1985] show that 
dividend and financing policies are closely related. Boyle and Eckhold [1997] demonstrate 
that firms with high payout ratios will also have high debt ratios in their capital structure if 
capital gain taxes are higher than dividend income taxes. It is because, in this case, higher 
payout ratio would mean higher tax rate on total stock returns. Consequently, cost of equity 
relative to debt rises due to the extra premium required by shareholders, which discourages 
the use of equity and thus increases leverage. 
A change in dividend payout ratio of a firm may have implications about its expected 
future income stream. An increase in payout ratio may either signal the absence of future 
growth opportunities to invest or abundant future cash flows sufficient to meet debt 
payments without having liquidity problems. Low dividend payout ratio may imply high 
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growth opportunities of immature firms and therefore low debt ratios due to potential 
agency conflicts. Accordingly, one may expect a positive correlation between leverage and 
payout ratio. 
Myers and Majlufs [1984] pecking order theory suggests that debt should be 
preferred to equity due to more informationally-sensitive equity. However, assuming that 
paying dividends signals the forthcoming of future earnings, the 'lemons' premium 
associated with equity may be curtailed by increasing payout ratio. This in turn implies a 
negative relation between leverage and payout ratio due to being able to employ more 
equity in the capital structure. 
In Bhattacharya's [1979] model, a possible optimal dividend policy is implied: Paying 
dividends is assumed to be a positive signal and this benefit can be traded-off against the 
tax disadvantage of dividends relative to capital gain taxes. If a firm is issuing debt and 
paying dividends at the same time, this may convey different signal than if it is only paying 
dividends. One interpretation could be that there are substantial agency costs of free cash 
flows. This is discussed by Jensen [1986] who argues that it is better for firms lacking 
future investment opportunities and having free cash flows to pay more dividends. In a 
related framework, Rozeff [1982] suggests a negative relationship between leverage and 
payout ratio. He proposes an optimal dividend policy by trading-off the issuance costs of 
debt against the benefits of mitigating agency costs through increased payout ratio. 
Debt contracts (especially long-term) generally restrict firms to pay cash dividends by 
setting certain limits. This is because of the bondholders' agency-problems concerns 
stemming from the high payout ratios. Thus, this argument implies that leverage and 
payout ratio should be negatively correlated. 
Unlike in France and Germany, corporate share ownership is dominated by institutional 
investors (e.g., pension funds) in the UK. As discussed in Short et al. [2002], institutions in 
the UK require certain levels of dividends apart from capital gains to meet their liabilities. 
It is criticised that UK institutional shareholders have short-term objectives and prefer 
higher amount of tax-advantaged dividend payments. Not surprisingly, UK firms have the 
highest average payout ratios among our sample countries. Institutional shareholders may 
force managers to pay out dividends due to agency costs of free cash flows. They may also 
do so in order to let the capital markets monitor the company when managers require 
external financing. If paying dividends disciplines the management, there remain fewer 
roles for the debt to do the same job. Thus, one may expect a negative relationship between 
leverage and payout ratio in the UK. This is especially valid if the flotation costs of debt 
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issuance is considerable. In France and especially in Germany, corporate ownership is not 
dispersed as many firms are held by large shareholders. In this case, the scrutiny of 
management by capital markets is less needed since large shareholders may monitor firms 
instead without resorting to high dividend payments for signalling purposes. As a 
consequence, at least we can say that the expected relation between leverage and payout 
ratio in France and Germany may be non-negative. 
Germany has operated two-rate taxation system since 1977. Currently, corporate tax rate 
on dividends is (30 %), which is less than that on retained earnings (45 %). Thus, 
according to the tax arguments, ceteris paribus, leverage and payout ratio should be 
positively correlated. France and the UK have similarities with respect to the taxation 
system in which double taxation of shareholders' income is mitigated by an imputed tax 
credit. In France, there is a standard rate for both types of taxable income, which is 
currently 33.3 %. However, shareholders receive a tax credit of 50 % of the dividend 
income. In the UK, tax-exempt shareholders prefer dividends to retentions contrary to the 
higher rate taxpayers who prefer retentions (see, e.g., Short et al. [2002]). 
After all, the direction and significance of this association depend on the entire impact of 
information asymmetries, agency costs and tax bias towards paying dividends, which is an 
empirical issue. We measure payout ratio as dividends to net income. 
5.2.2.10. Control (Market-related) Variables 
5.2.2.10.1. Equity Premium 
Equity premium measures the cost of equity in relation to the return on risk free 
investment. Evidence shows that the equity premium varies over time. Higher equity 
premium causes higher cost of equity capital. Thus, if a firm requires external capital 
during the period of high equity premium managers are likely to opt for debt than for 
equity. This implies a positive relationship between leverage ratio and equity premium. On 
the other hand, if the observed high equity premium is due to bullish stock market (stocks 
are overvalued), managers are likely to issue equity. This implies an inverse relation 
between equity premium and leverage. Therefore, the nature of the effects of equity 
premium on leverage is dependent on the source of change in equity premium. In order to 
allow for decision time we use six-month lagged equity premium. 
5.2.2.10.2. Term-structure of Interest Rates 
Despite the tax savings on interest, higher interest rates cause higher weighted average cost 
of capital resulting in a decline in the value of the firm. As the interest on loan is a 
relatively long-term fixed commitment, firms do not prefer to raise loan capital when the 
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market rate of interest is high. Moreover, firms with higher interest commitments face 
higher risk of bankruptcy if the earnings level drop below the level of interest liability. 
Such liability increases with the increase in the rate of interest. Hence, managers are likely 
to consider the market rate of interest while deciding the capital structure. Since the term-
structure of interest rates contains more information than the rate of interest on a particular 
type of financial asset, we include the term-structure as an explanatory variable in the 
model and expect an inverse relationship between this variable and financial leverage ratio 
in all countries. This variable is also measured with a six-month lag. 
5.2.2.10.3. Share Price Performance 
It is generally argued that managers choose to issue equity after share price increase. In 
fact, Marsh (1982] states that in choosing between debt and equity, firms are heavily 
affected by the past history of stock prices and market conditions. As explained by POT, 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors forces managers to sell 
the equity at a discount. Managers offer such discount when the benefit of raising external 
equity capital outweighs the cost of discount. When shares are overvalued discount could 
be offered without any loss in the wealth of existing shareholders. This is possible if equity 
is issued after a share price increase. This suggests an inverse relationship between the 
increase in share price and leverage ratio. However, such an inverse relationship with 
market-leverage may be observed due to artificial statistical distortions as the market value 
of equity increases with the change in market price even if there has not been any further 
equity issue. Yet, book leverage should remain independent of this statistical relationship. 
These two taken together should be able to reveal the cause and nature of the relationship 
between leverage and change in share price. We use annual price change to account year-
end of the firm. 
5.3. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA SET 
5.3.1. Construction ofVariables 
All the relevant data have been retrieved from Datastream International (DI) database, 
which is useful to get both accounting data and market data. The steps in the construction 
of panel data are as follows. First of all, in order to avoid the survivorship bias, dead firms 
for which both market and accounting data are available were also included in the 
database. The number of dead companies recorded in DI as of 20.06.2001 are 1133 for 
France, 2362 for Germany, and 3667 for the UK. In addition, the number of publicly 
traded domestic firms having company accounts data in DI are 418 for France, 832 for 
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Germany, and 1604 for the UK. The number of remaining non-financial corporations from 
the combination of dead and current firms is 1235 for France, 1590 for Germany, and 3153 
for the UK. 
Consequently, we have eliminated the firms in financial sectors96 • It is because the 
financial structure of such firms cannot systematically be compared to non-financial firms 
due to their nature of debts and quasi-debts outstanding and that of investors. Obviously, 
the firms having any missing data for any of the Datastream items during the sample 
period have been excluded from the data set. Clearly, the observations either contradicting 
the definition of variables or taking quite extreme values have been considered as outliers 
and dropped from the data set. For the purpose of studying dynamic panel data structure, 
the firms not having at least three continuous time-series observations during the period 
have been excluded. Eventually, we were left with 359 firms from France, 565 firms from 
Germany and 2417 firms from the UK fitting best to our data set. The panel data set is 
unbalanced in the sense that there are more observations on some firms than on others97• 
For all countries, size variable proxied by total assets or total sales in local currency have 
been deflated by Producer Price Index (PPI) taking the earliest year as the base year, which 
is 1969, 1983 and 1987 for the UK, France and Germany, respectively. 
5.3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
With respect to the both definitions of leverage (book; market), Table 5.1 reveals that 
while French firms have the highest leverage ratios (23 .2 % ; 31.1 % ), the UK firms have 
the lowest debt-ratios (16.7%; 24.4 %), and German firms are in between (19.7%; 25.2 
%)98• This fact confirms the conventional classification of continental European countries 
(France, Germany) as being a highly-levered countries and of the Anglo-Saxon countries 
(United Kingdom) as being a low-levered countries (See, for example, Borio [1990]). The 
results are also in line with what Guenther and Young [2000] and Kneeshaw [1995] report. 
The highest ratios in France confirm the idea that family-controlled firms, which are 
common in this country, tend to have relatively high debt ratios. Similarly, lowest ratios in 
96 The firms in the following Datastream sectors were excluded: Consumer-Mining-Mortgage Finance, All 
Banks, Investment Trusts, Unit Trusts, Property Agencies, Asset Managers, Life Assurance, Insurance, Real 
Estate Holding &Development, Real Estate Investment Trust. See Appendix for further explanations. 
97 For full details, see Table 5.A1 in the Appendix. 
98 These figures can be compared with the same leverage defmitions ofRajan and Zingales [1995]. They also 
fmd that French firms have the highest debt-ratios (26%, 23%) while German (20%, 16%) and British (21%, 
16%) firms have almost the same ratios. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
FRANCE Mean Median Std. Dev Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum 
LEV1 0.2321 0.2198 0.1446 0.4392 0.6157 0.0000 0.9985 
LEV2 0.3106 0.2737 0.2276 -0.4271 0.6187 0.0000 0.9968 
PROFIT 0.1144 0.1101 0.0969 43.9620 -2.6324 -1.4142 0.9935 
ETR 0.3123 0.3538 0.4363 60.5760 2.6000 -3.9682 6.5758 
MBR 1.5725 1.2219 1.1569 49.0590 5.4343 0.3968 20.602 
FAR 0.2303 0.2040 0.1558 1.8161 1.1628 0.0016 0.9855 
SIZE 14.8403 14.8525 1.9284 0.1192 -0.1489 5.2407 20.5264 
NDTS 0.0483 0.0406 0.0378 22.894 3.5126 0.0001 0.5467 
EARNV 1.2365 0.3074 4.6324 199.074 12.6348 0.0004 94.674 
DIVID 0.1093 0.2353 3.2818 195.290 -8.2583 -66.896 51.768 
CHSHP 0.0940 0.0781 0.4094 2.6823 0.0906 -2.3535 2.3690 
GERMANY Mean Median Std. Dev Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum 
LEV1 0.1973 0.1494 0.1880 0.4019 0.9746 0.0000 0.9996 
LEV2 0.2519 0.1798 0.2479 -0.2054 0.8806 0.0000 0.9942 
PROFIT 0.1171 0.1172 0.1316 63.818 -2.1810 -2.9200 1.7416 
ETR 0.3931 0.4495 1.0381 113.26 -0.3143 -16.467 16.638 
MBR 1.9219 1.3018 3.7442 254.49 14.0100 0.2536 93.883 
FAR 0.3353 0.3017 0.2041 0.5071 0.8494 0.0000 0.9985 
SIZE 12.3946 12.438 2.3296 0.6298 -0.2775 1.2306 19.402 
NDTS 0.0608 0.0540 0.0474 16.4930 2.5279 0.0000 0.7070 
EAR NV 5.9120 0.5320 69.171 624.4 22.7510 0.0000 2694 
DIVID 0.2992 0.0990 11.414 413.168 -1.7404 -301 272.66 
CHSHP 0.0046 0.0000 0.3441 4.4444 0.3460 -2.2276 2.7783 
UK Mean Median Std. Dev Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum 
LEV1 0.1674 0.1515 0.1368 2.4206 1.1689 0.0000 0.9948 
LEV2 0.2438 0.1891 0.2212 0.2243 0.9531 0.0000 0.9991 
PROFIT 0.1238 0.1295 0.1322 572.39 -13.4690 -6.8947 1.0557 
ETR 0.3586 0.3601 0.5449 473.63 -3.4540 -18.5 18.43 
MBR 1.4872 1.1122 1.6339 187.5 10.5780 0.1318 48.143 
FAR 0.3489 0.3118 0.2040 0.3003 0.8144 0.0000 0.9921 
SIZE 9.0331 8.8623 1.8970 0.7053 0.1656 0.1174 16.224 
NDTS 0.0356 0.0303 0.0263 45.593 3.8377 0.0000 0.8237 
EARNV 1.6490 0.3280 21.166 14343 104.732 0.0000 3094 
DIVID 0.4000 0.3626 3.2077 359.291 2.1072 -94.25 98.6 
CHSHP 0.0549 0.0700 0.4658 3.3877 -0.3385 -4.0134 3.3032 
Book-leverage (LEV1) is the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. 
Market-leverage (LEV2) is the ratio of book value of total debt to market value of equity plus 
book value of total debt. Profitability (PROFIT) is the ratio of operating profit to book value of 
total assets. Effective Tax Rate (ETR) is the ratio of total tax charge to total taxable income. 
Market-to-Book Ratio (MBR) is the ratio of book value of total assets less book value of equity 
plus market value of equity to book value of total assets. Fixed Asset Ratio (FAR) is the ratio 
of net tangible assets to book value of total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total sales. 
NDTS is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. Earnings Volatility (EARNV) is the first-
difference of earnings minus average of the first-differences. Dividend payout ratio (DIVID) is 
ordinary dividends to net income. Change in share price (CHSHP) is the difference between 
share prices at times [t] and [t-1] to share price at time [t-1]. The number of observations 
(firms) is 3171 (359), 6033 (565), 34957 (2417) for France, Germany and the UK, respectively. 
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the UK, where there is dispersed share ownership, verify the idea that concentrated 
corporate ownership structure tends to be accompanied with higher leverage99• 
On the other hand, the standard deviation of both types of debt-ratios is highest in 
Germany and lowest in the UK. Thus, one could state that the capital structure varies 
most (least) across German (UK) firms. Moreover, the highest profitability ratios (return 
on assets) and the highest volatility in earnings pertain to the British firms, and German 
firms are once more in the middle case in both respects. This finding justifies the 
traditional idea that Anglo-American firms are more profitable and have more volatile 
profits than the continental European firms (see, e.g., Glaum [2000]). 
Based on the descriptive statistics of countries in each year, the following 
pronounced differences come into the view100• There seems a decreasing trend in the debt 
ratios of French firms over the period with respect to Leverage2 but Leverage1 remains 
relatively stable. The figures show that Leverage1 is highest in 1984 with 26.4 % and 
lowest in 1987 with 21.2 %, and Leverage2 is highest in 1983 with 47.3% and lowest in 
1999 with 24.0 %. The decreasing trend in Leverage2 tends to imply that France is 
moving towards market-oriented system as net increase in equity outweighs net increase 
in debt. But it may also be due to the increased bankruptcy risk, higher real interest rates, 
reduction in tax benefits of debt (see, Cobham and Serre [2000]). On the other hand, there 
is an increasing trend in German firms' debt-ratios for both types. (Leverage! is lowest in 
1987 with 13.7% and highest in 1999 with 21.3 %; Leverage2 is lowest in 1989 with 
18.2% and highest in 1996 with 29.5 %). This upward trend could indicate that German 
firms have been using more debt relative to equity issuance, which may emphasise the 
bank -oriented structure of Germany. 
As for the UK, Leverage1 is relatively stable during the period but it tends to increase 
slightly, it takes its lowest value in 1978 with 13.6% and the highest value in 1999 with 
20.1 %. However, Leverage2 is unstable which ranges from 15.7% in 1987 to 45.0% in 
1974. Yet, unlike in Germany, the overall trend is downward implying the dominance of 
equity over debt financing in a market-oriented country. The instability of Leverage2 is 
basically due to its definition as its denominator includes market value of equity. 
Consequently, the initial impression seems to reveal that the capital structure of firms in 
99 New debt is preferred to new equity in order to minimise the dilution of ownership stake, to benefit from 
controlling corporations, and to prevent potential hostile takeovers, which are not common in France and 
Germany. See Kim and Sorensen [1986], and Stulz [1988] for further discussion. 
100 See Tables 5.A2, 5.A3 and 5.A4; and Figures 5.Al, 5.A2 and 5.A3 in the appendix for details. 
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these countries is different in terms of both the magnitude and the tendency to change 
overtime. 
5.3.3. Correlation Matrix 
According to Table 5.2., leverage is negatively associated with profitability in all 
countries, irrespective of its definition. This finding is predicted by the Pecking Order 
theory. The significantly positive correlation between leverage and non-debt tax shields 
in France is inconsistent with the prediction of DeAngelo and Masulis [1980]. The 
significantly negative relationship between leverage and effective tax rate in all countries 
is not in line with the theory. The association between leverage and market-to-book ratio 
is significantly negative in all cases, which is again predicted by the theory. In all 
countries, there is a positive and significant relationship between leverage and fixed asset 
ratio, which, again, confirms the theory. Finally, the theory is also successful in 
predicting the positive and significant relationship between leverage and size in France 
and in the UK. At this stage, although not being substantial, the statistics show that there 
are some differences in these countries with respect to the association between debt-ratios 
and the capital structure determinants. 
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Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix for France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
France LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE 
LEVER1 1 
LEVER2 0.7002* 1 
PROFIT -0.1010* -0.2110* 1 
NDTS 0.0719* 0.0568* 0.3179* 1 
ETR -0.0730* -0.056* 0.1557* -0.0066 1 
MBR -0.2060* -0.469* 0.1614* -0.0324 -0.0038 1 
FAR 0.3251* 0.2443* 0.1213* 0.3192* -0.049** -0.1732* 1 
SIZE 0.1192* 0.3072* 0.0438** -0.0793* 0.0509** -0.2188* 0.1456* 1 
Germany_ LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE 
LEVER1 1 
LEVER2 0.791* 1 
PROFIT -0.0993* -0.154* 1 
NDTS -0.031** -0.031** 0.3901* 1 
ETR -0.0178 -0.032** 0.1217* 0.0514* 1 
MBR -0.1003* -0.192* -0.050* -0.0615* 0.0001 1 
FAR 0.2316* 0.1775* 0.1162* 0.4115* 0.0428** -0.046** 1 
SIZE -0.0742* 0.1341* 0.0985* 0.0964* 0.0276 -0.2549* -0.029 1 
UK LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE 
LEVER1 1 
LEVER2 0.7017* 1 
PROFIT -0.146* -0.178* 1 
NDTS 0.0415* -0.049* 0.1091* 1 
ETR -0.071* -0.014 0.1125* -0.0190 1 
MBR -0.066* -0.313* -0.094* 0.0855* -0.0540* 1 
FAR 0.1725* 0.1086* 0.0577* 0.283* -0.016 -0.1151* 1 
SIZE 0.1708* 0.1676* 0.2166* 0.0049 0.0661* -0.1356* 0.0729* 1 
The statistics reported here are the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in 
the analysis. Not all variables are included in the matrix. (*) and (**) represent that the 
correlation coefficient is significant at 1 percent level and 5 percent level, respectively. See 
Table 5.1 for variable defmitions. 
5.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.4.1. THE MODEL 
For the purpose of having more complete dynamic specification which allows the 
possibility of AR-process of the stochastic term and of adjustment costs effects, consider 
equation (5.1)101 • This autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) is not estimated only 
in a first-differenced equation due to superiority of GMM-SYS estimator over GMM-DIF 
estimator, which is discussed in detail in terms of methodology comparisons in the 
previous chapter. 
101 See Devereux and Schiantarelli [1990] for a coherent discussion of this issue. Furthermore, Rajan and 
Zingales [1995], and Titman and Wessels [1988] lag the independent variables indirectly by taking their 
average of past values to control for potential reverse causality between dependent and independent 
variables. 
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J(il) = A,r;(t-1) + LAkXkil + LAk' xki(t-1) +17i +vii (5.1) 
k=2 k=2 
fori =1, ... , Nand t =2, ... , T (N is large and Tis fixed); IA.II <1; and OOit = lli +Vit is the 
standard fixed effects decomposition of the error term. As discussed by Blundell and 
Bond [1998], this has the corresponding common factor restricted form, where 4 = -o A.'k· 
In the end, our general dynamic model for the empirical study of capital structure is as 
follows (subscript-i stands for firm-i; P's are the unknown parameters to be estimated and 
rot is the disturbance term): 
LEVERAGE; t = fiJ[LEVERAGE]it-I 
+ fh[PROFITABILITY}it + /h[PROFITABILITY]it-1 
+ fi4[NON-DEBT TAX SHIELDS]it + fis[NON-DEBT TAX SHIELDS}u-I 
+ fi6[EFFECTIVE TAX RATE}it + fh[EFFECTIVE TAX RATE]it-I 
+ Ps[MARKET-TO-BOOK }u + /l9[MARKET-TO-BOOK lu-I 
+ fiw[FIXED ASSETS RATIO}it + fiu[FIXED ASSETS RATIO}it-I 
+ fi12[SIZE]it + fiB[SIZE]it-I + mit. (5.2)102 
Furthermore, in order to investigate the existence of target debt level in the 
framework of adjustment costs, the following procedure will be used. Assume that 
desired target debt-ratio, LEVERAGEi:, is determined by several explanatory variables, 
LEVERAGEi: = L'l/kXkil + {J)il 
k=l 
(5.3) 
where OOit is disturbance term serially correlated with mean zero and possibly 
heteroscedastic, and 'l'k's are estimable unknown parameters which are common to each 
firms. The model assumes that firms adjust their current debt-ratios, LEVERAGEu, with 
the degree of adjustment coefficient "8" to attain the desired capital structure. 103 
LEVERAGE;, - LEVERAGE;,_1 =(}(LEVERAGE: - LEVERAGE;,_1), (5.4) 
If 8 = 1, then, the actual change in debt ratio will equal to the desired change and firms 
will have a complete adjustment with zero transaction costs, being in equilibrium. If 8 = 
0, however, there will not be any change due to unaffordable high transaction costs and 
firms will set their current debt-ratios to the past level, LEVERAGEu-I· 
102 In the next section, for the sake of simplicity, we will estimate the model (5.2) with only the stated 
variables here in order to compare the methodologies. Later, the model will be extended by including more 
variables. 
103 See Miguel and Pindado [200 1 ], and Ozkan [200 I] who also use this model. 
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Substituting (5.3) into (5.4), we get the following equation: 
LEVERAGEit = (1- B)LEVERAGEi/_1 + LB'IfkXk;r + Bm, 
k=! 
(5.5) 
This adjustment model assumes that e lies between zero and unity due to the existence of 
transaction costs. If the cost of being in disequilibrium is higher (lower) than the cost of 
adjustment, e, which is inversely proportional to transaction costs, tends to unity (zero). 
What is more, as we want to compare the alternative methodologies, our model 
(5.2) will be estimated by OLS, Anderson-Hsiao Instrumental Variable technique, GMM-
differences and GMM-level estimation procedures. 
It is known that some industries are identified by high leverage (e.g., capital-
intensive manufacturing firms, utilities) and some by low leverage (e.g., hi-tech 
companies, mining companies)104• As it is expected that industry effects can also be 
important in determining capital structure of the firms, we have included industry dummy 
variables to the analysis to control industry-specific effects105• Obviously, the existence of 
such effects can only be investigated through the models in levels, not in differences. In 
this context, Jordan et al. [1998] argue that industry effects are not important in 
explaining capital structure of small firms. They propose, on the other hand, small and 
medium-sized firms will not be able to borrow more if they are diversified more with the 
engagement of different industrial sectors. This is because financial sources (e.g., banks) 
are more willing to lend when the firm is occupied with well-known industrial activities. 
In addition, Ferri and Jones [1979] emphasise the statistical relationship between relative 
debt structure class and generic industry class. Harris and Raviv [ 1991] also account for 
the industry classification by commenting that 'firms within an industry are more alike 
than those in different industries, and that industries tend to retain their leverage rankings 
overtime'. What is more, in order to control for the influence of time periods and for 
modelling time effects, time dummies will be utilised to test whether the corporate 
decisions are related to time-varying elements, say, macroeconomic factors or aggregate 
business cycles. 
104 See Bradley et al. [1984], Gaver and Gaver [1993], and Smith and Watts [1992], among others. 
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5.4.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.4.2.1. Comparison of the Results of Alternative Estimation Procedures 
In Table 5.3 to Table 5.8, we report estimation results of the dynamic capital structure for 
France, Germany and the UK, based on both leverage definitions. In these tables, Model 
1 presents the OLS-type estimates in levels, where unobservable firm-specific fixed 
effect are not eliminated and all explanatory variables (including lagged dependent 
variable) are assumed to be strictly exogenous. Models 2 and 3 give Anderson-Hsiao 
(AH)-type estimates in first differences, which uses MEVERAGE;t-2 (model-2) and 
LEVERAGEu-2 (model-3) as an instrument for MEVERAGEit-1 106• Models 4 and 5 show 
the GMM estimates in levels and in differences, respectively, where all explanatory 
variables except the lagged dependent variable (LDV) are treated as exogenous. Thus, in 
both models only LEVERAGEit-1 is instrumented, in which case GMM instruments used 
increase in each period through the panel, unlike in case of AH instruments. In Model 6, 
we report GMM estimates in levels, where all right-hand side variables are treated as 
endogenous. The number of observations and the estimation period change according to 
the models, which are given in the tables. Six different type of test statistics were 
reported, three of which (Wald Tests) test the joint significance of the estimated 
coefficients, time and industry dummies, and time dummies only, respectively; 
distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of 'no relationship'. Two tests 
(Correlation Tests) are performed for the first and second order autocorrelation of 
residuals; distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of 'no serial 
correlation'. The last statistics (Sargan Test) is to test the validity of the instrument set 
(overidentifying restrictions); distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of 'valid 
instruments'. Only the two-step GMM estimates will be reported as they are more 
efficient than one-step estimates and Sargan Test is consistent only in this specification. 
All estimation procedures were executed using PcGive (Doomik and Hendry [200 1 ]). 
Firstly, considering all countries, Correlation Tests reveal that in many cases the OLS and 
GMM-Level specifications violate the assumption of 'no serial correlation'. Apart from 
serial correlation in the error terms, OLS specification suffers from endogeneity problem 
105 See, e.g., Bennett and Donnelly [1993], Bradley et al. [1984], Johnson [1998] and Titman [1984]. 
Furthermore, see the Appendix for industry classification and the number offrrm in each industry. 
106 Arellano and Bond [1991] note that in a model containing an exogenous variable in addition to the 
lagged dependent variable there is no correlation between i\yi,t-l and i\yi,t-2, then i\yi,t-2 is not a valid 
instrument and AH-D is not identified. Thus, in such cases we used MEVERAGEu_3 as an instrument, 
instead of MEVERAGEu_2• 
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too. The former is not surprising since LDV might be correlated with seemingly existent 
unobservable and time-invariant firm-specific effects. Furthermore, the estimated 
coefficient of LDV is relatively too high and significant in all OLS specifications (model-
1) ranging from 0.82 to 0.92. The same problem exists in the GMM estimates in levels 
(model-4) and the upward bias is even higher in almost all cases as compared to the OLS 
coefficients. This upward bias, in spite of the industry dummies inclusion, can be 
attributed to the correlation between LDV and unobservable fixed effects. Moreover, the 
Sargan Test of GMM-Level (model-4) estimation results reveal that the instruments used 
are invalid. This is because we assumed the strict exogeneity of all variables except LDV. 
However, it is likely that the explanatory variables constructed on the basis of balance 
sheet data of firms are endogenous. Therefore, due to the reasons stated above one can 
conclude that the OLS and GMM specifications in levels are not appropriate for a study 
of dynamic capital structure model. 
In what follows, in order to overcome the problem in levels-specification, first-
differences of the variables were taken to control for fixed effects and the estimation 
results were reported in Models 2, 3 and 5. The coefficient ofLDV in Model2 is poorly 
determined, being insignificantly greater than unity in Germany; being insignificantly 
close to zero and greater than unity in France. Furthermore, the examination of standard 
deviation of the coefficients of model-2 in these six tables (Table 5.3 to Table 5.8) 
exhibits the fact that AH-type estimates using differenced instrument (AHD) result in 
larger variances than GMM estimates in differences (GMM-DIF). The inference from 
this comparison can be regarded as a strong finding and is consistent with the findings of 
Arellano and Bond [1991] that AHD causes substantial efficiency loss. As for the model-
3 of AH-estimates using level instrument (AHL), it performs better than AHD and in 
some cases the standard deviation ofthe coefficients of AHL is lower than that ofGMM-
DIF. However, this AH instrumental variable technique does not use all available 
moment conditions, which is not the case for GMM methodology. In the end, as 
discussed earlier, although AH-type estimates do not suffer from serial correlation and 
are consistent, they are far from being efficient. As for GMM estimates in differences 
(model-S), all Sargan Tests in these tables except Table 5.5 indicate that the instruments 
used are not valid. The reason for the rejection of instrument validity is apparent as we 
assumed that all the variables, except LDV by definition, are exogenous. We allowed the 
possibility that the past and current values of the regressors are uncorrelated with current 
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shocks by this way but that turned out to be a wrong assumption107• In model-6, the 
Sargan Tests again reject the validity of instruments in Germany and the UK, and the 
Correlation Tests show the presence of serial correlation problem in France. This, in turn, 
implies that even if we relax the exogeneity of variables by using GMM-instruments as 
lags of all variables dated (t-2) and earlier, the test statistics show the presence of 
misspecification in GMM-Level estimation108• Therefore, if serial correlation exists and 
the coefficient of LDV is too high in GMM-Level, controlling for firm heterogeneity is 
necessary despite the absence of endogeneity problem. In this case, GMM-DIF is used to 
control for potential unobserved firm-specific effects as the serious upward bias on the 
LDV of model-6 suggests its presence (it is 0.93, in Germany). 
The discussion above shows that the specification of the OLS, AH, the GMM-
Levels specification and GMM-Differences specification assuming strict exogeneity of 
the variables are not appropriate for our dynamic capital structure model. In the next 
section, we will relax the assumption of exogeneity in GMM-Differences models thereby 
using some more instruments to determine the most appropriate estimation procedure. 
107 As discussed in Blundell and Bond [ 1998, 1999], the pattern of signs on current and lagged regressors in 
the unrestricted models are consistent with the AR(l) specification as the signs are reverse in most cases. 
108 We did not, and will not in the next sections, use all available instruments in order to reduce fmite 
sample biases due to having too much instruments relative to the cross-sectional sample size. This is 
discussed by Alonso-Borrego and Arellano [1999], Kiviet [1995]. As time dummies are added in all models 
and thus used as additional instruments. If level instruments dated (t-2) in GMM-DIF is rejected by 
Sargan, it shows the presence of measurement errors. 
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Table 5.3: Dynamic capital structure in France: Alternative Estimations (Leverage!) 
Dependent Variable: LEVERAGE1~,~ 
Independent Predicted ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Sign OLS-LEV AH-DIF AH-LEV GMM-LEV1 GMM-DIF1 GMM-
LEV2 
LEVERAGE11,t-1 + 0.8613*** 0.0924 0.6925*** 0.8899*** 0.7822*** 0.8904*** 
(0.0135) (0.3145) (0.0695) (0.0176) (0.0886) (0.0137} 
PROFIT1.t -/+ -0.4019*** -0.5243*** -0.5096*** -0.3901*** -0.4815*** -0.6163*** 
(0.0426) (0.0728) (0.0660) (0.0451) (0.0725) (0.1035} 
PROFIT1.t-1 -/+ 0.3138*** 0.0351 0.2085*** 0.3147*** 0.2339*** 0.4965*** 
(0.0431) (0.1859) (0.0547) (0.0463) (0.0567) (0.0925} 
NDTAX-SHIELD1,t 0.1940* 0.2955** 0.2575** 0.2046* 0.2902** 0.3577* 
(0.1073) (0.1187) (0.1301) (0.1125) (0.1252) (0.1871} 
NDTAX-SHIELD1,t-1 -0.1483 0.0494 0.0402 -0.1360 0.0301 -0.2815 
(0.1191) (0.1837) (0.1953) (0.1258) (0.1908) (0.1819} 
TAXRATE;,1 + -0.0008 -0.0034 -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0013 0.0112* 
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0067} 
TAXRA TE1.1-1 + 0.0058** -0.0011 0.0024 0.0056* 0.0017 0.0039 
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0027} 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t -0.0060*** -0.0013 0.0028 -0.0058*** 0.0027 -0.0020 
(0.0019) (0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0040} 
MKT-TO-BOOK1.t-1 0.0090*** 0.0048 0.0122*** 0.0090*** 0.0153*** 0.0067* 
(0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0027) (0.0052) (0.0037} 
FIXASSETS;,t + 0.0205 -0.0221 -0.0016 0.0696 0.0420 0.0740 
(0.0547) (0.0752) (0.0759) (0.0599) (0.0841) (0.1134} 
FIXASSETS;,t-1 + 0.0283 0.1294 0.1024 -0.0329 0.0811 -0.0268 
(0.0553) (0.0666) (0.0765) (0.0585) (0.0858) (0.1118} 
SIZE~,~ + 0.0405*** 0.0611*** 0.0391*** 0.0437*** 0.0435*** 0.0373*** 
(0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0137) (0.0149) (0.0138} 
SIZE1,t-1 + -0.0389*** -0.0058 -0.0266*** -0.0418*** -0.0334*** -0.0354*** 
(0.0108) (0.0207) (0.0099) (0.0137) (0.0109) (0.0134} 
Correlation1 -2.906*** -0.6537 -7.188*** -2.423** -6.642*** -2.880 
Correlation2 1.477 -0.7384 1.531 0.8670. 1.714* 0.1006 
Sargan Test (df) 24.56 (15}* 27.90 (15}** 232.8 (399 
Wald Test-1 (df) 6284 (13}*** 109.7 (13}*** 224.8 (13}*** 4340 (13}*** 192.5 (13}*** 6444 (13} 
Wald Test-2 (df) 166.2 (31}*** 147 (31}*** 151 (31} 
Wald Test-3 (df) 100.1 (16}*** 73.83 (15}*** 96.61 (16}*** 100.8 (16}*** 85.29 (16}*** 92 (16} -
R2 0.8047 0.8001 0.7973 
Firms I Observations 359/2812 299/2094 359/2453 359/2812 359/2453 359/2812 
Estimation Period 1984-2000 1986-2000 1985-2000 1984-2000 1985-2000 1984-2000 
Leverage 1 is the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Profitability is the ratio of operating profit to 
book value of total assets. Non-debt Tax Shields is the ratio of depreciation to book value of total assets. Effective Tax Rate is 
the ratio of total tax charge to total taxable income. Market-to-Book Ratio is the ratio of book value of total assets less book 
value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of total assets. Fixed Asset Ratio is the ratio of net tangible assets to 
book value of total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total sales. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are 
in the parentheses. Model-l is OLS estimation in levels. Models 2 and 3 are Anderson-Hsiao type estimation in differences, 
where MEVERAGElu.2 and LEVERAGE1 11•2, respectively, is instrumented for MEVERAG£1 11•1• Models 4 and 5 are GMM 
estimates in levels and first differences, respectively, where only LEVERAGEl 1_1 is treated as endogenous. Model 6 is GMM 
estimates in levels, where all variables are treated as endogenous. Industry dummies are included in models l, 4 and 6. Time 
dummies are included in all models. Correlation I and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; 
which are asymptotically distributed as N(O, l) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as ;C(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests l, 2 and 3 test the joint 
significance of estimated coefficients, of time and industry dummies, and of time dummies, respectively; asymptotically 
distributed as X2(df) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term is not reported. (*), (**) and (***) 
indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at l 0, 5 and l percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5.4: Dynamic capital structure in France: Alternative Estimations (Leverage2) 
Dependent Variable: LEVERAGE21,t 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Sign OLS-LEV AH-DIF AH-LEV GMM-LEV1 GMM-DIF1 GMM-
LEV2 
LEVERAGE2i,t-1 + 0.8497*** 1.8416 0.7438*** 0.8631*** 0.7604*** 0.8600*** 
(0.0122) (1.7230) (0.0813) (0.0208) (0.0908) (0.0149) 
PROFIT1,t -I+ -0.5170*** -0.6772*** -0.6824*** -0.4487*** -0.6742*** -0.6455*** 
(0.0972) (0.1951) (0.1085) (0.1049) (0.1464) (0.1553) 
PROFIT1.t-1 -I+ 0.4297*** 1.1850 0.1975*** 0.3843*- 0.1326 0.5430*** 
(0.0765) (1.2580) (0.0751) (0.0843) (0.0826) (0.1260) 
NOT AX-SHIELDi,t 0.1593 0.0862 0.1919 0.0458 0.0654 0.5414** 
(0.1498) (0.4320) (0.2080) (0.1843) (0.2916) (0.2193) 
NDTAX-SHIELD1.t-1 -0.0550 -0.3352 0.2353 0.0327 0.1744 -0.3726* 
(0.1501) (0.7392) (0.2149) (0.1886) (0.3227) (0.1945) 
TAXRATE1,t + -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0179* 
(0.0045) (0.0104) (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.0068) (0.0107) 
TAXRATEi,t-1 + 0.0041 -0.0029 -0.0008 0.0026 0.0002 -0.0007 
(0.0034) (0.0084) (0.0055) (0.0041) (0.0065) (0.0036) 
MKT-TO-BOOKI.t -0.0264*** -0.0173 -0.0113** -0.0266*** -0.0107* -0.0073 
(0.0052) (0.0145) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0061) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1,t-1 0.0137*** 0.0571 0.0185*** 0.0147*- 0.0171 ** -0.0004 
(0.0045) (0.0633) (0.0059) (0.0049) (0.0071) (0.0050) 
FIXASSETS1,t + 0.1331* -0.1340 0.0749 0.1553* 0.0903 0.2979** 
(0.0755) (0.2831) (0.1107) (0.0913) (0.1374) (0.1410) 
FIXASSETSI.t-1 + -0.0838 -0.2819 -0.0580 -0.1176 -0.0441 -0.2355* 
(0.0772) (0.3319) (0.1074) (0.0914) (0.1391) (0.1380) 
SIZE1,t + 0.0918*** 0.1367*** 0.1038*** 0.0843*** 0.0955*** 0.0935*** 
(0.01 04) (0.0314) (0.0180) (0.0126} (0.0180} (0.0239) 
SIZEI,t-1 + -0.0898*** -0.2118 -0.0705*** -0.0827*** -0.0670*** -0.0903*** 
(0.0102) (0.2015) (0.0152) (0.0124) (0.0153) (0.0234) 
Correlation 1 -0.5281 -1.115 -6.840*** -0.5405 -6.227*** -0.6163 
Correlation2 -1.880* -0.7293 -1.393 -2.057** -1.323 -1.805* 
Sargan Test (df} 38.64 (15)*** 65.62 (15)*** 235.8 (399 
Wald Test-1 (df} 9301 (13)*** 100.8 (13)*** 319 (13)*** 4539 (13)*** 262.3 (13)*** 6383 (13) 
Wald Test-2 (df} 422.1 (31)*** 291.5 (31)*** 421 (31) 
Wald Test-3 (df} 361.7 (16)*** 91.86 (15)*** 331.6 (16)*** 223.2 (16)*** 158.6 (16)*** 355 (16) -
R2 0.8303 0.8294 0.8229 
Firms I Observations 359/2812 299/2094 359/2453 359/2812 359/2453 359/2812 
Estimation Period 1984-2000 1986-2000 1985-2000 1984-2000 1985-2000 1984-2000 
See Table 5.1 for variable defmitions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the 
parentheses. Model-l is OLS estimation in levels. Models 2 and 3 are Anderson-Hsiao type estimation in 
differences, where MEVERAGE2u.1 and LEVERAGE21,_2, respectively, is instrumented for MEVERAG£211•1• 
Models 4 and 5 are GMM estimates in levels and first differences, respectively, where only LEVERAGE11• 1 is 
treated as endogenous. Model 6 is GMM estimates in levels, where all variables are treated as endogenous. 
Industry dummies are included in models I, 4 and 6. Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation I and 
2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as 
N(O, I) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as x2(dt) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests I, 2 and 3 test the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients, of time and industry dummies, and of time dummies, respectively; asymptotically 
distributed as x2(dt) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term is not reported. (•), ( .. )and 
( .. •) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and I percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.5: Dynamic capital structure in Germany: Alternative Estimations (Leveragel) 
Dependent Variable: LEVERAGE1;,t 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Sign OLS-LEV AH-DIF AH-LEV GMM-LEV1 GMM-DIF1 GMM-
LEV2 
LEVERAGE1 i,t-1 + 0.8919*** 1.4348* 0.8402*** 0.9112*** 0.8088*** 0.9256*** 
(0.0093) (0.8443) (0.0834) (0.0104) (0.0798) {0.0107) 
PROFIT;,1 -/+ -0.0809** -0.0590 -0.0723 -0.0737** -0.0536 -0.0815** 
(0.0343) (0.0553) (0.0458) (0.0341) (0.0444) {0.0389) 
PROFIT1,t-1 -/+ 0.0401 0.0577 0.0130 0.0429 0.0168 0.0384 
(0.0277) (0.0716) (0.0282) (0.0279) (0.0286) {0.0316) 
NDTAX-SHIELD;,1 0.1388* 0.3807** 0.2887** 0.1471* 0.3309*** 0.1254 
(0.0742) (0.1932) (0.1205) (0.0757) (0.1125) {0.0997) 
NOT AX-SHIELD;,t-1 -0.1911*** -0.1351 -0.0525 -0.1913*** -0.0461 -0.1617** 
(0.0627) (0.1208) (0.0595) (0.0615) (0.0575) {0.0703) 
TAXRATE;,1 + 0.0002 0.0012 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0064 
(0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0011) {0.0048) 
TAXRATE;,t-1 + 0.0016 0.0011 0.0006 0.0013 0.0007 0.0012 
(0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0015) {0.0011) 
MKT-TO-BOOI<t,t -0.0012* -0.0016* -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0028 
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) {0.0009) {0.0017) 
MKT-TO-BOOI<t,t-1 0.0004 0.0025 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0015 
(0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0007) {0.0015) {0.0012) 
FIXASSETS;,t + 0.1703*** 0.1462** 0.1580*** 0.1736*** 0.1661*** 0.1706** 
{0.0357) (0.0682) {0.0494) (0.0383) (0.0488) {0.0700) 
FIXASSETSi.l-1 + -0.1338*** -0.1658 -0.0860* -0.1423*** -0.0960** -0.1400** 
(0.0357) (0.1390) (0.0455) (0.0387) (0.0470) {0.0652) 
SIZEi.l + 0.0173*** 0.0063 0.0111* 0.0158*** 0.0105 0.0304** 
(0.0051) (0.0099) (0.0067) (0.0055) (0.0073) {0.0123) 
SIZEi.t-1 + -0.0176*** -0.0208 -0.0147* -0.0157*** -0.0143* -0.0307** 
(0.0052) (0.0185) (0.0081) (0.0056) (0.0079) {0.0124) 
Correlation1 -1.602 -1.775* -9.423*** -1.814* -8.936*** -2.465** 
Correlation2 -1.070 -0.1199 -0.3623 -1.512 -0.4109 -1.617 
Sargan Test {df) 13.53 {11) 13.92 {11) 328 {287)* 
Wald Test-1 (df) 14570{13)*** 40.61 {13)*** 137.8 {13)*** 12240{13)*** 173.6 {13)*** 12520(13r 
Wald Test-2 (df) 79.76 {26)*** 60.62 {26)*** 57.6 {26)** 
Wald Test-3 (df) 24.27 {12)*** 7.913 {11) 20.81 {12)* 19.52 {12)* 24.30 {12)** 25.51 {12)* 
R2 0.8094 0.8089 0.8050 
Firms I Observations 565/5468 510/4338 565/4903 565/5468 565/4903 565/5468 
Estimation Period 1988-2000 1990-2000 1989-2000 1988-2000 1989-2000 1988-2000 
See Table 5.1 for variable definitions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the 
parentheses. Model-l is OLS estimation in levels. Models 2 and 3 are Anderson-Hsiao type estimation in 
differences, where ALEVERAGE1;,.2 and LEVERAGE1;1•2, respectively, is instrumented for ALEVERAG£111•1• 
Models 4 and 5 are GMM estimates in levels and first differences, respectively, where only LEVERAGE11•1 is 
treated as endogenous. Model 6 is GMM estimates in levels, where all variables are treated as endogenous. 
Industry dummies are included in models I, 4 and 6. Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation I and 
2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as 
N(O, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as x.2(dt) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests 1, 2 and 3 test the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients, of time and industry dummies, and of time dummies, respectively; asymptotically 
distributed as iCdt) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term is not reported.(*),(**) and 
(***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.6: Dynamic capital structure in Germany: Alternative Estimations (Leverage2) 
Dependent Variable: LEVERAGE2~,~ 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Sign OLS-LEV AH-DIF AH-LEV GMM-LEV1 GMM-DIF1 GMM-
LEV2 
LEVERAGE2t,t-1 + 0.9172*** 11.65 0.9188*** 0.9128*** 0.7203*** 0.9316*** 
(0.0078) (61.41) (0.0845) (0.0098) (0.0715) (0.0099) 
PROFIT;,1 -/+ -0.0935** 0.5668 -0.0396 -0.1094* -0.0896 -0.0247 
(0.0473) (3.4320) (0.0589) (0.0650) {0.0819) (0.0524) 
PROFITI,t-1 -/+ 0.0414 1.1754 0.0164 0.0440 -0.0437 -0.0001 
(0.0369) (6.732) {0.0416) (0.0519) {0.0475) (0.0399) 
NOT AX-SHIELD1.t -0.0490 -0.5818 -0.0394 -0.0418 0.0049 -0.1870* 
(0.0581) (3.004) (0.0868) {0.0690) (0.1002) (0.1109) 
NDTAX-SHIELDt,t-1 -0.0688 -0.4422 0.0286 -0.0582 0.1046 0.0090 
(0.0473) (2.7330) (0.0685) {0.0540) (0.0709) (0.0715) 
TAXRATE1,t + -0.0002 0.0047 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0010 0.0097 
{0.0011) (0.0339) (0.0016) {0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0063) 
TAXRATE1.t-1 + 0.0017 0.0123 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0003 0.0016 
{0.0014) (0.0715) (0.0020) {0.0016) {0.0021) (0.0016) 
MKT-T0-800~.1 -0.0030*** 0.0103 -0.0022 -0.0032*- -0.0025* -0.0032* 
{0.0010) (0.0772) {0.0013) {0.001 0) {0.0015) (0.0019) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t-1 0.0014* 0.0291 0.0010 0.0016* 0.0009 0.0016 
{0.0008) (0.1597) {0.0011) {0.0009) {0.001 0) (0.0014) 
FIXASSETS;,t + 0.1947*** 0.0294 0.1921*** 0.1939*** 0.1407*** 0.2230** 
(0.0415) (0.8646) {0.0532) {0.0416) (0.0530) (0.0880) 
FIXASSETS;,t-1 + -0.1554*** -1.9088 -0.0880 -0.1570*** -0.0641 -0.1845** 
(0.0409) (10.48) (0.0549) (0.0411) (0.0527) (0.0831) 
SIZE;,t + 0.0322*** -0.1049 0.0202** 0.0346*** 0.0273*** 0.0326*** 
(0.0055) (0.7043) (0.0087) (0.0054) {0.0093) (0.0122) 
SIZE;,t-1 + -0.0304*** -0.3688 -0.0278*** -0.0327*** -0.0191** -0.0310** 
(0.0056) (1.9650) (0.0096) (0.0055) {0.0091) (0.0122) 
Correlation1 0.3645 -0.1904 -10.13*** 0.3996 -7.716*** 0.0734 
Correlation2 -0.1097 -0.1611 -0.1501 0.0817 -0.2487 -0.6961 
Sargan Test {df) 43.56 (11)*** 44.98 (11)*** 343 (287)* 
Wald Test-1 (df) 23540(13)*** 1.027 (13) 216.6 (13)*** 14740(13)*** 225.7 (13)*** 14390(13)** 
Wald Test-2 {df) 315.9 (26)*** 224.3 (26)*** 208 (26)*** 
Wald Test-3 (df) 263.9 (12)*** 1.637 (11) 195.6 (12)*** 184 (12)*** 133.8 (12)*** 169 (12)*** 
R2 0.8357 0.8354 0.8325 
Firms I Observations 565/5468 510/4338 565/4903 565/5468 565/4903 565/5468 
Estimation Period 1988-2000 1990-2000 1989-2000 1988-2000 1989-2000 1988-2000 
See Table 5.1 for variable definitions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the 
parentheses. Model-l is OLS estimation in levels. Models 2 and 3 are Anderson-Hsiao type estimation in 
differences, where MEVERAGE2;,.1 and LEVERAGE211•2, respectively, is instrumented for MEVERAGE211•1• 
Models 4 and 5 are GMM estimates in levels and first differences, respectively, where only LEVERAGE1 1•1 is 
treated as endogenous. Model 6 is GMM estimates in levels, where all variables are treated as endogenous. 
Industry dummies are included in models 1, 4 and 6. Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation 1 and 
2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as 
N(O, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as x2(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests I, 2 and 3 test the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients, of time and industry dummies, and of time dummies, respectively; asymptotically 
distributed as x2( df) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term is not reported. (*), (**) and 
(***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.7: Dynamic capital structure in the UK: Alternative Estimations (Leveragel) 
Dependent Variable: LEVERAGE11.t 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Sign OLS-LEV AH-DIF AH-LEV GMM-LEV1 GMM-DIF1 GMM-
LEV2 
LEVERAGE 1 1,1·1 + 0.8183*** 0.5585*** 0.6670*** 0.8448*** 0.6534*** 0.8590*** 
(0.0058) (0.0975) (0.0266) (0.0067) (0.0228) (0.0068) 
PROFIT1,1 -I+ -0.1588*** -0.2166*** -0.1722*** -0.1490*** -0.1669*** -0.1136*** 
(0.0384) (0.0490) (0.0450) (0.0377) (0.0492) (0.0392) 
PROFIT1,1-1 -/+ 0.1090*** 0.0351 0.0577** 0.1068*** 0.0469** 0.0916*** 
(0.0287) (0.0240) (0.0235) (0.0287) (0.0237) (0.0288) 
NDTAX-SHIELD;,I 0.0564 -0.2444** -0.2440*** 0.0586 -0.2225** 0.3145** 
(0.0683) (0.0964) (0.0920) (0.0701) (0.0900) (0.1432) 
NDTAX-SHIELD1.1-1 -0.0892 -0.1893*** -0.2307*** -0.0776 -0.1976*** -0.2787** 
(0.0715) (0.0697) (0.0690) (0.0744) (0.0704) (0.1272) 
TAXRATE;,1 + -0.0030*** -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0027*** -0.0003 -0.0002 
(0.0010) (0.001 0) (0.001 0) (0.001 0) (0.001 0) (0.0051) 
T AXRATE1,1-1 + -0.0019** -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0017* 
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
MKT-T0-800K;,1 -0.0020** -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0017** -0.0015 -0.0029 
(0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
MKT-T0-800~.1-1 -0.0010 -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0013 
(0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
FIXASSETS1.1 + 0.1091*** 0.1267*** 0.1292*** 0.1213*** 0.1504*** 0.0212 
(0.0151) (0.0205) (0.0199) (0.0156) (0.0199) (0.0444) 
FIXASSETS;,1-1 + -0.0855*** -0.0032 -0.0204 -0.1010*** -0.0389** -0.0143 
(0.0151) (0.0190) (0.0171) (0.0158) (0.0175) (0.0419) 
SIZE;,1 + 0.0325*** 0.0380*** 0.0363*** 0.0323*** 0.0356*** 0.0569*** 
(0.0032) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0041) (0.0086) 
SIZE~.t-1 + -0.0295*** -0.0115** -0.0156*** -0.0295*** -0.0141*** -0.0542*** 
(0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0085) 
Correlation1 -5.444*** -7.601*** -22.33*** -5.783*** -21.28*** -6.675*** 
Correlation2 -1.262 1.602 0.9325 -2.982*** 0.8623 -3.444*** 
Sargan Test (df) 64.03 (29)*** 59.45 (29)*** 955 (791)*** 
Wald Test-1 (df) 30640(13)*** 373.2 (13)*** 1139 (13)*** 27030(13)*** 1782 (13)*** 27880(13)** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 467.4 (45)*** 444.4 (45)*** 388.6 (45)** 
Wald Test-3 (df) 406.9 (30)*** 303.1 (29)*** 283.8 (30)*** 393.6 (30)*** 269.8 (30)*** 357 (30)*** 
R2 0.6861 0.6854 0.6769 
Firms I Observations 2417/32540 2201/27706 2417/30123 2417/32540 2417/30123 2417/ 
32540 
Estimation Period 1970-2000 1972-2000 1971-2000 1970-2000 1971-2000 1970-2000 
See Table 5.1 for variable defmitions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the 
parentheses. Model-l is OLS estimation in levels. Models 2 and 3 are Anderson-Hsiao type estimation in 
differences, where MEVERAGEJil-l and LEVERAGE1;1•2, respectively, is instrumented for MEVERAGElii-J· 
Models 4 and 5 are GMM estimates in levels and first differences, respectively, where only LEVERAGEI 1•1 is 
treated as endogenous. Model 6 is GMM estimates in levels, where all variables are treated as endogenous. 
Industry dummies are included in models I, 4 and 6. Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation 1 and 
2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as 
N(O, I) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as x2(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests I, 2 and 3 test the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients, of time and industry dummies, and of time dummies, respectively; asymptotically 
distributed as x2(df) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term is not reported.(*),(**) and 
(* **) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at I 0, 5 and I percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.8: Dynamic capital structure in the UK: Alternative Estimations (Leverage2) 
Dependent Variable: LEVERAGE2,,t 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Sign OLS-LEV AH-DIF AH-LEV GMM-LEV1 GMM-DIF1 GMM-
LEV2 
LEVERAGE2t,t-1 + 0.8277*** 0.9079*** 0.7537*** 0.8168*** 0.7305*** 0.8509*** 
(0.0046) (0.1400) (0.0190) (0.0072) (0.0236) (0.0068) 
PROFIT,,1 -/+ -0.2490*** -0.2723*** -0.2211*** -0.2232*** -0.2489*** -0.1300*** 
(0.0557) (0.0564) (0.0521) (0.0666) (0.0914) (0.0404) 
PROFIT1.t-1 -/+ 0.1573*** 0.1522*** 0.1173*** 0.1390*** 0.0996*** 0.0961*** 
(0.0383) (0.0493) (0.0272) (0.0459) (0.0341) (0.0259) 
NDTAX-SHIELD,,1 -0.2747*** -1.0934*** -0.9445*** -0.2016** -0.8668*** -0.0011 
(0.0737) (0.2047) (0.1530) (0.0839) (0.1713) (0.1585) 
NDTAX-SHIELD,,t-1 0.1756** -0.1634* -0.1874** 0.0734 -0.2127** -0.0259 
(0.0786) (0.0941) (0.0809) (0.0902) (0.0980) (0.1343) 
TAXRATE,,t + -0.0025 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0030 0.0003 0.0071 
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0080) 
TAXRATE1.t-1 + -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0023 
(0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0015) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t -0.0156*** -0.0100*** -0.0113*** -0.0136*** -0.0108*** -0.0110*** 
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0024) 
MKT-TO-BOOK,,t-1 0.0057*** 0.0097*** 0.0055*** 0.0046*** 0.0044*** 0.0025* 
(0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0009) (0.001 0) (0.0010) (0.0015) 
FIXASSETS,,t + 0.0991*** 0.1162*** 0.1219*** 0.0889*** 0.1112*** 0.0457 
(0.0163) (0.0262) (0.0219) (0.0190) (0.0256) (0.0605) 
FIXASSETSt,t-1 + -0.0729*** -0.0013 0.0101 -0.0600*** 0.0075 -0.0323 
(0.0164) (0.0269) (0.0196) (0.0191) (0.0225) (0.0567) 
SIZE,,1 + 0.0536*** 0.0747*** 0.0704*** 0.0517*** 0.0716*** 0.1017*** 
(0.0039) (0.0064) (0.0053) (0.0047) (0.0068) (0.0111) 
SIZEI,t-1 + -0.0490*** -0.0390*** -0.0278*** -0.0473*** -0.0246*** -0.0970*** 
(0.0038) (0.0101) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0110) 
Correlation1 -1.063 -7.250*** -27.29*** 0.5532 -23.55*** -1.569 
Correlation2 -3.504*** 0.2649 -0.0852 -2.019** -0.1678 -3.777*** 
Sargan Test (df) 328.6 (29)*** 307.8 (29)*** 1145(791)-
Wald Test-1 (df) 50450(13)*** 826.6 (13)*** 2992 (13)*** 22600(13)*** 2223 (13)*** 25470(13)-
Wald Test-2 (df) 2625 (45)*** 1858 (45)*** 1971 (45)*** 
Wald Test-3 (df) 2509 (30)*** 2285 (29)*** 2321 (30)*** 1745 (30)*** 1585 (30)*** 1851 (30)*** 
R2 0.7467 0.7459 0.7362 
Firms I Observations 2417/32540 2201/27706 2417/30123 2417/32540 2417/30123 2417/ 
32540 
Estimation Period 1970-2000 1972-2000 1971-2000 1970-2000 1971-2000 1970-2000 
See Table 5.1 for variable defmitions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the 
parentheses. Model-l is OLS estimation in levels. Models 2 and 3 are Anderson-Hsiao type estimation in 
differences, where MEVERAG£211•2 and LEVERAGE2i1•2, respectively, is instrumented for MEVERAGE2;,.1• 
Models 4 and 5 are GMM estimates in levels and first differences, respectively, where only LEVERAGEI 1•1 is 
treated as endogenous. Model 6 is GMM estimates in levels, where all variables are treated as endogenous. 
Industry dummies are included in models I, 4 and 6. Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation I and 
2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as 
N(O,l) under the null ofno serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as x2(dt) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests I, 2 and 3 test the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients, of time and industry dummies, and of time dummies, respectively; asymptotically 
distributed as x2(dt) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term is not reported.(*},(**) and 
(* * *) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and I percent level, 
respectively. 
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5.4.2.2. The Comparison of System-GMM and Difference-GMM Estimators 
In Table 5.9, we report the GMM-DIF estimation results assuming the endogeneity of 
explanatory variables. Correlation Tests confirm the validity of the assumption of serially 
uncorrelated errors in levels as Correlation! is significant but Correlation2 is insignificant 
in all cases. Furthermore, two-step Sargan Tests accept the validity of lagged level 
instruments dated (t-2) and earlier in France-Germany but in (6) the validity of 
instruments is rejected for the UK. 
Although the results in Table 5.9 do not suffer from serial correlation, endogeneity 
problem and instrument invalidity, recent econometric studies document that standard 
GMM-DIF estimator has the problem of weak instruments109• As discussed by Blundell et 
al. [2000], the weak instruments problem can be seen by comparing GMM-DIF estimates 
with Within Groups (deviation from individual means)(WG) estimates in Table 5.10. The 
results in these tables are generally similar and the estimated coefficient of lagged 
leverage of GMM-DIF is not substantially higher than that of WG. It is known in the 
presence of firm-specific effects that OLS-Levels specification appears to cause an 
upward bias in the estimate of LDV while WG appears to cause a downward bias in the 
same coefficient's estimate. Consequently, one can expect this coefficient to be biased 
downwards in case of weak instruments usage. Therefore, as also discussed in the 
footnote below, system GMM (GMM-SYS) estimation procedure, in the end, has been 
shown to be the most efficient and consistent methodology for our dynamic capital 
structure model. 
109 Arellano and Bover [1995] argue that the absence of information concerning the parameters in the 
levels-variables causes substantial efficiency loss in models estimated in first-differences using instruments 
in levels. Hence, they propose to use instruments in first-differences for equations in levels in addition to 
instruments in levels for equations in first-differences. Furthermore, Blundell and Bond [1998] document 
that the extended GMM (GMM-SYS) estimator of Arellano and Bover [1995] reveals dramatic efficiency 
gains in cases where standard GMM-DIF estimator performs poorly (e.g. for short sample periods and 
persistent data). In addition, Mairesse and Hall [1996] fmd that GMM-DIF specification results in 
unsatisfactory estimations using panel data for a large sample of fmns with small number of time periods. 
Blundell and Bond [1999] document that once lagged frrst-differenced and lagged levels instruments are 
included in the instrument set, one could reduce the fmite sample bias substantially due to exploiting the 
additional moment conditions in this system approach. Their results show that the instruments used by 
GMM-DIF estimator contain little information about the endogenous variables in frrst-differences, and 
lagged first-differences are informative instruments for the endogenous variables in levels. 
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Table 5.9: Dynamic capital structure using GMM-DIF Estimations. 
Dependent Variable LEVERAGE1,,t LEVERAGE21,1 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Sign FRANCE GERMANY UK FRANCE GERMANY UK 
LEVERAGE1,t-1 + 0.6127*** 0.6214*** 0.6667*** 0.5845*** 0.6008*** 0.6638*** 
(0.0474) (0.0554) (0.0226) (0.0466) (0.0373) (0.0183) 
PROFIT,,1 -/+ -0.5272*** -0.1148** -0.1756*** -0.6611*** -0.1304** -0.2693* 
(0.0674) (0.0461) (0.0442) (0.1314) (0.0536) {0.0643) 
PROFIT1,1-1 -/+ 0.1846*** -0.0228 0.0607*** 0.1050* -0.0528 0.0874*** 
{0.0521) (0.0331) {0.0219) {0.0552) (0.0330) {0.0302) 
NOT AX-SHIELD,,I - 0.1207 0.1855** 0.1393 0.0280 0.0235 -0.1943 
(0.1687) (0.0939) (0.1597) (0.2874) (0.0880) (0.1891) 
NOT AX-SHIELD,,I-1 - -0.0619 -0.0358 -0.1259* 0.1377 0.0457 -0.0303 
(0.1564) (0.0485) (0.0651) (0.1845) (0.0487) (0.0906) 
TAXRATE1,1 + -0.0017 -0.0005 0.0073 0.0016 -0.0014 0.0161 
(0.0038) (0.0010) (0.0079) (0.0060) (0.0016) (0.0107) 
TAXRATEi.t-1 + 0.0036 0.0008 0.0032 0.0032 0.0000 0.0072 
(0.0033) (0.001 0) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0012) (0.0054) 
MKT-T0-800~.~ - 0.0102** -0.0009 0.0025 -0.0010 -0.0019** 0.0001 
(0.0048) (0.0010) (0.0024) {0.0067) (0.0010) (0.0028) 
MKT-T0-800~.1-1 - 0.0151*** -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0121** 0.0009 0.0079*** 
(0.0054) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0052) (0.0008) {0.0015) 
FIXASSETS,,I + 0.0173 0.0982** 0.1010*** 0.3282** 0.1668*** 0.0600 
(0.1082) {0.0438) (0.0350) (0.1395) {0.0543) (0.0535) 
FIXASSETSi,l-1 + 0.1536** -0.0658* -0.0416** 0.0172 -0.0601 -0.0144 
(0.0760) (0.0355) (0.0163) (0.1042) (0.0415) (0.0198) 
SIZE1.1 + 0.0409*** 0.0361*** 0.0443*** 0.0997*** 0.0398*** 0.0835*** 
(0.0151) (0.0110) (0.0081) {0.0181) {0.0107) (0.0108) 
SIZE1.1-1 + -0.0233*** -0.0108* -0.0206*** -0.0488*** -0.0160** -0.0243** * 
(0.0082) (0.0062) (0.0042) (0.0122) (0.0068) (0.0052) 
Correlation1 -6.719*** -7.704*** -18.13*** -6.539*- -8.064*- -20.93*** 
Correlation2 1.328 -0.3948 0.7203 -1.532 -0.1831 -0.9795 
Sargan Test (df) 241.9 (399) 300.1 (287) 444.5 (392)- 243.2 (399) 466.8 (434) 893 (581)*** 
Wald Test-1 (df) 359.1 (13)*** 289.2 (13)*- 1270 (13)*** 462.9 (13)-* 445.4 (13)*- 2032 (13)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 95.13 (16)*** 22.05 (12)** 333.5 (30)*- 334.7 (16)*** 181.4 (12)*** 1439 (30)*** 
Firms I Observations 359/2453 565/4903 2417/30123 359/2453 565/4903 2417/3012 
Estimation Period 1985-2000 1989-2000 1971-2000 1985-2000 1989-2000 1971-2000 
.. .. See Table 5.I for vanable defimttons. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasttc1ty are m the 
parentheses. Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation I and 2 are first and second order 
autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O, I) under the null of no serial 
correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as i(dt) under the 
null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests I and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of time 
dummies, respectively; asymptotically distributed as x.2{dt) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of 
intercept term is not reported. (*), (**) and(***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is 
rejected at 10, 5 and I percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5.10: Dynamic capital structure using Within Groups Estimations. 
Dependent Variable LEVERAGE1i.t LEVERAGE2,,t 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Sign FRANCE GERMANY UK FRANCE GERMANY UK 
LEVERAGE1.1-1 + 0.5374*** 0.6127*** 0.6175*** 0.5720*** 0.6652*** 0.6561*** 
(0.0281) (0.0195) (0.0088) (0.0247) (0.0173) (0.0071) 
PROFIT1,t -I+ -0.4716*** -0.0974*** -0.1839*** -0.6776*** -0.1145** -0.2930** * 
(0.0476) (0.0369) (0.0429) (0.1127) (0.0514) (0.0637) 
PROFIT1,t-1 -I+ 0.1322*** -0.0095 0.0391** 0.1298* -0.0247 0.0567*** 
(0.0467) (0.0221) (0.0179) (0.0665) (0.0239) (0.0212) 
NDTAX-SHIELD,,t - 0.2137** 0.1525* 0.0042 0.2585* -0.0393 -0.3617** * 
(0.0996) (0.0821) (0.0714) (0.1503) (0.0698) (0.0779) 
N DT AX-SHI ELD1,t-1 - -0.0600 -0.1034* -0.1272* 0.0845 -0.0287 0.0609 
(0.1251) (0.0567) (0.0666) (0.1478) (0.0483) (0.0791) 
TAXRATEi.t + -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0035*** 0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0032** 
(0.0030) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0047) (0.0011) (0.0015) 
T AXRA TE1,t-1 + 0.0038 0.0006 -0.0028*** 0.0045 0.0007 -0.0029** 
(0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0038) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
MKT-TO-BOOK,t - -0.0023 -0.0012* -0.0016* -0.0214*** -0.0032*** -0.0167** * 
(0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.0015) 
MKT-TO-BOOK.t-1 - 0.0105*** -0.0002 -0.0015** 0.0050 0.0008 0.0031*** 
(0.0039) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0047) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
FIXASSETS1,t + -0.0037 0.1761*** 0.1162*** 0.1230 0.2065*** 0.1235*** 
(0.0554) (0.0379) (0.0154) (0.0773) (0.0421) (0.0169) 
FIXASSETS1.t-t + 0.1490*** -0.0738** -0.0395*** 0.0291 -0.0860** -0.0244 
(0.0538) (0.0360) (0.0141) (0.0814) (0.0401) (0.0160) 
SIZE1,t + 0.0460*** 0.0153*** 0.0342*** 0.0996*** 0.0307*** 0.0597*** 
(0.0085) (0.0054) (0.0035) (0.0119) (0.0060) (0.0043) 
SIZEI,t-1 + -0.0183*** -0.0119** -0.0178*** -0.0474*** -0.0205*** -0.0278** * 
(0.0070) (0.0051) (0.0032) (0.0106) (0.0058) (0.0038) 
Correlation 1 -2.020** 1.369 -1.969** 0.0464 1.826* 4.332-· 
Correlation2 -1.019 -1.451 -1.256 -3.137*** -2.072** -2.717*-
Wald Test-1 ( df) 790.1 {13)*** 1541 {13)*** 7517 {13)*** 1335 {13)*** 2341 {13)*** 14630(13)-
Wald Test-2 (df) 126.1 {16)*** 21.34 {12)** 358.3 {30)*** 382.1 {16)*** 220.2 {12)*** 2399 (30)*-
Firms I Observations 359/2812 565/5468 2417/32540 359/2812 565/5468 2417/3254 0 
Estimation Period 1984-2000 1988-2000 1970-2000 1984-2000 1988-2000 1970-2000 
.. .. See Table 5.I for variable defmitlons. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedastlcity are m the 
parentheses. Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation I and 2 are first and second order 
autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O, I) under the null of no serial 
correlation. Wald Tests I and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of time dummies, 
respectively; asymptotically distributed as i< dt) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term 
is not reported.(*),(**) and(***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at IO, 5 
and I percent level, respectively. 
Standard GMM-DIF estimator is biased either when the lagged and current 
dependent variables are highly correlated or when heteroscedasticity is high across cross-
sections. It causes downward bias as the coefficient of lagged dependent variable (LDV) 
increase or relative variance of fixed effects increases. This is very important with respect 
to our adjustment coefficient which has long-run implications (see equation (5.6)). It also 
eliminates valuable information by taking first-differences and uses weak instruments. 
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The results in Table 5.11 show that GMM-SYS estimates, which are produced as a result 
of the shortcomings of GMM-DIF, are more reasonable than GMM-DIF estimates. This 
is particularly apparent in the estimated coefficient of lagged leverage, which is 
substantially higher in GMM-SYS case than in WG case. Hence, GMM-SYS estimator 
produces higher estimated coefficient ofLDV than GMM-DIF does, which is higher than 
WG estimate and below than OLS estimate. Consequently, the reported results are 
consistent with the analysis of Blundell and Bond [1998] that in autoregressive models 
with persistent series, GMM-DIF can cause serious finite sample biases due to weak 
instruments and these biases can be greatly reduced by including level equations in the 
system estimator. In what follows, therefore, we will report only the results of system-
GMM estimator specification in the next section. 
It would be noteworthy to mention about the implications of test statistics in Table 5.11. 
All Correlation and Sargan Tests are robust for France and Germany and, thus, the 
models are not misspecified. It implies that the instruments used (lagged-levels dated [t-
2] and earlier for differenced equations, and lagged-differenced dated [t-1] for level 
equations) are valid and there is no second-order correlation. Similarly, the Correlation 
tests are also robust for the UK. The validity of lagged levels dated [t-3] and earlier as 
instruments in the first-differenced equations combined with lagged first-differences 
dated [t-2] as instruments in levels seems to be marginal in GMM-SYS and GMM-DIF 
estimators for UK using Leverage! as LDV. What is more, the Sargan Test rejects the 
validity of instruments at 1% level using Leverage2 as LDV. However, these tests tend to 
overreject the instrument validity in such a large sample size or in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity (see e.g., Arellano and Bond [1991], Blundell et al. [2000])l1°. 
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Table 5.11: Dynamic capital structure using GMM-SYS Estimations 
Dependent Variable LEVERAGE1 i,t LEVERAGE21,t 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Sign FRANCE GERMANY UK FRANCE GERMANY UK 
LEVERAGE1,t-1 + 0.7532*** 0.7578*** 0.7599*** 0.7353*** 0.80750*** 0. 7670*** 
(0.0368) (0.0304) (0.0168) (0.0316) (0.0265) (0.0128) 
PROFITI,t -I+ -0.5762*** -0.1558** -0.1371*** -0.6687*** -0.1471* -0.1501** * 
(0.0892) (0.0729) (0.0498) (0.2184) (0.0804) (0.0560) 
PROFIT1.t-1 -I+ 0.3905*** 0.0399 0.0862*** 0.4163*** 0.0219 0.0880*** 
(0.0596) (0.0385) (0.0274) (0.1194) (0.0445) (0.0271) 
NOT AX-SHIELD1.t - 0.5195** 0.1918 0.3042 0.6675** -0.1074 -0.1242 
(0.2101) (0.1599) (0.2003) (0.2579) (0.1813) (0.1750) 
NDTAX-SHIELD1.t-1 - -0.3333** -0.1737*** -0.2043 -0.2714 -0.0264 -0.0029 
(0.1657) (0.0653) (0.1315) (0.1719) (0.0566) (0.1116) 
TAXRATE1,t + 0.0017 -0.0008 0.0003 0.0018 -0.0025 0.0103 
(0.0049) (0.0017) (0.0063) (0.0095) (0.0024) (0.0095) 
T AXRATE1.t-1 + 0.0039 0.0012 -0.0013 0.0024 0.0007 0.0011 
(0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0050) (0.0014) (0.0031) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1,t - 0.0045 -0.0015 -0.0051** -0.0067 -0.0009 -0.0128** * 
(0.0066) (0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0051) (0.001 0) (0.0028) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t-1 - 0.0030 -0.0003 -0.0020** -0.0017 -0.0004 0.0026** 
(0.0046) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0042) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
FIXASSETS1.t + 0.0405 0.1577** 0.0514 0.4363*** 0.1986*** -0.0190 
(0.1167) (0.0618) (0.0609) (0.1153) (0.0651) (0.0631) 
FIXASSETS1.t-1 + 0.0477 -0.0865* -0.0347 -0.3317*** -0.1209** 0.0342 
(0.1111) (0.0497) (0.0527) (0.1131) (0.0566) (0.0543) 
SIZE1,t + 0.0216 0.0368*** 0.0537*** 0.0650*** 0.0428*** 0.0614*** 
(0.0148) (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0207) (0.0104) (0.0125) 
SIZE1.t-1 + -0.0191 -0.0374*** -0.0490*** -0.0584*** -0.0387*** -0.0551 ** * 
(0.0142) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0200) (0.0100) (0.0121) 
Correlation 1 -7.065*** -9.317*** -19.96*** -7.453*** -9.218*** -23.48*** 
Correlation2 1.491 -0.1503 1.366 -1.143 0.2154 -0.5716 
Sargan Test (df) 266.6 (511) 440.8 (427) 649.1 (595)* 265.9 (511) 518.6 (476) 1081(784)** 
Wald Test-1 (df) 904.6 (13)*** 1468 (13)*** 4750 (13)*** 2981 (13)*** 2474 (13)*** 8163 (13)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 85.15 (16)*** 24.14 (12)** 335.7 (30)*** 369.6 (16)*** 238.4 (12)*** 1728 (30)*** 
R2 0.7769 0.7861 0.6757 0.8037 0.8219 0.7367 
Firms I Observations 359/2812 565/5468 2417/32540 359/2812 565/5468 2417/3254 
Estimation Period 1985-2000 1989-2000 1971-2000 1985-2000 1989-2000 1971-2000 
. . .. See Table 5.I for variable defmitlons. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedastJcity are m the 
parentheses. Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation I and 2 are first and second order 
autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O, I) under the null of no serial 
correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentitying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as i(df) under the 
null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests I and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of time 
dummies, respectively; asymptotically distributed as x2(df) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of 
intercept term is not reported. (*), (**) and(***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is 
rejected at I 0, 5 and I percent level, respectively. 
110 In fact, after dividing the full sample into three classes for size classification, the Sargan Tests turned out 
to easily accept the validity of instruments for the UK models. 
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5.4.2.3. The Results of System-GMM Estimator Specification 
In this section, we discuss our main results based on the model for which all relevant 
variables are shown in equation (5.6). Although the main focus will be the static long-run 
results in Table 5 .14, the implications of short-run models in Tables 5.12 & 5.13 will be 
referred to where necessary. 
The GMM estimates in Table 5.13 were obtained, following general-to-specific 
approach, after excluding the insignificant lagged independent variables from the 
estimation of general dynamic model in Table 5.12 111 • Focusing on the lagged independent 
variables in Table 5.13, one can see that almost all lagged-variables are significant in the 
UK. In France and Germany, size, market-to-book ratio and profitability are the significant 
lagged-variables. Together with highly-significant lagged dependent variable, a significant 
lagged variable would imply some transitional effects on debt-ratios. This finding 
necessitates the discussion of long-run relationships between leverage and firm-specific 
factors. In Tables 5.12 & 5.13, time dummies are not included. Instead, we use market-
related factors that control for time effects more explicitly. The significant coefficients of 
these factors emphasise the importance of dynamic relationship between firm 
characteristics and changes in business life. 
5.4.2.3.1. Lagged Leverage 
In Tables 5.12 &5.13, the coefficient of lagged leverage is positive and significant at 1% 
level for all countries. Beside this, as it is between zero and unity, one can assert that the 
coefficient is stable and converging to its desired value. It is important to note that the 
adjustment speed is independent from the serial correlation problem. Hence, the inclusion 
of lagged dependent variable implying the existence of dynamic capital structure is 
validated with these results. Accordingly, one can argue that the firms adjust their leverage 
ratios in order to achieve their targeted capital structure112• In terms of the adjustment 
speed, French firms are the quickest ones in adjusting themselves to desired debt ratios in 
all cases. For instance, they have the highest adjustment coefficient of 0.5760 (8 =1-
0.4240) based on market leverage in Table 5.12. This is consistent with the idea that time 
111 Before discussing the implication of results in particularisation, it should again be noted that there is no 
misspecification problem for all countries. As one expects, all Correlation-! test statistics indicate the 
existence of significant and negative first-order serial correlation of residuals while all Correlation-2 
statistics do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. Finally, all Sargan Tests 
(except the over-rejection case in the UK) confirm the validity of instruments used in the models, as there is 
no correlation between the residuals and the instruments. 
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dimension constructs a very important variable explaining the evolution of firms' debt 
ratios in France (Kremp et al. [1999]). It seems the adjustment process is relatively very 
costly and slow in Germany, where the adjustment coefficient is always lowest. It can also 
be argued that the cost of not being on the targeted (equilibrium) debt ratio is insignificant 
for the German firms. Thus, it may not be very important for German firms to adjust 
quickly their debt ratios as they are in a bank-oriented economy, where capital markets 
seem to react relatively slowly to financial activities of corporations. The UK seems to be 
the middle case in this adjustment process with the medium adjustment coefficients. 
Overall, the results seem to reveal that the dynamic capital structure implied by our model 
is not rejected as firms tend to trade-off between transaction costs of being on-target and 
disequilibrium costs of being off-target. 
Table 5.14 shows the static long-run relationship between leverage and firm-
specific factors based on general (panel-a) and specific (panel-b) case (see equation [5.2]). 
The GMM estimates for the long-run model are obtained using the following general 
equation. The implications of these long-run relationships will be discussed in depth in the 
next sections. (PcGive's calculations for the estimated coefficients of static long-run 
equation are based on the algorithm proposed by Bardsen [1989]). 
Leverage;, = (p2 + p3 )Profitability;,+ (p4 + Ps )rax Rate;, +(p6 + p1 )Market to Book ratio;,+ 
I - PI I - PI I - PI 
( Ps + fig )Fixed Assests ~ + ( PIO + PII )Firm Size" + ( p12 + p13 )Earninas Volatility~ + I - PI II I - PI II I - PI 0' II 
(p14 +Pis )Dividend~ +(p16 + p11 )Market Equity Premium·+ I -PI II I - PI II 
( Pis + p
19 )rerm Structure;, + ( p20 + p21 ) Share Price Change;, (5.6) 
I-PI I-PI 
112 In their survey of 392 US ftrms, Graham and Harvey [200 I] fmd that 44% of the ftrms in their sample 
have strict or somewhat strict target debt ratios and 64% of investment-grade firms have somewhat strict 
optimal capital structure implied by static trade-off theory. 
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Table 5.12: Dynamic capital structure using GMM-SYS Estimations (General). 
Dependent Variable BOOK-LEVERAGE1,t MARKET -LEVERAGE1,t 
Independent Predicted 
Variables Sign FRANCE GERMANY UK FRANCE GERMANY UK 
LEVERAGE1.t-1 + 0.7089*** 0.7859*** 0.7301*** 0.4240*** 0.7958*** 0.6457*** 
(0.0381) (0.0369) (0.0179) (0.0329) (0.0266) (0.0162) 
PROFIT1,t -/+ -0.6175*** -0.0788 -0.1398*** -0.7382*** -0.1396 -0.1491*** 
(0.1232) (0.0732) (0.0542) (0.1432) (0.0888) (0.053) 
PROFIT1.t-1 -/+ 0.4358*** -0.0005 0.0951*** 0.3063*** 0.0076 0.0473* 
(0.1016) (0.0255) (0.0298) (0.0853) (0.0333) (0.0243) 
TAXRATE1,t + -0.0019 -0.0006 -0.0105** 0.0004 -0.0016 0.0278** 
(0.005) (0.0021) (0.0053) (0.0106) (0.0025) (0.0118) 
TAXRATE1.t-1 + 0.0017 0.0011 -0.0050*** 0.0016 0.0005 0.0039 
(0.0028) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0048) (0.0015) (0.0034) 
MKT-TO-BOOK~,, - 0.0098 -0.0015** 0.0016 -0.0560*** -0.0015* -0.0517*** 
(0.0105) (0.0007) (0.0024) (0.0118) (0.0008) (0.0065) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1.1-1 - -0.0013 0.0004 -0.0034*** 0.0133* 0.0003 0.0113*** 
(0.0079) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.008) (0.0007) (0.0034) 
FIXASSETS1,t + 0.0070 0.1193 0.0570 0.2425** 0.1858** -0.3304*** 
(0.1112) (0.0811) (0.0516) (0.1237) (0.0865) (0.0798) 
FIXASSETS1,t-1 + 0.1067 -0.0571 -0.0310 -0.0556 -0.1142 0.2782*** 
(0.1072) (0.0691) (0.0443) (0.1195) (0.0699) (0.0669) 
SIZE~,, + 0.0601*** 0.0380*** 0.0466*** 0.1281*** 0.0483*** 0.0476*** 
(0.0162) (0.0107) (0.0093) (0.026) (0.0127) (0.0161) 
SIZE1.1-1 + -0.0585*** -0.0375*** -0.0411*** -0.1186*** -0.0435*** -0.0407** * 
(0.0159) (0.0104) (0.0090) (0.0258) (0.0122) (0.0156) 
EARNINGS VOL1.1 - -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0011 0.0000 -0.0004 
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t-1 - -0.0001 0.0000 0.00005** -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.00002) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
DIVIDEND1,t -I+ -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0015* 0.0018 0.0005 -0.0040** 
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0018) 
DIVIDEND1.t-1 -I+ 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0013* 0.0001 -0.0018** * 
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
EQUITY PREMIUM - 0.0002* -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003** * 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TERM-STRUCTR - -0.0047*** -0.0012* -0.0017*** -0.012*** -0.0022** -0.0047** * 
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0004) 
SHARE PRICE - -0.0125** -0.0126** -0.0119*** -0.0547*** -0.0560*** -0.0189** * 
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0021) (0.0082) (0.0069) (0.0035) 
Constant 0.0313 0.0229 0.0073 0.1520** -0.0005 0.1261*** 
(0.0247) (0.0231) (0.008) (0.0622) (0.0282) (0.0174) 
Correlation1 -6.166*** -8.738*** -18.90*** -6.779*** -9.009*** -20.47*** 
Correlation2 1.014 0.09975 1.316 0.3003 1.359 3.266*** 
Sargan Test (df) 272.2 (575) 281.5 (263) 850 (679)*** 256.7 (574) 322 (263)*** 1159(679)** 
Wald Test-1 (df) 1016 (18)*** 1450 (18)*** 4448 (18)*** 948.4 (18)*** 3013 (18)*** 4673 (1 B)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 33.71 (15)*** 30.14 (14)*** 36.15 (15)*** 39.74 (15)*** 32.01 (14)*** 74.75 (15)** 
R2 0.7896 0.7969 0.6753 0.7140 0.8240 0.6432 
Firms I Observations 293/2280 506/4772 2194/29774 293/2280 506/4772 2194/2977 4 
Estimation Period 1986-2000 1990-2000 1972-2000 1986-2000 1990-2000 1972-2000 
. . .. See notes m Table 5.1 for variable defimt10ns. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedast1c1ty are m the parentheses . 
Correlation 1 and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as 
N(O, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentitying restrictions, asymptotically distributed 
as i(dt) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests 1 and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of 
industry dummies, respectively; asymptotically distributed as i(dt) under the null of no relationship. (*), (**) and (***) 
indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5.13: Dynamic capital structure using GMM-SYS Estimations (Specific). 
Dependent Variable BOOK-LEVERAGEt,t MARKET -LEVERAGE~,~ 
Independent Predicted 
Variables Sign FRANCE GERMANY UK FRANCE GERMANY UK 
LEVERAGEt,t-1 + 0.7143*** 0.7905*** 0.7282*** 0.4550*** 0.7897*** 0.6461*** 
(0.0377) (0.0369) (0.0183) (0.0302) (0.0292) (0.0161) 
PROFIT,,1 -/+ -0.4540*** -0.0985* -0.1385*** -0.5521*** -0.1390** -0.1584** * 
(0.0774) (0.0590) (0.053) (0.1971) (0.067) (0.0561) 
PROFIT1.t-1 -/+ 0.3277*** - 0.0943*** 0.2145* - 0.0575** 
(0.0728) 
-
(0.0293) (0.1136) 
-
(0.0277) 
TAXRATEt,t + -0.0005 0.0042 -0.0106** 0.0087 0.0017 0.0309** 
(0.0058) (0.0043) (0.005) (0.0125) (0.0053) (0.0141) 
T AXRATE1,t-1 + - - -0.0050*** - - -
- - (0.0017) - - -
MKT-TO-BOO~.t - 0.0098** -0.0012 0.0016 -0.0533*** -0.0009 -0.0508** * 
(0.0042) (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0106) (0.0008) (0.0063) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t-1 - - - -0.0034*** 0.0148** - 0.0110*** 
- -
(0.0011) (0.0068) - (0.0030) 
FIXASSETS1,t + 0.1290*** 0.0968** 0.0378** 0.2524*** 0.1278** -0.3265** * 
(0.0399) (0.0484) (0.0176) (0.0571) (0.0541) (0.0806) 
FIXASSETSt,t-1 + - - - - - 0.2696*** 
- - - - -
(0.0672) 
SIZEt,t + 0.0331** 0.0398*** 0.0471*** 0.0988*** 0.0509*** 0.0482*** 
(0.0130) (0.0122) (0.009) (0.0213) (0.012) (0.0161) 
SIZEt,t-1 + -0.0305** -0.0395*** -0.0418*** -0.0886*** -0.0462*** -0.0418** * 
(0.0125) (0.0120) (0.0087) (0.0214) (0.0116) (0.0155) 
EARNINGS VOL1,t - 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0004 
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
EARNINGS VOL1,t-1 - - - 0.00004** - - -
- -
(0.00002) - - -
DIVIDEND1,t -/+ 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0016* 0.0003 -0.0041** 
(0.00063) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0019) 
DIVIDEND1,t-1 -/+ - - - 0.0011* - -0.0018** * 
- - - (0.0006) - (0.0006) 
EQUITY PREMIUM - 0.0002* -0.0001 0.0000 0.0003** 0.0001 -0.0003** * 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TERM-STRUCTR - -0.0050*** -0.0008 -0.0018*** -0.0131*** -0.0013 -0.0048** * 
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.001) (0.0004) 
SHARE PRICE - -0.0073 -0.0120** -0.0122*** -0.0523*** -0.0525** -0.0181** * 
(0.0065) (0.0057) (0.0021) (0.0073) (0.0065) (0.0034) 
Constant 0.0048 0.0084 0.0037 0.0942* -0.0261 0.1344*** 
(0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0090) (0.0563) (0.034) (0.0182) 
Correlation 1 -6.654*** -8.992*** -18.80*** -7.011**** -9.178*** -21.12*** 
Correlation2 1.691 -0.4362 1.415 -0.9985 0.5795 3.352*** 
Sargan Test (df) 275.6 {583) 286.7 {271) 854 {679)*** 278.1 {583) 342 {271)*** 1159(679)** 
Wald Test-1 (df) 902.5 {13)*** 761.9 (12)*** 3833 (16)*** 1181 (15)*** 1416 (12)*** 4683 (16) 
Wald Test-2 ( df) 38.64 (15)*** 32.90 (14)*** 34.56 (15)*** 43.06 {15)*** 29.76 (14)*** 76.64 (15)** 
R2 0.7870 0.7899 0.6753 0.7287 0.8180 0.6370 
Firms I Observations 325/2604 529/5045 2197/29799 321/2573 529/5045 2342/3176 0 
Estimation Period 1985-2000 1989-2000 1972-2000 1985-2000 1989-2000 1971-2000 
. . .. See notes m Table 5.1 for varmble defimtwns. Asymptottc standard errors robust to heteroscedasttctty are m the parentheses . 
Correlation I and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as 
N(O,I) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentitying restrictions, asymptotically distributed 
as r(dt) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests I and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of 
industry dummies, respectively; asymptotically distributed as r(dt) under the null of no relationship. (*), (**) and (* .. ) 
indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at I 0, 5 and I percent level, respectively. 
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5.4.2.3.2. Profitability 
In Table 5.14, there is a significantly negative association between profitability and 
leverage in all countries, which is consistent with the Pecking Order Theory (POT) 
(Myers [1984]; Myers and Majluf [1984])113 • That is, firms rely on their retained earnings 
at first instance for their investment opportunities and then, on external funding if needed. 
The results, hence, do not confirm the positive prediction of Free Cash Flow Theory 
(Jensen [1986]), which argues that debt reduces agency costs of free cash and disciplines 
management114• It seems that the agency costs of using debt is not negligible and the 
bankruptcy probability due to higher debt ratios cannot be preferred to additional tax 
benefits of using more debt in these countries. Or, the agency cost of free cash flow is not 
considerable, which cannot outweigh the importance of information asymmetries implied 
by POT. A profitable UK firm may have high debt-ratios to convey a quality signal to the 
market, where information disclosure of corporations is much more important than in 
Continental Europe115• It is also possible that in order to shelter gross profit from 
corporate taxes, firms with high income might have motivations to borrow more. 
Consequently, it may be surprising to find a significantly negative correlation in the UK, 
where market for corporate control plays an important disciplinary role in management 
and managers do not have control over the information processed by creditors. This fact 
could also explain why there is no significantly positive relationship between profitability 
and leverage in Germany, where takeovers are very rare and managers are 
informationally advantageous. 
Hovakimian et al. [2001] argue that firms with relatively high profitability are likely to 
have more valuable assets-in-place, thus higher target debt-ratios. However, our results 
contradict this argument as profitability has significantly negative influence upon 
leverage despite the significantly positive relationship between profitability and fixed-
assets ratio (see Table 5.2). One may, thus, argue that there might be chronic problems in 
raising outside equity because there is information asymmetries between managers and 
113 The same association is also reported by Bennett and Donnelly [1993], De Jong and Veld [2001], 
Johnson [1998], Narayanan [1988], and Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999]. Therefore, the present evidence 
is not in line with the fmdings ofBiazenko [1987], Leland and Pyle [1977], Heinkel [1982], John [1987] 
and Ross [ 1977]. 
114 As discussed by Myers [1998], a significantly negative relationship between profitability and leverage 
would also invalidate the static-tradeoff theory in this respect as it suggest a direct causation because higher 
~rofit would mean more taxable income to shield. 
15 In fact, the empirical evidence shows that security prices rise when firms armounce leverage-increasing 
events (e.g., Masulis [1980]; Travlos [1987], and decline when firms announce leverage-decreasing events 
(e.g., Asquith and Mullins [1986]; Loughran and Ritter [1995]. 
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shareholders as well as adverse selection problems. The highest negative 
contemporaneous coefficient of profitability in Table 5.14 is in France. This implies that 
French firms, whose managers are argued to have strategic advantage over the 
information processed by creditors, use a hierarchy of alternative financing due to severe 
information asymmetries as stated by POT. As another reason, the protection of both 
shareholders and creditors is weakest in France (La Porta et al., 2000b ), which means 
French firms should rely on their profits most as external borrowing is difficult or very 
costly. Similarly, the significantly negative coefficient of profitability in Germany is in 
line with POT, which contrasts with the traditional idea that the type of banks' 
relationship with firms and the concentrated ownership mitigate asymmetric information 
problemsll6• 
The relationship between past profitability and leverage is significantly positive in 
France and in the UK (Table 5.13). Past profitability can be regarded as a proxy for 
higher future growth opportunities in the framework of intangible assets. Consequently, 
this positive correlation should not be expected as the value of intangible assets decrease 
considerably in case of financial distress (see, Smith and Watts [1992]; Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers [1999]). As another explanation, firms may have been in short of enough 
retained profits as they would have needed more financing for attractive projects with 
positive-NPVs, which were unexpectedly abundant within a relatively short period. In 
order not to miss these opportunities they might have borrowed externally despite their 
increasing retained earnings. Alternatively, with a background of higher profitability it 
may be much easier for the firms to raise external capital. 
5.4.2.3.3. Effective Tax Rate 
In Table 5.14, the estimated coefficient of tax rate is always insignificant in France and 
Germany. As the coefficients are insignificant, one would not conclude that debt 
financing-related costs (e.g., agency and bankruptcy costs) seem to be outweighed by the 
tax benefits of debt financing in these countries. The insignificance of tax rate in France 
is not surprising as one may not expect such an association due to the fact that French tax 
116 Edwards and Fischer [1994] mention about how German banks decide whether a firm is eligible for a 
loan: German banks always obtain the firm's accounts for the preceding three years to have information 
about the management characteristics and its prospects for profitability and liquidity. The conventional 
wisdom that 'close relationship between German banks and firms due to bank representation on supervisory 
boards increases firm profitability', however, takes limited support by the empirical study of Edwards and 
Fischer [1994]. On the other hand, Cable's [1985] study on the role of banks in increasing German firms' 
profitability shows that there are motivations for large firms' shareholders to monitor management closely, 
thus, improve profitability. This deduction might stem from the greater degree of concentration of 
shareholdings in German firms than in UK firms. 
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system is mainly designed to promote the retentions of profits by reducing corporate 
taxes constantly. On the other hand, the significantly positive correlation between tax rate 
and market-leverage in the UK lends support to the mainstream finance literature 
(Modigliani and Miller [1963]) proposing a capital structure with almost only debt due to 
tax advantages of debt financing 117• 
Interestingly, we detect a significantly negative association between tax rate and book-
leverage in the UK118• This negative effect could also be due to the argument ofFama and 
French [1998] stating that negative information in high leverage about profitability 
outweighs tax benefits of debts. Jordan et al. [1998] also find a very strongly significant 
negative association between debt ratios and tax rate across UK firms. Accordingly, we 
can also argue that higher corporate taxes reduce the net earnings after taxes or the 
amount of retained earnings. This fact may lead the debt capacity of the firms to fall. It 
seems probable that the average amount of tax paid during time t affects the average level 
of debt during time t+ 1 simply as a result of the effect on retained earnings. 
Consequently, this may explain the negative relationship between tax rate and leverage in 
the long-run. 
5.4.2.3.4. Market-to-Book Ratio 
The results in Table 5.14 under book-leverage show that the association of leverage with 
market-to-book ratio (proxy for growth opportunities) is different across countries, which 
may imply that resolving agency problems and related costs might differ across different 
legal systems. On one hand, the coefficient is significantly positive in France. The 
positive association may be because of the low shareholder protection in France such that 
growing firms would not prefer equity but debt financing. In Germany and the UK, the 
association is negative and significant only for one case (Germany, panel-a). 
Furthermore, the significantly positive coefficient in France may imply that French firms 
do not suffer from these problems or their profitable growth opportunities are not 
financially constrained. Alternatively, as there are no severe debt-related agency costs 
117 Haugen and Senbet (1986], Mohammed et al. [1998] and Zimmennan [1983] justify this positive 
correlation. 
118 Taub (1975] also reports a negative relationship between (statutory) tax rate and debt-equity ratio. He 
has two possible explanations for this fmding. Total variation in the tax rate during the estimation period is 
not sufficient enough to affect fmns' debt ratios, or, there are some unknown factors closely correlated with 
tax rate. Since we do not use statutory tax rate, our tax variable does not suffer from invariation during the 
period. Furthennore, Fischer et al. (1989] and Yang et al. [2001] fmd a negative relation between effective 
tax rate and optimal debt ratio range. Yang et al. [2001] argue that the use of interest rate swaps by fmns 
results in this negative association as hedging may reduce fmns' expected tax liability (tax incentive of 
hedging argument). 
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problems they might prefer debt to equity. The monitoring of large shareholders in the 
UK is not effective due to dispersed ownership. However, it is unlikely to see the same 
problem in France because of the family and government influence on French firms, 
which might bring about this positive correlation. If asymmetric information problems 
are substantial in high-growth firms, then, such firms would employ high debt ratios to 
signal their quality to the market119• That argument could be another explanation for the 
significantly positive market-to-book ratio coefficient in France. 
However, the relationship turns out to be significantly negative under market-
leverage in all countries 120• The results support the idea that cost of financial distress is 
relatively high and agency cost of debt (underinvestment problem) is considerable. 
Actually, this negative association is expected in the UK, where shareholders protection 
is high and therefore equity should be preferred over debt as an external finance. The 
rationale behind this association is that the firms having relatively higher growth 
opportunities may experience more severe underinvestment problems and thus less debt 
is used to mitigate such problems (Myers [ 1977]). Instead of existing assets, more of the 
firms' value with high market-to-book ratio arises from future cash flow streams of 
present and future projects. The capital markets might perceive that less debt or more 
equity is issued in situations where the firms' equity is overvalued by managers, and that 
rising market-to-book ratios increase the cost of financial distress (expected liquidation 
costs)121 • In this case, high market-to-book ratios may decrease firms' debt capacity. 
Alternatively, equity might be preferred by both managers and shareholders of firms with 
growth opportunities as their interest coincide (Jung et al. [1996]). In the absence of 
investment opportunities, debt would be useful to mitigate the agency costs of managerial 
discretion (Jensen [1986], Berger et al. [1997]). This would reduce debt-equity ratios as 
higher (lower) growth opportunities would warrant the use of more equity (debt). The 
negative association of growth opportunities with leverage in Germany is not an expected 
result since the universal German banking system is supposed to reduce the asymmetric 
information problems. 
119 See Gul [1999], and Myers and Majluf [1984] for a similar discussion. 
120 Our negative finding is in line with the results of Johnson [1997,1998] and Rajan and Zingales [1995]. 
121 In their new capital structure theory of market timing, Baker and Wurgler [2002] also document that 
current capital structure, which is assumed to be the cumulative outcome of past attempts, is strongly 
correlated to past market values. The theory, hence, does not assume an optimal capital structure. The 
authors use the market-to-book ratio to measure the market timing opportunities realised by managers. 
They find that firms are low (high)-levered because they raise funds when their market valuations are high 
(low). 
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Table 5.14 indicates that the results in France are sensitive to the alternative 
leverage definition, as the coefficient has become significantly negative at 1% level under 
market-leverage. In Germany, alternative leverage definition did not change the results. 
Although the coefficients are insignificant in panel-b, they are always negative. This may 
imply that the agency costs of debt supposed to be mitigated by main banks are higher 
than natural costs of equity due to flexible disclosure standards122• The opportunity for 
managers to pursue their own objectives at the expense of shareholders is very limited in 
Germany since most German firms have a large shareholders with strong incentives to 
monitor the management (Edwards and Fischer [1994]). This in turn suggests that agency 
costs of debt financing are reduced with the structure of share ownership by the close 
monitoring of management in Germany. Consequently, the strongly negative coefficient 
of market-to-book ratio is unexpected in Germany, where firms can benefit from low 
costs of debt and high debt capacity because of their long-term relationship with 
creditors. 
5.4.2.3.5. Fixed Assets Ratio 
The association between leverage and fixed assets ratio is significantly positive 
irrespective of the leverage definitions in France and Germany; and under book-leverage 
in the UK. This positive correlation is not surprising since there is a consensus on the 
effect of fixed asset ratio to capital structure in this direction (Harris and Raviv [ 1991 ], 
Myers [1977,1984], Scott [1977]). There is a potential problem of asset substitution-risk 
shifting in firms with proportionately low tangible fixed assets. Hence, it is difficult for 
firms with relatively high tangible assets to shift to riskier projects as their debt is secured 
with these assets (Johnson [1997, 1998], Stulz and Johnson [1985]). Therefore, tangible 
assets mitigate the agency costs of debt financing thereby raising optimal debt level since 
they can be regarded as collateral for debt. Furthermore, tangible assets have also the 
potential to generate cash flows. Johnson [1997] uses fixed asset ratio as a proxy for 
project liquidation values. This is useful because the firms with relatively more intangible 
assets are given less reliance in supplying debt by creditors since the intangible assets 
tend to be less valued in case of firms' liquidation. The fact that the relation is always 
significant may imply that the agency problems in the corporations are considerable, 
which necessitates the collateral of physical assets for borrowing. 
122 Hovakimian et al. [200 1] fmd that ftrms prefer equity issuance or debt repurchase when the incumbent 
managers think that the current share price is high relative to book value, assuming better growth 
opportunities are realised. This result being consistent with tradeoff /adjustment models may also be a 
reason for negative relationship between market-to-book ratio and leverage. 
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According to Edwards and Fischer [1994], the importance of collateral for loans 
in Germany is caused partly by institutional factors; e.g., saving banks are generally 
subject to limits on the amounts of uncollateralised loans they make. However, they 
emphasise that the procedures used by German and British banks to evaluate loan 
applications seem to be similar. Notwithstanding, the importance oftangibility should be 
less in Germany if the conventional wisdom is right in arguing that close relationship 
between German banks and firms reduces agency costs of debt (Berger and Udell 
[1994]). 
Finally, the observed inverse relationship between market-leverage and tangibility of 
assets in the UK in Table 5.14 is more likely to be spurious than real. 
5.4.2.3.6. Size 
Table 5.14 shows that the definition of leverage matters in France and Germany 
regarding the influence of size on leverage123 • The effect of size on debt ratios under 
market-leverage is the same across countries as the coefficient is always significantly 
positive at 1%124• The effect of bankruptcy costs can be seen as one of main determinants 
of optimal capital structure as a market imperfection (Kraus and Litzenberger [1973]). 
Moreover, Warner [1977] and Ang et al. [1982] argue that market value of the firm is 
negatively associated with the ratio of direct bankruptcy costs to firm value, which 
proposes that large firms might not envisage considerable difficulties in external 
borrowing. Assuming that size is the inverse proxy for bankruptcy probability, these 
arguments may help explain the positive correlation between size and leverage due to 
considerable costs of expected financial distress. Bankruptcy code is not conductive to 
reorganising firms, i.e., firms entering bankruptcy are usually liquidated in Germany, and 
liquidation process is costly and lengthy. If this is the case, the strongly positive 
correlation between size and leverage should not be unexpected. 
On the other hand, under book-leverage, there is an insignificant relationship between 
size and debt ratios in Germany125• One possible explanation to this is that the control 
problems of large German companies may be mitigated by the effective role of banks in 
firm management. Another reason could be that German banks are supposed to support 
the firms in bad conditions (see, Dyson [1986]). Besides, because of information 
123 The results are based on ftrm size measured by total sales. We also used total assets as an alternative to 
size measure but it did not change the quality of results. 
124 The same association is also reported by Bennett and Donnelly [1993], Friend and Lang [1988], Marsh 
[1982], Michaelas et al. [1999], Mohammed et al. [1998], Theis and Casey [1999] and Warner [1977]. 
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asymmetries small firms do not prefer costly equity financing and thus choose debt 
financing. The costs of resolving asymmetric information problems as well as the 
bankruptcy and agency costs are higher in small firms whose stocks are relatively less 
traded. Hence, one may argue that large German firms prefer informationally sensitive 
equities in the presence of asymmetric information between managers and outside 
investors, which leads to low debt ratios126• 
5.4.2.3. 7. Earnings Volatility 
Contrary to our expectations the volatility in earnings does not play any significant role in 
.the capital structure decisions ofthe firms in any ofthe sample countries in Table 5.14. In 
the case of UK, some evidence of a positive relationship appears in Tables 5.12 & 5.13, 
which is theoretically inconsistent. 
5.4.2.3.8. Dividend Payout Ratio 
The results in Table 5.14 show that the impact of dividend policy on capital structure 
decisions varies across countries. In Germany, these two policies seem to be independent 
from each other as the relevant coefficient is not significant. The observed relation should 
have been significantly positive due to German taxation system if the tax arguments were 
right. Regarding the concentrated corporate ownership in Germany, this result may not be 
surprising. It is because large shareholders may not need the management to be 
monitored by the capital markets by forcing them to pay dividends and to search for 
external finding. 
In France, market-leverage and payout ratio are positively correlated at 10 % significance 
level. This may be due to net weight of tax effect as shareholders receives tax credit for 
dividend income despite the tax rate on capital gains and dividends are standard. In this 
case, higher payout ratio increases relative cost of equity, encourages the use of debt, and 
thus leads to higher debt ratios. Another reason for the positive relation can be due to 
signalling effects. If lower payout ratio means more growth opportunities, then it should 
also mean lower debt ratios due to agency costs of debt (see, Myers [1977]). 
125 Johnson [1997, 1998], Kester [1986], Kim and Sorensen [1986], and Titman and Wessels [1988] also 
find a negative size effect. 
126 Ferri and Jones [1979] argue that it is not as simple as it seems to suggest a monotonically positive 
relationship between leverage and size. According to Castanias [1983], one might not find a positive 
correlation between leverage and default probability. Although Castanias [1983] implies a positive relation 
between size and leverage, he emphasises the ambiguity of this association despite the assertion of Titman 
and Wessels [1988] suggesting a direct relationship as larger firms are less likely to suffer from the 
bankruptcy threat. Interestingly, Harris and Raviv [1990] fmd a positive relationship between leverage and 
default probability. Booth et al. [200 1] report inconsistent size effects across developing countries. 
Consequently, the size effect should be interpreted under the light of these caveats and controversies. 
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On the other hand, the relationship between leverage and payout ratio is significantly 
negative in the UK. One possible explanation is that if higher payout ratios signal higher 
expected future income the cost of equity associated with information asymmetries may 
decrease. Then, in return issuing equity would be advantageous, which would reduce the 
debt-equity ratio. Furthermore, this negative relation can be explained in the agency 
framework: In the debt contracts bondholders may restrict the dividend-paying firms to 
have high debt ratios at the same time. 
5.4.2.3.9. Control (Market-related) Variables 
Equity Premium 
The results indicate that the influence of equity premiums on capital structure decisions is 
market dependent. In France managers seem to prefer to issue debt at the time of higher 
equity premium as suggested by the positive and significant coefficient in Table 5.14. On 
the other hand, the market-leverage in the UK declines significantly in response to 
increases in equity premium. This implies that managers issue more equity when the 
equity premium is high. This is possible in a situation when the observed high equity 
premium is due to a bullish market and managers believe that even after offering the 
required discount on equity issued the amount raised is at least equivalent to the true 
value of the securities issued. Unlike in France and in the UK, firms in Germany do not 
seem to consider the market equity premium while deciding their capital structure. This 
may also be related to the our evidence that German firms do not adjust their capital 
structure as quick as their French and UK counter parts do. 
Term Structure of Interest Rates 
Consistent with our expectation the results reveal an inverse relationship between the 
term-structures of interest rates and market-leverage in all sample countries in Table 5.14. 
This confirms the argument that at the time of high long-term interest rate fi~s are 
reluctant to raise debt capital and hence raise equity capital to meet their financing need. 
This seems to hold in all sample countries irrespective of their institutional arrangements 
and traditions. 
Change in Share Price 
Consistent with our expectation the results for all sample countries in Table 5.14 reveal 
that the book-leverage and market-leverage declines after an increase in share value. The 
significant negative coefficient of six-month lag annual return indicates that managers 
issue equity after positive stock market performance. In a situation of information 
asymmetry, where managers are better informed than the market (as in Myers and Majluf 
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[1984]) and they work for the benefit of existing shareholders, issuing equity signals that 
the shares are overvalued and hence a discount should be offered to attract new investors 
to invest on equity capital. However, if the current share prices are high then the realised 
value of the shares (even after the discount) is likely to be at least equivalent the true 
value of the equity, a condition conducive to equity issue. Moreover, the significant effect 
of this variable on book-leverage confirms that a reduction in leverage is not only due to 
the relative increase in the market value of equity (the denominator in market-leverage) 
but also due to actual additions in the value of equity. Therefore, our results confirm the 
common belief that managers issue equity when share prices are high. 
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Table 5.14: Static long-run relationship using system-GMM. 
Dependent Variable BOOK-LEVERAGE1,1 MARKET -LEVERAGE1.t 
Independent Predicted 
Variables Sign ----;;;F=-RA~N~C~E;;;--"""'G=E=R-:-::MC7A-:-:-NY,..-;----:-:Uc:-=K--.-=FRA:-:-:N:-:-:C=E;;;--=G=E=R=-=M-=-A""""NY,..-;----:-:Uc:-=K-
a) General 
PROFIT1,t -/+ -0.6245*** -0.3705 -0.1657 -0.7498*** -0.6466** -0.2873** * 
(0.1564) (0.2728) (0.1079) (0.1499) (0.3214) (0.1000) 
TAXRATE1,t + -0.0006 0.0025 -0.0575** 0.0034 -0.0055 0.0894** 
(0.0231) (0.0132) (0.0244) (0.0242) (0.0176) (0.0422) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1,t - 0.0293* -0.0053** -0.0067 -0.0741*** -0.0056** -0.1141** * 
(0.0158) (0.0024) (0.0067) (0.0144) (0.0026) (0.0125) 
FIXASSETS1.t + 0.3904*** 0.2906*** 0.0963*** 0.3244*** 0.3504*** -0.1475** * 
(0.0783) (0.1036) (0.0336) (0.0700) (0.1320) (0.0461) 
SIZE1.1 + 0.0056 0.0021 0.0203*** 0.0165*** 0.0235*** 0.0196*** 
(0.0043) (0.0058) (0.0024) (0.0054) (0.0070) (0.0034) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t - -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0023 0.0001 -0.0010 
(0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0011) 
DIVIDEND1.t -/+ -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0074* 0.0053* 0.0030 -0.0165** 
(0.003) (0.0011) (0.0045) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0069) 
EQUITY PREMIUM - 0.0007* -0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0008** * 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
TERM-STRUCTR - -0.0161*** -0.0057* -0.0064*** -0.0209*** -0.0110** -0.0134** * 
(0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0008) (0.0028) (0.0049) (0.0013) 
SHARE PRICE - -0.0431** -0.0588** -0.0442*** -0.0950*** -0.2743*** -0.0534** * 
(0.0207) (0.0296) (0.008) (0.0149) (0.0437) (0.0096) 
b) Specific 
PROFIT1,t -/+ -0.4422*** -0.4700* -0.1625 -0.6194*** -0.6612** -0.2851 ** * 
(0.1177) (0.2874) (0.1048) (0.1763) (0.3168) (0.1003) 
TAXRATE1,t + -0.0017 0.0200 -0.0571** 0.0159 0.0081 0.0874** 
(0.0202) (0.0211) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0254) (0.0400) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1.1 - 0.0343** -0.0055 -0.0063 -0.0706*** -0.0043 -0.1123** * 
(0.0153) (0.0044) (0.0066) (0.0135) (0.004) (0.0123) 
FIXASSETS1,t + 0.4514*** 0.4618** 0.1390** 0.4631*** 0.6078** -0.1608** * 
(0.1365) (0.2258) (0.0625) (0.1012) (0.2561) (0.0474) 
SIZEI,I + 0.0092* 0.0015 0.0196*** 0.0187*** 0.0221*** 0.0181*** 
(0.0047) (0.005) (0.0023) (0.0052) (0.0069) (0.0036) 
EARNINGS VOL1,t - 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0013 
(0.0014) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0011) 
DIVIDEND1,t -/+ 0.0027 -0.0002 -0.0035 0.0050* 0.0013 -0.0168** 
(0.0022) (0.0009) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0069) 
EQUITY PREMIUM - 0.0007* -0.0004 0.0000 0.0005** 0.0004 -0.0008** * 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
TERM-STRUCTR - -0.0174*** -0.0037 -0.0065*** -0.0240*** -0.006 -0.0136** * 
(0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0008) (0.0028) (0.0047) (0.0013) 
SHARE PRICE - -0.0257 -0.0573** -0.0447*** -0.0959*** -0.2497*** -0.0511** * 
(0.0221) (0.0278) (0.0079) (0.0143) (0.0047) (0.0095) 
These results are based on the model m Tables 5.12 (panel-a) and 5.13 (panel-b). See also notes tn Tables 5.1, 5.12. and 5.13. 
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5.4.2.4. GMM Estimates of Static Models 
In this section, we will examine the estimates of static models which do not incorporate 
any lagged variables (Table 5.15). Based on the same leverage definition, one can 
compare the results in Tables 5.14 and 5.15. In general, it seems that the results of static 
models confirm our main results in Table 5.14. In addition, it emerges that the 
corresponding coefficients of determination and Wald Test-1 statistics of the dynamic 
models are much higher than that of static models in every case (showing the success and 
explanatory power of dynamic models relative to static ones). More importantly, 
significant Correlation-2 test statistics in Germany and the UK show that there is 
misspecification in the static models under book-leverage. This was not the case in 
dynamic models in Tables 5.12 & 5.13. Consequently, these findings can be a verification 
of appropriateness of dynamic models in capital structure studies. 
Table 5.15: Static capital structure using GMM-SYS Estimations. 
Independent Predicted BOOK-LEVERAGE1,t MARKET-LEVERAGE~,~ 
Variables Sign FRANCE GERMANY UK FRANCE GERMANY UK 
PROFIT1,t -/+ -0.1525** -0.0305 -0.2340*** -0.4005*** -0.0533 -0.3821** * 
(0.0655) (0.0597) (0.0555) (0.1322) 0.0609 {0.0923) 
TAXRATE1,t + 0.0042 -0.0049 -0.0278** 0.0056 -0.0202** 0.0525** 
(0.0086) (0.0058) {0.0137) (0.0196) 0.0095 {0.0244) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1,t - -0.0038 -0.0046** 0.0017 -0.0641*** -0.0048** -0.0738* ** 
(0.0075) (0.0019} (0.0024) (0.0122) 0.0020 (0.0083) 
FIXASSETS1,t + 0.3226*** 0.2438*** 0.1136*** 0.3439*** 0.2389*** -0.0063 
(0.1003) (0.064) {0.0308) {0.1101) 0.0789 {0.0502) 
SIZE1,t + 0.0130* 0.0068 0.0255*** 0.0201** 0.0297*** 0.0031 
(0.007) (0.0077) {0.0034) (0.0093) 0.0070 (0.0059) 
EARNINGS VOL1,t - -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0010*** 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0010** 
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0009) 0.0002 (0.0004) 
DIVIDEND1,t -/+ 0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0045*** 0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0028 
(0.0011) {0.0003) (0.0018) (0.0017) 0.0012 (0.0034) 
EQUITY PREMIUM - 0.0002 0.0003** 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0007*** 0.0000 
(0.0002) (0.0001) {0.0001) (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0001) 
TERM-STRUCTR - -0.0095*** -0.0008 -0.0018*** -0.0191*** -0.0040** -0.0026** * 
(0.0016) (0.0014) {0.0003) {0.0023) 0.0018 (0.0006) 
SHARE PRICE - -0.0175 -0.0447*** -0.0375*** -0.0469*** -0.1396*** -0.1170** * 
(0.0119) {0.0131) {0.0054) (0.0122) 0.0190 (0.0122) 
Constant 0.0310 0.0288 -0.0369 0.1781 -0.1196 0.4338*** 
(0.1108) {0.1044) {0.0344) {0.1634) 0.0918 (0.0606) 
Correlation1 -3.807*** -4.121*** -9.681*** -4.642*** -5.733*** -10.90*** 
Correlation2 -0.9333 -2.452** -4.725*** -1.243 1.179 0.7680 
Sargan Test (df) 268.6 (416) 268.9 (234)* 642 (395)*** 266.3 (416) 293 (234)*** 924 (395)*** 
Wald Test-1 {df) 75.96 (10)*** 46.98 (10)*** 414.6 (10) 165.9 (10)*** 124.3 (10)*** 689.4 (10)** 
Wald Test-2 {df) 79.63 (15)*** 69.61 (14)*** 34.31 (15)*** 81.09 (15)*** 54.40 (14) 83.51 (15)** 
R2 0.2222 0.1090 0.0741 0.3853 0.1397 0.1152 
Firms I Observations 325/2604 529/5045 2345/31786 325/2604 529/5045 2345/3178 6 
Estimation Period 1985-2000 1989-2000 1971-2000 1985-2000 1989-2000 1971-2000 
See notes m Table 5.1 and Table 5.12. 
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5.4.2.5. GMM Estimates based on Size Classification 
This section is designed to examine the size-specific behaviour of firms while borrowing 
externally. We will focus on the long-run implications of the models, which are obtained 
after following general-to-specific approach. Size classification is useful to reduce the 
heterogeneity bias and thus to improve the precision of results. It is known that GMM 
estimates are valid especially for large samples. However, the results based on reduced 
sample-size due to size classification are still robust as they are corrected for small 
sample bias using Windmeijer [2000] process. As a general note for specification tests, 
all Correlation and Sargan tests confirm that the models in all countries are correctly 
specified. It is important to note that the over-rejection of Sargan Tests in Tables 5.12 and 
5.13 for the UK is not the case in Table 5.20. This could be a strong evidence as to why 
we should not be concerned about the invalidity of instruments in the UK based on the 
full sample. 
Table 5.16 reveals all French firms in different size classes adjust their debt ratios 
with approximately the same degree of adjustment (between 0.3 and 0.32) under book-
leverage while medium firms have the highest adjustment coefficient under market-
leverage. Furthermore, profitability is again inversely related to leverage for medium and 
large firms in Table 5.17, which strongly confirms the POT. Interestingly, profitability 
has no significant impact on small firms' debt ratios, which should not be the case if 
information asymmetries are relevant especially for small firms. Moreover, size 
classification does not seem to change the relationship between fixed-assets ratio and 
leverage as it detects a strong positive association. Market-leverage is negatively 
correlated with market-to-book ratio for small and large firms; and book-leverage is 
positively correlated with market-to-book ratio for medium firms. These fmdings may 
imply that medium-sized firms prone to grow with profitable future growth opportunities, 
for which suboptimal investment policies are unlikely to occur, do not have external 
financing constraints. The invariance of leverage with tax rate and earnings volatility in 
Table 5.14 is still valid across size classes except the significantly negative coefficient of 
tax rate under market-leverage for large firms. This may stem from the fact that France 
tax system favours the retention of profits with lowering tax rates gradually. The results 
with respect to the dividend policy show that the positive relationship between leverage 
and payout ratio in Table 5.14 seems to be driven by small firms. 
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Among the market-related factors in Table 5.17, the effects of share price performance 
and equity premium on capital structure do not vary across size classes. However, only 
small firms appear to disregard the trend in term structure of interest rates while deciding 
their financing mix. 
Table 5.16: Dynamic capital structure in France: Size classification. 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Predicted BOOK-LEVERAGE,,t MARKET-LEVERAGEu 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
LEVERAGE1,t-1 + 0.6830*** 0.6826*** 0.7029*** 0.6972*** 0.5783*** 0.6246*** 
(0.0549) (0.0385) (0.0754) (0.0491) (0.0448) (0.0507) 
PROFIT,,t -/+ -0.4700*** -0.3634*** -0.3808*** -0.0632 -0.4035*** -0.3608* 
(0.0955) (0.0875) (0.1197) (0.0880) (0.1111) (0.2172) 
PROFIT1.t-1 -/+ 0.3938*** 0.1900*** 0.2302** 
(0.0716) (0.0674) (0.0921) 
TAXRATE,,t + 0.0121 0.0024 -0.0070 0.0237 0.0077 -0.0268** 
(0.0189) (0.0081) (0.0076) (0.0183) (0.0192) (0.0114) 
TAXRATE1.t-1 + 
MKT-T0-800~.1 0.0045 0.0128** 0.0027 -0.0303*** -0.0256** -0.1211*** 
(0.0060) (0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0096) (0.0128) (0.0289) 
MKT-TO-BOOK,.t-1 0.0193** 0.0840*** 
(0.0082) (0.0199) 
FIXASSETS,,t + 0.2134** 0.1626** 0.0738 0.1294 0.2503*** 0.1847* 
(0.0893) (0.0727) (0.0677) (0.1160) (0.0971) (0.1109) 
FIXASSETS1.1-1 + 
EARNINGS VOL,,t -0.0005 0.0002 0.0025 0.0023 -0.0005 0.0043 
(0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0031) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t-1 -0.0011** 
(0.0005) 
DIVIDEND1,t -/+ 0.0014* -0.0003 0.0011 0.0012 -0.0028 0.0019 
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
DIVIDEND,,t-1 -/+ 0.0016*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** -
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) -
EQUITY PREMIUM 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0013** 0.0004 0.0004** 
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
TERM-STRUCTR -0.0051 -0.0067*** -0.0036*** -0.0058 -0.0126*** -0.0104*** 
(0.0032) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0050) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
SHARE PRICE -0.0032 -0.0089 -0.0088 -0.0560*** -0.0423*** -0.0543*** 
(0.0184) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0198) (0.0119) (0.0108) 
Constant 0.0252 0.0634* 0.0851** 0.1124** 0.1568*** 0.2299*** 
(0.0257) (0.0333) (0.0377) (0.0486) (0.0478) (0.0518) 
Correlation1 -3.328*** -4.792*** -3.965*** -2.905*** -4.566*** -5.410*** 
Correlation2 1.481 1.813* 0.3061 -0.4812 -1.710* 0.9668 
Sargan Test (df) 65.88 (494) 87.06 (510) 92.18 (510) 48.93 (503) 92.38 (510) 92.51 (510) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 545.3 (12)*** 517.5 (11)*** 199.4 (11)*** 904.2 (12)*** 732.5 (12)*** 807.2 (11)** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 12.09 (14) 47.35 (14)*** 24.45 (15)* 21.74 (14)* 66.50 (14)*** 39.07 (15)** 
R2 0.7370 0.8120 0.7661 0.7509 0.7827 0.7682 
Firms I Observations 91/394 116/899 115/1302 91/394 116/899 115/1302 
Estimation Period 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 
The firms were sorted according to their average total sales and divided into three sub-samples. See notes in Tables 5.1 and 
5.12. 
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Table 5.17: Size classification in France: Long-run Relationship 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Predicted BOOK-LEVERAGE1,1 MARKET-LEVERAGE,,1 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
PROFIT~,~ -/+ -0.2405 -0.5464** -0.5067* -0.2088 -0.9570*** -0.9611* 
(0.1731) (0.2190) (0.2725) (0.2966) (0.2400) (0.5448) 
TAXRATE;,1 + 0.0381 0.0076 -0.0235 0.0783 0.0183 -0.0714** 
(0.0628) (0.0254) (0.0271) (0.0646) (0.0457) (0.0334) 
MKT-TO-BOOK;,t - 0.0141 0.0404** 0.0090 -0.1002*** -0.0149 -0.0990** 
(0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0236) (0.0322) (0.0141) (0.0433) 
FIXASSETS;,t + 0.6734*** 0.5123** 0.2483 0.4272 0.5936*** 0.4920* 
(0.2370) (0.2213) (0.2304) (0.3590) (0.2107) (0.2717) 
EARNINGS VOL;,t - -0.0016 0.0006 0.0085 0.0041 -0.0011 0.0114 
(0.0033) (0.0013) (0.0058) (0.0064) (0.0011) (0.0081) 
DIVIDEND,,t -/+ 0.0095*** -0.0009 0.0036 0.0095* -0.0027 0.0049 
(0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0047) (0.0048) 
EQUITY PREMIUM - 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0042** 0.0009 0.0011* 
(0.0013) (0.0005} (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0006} 
TERM-STRUCTR - -0.0162 -0.0211*** -0.0121** -0.0193 -0.0299*** -0.0277** * 
(0.0102} (0.0046} (0.0048} (0.0159} (0.0059) (0.0063) 
SHARE PRICE - -0.0102 -0.0281 -0.0297 -0.1849*** -0.1004*** -0.1447** * 
(0.0578} (0.0191) (0.0207) (0.071 0} (0.0281) (0.0360) 
See notes m Table 5.16. 
Table 5.18 and Table 5.19 report the short-run and long-run implications of size 
classification in Germany, respectively. Considering the adjustment process in Table 
5.18, it is more important for small firms to adjust their debt ratios relatively quickly than 
for the others. Furthermore, confirming POT, there is a negative correlation between 
profitability and leverage in Table 5.19 for medium and large firms. As it was the case in 
France, the same association is insignificant for only small firms. Parallel with the theory, 
the estimated coefficient of tax rate is significantly positive only for small firms. 
Interestingly, the same coefficient is insignificant but negative for large firms despite 
their average tax rate being higher than small firms' tax rates (see Table 5.A5). This is 
unexpected because the coefficient should be positive especially for large firms because 
of their substantial taxable income. On the other hand, the relationship between market-
to-book ratio and leverage shows a non-uniform behaviour across size classes. The 
estimated market-to-book ratio coefficient is statistically zero for medium and large 
firms. The association, however, is significantly negative only for small firms whose 
average market-to-book ratio is highest among the size class. This finding may emphasise 
the existence of suboptimal investment decisions for such firms. The relationship 
between fixed-assets ratio and leverage is always positive and significant for all types of 
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firms. This strongly positive effect implies the importance of asset structure in case of 
liquidation, and therefore, the significance of agency costs in Germany. The results with 
respect to equity premium and earnings volatility do not change across size classes as 
they have always insignificant estimated coefficients in each case. A notable finding is 
due to the strongly positive effect of payout ratio on market-leverage for small firms. This 
is an expected result, probably, due to the fact that corporate tax rate on dividends is less 
than that on retained earnings. The same association is insignificant for medium and large 
firms maybe because tax concerns are not considerable for such firms. 
On the other hand, only large firms seem to consider the trend in the term structure of 
interest rates while deciding their financing decisions. Finally, the relationship between 
market-leverage and share price performance is always significantly negative but the 
association of book-leverage with share price performance appears to be the same only 
for medium firms. 
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Table 5.18: Dynamic capital structure in Germany: Size classification. 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Predicted BOOK-LEVERAGE1.1 MARKET -LEVERAGE1.t 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
LEVERAGEi,t·1 + 0.6825*** 0.6949*** 0.7492*** 0.6695*** 0.7654*** 0.7732*** 
(0.0410) (0.0539) (0.0497) (0.0471) (0.0538) (0.0328) 
PROFIT1,t -/+ -0.0271 -0.2255*** -0.1705* -0.0022 -0.2534*** -0.1679* 
(0.0472) (0.0785) (0.0907) (0.0403) (0.0950) (0.1007) 
PROFIT1.t-1 -/+ -0.0513* 0.1037** 0.0871 -0.0591** 0.1477*** -
(0.0278) (0.051 0) (0.0654) (0.0291) (0.0402) -
TAXRATEu + 0.0064* -0.0020 -0.0083* 0.0128** -0.0046 -0.0092 
(0.0035) (0.0024) (0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0032) (0.0072) 
TAXRATE1.1-1 + 0.0037 - - - - -
(0.0028) - - - - -
MKT-TO-BOOK,,t - -0.0022* -0.0037 0.0010 -0.0019** -0.0070 -0.0223 
(0.0008) (0.0034) (0.0051) (0.0008) (0.0050) (0.0155) 
MKT-TO-BOOKu-1 - - - - - - 0.0166* 
- - - - - (0.0089) 
FIXASSETS1.t + 0.1437** 0.4131*** 0.4442*** 0.2037** 0.4040*** 0.3537** 
(0.0590) (0.1192) (0.1633) (0.0824) (0.1383) (0.1641) 
FIXASSETS1,t-1 + - -0.3046*** -0.3454** -0.1262* -0.2739** -0.2710* 
- (0.0988) (0.1449) (0.0712) (0.1091) (0.1597) 
EARNINGS VOL1.1 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0013) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t-1 - 0.0002*** -0.0000*** - - - -0.0004** * 
(0.0000) (0.0000) - - - (0.0002} 
DIVIDEND1,t -/+ -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0002 
(0.0004} (0.0005} (0.0001} (0.0003} (0.0003} (0.0002} 
DIVIDEND1,t-1 -/+ - - - 0.0006*** - -
- - -
(0.0002} 
- -
EQUITY PREMIUM - -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.0002} (0.0001} (0.0001} (0.0002} (0.0002} (0.0002} 
TERM-STRUCTR - -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0019** -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0033** 
(0.0020} (0.0014} (0.0009} (0.0019} (0.0019) (0.0015} 
SHARE PRICE - 0.0043 -0.0144* -0.0104 -0.0391*** -0.0480*** -0.0679** * 
(0.0108) (0.0081) (0.0073} (0.0096} (0.0090) (0.0123) 
Constant 0.0313 0.0204 0.0307** 0.0943*** 0.0566 0.0979*** 
(0.0392} (0.0266} (0.0152) (0.0360) (0.0370) (0.0303} 
Correlation 1 -5.876*** -4.902*** -5.550*** -5.786*** -4.348*** -6.683*** 
Correlation2 -1.171 1.158 1.554 -0.09281 0.4150 0.3003 
Sargan Test (df} 138.2 (363) 146.2 (363) 151.5 (370) 140.6 (370) 161.6 (370) 155.8 (363) 
Wald Test-1 (df} 797.5 (13)*** 569.4 (13)*** 865.2 (12)*** 454.4 (13)*** 1064 (12)*** 2100 (13)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df} 27.16 (14)*** 26.02 (14)*** 33.21 (14)*** 29.09 (14)*** 19.46 (14) 22.55 (14)* 
R2 0.7617 0.7893 0.7992 0.7727 0.8229 0.82659 
Firms I Observations 159/1485 166/1493 185/1932 167/1527 177/1576 181/1807 
Estimation Period 1990-2000 1990-2000 1989-2000 1989-2000 1989-2000 1990-2000 
.. The firms were sorted accordmg to thetr average total sales and dtvtded mto three sub-samples. See notes m Tables 5.1 and 
5.12. 
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Table 5.19: Size classification in Germany: Long-run Relationship 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Predicted BOOK-LEVERAGE1,t MARKET -LEVERAGE1,t 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
PROFIT1,t -/+ -0.2470 -0.3993** -0.3324 -0.1854 -0.4504 -0.7404* 
(0.1705) (0.1641) (0.2269) (0.1395) (0.3109) (0.4426) 
TAXRATE1.t + 0.0317* -0.0067 -0.0333 0.0387* -0.0194 -0.0405 
(0.0172) (0.0079) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0140) (0.0311) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1,t - -0.0070*** -0.0122 0.0042 -0.0058** -0.0298 -0.0253 
(0.0027) (0.0113) (0.0204) (0.0026) (0.0230) (0.0539) 
FIXASSETS1,t + 0.4527*** 0.3555*** 0.3943*** 0.2344** 0.5545*** 0.3645** 
(0.1646) (0.1081) (0.0883) (0.0969) (0.1717) (0.1495) 
EARNINGS VOL1,t - 0.0004 -0.0000 0.0014 0.0001 0.0001 0.0026 
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0024) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0057) 
DIVIDEND1,t -/+ -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0030*** 0.0011 -0.0009 
(0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0005) (0.001 0) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
EQUITY PREMIUM - -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0006 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
TERM-STRUCTR - -0.0004 -0.0038 -0.0076* -0.0062 -0.0090 -0.0147** 
(0.0063) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0056) (0.0087) (0.0067) 
SHARE PRICE - 0.0135 -0.0473* -0.0413 -0.1184*** -0.2044*** -0.2992** 
(0.0342) (0.0275) (0.0258) (0.0309) (0.0516) (0.0591) 
See notes m Table 5.18. 
Table 5.20 and Table 5.21 report the short-run and long-run implications of size 
classification in the UK, respectively. It seems more important for small firms to adjust 
their book-leverage as their adjustment coefficients are highest in Table 5.20. This may 
be the effort of such firms to avoid from inefficient liquidations, which is particular to 
small firms in the UK. However, adjusting the market-leverage appears to be especially 
relevant for large firms. Being consistent with the POT, profitability is negatively 
correlated with leverage in all cases and it is insignificant only for small firms in Table 
5.21. This finding implies that asymmetric information problems are specific to medium 
and large firms in the UK. On the other hand, under book-leverage, the coefficient of tax 
rate variable is insignificant for medium firms and significantly negative small and large 
firms. This does not support the relevant theory. A partial support to the tax theory is due 
to the significantly positive (at 10%) relation between tax rate and market-leverage for 
large firms. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of market-to-book ratio variable under 
market-leverage is significantly negative at 1% for all firms. This confirms the idea that 
financial distress costs and agency-type problems are substantial in the UK. However, for 
medium firms the relationship turns out to be significantly positive at 5% under book-
leverage. This may imply that financial distress costs and agency costs of debt are not 
considerable for medium firms or their profitable future investments are not financially 
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constrained. The expected positive relation between leverage and asset tangibility is 
found only under book-leverage for medium and large. The estimated coefficient of 
earnings volatility is never significant across size classes and that of payout ratio is 
significant and negative only for small firms under book-leverage. The impact of equity 
premium on debt ratios is uniform across different size classes: Under book-leverage it is 
insignificant; under market-leverage it is significantly negative at 1% level. Moreover, 
the impact of term structure of interest rates on debt ratios is even more uniform as it is 
significant negative across size classes and leverage defmitions. However, the 
significantly negative effect of share price performance on debt-equity ratio is only 
detected for medium and large firms as the same impact is insignificant for small firms. 
Consequently, the results tend to be uniform across size classes especially for the 
profitability, earnings volatility and market-related variables. In some cases, it has been 
able to resolve some ambiguous relationships in Table 5.14. Overall, the figures based on 
size classification tend to verify our main fmdings in Table 5.14. 
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Table 5.20: Dynamic capital structure in the UK: Size classification. 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Predicted BOOK-LEVERAGE1,1 MARKET -LEVERAGE,,1 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
LEVERAGE1,1-1 + 0.6822*** 0.6846*** 0.7742*** 0.7024*** 0.6672*** 0.5538*** 
(0.0378) (0.0305) (0.0250) (0.0280) (0.0242) (0.0248) 
PROFIT,,, -/+ -0.0134 -0.2795*** -0.3067*** -0.0103 -0.3295*** -0.0811 
(0.0325) (0.0466) (0.0649) (0.0276) (0.0848) (0.0792) 
PROFIT1,t-1 -/+ - 0.1560*** 0.2368*** - 0.2049*** -
- (0.0319) (0.0423) - (0.0461) -
TAXRATE,,1 + -0.0232** 0.0028 -0.0125* 0.0092 0.0139 0.0258* 
(0.0096) (0.0052) (0.0070) (0.0116) (0.0098) (0.0152) 
T AXRA TE1,1-1 + 0.0018 - -0.0050* - - -
(0.0067) - (0.0030) - - -
MKT-TO-BOO~.t - 0.0003 0.0079*** 0.0067** -0.0213*** -0.0588*** -0.0500** * 
(0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0164) (0.0113) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t-1 - -0.0049 - -0.0027* 0.0038** 0.0222*** -
(0.0033) - (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0065) -
FIXASSETS,,t + 0.0236 0.0515*** 0.0536** -0.1167 -0.2330** -0.5549** * 
(0.0286) (0.0243) (0.0240) (0.0817) (0.1053) (0.1362) 
FIXASSETS1.1-1 + - - - 0.1044 0.1995** 0.5073*** 
- - - (0.0650) (0.0897) (0.1208) 
EARNINGS VOL,,t - 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t-1 - - - 0.0001*** - 0.0001* -
- -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) -
DIVIDEND1,t -I+ -0.0022* 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0039 
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0030) 
DIVIDEND,,t-1 -/+ - - - - -0.0013* -
- - - -
(0.0007) -
EQUITY PREMIUM - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003** * 
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TERM-STRUCTR - -0.0042*** -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0074*** -0. 0050*** -0.0041 ** * 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
SHARE PRICE - -0.0041 -0.0113*** -0.0093*** -0.0038 -0.0117** -0.0323** * 
(0.0043) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Constant 0.0657*** 0.0571*** 0.0409*** 0.1285*** 0.1836*** 0.2422*** 
(0.0185) (0.0128) (0.0120) (0.0210) (0.0233) (0.0274) 
Correlation1 -9.696*** -12.47*** -13.27*** -11.53*** -13.51*** -14.47*** 
Correlation2 1.054 -0.7185 0.1418 0.8957 0.9939 3.685 
Sargan Test (df) 374.9 (394) 453.1 (398) 485.4 (398) 410.6 (396) 500.6 (398) 545.2 (398) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 754.5 (12)*** 1173 (11)*** 1629 (14)*** 1235 (12)*** 2609 (15)*** 1965 (11)** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 31.61 (15)*** 51.66 (15)*** 38.96 (15)*** 69.80 (15)*** 121.6 (15)*** 133.9 (15)** 
R2 0.6051 0.6596 0.7297 0.6418 0.6917 0.6617 
Firms I Observations 768/7605 785/10860 766/12654 768/7605 737/10184 792/13321 
Estimation Period 1971-20000 1971-20000 1972-2000 1971-20000 1972-2000 1971-2000 
.. The firms were sorted accordmg to their average total sales and divtded mto three sub-samples. See notes m Tables 5.1 and 
5.12. 
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Table 5.21: Size classification in the UK: Long-run Relationship 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Predicted BOOK-LEVERAGE1,t MARKET -LEVERAGEu 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
PROFITI,t -I+ -0.0421 -0.3916*** -0.3092** -0.0345 -0.3745** -0.1818 
(0.1020) (0.1098) (0.1523) (0.0922) (0.1890) (0.1759) 
TAXRATEI,t + -0.0672** 0.0089 -0.0778* 0.0310 0.0418 0.0578* 
(0.0312) (0.0164) (0.0407) (0.0396) (0.0291) (0.0344) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t -0.0143 0.0249** 0.0175 -0.0587*** -0.1 099*** -0.1119** * -
(0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0343) (0.0220) 
FIXASSETS1,t + 0.0744 0.1633** 0.2375** -0.0414 -0.1006 -0.1068** 
(0.0896) (0.0757) (0.1035) (0.0775) (0.0647) (0.0483) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t - -0.0001 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0002 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.001 0) (0.0010) (0.0003) 
DIVIDEND1,t -/+ -0.0069* 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0034 -0.0072 -0.0086 
(0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0066) (0.0072) (0.0068) 
EQUITY PREMIUM - 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0010*** -0.0007*** -0.0007** 
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
TERM-STRUCTR - -0.0132*** -0.0049*** -0.0061*** -0.0248*** -0.0149*** -0.0092** 
(0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0035) (0.0023) (0.0013) 
SHARE PRICE - -0.0128 -0.0359*** -0.0413*** -0.0127 -0.0353** -0.0725** 
(0.0134) (0.0094) (0.0135) (0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0114) 
See notes m Table 5.20. 
5.4.2.6. GMM Estimates based on Industry Classification 
It is obvious that the firms in manufacturing and service sectors have some differences 
with respect to their asset structure and the degree of vulnerability to the changes in 
financial markets. Myers [1977] and Hovakimian et al. [2001] argue that firms' assets-in-
place should be financed more by debt and growth opportunities more by equity, where 
the former is relevant to manufacturing firms. Descriptive statistics (see Table 5.A6) 
show that, in all countries, service companies reveal lower debt ratios, higher market-to-
book and fixed-assets ratios, and higher variability in profitability than manufacturing 
firms do. Service companies may borrow more to signal their credibility and profitability 
to the market, as share prices of such firms seem relatively sensitive to the news in the 
market. Thus, one may investigate further systematic differences by dividing the full 
sample into two industry groups; manufacturing and service sectors. In the following 
three tables, we will discuss the long-run relationships between debt-ratio and firm-
specific factors with respect to the industry classification in France, Germany and the 
UK. 
Table 5.22 shows that manufacturing companies seem quicker than service 
companies in adjusting their debt ratios in France. The relationship between profitability 
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and leverage is significantly negative only for manufacturing firms in Table 5.23. The 
tax rate variable and dividend payout ratio do not have any significant effects on 
leverage. The fact that there is a strongly negative relationship between market-to-book 
ratio and market-leverage for manufacturing firms contradicts the idea that there are 
difficulties in shifting to riskier projects for such firms due to their substantial tangible 
assets. However, one can see from the significantly negative correlation between market-
to-book ratio and market-leverage, how easy it may be for service companies to shift to 
riskier projects as they have relatively great amounts of intangible assets. Thus, the 
results imply that cost of financial distress increases with market-to-book ratio not only 
for service companies but also for manufacturing firms in France. However, the 
relationship between market-to-book ratio and book-leverage turns out to be significantly 
positive for manufacturing firms. 
Besides, as expected, the relationship between leverage and fixed-assets ratio is 
significantly positive for manufacturing firms due to their collateralisable tangible assets 
which increase debt capacity. This finding confirms Myers' [1977] hypothesis that capital 
intensity should support heavy debt financing. However, we detect the same significant 
relationship for service companies as well. In addition, size and leverage are not 
significantly correlated for service firms under market-leverage and for manufacturing 
firms under book-leverage. Considering the size variable as an inverse proxy for 
bankruptcy probability, these findings emphasise the influence of French insolvency code 
in which firms' reorganisation is favoured. The effect of earnings volatility on debt ratio 
is insignificant except for service firms under book-leverage, in which the relationship is 
significantly positive contradicting the theory. As for the results related to the term 
structure of interest rates and share price performance, one can see the uniform behaviour 
across size classes as the relationship is significantly negative at 1%. However, only 
manufacturing firms consider the effect of equity premium while deciding their capital 
structure as the estimated coefficient is significantly positive. Thus, the managers of such 
firms prefer to issue debt when equity premium is high. 
Table 5.25 shows that the results related to tax rate, market-to-book ratio, 
dividend payout ratio and term structure of interest rates variables do not vary in terms of 
significance (all insignificant) across different industry classes in Germany. On the other 
hand, one salient feature is that service companies are quicker and seem advantageous to 
be on their target capital structure with their higher adjustment coefficient in Table 5.24. 
This may be due to the sensitivity of share prices of service companies to corporate 
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information disclosure. Moreover, as profitability exerts a significantly negative impact 
on leverage, service and manufacturing companies behave according to the pecking order 
theory. It could be due to the weak reorganisation process but strong liquidation process 
in German insolvency code that there is a significantly positive size effect on leverage for 
both types of firms. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient of fixed-assets ratio is 
positively significant only for service firms. The possible reason could be that service 
firms with such expenses also employ tangible assets that are collateralisable against 
borrowing, which imply the existence of agency problems in such firms. 
Earnings volatility and equity premium seem to be insignificant except for service firms 
under market-leverage where both coefficients are significantly positive. Finally, leverage 
and share price performance tend to be negatively correlated irrespective of industry 
classes. 
The findings of industry classification for the UK in Table 5.26 reveal that, unlike 
in Germany, manufacturing firms have the higher adjustment coefficients than service 
firms have. As being common findings in Table 5.27, the variables "profitability, 
dividend payout ratio, term structure of interest rates, share price performance", are 
significantly and negatively correlated with leverage across two industry classes. Market-
to-book ratio and equity premium have no significant impact on book-leverage but their 
impact on market-leverage is significantly negative across industries. The significantly 
negative effect of market-to-book ratio on leverage implies the importance of agency 
problems and financial distress costs in both types of firms. 
The significant and negative tax rate coefficient for manufacturing firms under book-
leverage is not in line with the theory. Moreover, the significantly negative coefficient of 
fixed-assets ratio for manufacturing companies under market-leverage is not predicted by 
the theory either. Yet, the theory is confirmed by the significant and positive fixed-assets 
ratio coefficient under book-leverage for manufacturing firms. On the other hand, firm 
size has direct influence upon debt ratios for firms in both sectors (always significant at 
1 %), which highlights the significance of expected bankruptcy costs in the UK having 
considerable premature liquidation cases. Finally, the expected significant and negative 
relation between leverage and earnings volatility is found only under market-leverage for 
manufacturing firms. 
In conclusion, we find several important differences in fmancing patterns of 
manufacturing and service companies across countries. However, market-related factors, 
profitability, fixed-assets ratio and size variables tend to have similar effects on leverage 
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across industries in these countries. One can say that the findings based on industry 
classification generally support our main results reported in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.22: Dynamic capital structure in France: Industry classification. 
Dependent Variable: BOOK-LEVERAGE1.t MARKET- LEVERAGE1,t 
Independent Predicted Manufacturing Service Manufacturing Service 
Variables Sign 
LEVERAGE1.1-1 + 0.7208*** 0.7502*** 0.6530*** 0.6937*** 
(0.0435) (0.0460) (0.0301) (0.0388) 
PROFIT1,t -1+ -0.3912*** -0.5052*** -0.4939*** -0.3173* 
(0.0890) (0.0736) (0.1333) (0.1739) 
PROFIT1.t-1 -1+ 0.2442*** 0.4504*** 0.2623*** 0.2597** 
(0.0655) (0.0547) (0.0999) (0.1229) 
TAXRATE1.t + -0.0094 0.0038 -0.0080 0.0070 
(0.0064) (0.0072) (0.0099) (0.0124) 
T AXRATE1,1-1 + 
MKT-TO-BOOI<t.t 0.0060 0.0152*** -0.0709*** -0.0309*** 
(0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0190) (0.0105) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1.t-1 0.0456*** 0.0159** 
(0.0152) (0.0065) 
FIXASSETS1,t + 0.1542*** 0.0817** 0.1351*** 0.1075** 
(0.0407) (0.0402) (0.0500) (0.0437) 
FIXASSETS1.1-1 + 
SIZE1.t + 0.0466*** 0.0343* 0.1227*** 0.0855*** 
(0.0121) (0.0186) (0.0221) (0.0219) 
SIZEI,t-1 + -0.0457*** -0.0299* -0.1160*** -0.0802*** 
(0.0119) (0.0179) (0.0219) (0.0208) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t -0.0002 0.0022** -0.0001 0.0008 
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0014) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t-1 
DIVIDEND1,t -1+ 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0010 -0.0010 
(0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0026) 
DIVI DEND1.t-1 -1+ 
EQUITY PREMIUM 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0004** 0.0003 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
TERM-STRUCTR -0.0048*** -0.0050*** -0.0112*** -0.0107*** 
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0021) 
SHARE PRICE -0.0157*** -0.0047 -0.0547*** -0.0461*** 
(0.0047) (0.0116) (0.0086) (0.0116) 
Constant 0.0226 -0.0464 0.0434 0.0083 
(0.0254) (0.0369) (0.0374) (0.0637) 
Correlation 1 -5.126*** -4.568*** -6.110*** -5.398*** 
Correlation2 0.7711 1.472 -0.02842 -1.510 
Sargan Test (df) 186.1 (583) 96.87 (583) 201.1 (583) 102.6 (583) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 801.1 (13)*** 995.5 (13)*** 1860 (14)*** 1417 (14)*** 
R2 0.7964 0.7675 0.8012 0.7816 
Firms I Observations 209 I 1765 1161839 209 I 1765 116 I 839 
Estimation Period . 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 
The industries were classified as manufacturing (sectors 1-8, 14) and service (sectors 9-13, 15). See Appendix for 
industry classification of sectors. See also notes in Tables 5.1 and 5.12. 
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Table 5.23: Industry classification in France: Long-run Relationship 
Dependent Variable: BOOK-LEVERAGE1,t MARKET- LEVERAGE1,t 
Independent Predicted Manufacturing Service Manufacturing Service 
Variables Sign 
PROFIT1,t -/+ -0.5267*** -0.2192 -0.6673*** -0.1881 
(0.1650) (0.1762) (0.1886) (0.2211) 
TAXRATE1,t + -0.0337 0.0152 -0.0231 0.0230 
(0.0231) (0.0293) (0.0285) (0.0405) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t 0.0216 0.0609*** -0.0728*** -0.0489** 
(0.0153) (0.0200) (0.0241) (0.0196) 
FIXASSETS1,t + 0.5525*** 0.3271** 0.3894*** 0.3509** 
(0.1368) (0.1362) (0.1402) (0.1439) 
SIZE1,t + 0.0032 0.0177* 0.0193*** 0.0175 
(0.0053) (0.0091) (0.0062) (0.0109) 
EARNINGS VOL1,t -0.0008 0.0086** -0.0003 0.0026 
(0.0008) (0.0035) (0.0023) (0.0047) 
DIVIDEND1,t -/+ 0.0025 -0.0010 0.0030 -0.0034 
(0.0016) (0.0071) (0.0029) (0.0084) 
EQUITY PREMIUM 0.0011** 0.0003 0.0012** 0.0011 
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
TERM-STRUCTR -0.0171*** -0.0199*** -0.0324*** -0.0350*** 
(0.0045) (0.0069) (0.0053) (0.0074) 
dSHARE PRICE -0.0561*** -0.0189 -0.1576*** -0.1504*** 
(0.0185) (0.0455) (0.0276) (0.0408) 
See notes in Table 5.22. 
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Table 5.24: Dynamic capital structure in Germany: Industry classification. 
Dependent Variable: BOOK-LEVERAGEt,t MARKET- LEVERAGE~,, 
Independent Predicted Manufacturing Service Manufacturing Service 
Variables Sign 
LEVERAGEt,t-1 + 0.8120*** 0.6397*** 0.8078*** 0.7728*** 
(0.0410) (0.1057) (0.0284) (0.0778) 
PROFITt,t -/+ -0.1066* -0.3087** -0.1409** -0.1317* 
(0.0577) (0.1560) (0.0685) (0.0766) 
PROFITt,t-1 -/+ 
TAXRATE1.1 + 0.0076 0.0038 0.0098 -0.0025 
(0.0056) (0.0038) (0.0076) (0.0041) 
T AXRA TEt,t-1 + 
MKT-TO-BOOKt,t -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0001 
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.001 0) (0.0011) 
MKT-TO-BOOK~,~_1 
FIXASSETSt,t + 0.0723 0.1163** 0.0766 0.1505* 
(0.0569) (0.0542) (0.0498) (0.0791) 
FIXASSETSt,t-1 + 
SIZEt,t + 0.0505*** 0.0116* 0.0610*** 0.0130** 
(0.0143) (0.0067) (0.0120) (0.0055) 
SIZEt,t-1 + -0.0504*** -0.0567*** 
(0.0141) (0.0116) 
EARNINGS VOLt,t 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
EARNINGS VOLt,t-1 
DIVIDENDt,t -/+ 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0004 -0.0014 
(0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0012) 
DIVIDENDt,t-1 -/+ 
EQUITY PREMIUM -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0006** 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
TERM-STRUCTR -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0013 
(0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0023) 
~SHARE PRICE -0.0110* -0.0156* -0.0525*** -0.0575*** 
(0.0064) (0.0094) (0.0073) (0.0141) 
Constant 0.0261 -0.0992 -0.0067 -0.1577*** 
(0.0229) (0.0701) (0.0228) (0.0736) 
Correlation 1 -7.992*** -4.008*** -9.023*** -3.446*** 
Correlation2 -1.039 1.904 0.04958 1.927 
Sargan Test ( df) 289.4 (271) 104.8 (271) 317.7 (271) 110.2 (271) 
Wald Test-1 {df) 782.1 (12)*** 412.8 (11)*** 1778 ( 12)*** 1149 (11 )*** 
R2 0.7858 0.7205 0.8137 0.8118 
Firms I Observations 415/4041 114/1004 415/4041 114/1004 
Estimation Period 1989-2000 1989-2000 1989-2000 1989-2000 
The industries were classified as manufacturing (sectors 1-8, 14) and service (sectors 9-13, 15). See Appendix for 
industry classification of sectors. See also notes in Tables 5.1 and 5.12. 
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Table 5.25: Industry classification in Germany: Long-run Relationship 
Dependent Variable: BOOK-LEVERAGE1.t MARKET- LEVERAGE~,~ 
Independent Predicted Manufacturing Service Manufacturing Service 
Variables Sign 
PROFIT1.t -I+ -0.5671* -0.8567*** -0.7331** -0.5796 
(0.3261) (0.2769) (0.3533) (0.4033) 
TAXRATE1,t + 0.0404 0.0107 0.0508 -0.0108 
(0.0316) (0.0098) (0.0405) (0.0193) 
MKT-T0-800~.1 -0.0025 0.0017 -0.0025 0.0005 
(0.0054) (0.0035) (0.0054) (0.0050) 
FIXASSETS1.t + 0.3848 0.3227** 0.3984 0.6626* 
(0.2862) (0.1535) (0.2555) (0.3540) 
SIZE1.t + 0.0005 0.0323** 0.0227*** 0.0573** 
(0.0054) (0.0137) (0.0064) (0.0248) 
EARNINGS VOLi.t 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004* 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
DIVIDEND1,1 -/+ 0.0012 -0.0031 0.0019 -0.0060 
(0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0060) 
EQUITY PREMIUM -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0024*** 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
TERM-STRUCTR -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0022 -0.0059 
(0.0043) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0101) 
~SHARE PRICE -0.0582* -0.0432 -0.2732*** -0.2531*** 
(0.0340) (0.0269) (0.0490) (0.0644) 
See notes in Table 5.24. 
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Table 5.26: Dynamic capital structure in the UK: Industry classification. 
Dependent Variable: BOOK-LEVERAGE1,t MARKET- LEVERAGE1,1 
Independent Predicted Manufacturing Service Manufacturing Service 
Variables Sign 
LEVERAGE1.t-1 + 0.6905*** 0.7795*** 0.6105*** 0.7146*** 
(0.0278) (0.0276) (0.0239) (0.0235) 
PROFIT1.t -/+ -0.2057*** -0.0986* -0.3032*** -0.1064*** 
(0.0385) (0.0606) (0.0829) (0.0377) 
PROFIT1,t-1 -/+ 0.1245*** 0.0630** 0.1280*** 0.0488*** 
(0.0221) (0.0299) (0.0489) (0.0157) 
TAXRATE~,~ + -0.0099* 0.0025 0.0386 0.0207 
(0.0059) (0.0054) (0.0277) (0.0134) 
TAXRATE1.1-1 + -0.0048** 
(0.0020) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1.t -0.0002 0.0052 -0.0418*** -0.0400*** 
(0.0025) (0.0041) (0.0102) (0.0055) 
MKT-TO-BOOKi.t-1 -0.0006 -0.0039* 0.0075** 0.0086*** 
(0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0027) 
FIXASSETS1,t + 0.0470** 0.0129 -0.4370*- -0.0435 
(0.0242) (0.0193) (0.0981) (0.0272) 
FIXASSETS1.t-1 + 0.3990*** 
(0.0839) 
SIZE1,t + 0.0098*** 0.0549*** 0.0424** 0.0565*** 
(0.0019) (0.0153) (0.0201) (0.0158) 
SIZE1.t-1 + -0.0501*** -0.0330* -0.0521*** 
(0.0149) (0.0194) (0.0153) 
EARNINGS VOL1,t -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0010* -0.0010 
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0011) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t-1 
DIVIDEND1,t -/+ -0.0014 -0.0031*** -0.0066** 0.0001 
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0014) 
DIVI DEND1,t-1 -/+ -0.0006* -0.0008* -0.0026*** 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0009) 
EQUITY PREMIUM 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0002*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TERM-STRUCTR -0.0015*** -0.0026*** -0.0047*** -0.0055*** 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
~SHARE PRICE -0.0076*** -0.0157*** -0.0202*** -0.0102** 
(0.0021) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0046) 
Constant -0.0346** -0.0100 0.0880*** 0.0910*** 
(0.0171) (0.0131) (0.0271) (0.0187) 
Correlation 1 -14.27*** -12.71*** -16.74*** -13.71*** 
Correlation2 0.2516 1.030 2.135 2.420 
Sargan Test (df) 566.5 (455) 446.6 (396) 742.5 (455) 513.2 (396) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 1673 ( 15)*** 1395 (15)*** 3436 (16)*** 2279 (14) 
R2 0.6807 0.6515 0.6325 0.6515 
Firms I Observations 1344/20368 998/11392 1344/20368 1001 /11413 
Estimation Period 1971-2000 1971-2000 1971-2000 1971-2000 
The industries were classified as manufacturing (sectors 1-8, 14) and service (sectors 9-13, 15). See Appendix for 
industry classification of sectors. See also notes in Tables 5.1 and 5.12 
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Table 5.27: Industry classification in the UK: Long-run Relationship 
Dependent Variable: BOOK-LEVERAGE1,t MARKET- LEVERAGEt,t 
Independent Predicted Manufacturing Service Manufacturing Service 
Variables Sign 
PROFIT;,t -/+ -0.2624*** -0.1613 -0.4498*** -0.2015** 
(0.0801) 0.1677 (0. 1336) (0.0921) 
TAXRATEt,t + -0.0474* 0.0112 0.0991 0.0727 
(0.0245) 0.0248 (0.0709) (0.0478) 
MKT-TO-BOOK;,t -0.0025 0.0058 -0.0881*** -0.1099*** 
(0.0057) 0.0146 (0.0194) (0.0148) 
FIXASSETS;,t + 0.1519** 0.0583 -0.0974* -0.1526 
(0.0756) 0.0876 (0.0561) (0.0956) 
SIZEt,t + 0.0316*** 0.0217*** 0.0239*** 0.0156*** 
(0.0057) 0.0054 (0.0045) (0.0053) 
EARNINGS VOL;,t -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0026* -0.0037 
(0.0006) 0.0035 (0.0016) (0.0038) 
DIVIDEND1,t -/+ -0.0065* -0.0176** -0.0237** 0.0002 
(0.0039) 0.0073 (0.0094) (0.0050) 
EQUITY PREMIUM -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0011*** -0.0008** 
(0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0002) (0.0003) 
TERM-STRUCTR -0.0050*** -0.0120*** -0.0120*** -0.0192*** 
(0.0008) 0.0022 (0.0016) (0.0027) 
~SHARE PRICE -0.0246*** -0.0711*** -0.0518*** -0.0358** 
(0.0071) 0.0160 (0.0114) (0.0158) 
See notes in Table 5.26. 
5.5. ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS 
It is highly difficult to establish exogeneity in financial and accounting data of balance 
sheets. So causation between variables or analysing determination of variables is 
problematic because of the endogeneity problem. That is, it would be less probable that 
the observed relations of explanatory variables would misleadingly affect the dependent 
variable when we use past values of capital structure determinants. For instance, if there 
has been a change in market value of a firm in this year compared to last year, the source 
of this change should be obtained from the last year's financial decisions. Therefore, 
using the same period data for both leverage and capital structure determinants might 
give misleading results. 
We have compared the regression results of models in levels and differences 
using OLS, Anderson-Hsiao and GMM procedures. In the end, it was shown that the 
most appropriate methodology for dynamic capital structure would be system-GMM 
specification that combines the differenced equation with the level equation. Our results 
based on GMM estimates are robust due to many reasons. For instance, potential 
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endogeneity problem is eliminated by GMM methodology. Moreover, GMM does not 
need the conditions of 'no autocorrelation', 'no heteroscedasticity', and 'normality' to be 
fulfilled especially for the large samples (see, Hansen [1982]). Our panel data set is far 
from suffering the consequences of small samples with large number of observations for 
the UK, and asymptotic standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. Related to 
sample size of France and Germany, the two-step GMM results in PcGive use the 
estimated variance matrix incorporating the small-sample correction of Windmeijer 
[2000]. Similarly, in order not to be affected by 'survivorship bias', we included dead 
firms to our data set as well depending the availability of data for dead firms. 
Furthermore, there are some advantages of employing panel data. It increases degrees of 
freedom, renders large number of observations, reduces the collinearity among the 
explanatory variables (as indicated by very significant Wald tests) and consequently leads 
to more efficient estimates. 
There are also some points of secondary importance in our analysis. For example, 
useful descriptive statistics for each year are reported to examine the yearly change in 
firms characteristics or the stability of the results across sub-samples. In addition, 
substantial outliers have been deleted from the data set. Different leverage and size 
measures have been utilised and the results were shown to be generally insensitive to 
these alternative definitions. 
One should also emphasise the potential biases in selecting companies for the sample 
size. Sample selection bias may be due to two main reasons (Heckman, [1979]). First, we 
may have a self-selection of individuals or investigated data units; second, data processor 
or researchers' decision may prevail in sample selection. There is neither bias nor 
specification error due to omitted variable and missing data as the sample data set 
incorporates no missing value for any capital structure determinant and the nature of 
selected variables depends on the purpose of research. 
Another point is that size and industry classification generally support our main findings. 
There is a caveat for German data as the Prudence Principle results in the 
undervaluation of assets and overvaluation of liabilities. Yet, it is known that elimination 
of accounting differences, mainly in the definitions of assets and debts, for international 
comparisons can only be partial (see Friderichs et al. [1999]). As discussed by Wald 
[1999], assuming that accounting and institutional differences affect all firms in a country 
with a constant multiplier, these differences should disappear. That is to say, since total 
assets appear in the denominator of both dependent and independent variables, the 
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estimated coefficient should not change due to proportional scaling. Hence, such 
differences should not be important in by-country regressions. More importantly, our data 
source DA TASTREAM INTERNATIONAL supplies some datatypes which are common 
to all companies. As almost all of our datatypes are such common items, the empirical 
results imply the maximum comparability across countries. 
Focusing on the correlation matrix of variables in all countries (Table 5.2), the correlation 
coefficients give some insights about the possibility of multicollinearity. The correlation 
between non-debt tax shields and profitability is too high in all countries. This is not 
surprising because the operating profit is used before depreciation. As the data are based 
on the balance sheets of firms, there are expectedly some other high correlations (e.g., 
between NDTS and fixed assets ratio). It is inevitable to use financial variables in terms 
of ratios, which have some common denominators, for cross-sectional regressions to have 
more robust results but this also causes high correlations between capital structure 
variables. Consequently, one should be cautious while interpreting the regression results 
in the context of these interrelations. 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to explain why there have been substantial variations in the 
debt ratios that firms employ in their capital structure. This capital structure study has 
aimed to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, in the empirical analysis three 
distinct economies, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, have been taken as bases 
to investigate whether different institutional factors across countries have different 
influence upon the financing decisions of firms. Second, apart from commonly used firm-
specific factors we also included some market-related factors and controlled for dividend 
policy to see their interaction with debt-equity ratio. Third, large panel data set was 
utilised to study dynamic capital structure. We believe its necessity because it is apparent 
that factors influencing firms' capital structure change overtime and thus time-varying 
observed difference in firms' capital structure should also be investigated. Moreover, we 
use the GMM estimation methodology due to its superiority in overcoming common 
econometric problems, especially in controlling for the endogeneity problem by using 
efficient instrumental variables. Using panel data together with GMM procedure, one is 
also able to control for unobservable and fixed firm-specific effects, which might 
potentially influence firms' capital structure decisions. 
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The empirical evidence seems to reveal that financing decisions of firms are not 
independent from country-specific institutional factors as the association between 
leverage and a certain firm-specific characteristics varies across countries. Our results 
related to the dynamics in firms' borrowing decisions suggest that the firms are adjusting 
their debt ratios to achieve their targeted capital structure. With respect to the estimated 
coefficients of lagged market-leverage, this adjustment process in France seems quickest 
in terms of responding to the new circumstances due to relatively low transaction costs. 
Furthermore, there is a significantly negative association between profitability and 
leverage in all countries. However, the asymmetric information problems between 
managers and outside investors implied by the pecking order theory seem most severe in 
France. The association between market-leverage and tax rate is insignificant in France 
and Germany, which does not give credit to the theory. This invariance is expected 
especially for France due to French tax system's objective to promote the retentions of 
profits by reducing corporate tax rates. The influence of tax rate on market-leverage is, 
however, significantly positive in the UK. Furthermore, the association of book-leverage 
with market-to-book ratio is also different across countries, which may imply that 
resolving agency problems and related costs might differ across different legal systems. 
The relationship is significantly positive in France, insignificant in the UK and 
significantly negative in Germany. The insignificant market-to-book ratio coefficient in 
the UK is not expected since the dispersed equity ownership and thus ineffective 
monitoring of management tend to prevent the mitigation of severe agency problems. The 
low shareholder protection in France might necessitate the preference of using debt over 
equity and therefore causes a strongly positive estimate of market-to-book ratio 
coefficient. On the other hand, market-to-book ratio and market-leverage is negatively 
associated in all countries, which confirms the idea that less debt should be used to 
mitigate underinvestment problems in growing firms. The relationship between fixed-
assets ratio and leverage is significantly positive in all sample countries, which is in line 
with the theory that collateral tangible assets are useful to prevent risk-shifting problems. 
Another apparent difference across countries is due to the impact of dividend policy: The 
association of market-leverage with payout ratio is insignificant in Germany, significantly 
positive in France and significantly negative in the UK. This might be the reflection of 
differences of taxation systems and corporate governance in these countries. 
Furthermore, size is found to be a strongly positive determinant of debt financing in all 
countries under market-leverage. This finding emphasises the importance of expected 
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bankruptcy costs in financial distress, as size can be an inverse proxy for bankruptcy 
probability. The irrelevance of size with book-leverage in Germany, on the other hand, 
might be attributed to the effective role of banks in controlling the management and in 
supporting firms in bad conditions. This invariance is in line with the conventional 
wisdom that close and long-term relationship between firms and banks reduces the cost of 
financial distress. However, strongly negative association of leverage with profitability 
and market-to-book ratio; significantly positive relationship between size and market-
leverage, and significantly positive of fixed-assets ratio on debt-ratios in Germany reveal 
somewhat important evidence, also found by Edwards and Fischer [1994]. Our results 
imply that allegedly efficient and strong characteristics of German corporate governance 
system seems to fail in mitigating agency, financial distress and asymmetric information 
problems with concentrated share ownership, and banks' close control and monitoring of 
the management. 
As for the market-related factors, the inverse relation between term-structure and 
leverage in all countries confirms that companies are reluctant to raise debt capital while 
the long term-rate of interest is high. Similarly, the negative impact of prior share price 
change on leverage in all countries suggests that firms issue equity after share price 
increase. It seems that the effect of equity premium in debt-equity ratios is country 
dependent: German firms do not seem to consider the market equity premium when 
deciding their financing mix; French (UK) firms tend to issue debt (equity) when equity 
premium is high. 
Furthermore, our study finds some other country-specific differences in financing 
behaviour of firms based on size and industry classification. On one hand, size 
classification in France shows that asymmetric information problems persist for medium 
and large firms while there seem no significant agency-type (underinvestment) problems 
for medium firms under book-leverage. In addition, the importance of collateralisable 
assets for external borrowing is seen in all size classes of French firms. Information 
asymmetries are not considerable for small firms in Germany and the UK as profitability 
has no significant impact on leverage for small firms. However, there are some concerns 
about such problems for medium and large UK firms. 
On the other hand, industry classification reveals that capital intensity supports relatively 
heavy debt financing against risk-shifting problems for manufacturing firms only in 
France and the UK as fixed-assets ratio does not exert any significant effect on leverage 
in Germany. The estimated coefficient of profitability is insignificant for service 
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companies in France, which implies the absence of information asymmetries in these 
firms. However, the same association is significant for manufacturing companies in all 
countries. The significantly positive impact of size on leverage in Germany and the UK 
emphasises the fact that UK insolvency code causes too many premature liquidations, and 
German firms entering into bankruptcy process are generally liquidated. The same 
relationship in France tends to be insignificant for service companies implying the firm-
friendly nature of French bankruptcy laws. The effect of equity premium tends to be 
considerable with different directions for manufacturing firms in France and service firms 
in Germany and for both sectors in the UK. 
In conclusion, the implications in this chapter reject the irrelevance hypothesis of 
Modigliani and Miller theorem with some significant firm-characteristics determinants 
accounting for capital structure variations across firms. We have also found some 
evidence that the institutional factors appear to be effective in financing decisions of 
firms across countries. However, we still need further empirical and theoretical research 
on capital structure, especially, across countries as there remain to be some ambiguous 
points waiting for investigation in this puzzling issue of corporate finance. 
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5.7. APPENDIX 
Table 5. Al: Panel Structure: a) Number of firms having 'n' continuous observations during the 
period; b) number of observations in each year; c) number of firms in each industry class; and 
d) number of observations in each industry class. 
a) Number of firms b) Number of observations 
n (years) France Germany UK Years France Germany UK 
3 60 55 216 1969 - - 456 
4 53 31 218 1970 - - 478 
5 34 18 194 1971 - - 486 
6 13 20 130 1972 - - 845 
7 23 12 103 1973 - - 886 
8 17 13 66 1974 - - 913 
9 14 12 52 1975 - - 918 
10 11 20 51 1976 - - 923 
11 2 28 86 1977 - - 929 
12 48 34 92 1978 - - 942 
13 15 186 85 1979 - - 962 
14 4 136 82 1980 - - 974 
15 3 - 87 1981 - - 1002 
16 3 - 66 1982 - - 1043 
17 6 - 74 1983 58 - 1109 
18 53 - 66 1984 65 - 1191 
19 - - 61 1985 68 - 1249 
20 - - 50 1986 71 - 1290 
21 - - 31 1987 75 151 1304 
22 - - 27 1988 92 349 1320 
23 - - 24 1989 142 372 1311 
24 - - 16 1990 143 397 1288 
25 
- -
25 1991 151 412 1247 
26 - - 21 1992 163 424 1208 
27 - - 44 1993 175 430 1217 
28 - - 42 1994 197 442 1267 
29 - - 161 1995 208 463 1315 
30 - - 30 1996 243 477 1396 
31 - - 38 1997 292 504 1478 
32 - - 179 1998 347 551 1479 
1999 346 545 1351 
2000 335 516 1180 
Total 359 565 2417 Total 3171 6033 34957 
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c) Number of firms 
Industry France German. UK 
1 23 49 164 
2 10 43 30 
3 19 56 200 
4 31 36 162 
5 48 57 261 
6 16 31 28 
7 41 89 308 
8 22 15 89 
9 25 21 194 
10 1 0 55 
11 20 22 148 
12 31 23 252 
13 46 31 318 
14 17 59 142 
15 9 33 66 
d) No. of observations 
Industry France German. 
1 253 532 
2 94 510 
3 234 610 
4 269 410 
5 378 517 
6 153 359 
7 397 1034 
8 186 170 
9 218 207 
10 4 0 
11 146 241 
12 295 246 
13 353 179 
14 141 648 
15 50 370 
UK 
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Figure 5 .A 1: Plots of mean leverage values for France. 
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Figure 5.A2: Plots of mean leverage values for Germany. 
0.300 
1-LEVER! · ...... LEVER21 
0.275 
0.250 
0.225 
0.200 
0.175 
0.150 
1990 1995 2000 
196 
Figure 5 .A3: Plots of mean leverage values for the UK. 
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Table 5. A2: Descriptive Statistics for France in each Year. 
1983 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2541 0.4728 0.1408 0.0512 0.4632 1.1466 0.2534 15.749 15.479 
Standard Deviation 0.1156 0.2552 0.0763 0.0278 0.327 0.3306 0.1152 1.1441 1.153 
Minimum 0.086 0.0893 0.0323 0.0152 -0.664 0.7918 0.0434 12.787 12.838 
Maximum 0.6194 0.9258 0.523 0.1379 2.0451 2.5744 0.5712 18.756 18.828 
1984 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.264 0.4711 0.1418 0.0502 0.4237 1.1843 0.2487 15.67 15.392 
Standard Deviation 0.1196 0.2522 0.0836 0.028 0.5075 0.3908 0.1099 1.2168 1.2194 
Minimum 0.0554 0.0866 0.0387 0.0147 -2.023 0.814 0.0402 12.721 12.39 
Maximum 0.5977 0.9324 0.6057 0.1774 2.3899 3.1776 0.5096 18.909 18.825 
1985 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2485 0.3753 0.1365 0.0469 0.3143 1.3183 0.2448 15.653 15.355 
Standard Deviation 0.114 0.2135 0.0829 0.0256 0.6596 0.5309 0.1167 1.2139 1.2078 
Minimum 0.0547 0.0419 -0.118 0.0069 -3.9682 0.7989 0.0286 12.855 12.637 
Maximum 0.5965 0.8217 0.5277 0.1538 1.1686 4.0838 0.5983 18.88 18.808 
1986 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2397 0.3251 0.1296 0.0568 0.3964 1.4412 0.2508 15.678 15.507 
Standard Deviation 0.117 0.2001 0.0744 0.0527 0.3118 0.651 0.1265 1.2287 1.2793 
Minimum 0.0372 0.0209 0.0024 0.0066 -0.722 0.7684 0.0306 12.992 12.81 
Maximum 0.5827 0.8348 0.4414 0.3402 1.7247 5.6769 0.547 18.477 18.74 
1987 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2117 0.3716 0.1367 0.0519 0.3731 1.2126 0.2402 15.733 15.589 
Standard Deviation 0.1044 0.207 0.0748 0.0382 0.2204 0.4999 0.127 1.336 1.393 
Minimum 0.0175 0.0139 -0.0214 0.0076 -0.4376 0.8014 0.0306 11.541 10.886 
Maximum 0.4896 0.9103 0.4135 0.2417 1.0865 4.1922 0.5699 18.541 18.728 
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1988 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2208 0.3151 0.1368 0.0478 0.3597 1.416 0.2317 15.584 15.428 
Standard Deviation 0.114 0.1945 0.0677 0.0369 0.1724 0.604 0.1317 1.4307 1.503 
Minimum 0.0043 0.0016 0.0092 0.0089 -0.091 0.8397 0.0228 11.266 11.444 
Maximum 0.563 0.7696 0.3691 0.2621 1.3551 4.5993 0.613 18.579 18.784 
1989 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR llliBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2516 0.2939 0.1333 0.0464 0.3061 1.5276 0.2318 15.003 14.9 
Standard Deviation 0.1321 0.1645 0.0685 0.0334 0.2806 0.7298 0.1403 1.6816 1.6837 
Minimum 0.0064 0.0024 0.0014 0.0049 -1.7055 0.7482 0.0202 10.005 9.946 
Maximum 0.7483 0.7832 0.3747 0.2207 0.8405 6.8928 0.7989 18.631 18.858 
1990 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR llliBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2611 0.3875 0.1194 0.0463 0.3124 1.2477 0.237 15.091 15.036 
Standard Deviation 0.1408 0.2079 0.0614 0.0351 0.6614 0.4513 0.1486 1.7122 1.7068 
Minimum 0 0 -0.024 0.0024 -2.63 0.7137 0.0188 9.9416 9.9071 
Maximum 0.6552 0.8995 0.3626 0.2286 6.5758 3.3998 0.7797 18.776 18.989 
1991 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2571 0.3858 0.117 0.0478 0.3323 1.2539 0.2439 15.119 15.119 
Standard Deviation 0.1422 0.2147 0.0699 0.0359 0.4465 0.5001 0.1507 1.745 1.7617 
Minimum 0 0 -0.032 0.0038 -2.568 0.6946 0.0152 10.041 10.043 
Maximum 0.6164 0.8664 0.4642 0.2421 2.8378 3.9573 0.7615 18.922 19.109 
1992 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR iVIBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2616 0.4192 0.106 0.0476 0.2848 1.2055 0.2434 15.187 15.195 
Standard Deviation 0.145 0.2483 0.0631 0.0342 0.2582 0.4325 0.1515 1.7758 1.7926 
Minimum 0.0093 0.004 -0.057 0.0034 -0.845 0.4807 0.0069 9.6582 10.028 
Maximum 0.6166 0.9575 0.3378 0.2622 1.5667 3.1922 0.7593 18.933 19.151 
1993 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR llliBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2478 0.3415 0.0983 0.0499 0.2916 1.415 0.2476 15.038 15.119 
Standard Deviation 0.153 0.2328 0.07 0.0413 0.5318 0.7016 0.168 1.7833 1.7575 
Minimum 0.0001 2E-05 -0.116 0.0046 -2.442 0.7316 0.0062 10.324 11.278 
Maximum 0.6332 0.9637 0.3868 0.2965 5.5849 5.2089 0.8825 19 19.249 
1994 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR llliBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2269 0.3189 0.1114 0.0487 0.321 1.3713 0.24063 14.969 15.075 
Standard Deviation 0.1523 0.2224 0.0731 0.0389 0.4925 0.6351 0.1689 1.7882 1.7732 
Minimum 0 0 -0.071 0.0026 -1.614 0.6389 0.00531 10.422 11.162 
Maximum 0.7437 0.9537 0.4452 0.271 5.2882 5.2384 0.96379 18.979 19.253 
1995 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR llliBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2237 0.3485 0.1142 0.0479 0.3232 1.3387 0.2367 15.008 15.073 
Standard Deviation 0.1515 0.2488 0.0714 0.0359 0.528 0.7252 0.1646 1.8009 1.8 
Minimum 0.0004 6E-05 -0.0868 0.0011 -1.98 0.5967 0.0049 10.427 11 
Maximum 0.7615 0.9968 0.4575 0.2677 4.5472 6.9749 0.9855 20.526 20.067 
1996 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2136 0.2895 0.1079 0.048 0.3242 1.5131 0.2361 14.76 14.821 
Standard Deviation 0.1415 0.2331 0.0935 0.0323 0.4497 0.8309 0.1644 1.84 1.8375 
Minimum 0 0 -0.7932 0.0003 -1.7464 0.5952 0.0036 8.677 9.9371 
Maximum 0.8875 0.9753 0.5599 0.2056 5.0494 5.7161 0.9788 19.07 19.134 
1997 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2143 0.2498 0.1204 0.0486 0.3095 1.6769 0.2249 14.44 14.487 
Standard Deviation 0.151 0.2128 0.1257 0.0385 0.4612 1.0215 0.1635 2.0363 2.059 
Minimum 0 0 -1.414 8E-05 -1.746 0.6766 0.0042 9.3434 9.2409 
Maximum 0.9985 0.9662 0.7852 0.2875 6.4984 9.0462 0.9716 19.164 19.784 
1998 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2137 0.2433 0.1121 0.0469 0.3062 1.8202 0.2145 14.229 14.286 
Standard Deviation 0.1486 0.2131 0.1206 0.0352 0.3608 1.2877 0.1621 2.1688 2.1276 
Minimum 0 0 -1.09 0.0002 -3.218 0.5516 0.0016 6.8712 9.3613 
Maximum 0.8578 0.9541 0.5967 0.2447 2.44 13.155 0.964 19.132 19.798 
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1999 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2244 0.2396 0.105 0.0481 0.2697 2.1178 0.2144 14.371 14.456 
Standard Deviation 0.1491 0.2037 0.1166 0.0427 0.4078 2.0662 0.1609 2.1693 2.1312 
Minimum 0 0 -0.852 0.0021 -3.457 0.5603 0.0036 5.2407 9.2507 
Maximum 0.8386 0.939 0.6563 0.5467 3.0245 20.602 0.9629 19.272 19.946 
2000 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2348 0.2743 0.1002 0.0484 0.2701 1.8826 0.2107 14.547 14.649 
Standard Deviation 0.1542 0.218 0.1208 0.0434 0.396 1.6314 0.16 2.1501 2.1142 
Minimum 0 0 -0.797 0.0021 -2.621 0.3968 0.0027 5.2407 9.2072 
Maximum 0.8472 0.9145 0.9935 0.4337 3.4324 12.808 0.9623 20.227 20.502 
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Table 5. A3: Descriptive Statistics for Germany in each Year. 
1987 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1366 0.2288 0.1377 0.0564 0.5296 1.2599 0.3242 13.706 13.392 
Standard Deviation 0.1215 0.2073 0.0898 0.0445 0.3914 0.3789 0.1681 1.772 1.7844 
Minimum 0 0 -0.222 0 -2.98 0.6647 0.0341 9.6536 9.6708 
Maximum 0.5023 0.7841 0.4347 0.2858 2.5633 2.628 0.8525 18.027 17.821 
1988 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1702 0.2133 0.1405 0.0703 0.5663 1.9045 0.3493 12.246 12.149 
Standard Deviation 0.1753 0.2174 0.1221 0.0608 0.6587 4.2471 0.211 2.3313 1.9986 
Minimum 0 0 -0.6098 0 -0.769 0.2955 0.0017 5.0057 6.8995 
Maximum 0.7945 0.9885 0.7223 0.707 10.978 72.717 0.9947 18.101 17.892 
1989 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1725 0.1819 0.1349 0.064 0.6151 2.0968 0.3467 12.298 12.203 
Standard Deviation 0.1693 0.1903 0.1103 0.0451 0.8679 3.9257 0.2054 2.3059 2.0057 
Minimum 0 0 -0.731 0 -2.682 0.3067 0 5.8035 6.7186 
Maximum 0.7732 0.97 0.5349 0.2331 10.978 68.04 0.9938 18.108 17.937 
1990 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.175 0.1974 0.1357 0.0663 0.5493 2.1348 0.3491 12.358 12.265 
Standard Deviation 0.1699 0.1997 0.1069 0.0449 0.767 4.3375 0.2031 2.2734 1.9926 
Minimum 0 0 -0.622 0 -3 0.3479 0 5.4613 6.6219 
Maximum 0.7856 0.9792 0.5625 0.3454 13.108 65.129 0.9909 18.204 17.945 
1991 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1872 0.228 0.1399 0.0696 0.4725 1.8234 0.3631 12.416 12.307 
Standard Deviation 0.1698 0.2155 0.1158 0.0494 0.9829 2.6847 0.2054 2.2468 1.973 
Minimum 0 0 -0.6222 0 -15 0.4744 0.0086 5.2223 6.7654 
Maximum 0.9925 0.9773 0.6723 0.3743 6.9531 40.647 0.9904 18.25 18.001 
1992 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1971 0.2629 0.1275 0.0726 0.4621 1.6928 0.3671 12.411 12.337 
Standard Deviation 0.1798 0.2445 0.1288 0.053 1.2422 2.3812 0.2016 2.2475 1.9657 
Minimum 0 0 -0.901 0 -16.222 0.3208 0 5.3871 6.8838 
Maximum 0.9911 0.9834 0.7428 0.4678 12.785 31.578 0.985 18.272 18.122 
1993 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2064 0.2465 0.1161 0.073 0.2852 1.8508 0.3611 12.405 12.365 
Standard Deviation 0.1883 0.2382 0.1203 0.0623 1.4671 2.6736 0.2024 2.2319 1.9698 
Minimum 0 0 -0.339 0 -10.236 0.3608 0 5.5286 6.9758 
Maximum 0.83564 0.9604 0.7291 0.6219 14.2 40.206 0.9929 18.263 18.188 
1994 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1987 0.2532 0.113 0.065 0.3653 1.747 0.3422 12.421 12.403 
Standard Deviation 0.1871 0.2401 0.1188 0.0471 1.0655 2.6509 0.1978 2.2531 1.9443 
Minimum 0 0 -0.4615 0 -8.8 0.3868 0 5.0423 7.1078 
Maximum 0.9916 0.9681 0.7355 0.3094 15.5 43.136 0.9978 18.321 18.214 
1995 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2067 0.2775 0.1063 0.0595 0.2613 1.8619 0.3341 12.38 12.396 
Standard Deviation 0.1892 0.2519 0.1377 0.0438 1.1585 4.0229 0.1942 2.3379 1.9608 
Minimum 0 0 -1.162 0 -15.58 0.4062 0 3.2106 7.0609 
Maximum 0.9916 0.9789 0.7383 0.2876 5.7685 61.53 0.9984 18.299 18.175 
1996 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2111 0.295 0.1048 0.057 0.3517 1.77 0.3344 12.378 12.444 
Standard Deviation 0.1933 0.2682 0.1234 0.0428 1.5958 3.7619 0.1984 2.3809 1.9726 
Minimum 0 0 -1.099 0 -16.47 0.3392 0 4.4804 7.0542 
Maximum 0.8704 0.9735 0.744 0.3697 16.638 66.395 0.9804 18.338 18.829 
1997 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2086 0.2615 0.1162 0.0553 0.3502 1.8831 0.3192 12.349 12.404 
Standard Deviation 0.1997 0.2532 0.1311 0.0413 0.6856 4.2163 0.1979 2.4262 1.989 
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Minimum 0 0 -0.41 0 -2.959 0.4326 0 1.2306 6.9384 
Maximum 0.9904 0.9708 1.7416 0.3668 9.9538 88.476 0.9977 18.486 18.748 
1998 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2034 0.2516 0.1074 0.0527 0.3548 2.3431 0.3099 12.271 12.385 
Standard Deviation 0.1988 0.2603 0.1909 0.0426 0.8283 5.0078 0.2082 2.4446 2.0047 
Minimum 0 0 -2.92 0 -3.5734 0.4445 0 4.2792 6.9424 
Maximum 0.883 0.9942 1.7174 0.4061 15.202 93.883 0.9985 19.216 19.211 
1999 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2132 0.276 0.0978 0.0507 0.3144 1.9977 0.3085 12.363 12.526 
Standard Deviation 0.2061 0.2789 0.1366 0.0398 0.886 4.1348 0.21046 2.3919 2.0168 
Minimum 0 0 -0.796 0 -12.377 0.4229 0 4.1625 7.1757 
Maximum 0.9995 0.9878 1.3434 0.3096 8.6536 86.81 0.99716 19.355 19.486 
2000 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2127 0.2934 0.0987 0.0477 0.2725 2.0158 0.3077 12.384 12.516 
Standard Deviation 0.2026 0.2883 0.1241 0.0373 0.8757 3.7037 0.2148 2.3738 2.0477 
Minimum 0 0 -0.7074 0 -10.3 0.2536 0 4.2563 4.5704 
Maximum 0.8444 0.9925 0.7245 0.2236 9.3808 41.805 0.9809 19.402 19.594 
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Table 5. A4: Descriptive Statistics for the UK in each Year. 
1969 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.164 0.2469 0.1386 0.0299 0.4328 1.2076 0.376 9.6633 9.5096 
Standard Deviation 0.1169 0.2034 0.0572 0.019 0.1139 0.5997 0.1791 1.5296 1.5171 
Minimum 0 0 -0.094 0.0012 -0.623 0.3582 0.0124 6.5539 6.3226 
Maximum 0.6335 0.9464 0.3333 0.1679 1.3277 4.9602 0.9077 14.667 14.764 
1970 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1749 0.2797 0.1368 0.0299 0.4178 1.1059 0.3711 9.7305 9.5549 
Standard Deviation 0.1165 0.2055 0.0637 0.0197 0.2008 0.5157 0.1765 1.5304 1.5166 
Minimum 0 0 -0.111 0 -2 0.3395 0.0163 6.2631 6.1792 
Maximum 0.6385 0.9449 0.8129 0.1892 2.2215 4.7512 0.8975 14.739 14.798 
1971 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1723 0.2247 0.1448 0.0309 0.3906 1.3752 0.3732 9.7611 9.5524 
Standard Deviation 0.1121 0.1843 0.0621 0.0206 0.1909 0.747 0.1764 1.5141 1.5056 
Minimum 0 0 -0.0088 0.0017 -1.1366 0.3724 0.0401 6.4892 6.2628 
Maximum 0.6075 0.9039 0.5703 0.1786 3.6 7.8801 0.9002 14.705 14.825 
1972 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.155 0.1942 0.149 0.0302 0.3815 1.3932 0.3658 8.9319 8.6787 
Standard Deviation 0.1216 0.174 0.0682 0.0196 0.2416 0.745 0.1721 1.7095 1.7312 
Minimum 0 0 -0.142 0 -5.4286 0.3667 0 3.7905 4.3659 
Maximum 0.8199 0.8977 0.4919 0.1823 1.88 9.9818 0.9257 14.882 14.896 
1973 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1521 0.2626 0.1585 0.0288 0.4163 1.0436 0.3528 9.0192 8.7746 
Standard Deviation 0.1202 0.211 0.0667 0.0184 0.3401 0.4279 0.1705 1.7084 1.7148 
Minimum 0 0 -0.071 0 -9 0.2609 0 3.6164 4.4067 
Maximum 0.8475 0.9168 0.4142 0.1522 1.9091 6.5832 0.9652 15.042 15.07 
1974 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1664 0.4496 0.1518 0.0285 0.5025 0.7481 0.345 9.022 8.7587 
Standard Deviation 0.1212 0.2738 0.0656 0.0189 0.3298 0.1904 0.1684 1.7228 1.7056 
Minimum 0 0 -0.0641 0 -4.394 0.2518 0 2.8198 4.4727 
Maximum 0.7403 0.9889 0.4312 0.1872 5.8258 2.8465 0.9311 15.395 15.2 
1975 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1559 0.3416 0.1436 0.0296 0.511 0.8966 0.345 8.9825 8.6586 
Standard Deviation 0.1186 0.2481 0.0659 0.019 0.3553 0.2999 0.1715 1.716 1.7071 
Minimum 0 0 -0.189 0 -4.235 0.2969 0 3.1903 4.1149 
Maximum 0.7894 0.9788 0.4872 0.168 5.9891 4.1073 0.9733 15.186 15.112 
1976 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1475 0.3574 0.144 0.029 0.5034 0.8468 0.3352 8.998 8.652 
Standard Deviation 0.1178 0.2592 0.0621 0.0188 0.2377 0.2418 0.1668 1.7381 1.7183 
Minimum 0 0 -0.075 0 -2.3846 0.3227 0 3.1335 4.6313 
Maximum 0.7568 0.9867 0.3771 0.1677 3.1667 3.8594 0.9351 15.312 15.151 
1977 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1413 0.2882 0.1496 0.029 0.4949 0.9782 0.3262 9.004 8.6316 
Standard Deviation 0.111 0.2294 0.0635 0.0194 0.3345 0.3317 0.1663 1.737 1.7118 
Minimum 0 0 -0.178 0 -6.5 0.2221 0 3.053 4.5215 
Maximum 0.7266 0.9758 0.4425 0.1899 3.059 3.4212 0.9285 15.29 14.992 
1978 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1362 0.2681 0.1478 0.0303 0.4977 0.9829 0.3321 9.0623 8.6962 
Standard Deviation 0.1099 0.2186 0.0639 0.0205 0.2489 0.3474 0.1679 1.7225 1.7002 
Minimum 0 0 -0.119 0 -6.5 0.2156 0 3.1382 4.3465 
Maximum 0.8374 0.9884 0.4481 0.2148 1.0243 4.0916 0.9345 15.378 15.282 
1979 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1409 0.3006 0.141 0.0309 0.4947 0.939 0.3303 9.0783 8.7532 
Standard Deviation 0.1086 0.2336 0.0642 0.0205 0.6614 0.4015 0.1681 1.7446 1.6889 
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Minimum 0 0 -0.215 0 -16 0.2177 0 2.7056 4.4031 
Maximum 0.8506 0.9904 0.4035 0.1983 9.9474 4.8252 0.9281 15.513 15.354 
1980 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1505 0.3283 0.1241 0.0334 0.5145 0.9406 0.3447 9.0183 8.6923 
Standard Deviation 0.1119 0.2495 0.0742 0.0225 0.6817 0.5115 0.1714 1.7743 1.6916 
Minimum 0 0 -0.4732 0 -3.4063 0.2257 0 2.8343 4.3877 
Maximum 0.9252 0.9925 0.3824 0.214 13.742 5.6504 0.9744 15.488 15.331 
1981 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.148 0.3069 0.1036 0.035 0.46 0.9603 0.3538 8.8868 8.6109 
Standard Deviation 0.1167 0.2467 0.0767 0.024 0.7824 0.5317 0.1753 1.8585 1.7372 
Minimum 0 0 -0.664 0 -17.14 0.1822 0 1.3763 4.3207 
Maximum 0.8859 0.9946 0.3746 0.2411 6.6667 7.1296 0.9921 15.581 15.498 
1982 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1559 0.3087 0.1048 0.0354 0.4434 1.0884 0.3534 8.8381 8.5668 
Standard Deviation 0.1214 0.2605 0.0743 0.0242 0.8185 0.9766 0.1782 1.8823 1.7518 
Minimum 0 0 -0.1905 3E-05 -17.3 0.1318 0.0002 0.4072 4.2327 
Maximum 0.6721 0.9963 0.4066 0.2767 11.607 22.828 0.9788 15.656 15.541 
1983 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1552 0.267 0.1134 0.0364 0.4648 1.2221 0.3491 8.7832 8.5162 
Standard Deviation 0.1221 0.2365 0.0838 0.0253 0.5461 0.8328 0.1797 1.8947 1.765 
Minimum 0 0 -0.684 0 -2.993 0.1676 0 2.4241 4.282 
Maximum 0.7029 0.9941 0.658 0.2397 10.93 7.4721 0.9448 15.851 15.512 
1984 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1552 0.2443 0.1252 0.0363 0.4357 1.3824 0.341 8.7967 8.5196 
Standard Deviation 0.1207 0.2216 0.082 0.0257 0.5594 1.0731 0.185 1.8751 1.7671 
Minimum 0 0 -0.445 0 -14.41 0.2137 0 0.5386 4.3935 
Maximum 0.6721 0.9895 0.658 0.2677 8.3333 14.206 0.9609 15.942 15.685 
1985 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1618 0.2253 0.1294 0.0378 0.3916 1.4287 0.336 8.7957 8.5052 
Standard Deviation 0.1284 0.2031 0.0932 0.0314 0.4143 0.9169 0.1852 1.8573 1.7683 
Minimum 0 0 -0.852 0.0004 -9.3421 0.2137 0 1.6825 3.9408 
Maximum 0.963 0.9686 0.5679 0.579 5.2667 10.062 0.9784 15.95 15.491 
1986 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1584 0.1858 0.1359 0.0376 0.3538 1.642 0.333 8.855 8.5798 
Standard Deviation 0.1316 0.1805 0.0984 0.0271 0.3254 1.112 0.1894 1.846 1.7553 
Minimum 0 0 -1.098 0.0004 -8.429 0.2073 0.0011 0.7532 4.0208 
Maximum 0.963 0.9524 0.657 0.3542 4.3667 16.347 0.9669 15.617 15.413 
1987 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1488 0.1569 0.147 0.0368 0.3283 1.8173 0.3282 8.9347 8.6827 
Standard Deviation 0.1276 0.1607 0.0959 0.0269 0.2765 1.4043 0.1938 1.8453 1.771 
Minimum 0 0 -0.616 0 -7.066 0.2444 0.0005 0.1802 4.0395 
Maximum 0.7209 0.8945 0.5888 0.3913 2.4359 22.115 0.9742 15.603 15.317 
1988 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1567 0.1646 0.1533 0.0355 0.3301 1.6984 0.3337 9.0401 8.8191 
Standard Deviation 0.127 0.1504 0.0994 0.0257 0.2611 1.4754 0.1969 1.8362 1.7612 
Minimum 0 0 -0.6739 0.0005 -5.292 0.2671 0 0.3138 3.6312 
Maximum 0.8309 0.8689 1.0108 0.3913 5.1739 40.024 0.981 15.513 15.391 
1989 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1796 0.2052 0.1416 0.0347 0.3266 1.56 0.3437 9.134 8.9555 
Standard Deviation 0.139 0.1749 0.1069 0.0236 0.3855 1.078 0.2045 1.8621 1.7882 
Minimum 0 0 -1.125 0.0003 -6.027 0.2499 0 0.7166 3.6968 
Maximum 0.8844 0.8655 0.6248 0.2044 10.5 13.895 0.9705 15.589 15.418 
1990 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1952 0.2846 0.1302 0.0371 0.3218 1.2435 0.3571 9.1601 8.9943 
Standard Deviation 0.1515 0.2288 0.1082 0.0274 0.6666 0.7033 0.2082 1.8349 1.8132 
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Minimum 0 0 -1.3217 0.0005 -6.027 0.2504 0.0007 2.6446 4.2435 
Maximum 0.9682 0.9758 0.6184 0.35 17 9.3443 0.9685 15.637 15.323 
1991 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1992 0.2737 0.1111 0.0405 0.2802 1.3477 0.3741 9.1522 9.0073 
Standard Deviation 0.1545 0.2314 0.116 0.0366 0.7921 0.8484 0.2126 1.8883 1.8703 
Minimum 0 0 -1.435 0.0002 -18.35 0.2532 0.0005 0.1174 2.7525 
Maximum 0.9948 0.9751 0.5739 0.8237 13.769 11.181 0.951 15.574 15.313 
1992 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1974 0.2821 0.1028 0.0403 0.2428 1.3962 0.38 9.1376 9.0246 
Standard Deviation 0.1464 0.2443 0.117 0.0275 0.8347 1.0137 0.2198 1.892 1.8814 
Minimum 0 0 -1.435 0 -18 0.2416 0 0.1174 2.7525 
Maximum 0.915 0.9904 0.5779 0.2522 7.3582 15.112 0.9685 15.592 15.372 
1993 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1871 0.2121 0.1088 0.0408 0.2563 1.713 0.3707 9.137 9.0262 
Standard Deviation 0.1535 0.2087 0.1046 0.0304 0.4516 1.3004 0.2205 1.9338 1.8786 
Minimum 0 0 -0.569 0 -5.1795 0.2497 0 1.013 3.3437 
Maximum 0.9896 0.9988 0.5779 0.4473 5.6069 19.838 0.9897 15.648 15.454 
1994 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1675 0.1933 0.1185 0.0384 0.2728 1.6927 0.3623 9.1565 9.0491 
Standard Deviation 0.1398 0.1884 0.1088 0.0262 0.5119 1.341 0.2228 1.9233 1.8594 
Minimum 0 0 -0.653 0 -10.58 0.2539 0 1.013 3.7964 
Maximum 0.9256 0.9979 0.5481 0.2473 6.6128 20.792 0.9766 15.594 15.448 
1995 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1666 0.189 0.1129 0.0384 0.2442 1.8969 0.3572 9.142 9.0437 
Standard Deviation 0.1354 0.1842 0.1328 0.029 0.7223 2.1523 0.2279 1.9892 1.8885 
Minimum 0 0 -0.8156 0 -18.5 0.2394 0 1.013 4.1811 
Maximum 0.967 0.9964 0.7289 0.4423 5.6849 37.54 0.9859 15.636 15.532 
1996 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1703 0.1789 0.1075 0.0382 0.2618 1.984 0.3534 9.0246 8.9573 
Standard Deviation 0.1429 0.1747 0.1526 0.0289 0.3398 2.0992 0.2388 2.041 1.8944 
Minimum 0 0 -1.398 0 -7.838 0.2006 0 1.0143 4.2103 
Maximum 0.967 0.9991 0.7123 0.3177 6.2262 41.918 0.9779 15.778 15.541 
1997 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1673 0.1773 0.1014 0.0374 0.2415 1.9839 0.3456 8.9389 8.9068 
Standard Deviation 0.148 0.1768 0.254 0.0273 0.3802 2.1431 0.2448 2.1233 1.9297 
Minimum 0 0 -6.8947 0 -5.667 0.2201 0 0.2679 1.5076 
Maximum 0.967 0.9739 0.7298 0.2509 5.2182 45.982 0.9777 15.722 15.62 
1998 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1847 0.2122 0.0917 0.039 0.2464 1.8961 0.3502 8.9406 8.9185 
Standard Deviation 0.1618 0.2005 0.3036 0.0298 0.7544 2.068 0.248 2.1675 1.9463 
Minimum 0 0 -6.8947 0 -15 0.2258 0 0.2621 1.5076 
Maximum 0.9736 0.9717 1.0557 0.318 11.958 30.674 0.9826 15.398 15.608 
1999 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.2008 0.1979 0.0973 0.0405 0.2798 2.816 0.3505 9.0281 9.0102 
Standard Deviation 0.1741 0.2001 0.188 0.0292 0.8131 4.3578 0.2512 2.1537 1.9723 
Minimum 0 0 -2.721 0 -2.871 0.2113 0 0.2621 3.136 
Maximum 0.9917 0.9802 0.7737 0.2507 18.43 48.143 0.9908 15.613 15.683 
2000 LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
Mean 0.1991 0.2236 0.0782 0.0387 0.2231 2.147 0.3296 9.0614 9.1736 
Standard Deviation 0.1749 0.2187 0.1684 0.0301 0.4423 3.2681 0.2543 2.2344 2.0142 
Minimum 0 0 -1.411 0 -5.8228 0.1955 0 0.6001 3.6681 
Maximum 0.9917 0.9831 0.6856 0.27 5.1667 48.143 0.9815 16.224 16.674 
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Table 5.A5: Descriptive Statistics for Size classification. 
LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
France-small 
Mean 0.2147 0.2073 0.0918 0.051 0.268 2.0787 0.1991 12.172 12.48 
Standard Dev. 0.1682 0.2 0.1591 0.0408 0.4632 1.5552 0.1942 1.0765 1.130 
Minimum 0 0 -1.414 0.0002 -2.814 0.3968 0.0016 5.2407 9.207 
Maximum 0.7483 0.8947 0.5137 0.3204 6.5758 12.808 0.8861 14.539 16.16 
France-medium 
Mean 0.2334 0.2967 0.129 0.0493 0.3138 1.5671 0.2271 14.128 14.09 
Standard Dev. 0.1515 0.2223 0.0771 0.0417 0.4411 1.1633 0.1555 0.6588 0.852 
Minimum 0 0 -0.255 0.0024 -3.457 0.627 0.0148 11.208 10.88 
Maximum 0.9985 0.9753 0.5925 0.5467 5.5849 13.096 0.9855 16.377 18.15 
France-large 
Mean 0.2383 0.363 0.113 0.0465 0.3294 1.3689 0.2453 16.453 16.38 
Standard Dev. 0.1275 0.2261 0.0708 0.0331 0.4202 0.8603 0.1351 1.1276 1.278 
Minimum 0.0035 0.0008 -0.038 8E-05 -3.968 0.7182 0.0224 13.861 13.47 
Maximum 0.695 0.9968 0.9935 0.3402 6.4984 20.602 0.7045 20.526 20.50 
Germany-small 
Mean 0.2146 0.212 0.1002 0.0581 0.3971 2.8822 0.3513 9.9149 10.46 
Standard Dev. 0.223 0.2414 0.1789 0.0604 1.041 6.1932 0.2604 1.6457 1.229 
Minimum 0 0 -2.92 0 -15 0.2536 0 1.2306 6.621 
Maximum 0.9925 0.9652 1.7416 0.707 15.5 93.883 0.9985 14.385 14.77 
Germany-medium 
Mean 0.2136 0.2755 0.1244 0.0617 0.3647 1.6077 0.3242 12.307 12.11 
Standard Dev. 0.1906 0.2607 0.1229 0.0428 1.1593 1.8239 0.1828 0.6117 0.748 
Minimum 0 0 -0.796 0 -16.47 0.2955 0 4.6377 4.570 
Maximum 0.9995 0.9942 1.3434 0.4061 16.638 38.542 0.9239 14.547 14.80 
Germany-large 
Mean 0.1683 0.2662 0.1256 0.0623 0.4143 1.3601 0.331 14.623 14.32 
Standard Dev. 0.144 0.2379 0.0785 0.0373 0.9177 0.978 0.1604 1.3603 1.419 
Minimum 0 0 -0.5078 0 -16.222 0.4788 0 6.2712 6.319 
Maximum 0.6874 0.9885 0.5927 0.3403 15.202 35.356 0.8658 19.402 19.59 
UK-small 
Mean 0.15 0.1941 0.0825 0.0374 0.292 1.8291 0.3447 6.959 7.097 
Standard Dev. 0.1605 0.2219 0.2175 0.0324 0.6916 2.583 0.2286 1.1769 1.021 
Minimum 0 0 -6.8947 0 -18.5 0.1955 0 0.1174 1.508 
Maximum 0.9896 0.9991 1.0557 0.8237 17.857 48.143 0.9908 11.119 11.85 
UK-medium 
Mean 0.1592 0.2523 0.1358 0.0351 0.3636 1.3596 0.3427 8.5466 8.273 
Standard Dev. 0.1302 0.2285 0.09 0.024 0.544 1.2358 0.1951 0.6961 0.827 
Minimum 0 0 -1.125 0 -17.14 0.1318 0 2.446 3.696 
Maximum 0.9459 0.9831 0.8129 0.296 18.43 40.175 0.9859 11.905 12.54 
UK-Iarge 
Mean 0.1849 0.2669 0.1391 0.0351 0.395 1.3845 0.3567 10.701 10.38 
Standard Dev. 0.1239 0.2095 0.0664 0.0238 0.4278 1.0403 0.1948 1.3892 1.532 
Minimum 0 0 -0.308 0 -17.3 0.2499 0 5.6094 5.438 
Maximum 0.9948 0.9963 1.0108 0.3177 13.6 30.385 0.9921 16.224 16.67 
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Table 5.A6: Descriptive Statistics for Industry classification 
LEVER1 LEVER2 PROFIT NDTS ETR MBR FAR SIZE1 SIZE2 
France-Manuf 
Mean 0.2314 0.3338 0.1159 0.0488 0.3088 1.4669 0.2293 14.996 15.04 
Standard Dev. 0.1398 0.2345 0.0925 0.0354 0.432 0.9885 0.1401 1.9617 1.9598 
Minimum 0 0 -1.09 8E-05 -3.968 0.4807 0.0016 5.2407 9.2935 
Maximum 0.9985 0.9753 0.9935 0.3402 6.4984 13.096 0.9855 20.227 19.948 
France-Service 
Mean 0.2334 0.2647 0.1113 0.0474 0.3194 1.7811 0.2321 14.533 14.491 
Standard Dev. 0.1537 0.2057 0.1051 0.042 0.44484 1.4098 0.1829 1.8233 1.7295 
Minimum 0 0 -1.4142 0.0003 -3.4565 0.3968 0.0027 8.6773 9.2072 
Maximum 0.74 0.9968 0.5925 0.5467 6.5758 20.602 0.8825 20.526 20.502 
Germany-Manuf 
Mean 0.2001 0.2597 0.1213 0.0599 0.3853 1.8283 0.3167 12.359 12.35 
Standard Dev. 0.1871 0.2474 0.1353 0.0476 1.0707 3.1787 0.1898 2.335 1.971 
Minimum 0 0 -2.9204 0 -16.47 0.2536 0 3.2106 4.5704 
Maximum 0.9925 0.9885 1.7416 0.707 16.638 93.883 0.9985 19.402 19.594 
Germany Service 
Mean 0.1866 0.2218 0.1013 0.0642 0.4234 2.2827 0.407 12.533 12.591 
Standard Dev. 0.1915 0.248 0.1149 0.0466 0.9016 5.3817 0.2384 2.3045 2.0564 
Minimum 0 0 -0.707 0 -10.3 0.4788 0 1.2306 6.6219 
Maximum 0.9995 0.9942 0.6185 0.4135 14.2 86.81 0.965 18.182 19.13 
UK-Manuf 
Mean 0.1697 0.2606 0.1211 0.0351 0.3604 1.3846 0.3234 9.1078 8.9178 
Standard Dev. 0.132 0.2234 0.1086 0.0229 0.5782 1.6022 0.1693 1.9173 1.8135 
Minimum 0 0 -2.462 0 -18.5 0.1955 0 0.1174 3.6681 
Maximum 0.9459 0.9991 1.0557 0.35 18.43 48.143 0.9921 16.224 16.21 
UK-Service 
Mean 0.1636 0.2148 0.1286 0.0366 0.3555 1.6634 0.3927 8.9046 8.7164 
Standard Dev. 0.1446 0.2143 0.1606 0.0313 0.4822 1.6723 0.2466 1.8546 1.815 
Minimum 0 0 -6.895 0 -14.41 0.1318 0 0.3138 1.5076 
Maximum 0.9948 0.9831 1.0108 0.8237 17 39.964 0.9859 14.577 16.674 
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6. CHAPTER 5: DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE DEBT 
MATURiTY STRUCTURE 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
In empirical and theoretical corporate finance, the principal focus of firms' financing 
decisions has traditionally been on the choice between debt and equity127• Obviously, 
firms should also decide the maturity of the new debt when they choose debt-financing 
rather than equity-financing. As a consequence, not only the issue of 'the amount of 
firms' future cash flows to be paid out to debtholders instead of shareholders' but also 
that of 'the timing of future payments to debtholders' has been another financial concern 
since 1980s128• However, not much is known about the maturity structure of debt 
financing, relative to the research on capital structure decisions. Earlier, Merton [1974] 
and Stiglitz [1974] theoretically show the irrelevance of debt maturity structure in which 
neither short- nor long-term debt affect firm value, surely assuming perfect market 
conditions. Why firms use both commercial papers and bonds to finance their assets and 
investment opportunities seems to be partially understood under the existence of market 
imperfections. The debt maturity structure is important to firms, since a badly chosen 
maturity may cause an inefficient liquidation of even a positive-NPV project. However, it 
can also be used by firms as a signalling device in an imperfect market to provide 
information about their quality, credibility and future prospects. According to signalling 
models, under-( over-)valued firms issue short-(long-)term debt to signal their under-
( over-)valuation. Indeed, Fama [1990] suggests that maturity structure of corporate debt 
reflects the incentive to provide information, monitoring and bonding relevant for 
contracts. 
The general tendency in the literature favours short-term debt as it mitigates 
asymmetric information and agency problems, i.e., in most cases an optimal debt 
maturity structure is implied. The main debt maturity theories can be grouped as follows. 
One strand is interested in tax arguments: Brick and Ravid [1985] contend that when 
term structure of interest rates is upward sloping long-term debt is optimal since gain 
from leverage due to interest tax shield is accelerated (borrower's incentive) and 
recognition of interest income is delayed (lender's incentive). Brick and Ravid [1991] 
further demonstrate the optimality of long-term debt even if yield curve is flat or 
127 For an excellent survey of capital structure theories and the relevant empirical studies, see Harris and 
Raviv [1991]. 
128 For another well-designed review study, see Ravid's [1996] survey paper on debt maturity. 
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downward sloping assuming interest rates are uncertain. Kim et al. [1995], and Stohs and 
Mauer [1996] find some supportive evidence for tax effect but Guedes and Opler [1996], 
and Barclay and Smith [1995] cannot. Another strand is based on information 
asymmetries: Flannery [1986] and Kale and Noe [1990] predict that high-quality firms 
prefer short-term debt to signal their type, which is empirically supported by Stohs and 
Mauer [1996]. Diamond [1991b, 1993] shows that even low-quality firms would prefer 
short-term debt due to liquidity risk and only medium-rated firms are predicted to issue 
long-term debt, which is empirically supported by Barclay and Smith, Guedes and Opler, 
and Stohs and Mauer. Third strand deals with contracting costs arguments: Myers [1977] 
argues that short-term debt mitigates underinvestment problem if it matures before 
growth options are exercised since there remains an opportunity for lenders and firms to 
re-contract. Similarly, Barnea et al. [1980] argue that short-term debt may diminish asset 
substitution problem since the value of short-term debt is less sensitive to changes in 
firms' asset value. This contracting costs hypothesis is empirically supported by Barclay 
and Smith, and Guedes and Opler but not by Stohs and Mauer. It is also predicted by 
asymmetric information arguments (Hart and Moore [1994]) and contracting costs 
hypothesis (Myers [1977]) that firms match the maturity of their assets and liabilities 
(matching principle). This immunisation hypothesis is heavily supported by empirical 
studies. 
Early empirical debt maturity studies focus on different perspectives but not 
directly examine the determinants of debt maturity. Titman and Wessels [1988] find a 
negative correlation between size and short-term debt and argue that smaller firms cannot 
afford to high flotation costs of issuing long-term debt. Mitchell [1991] finds information 
variables significant; e.g., unquoted firms are more likely to issue shorter-term debt due 
to information asymmetries. Mitchell [1993] finds a negative (positive) correlation 
between maturity and leverage (firm quality). Later, several papers study explicitly the 
possible determinants of firms' debt maturity decisions. Kim et al. [1995] report a 
significantly positive correlation between debt maturity, and leverage and size. Barclay 
and Smith [1995] find that larger firms with lower market-to-book ratio have longer debt 
maturity. Guedes and Opler [1996] report that larger and better firms, and the ones with 
higher growth opportunities are most likely to issue short-term debt. Stohs and Mauer 
[1996], however, find only mixed support that there is an inverse relationship between 
debt maturity and market-to-book ratio. Ozkan [2000] also finds a supportive evidence 
for the maturity-matching hypothesis but not for the tax hypothesis. He further reports 
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that maturity is negatively correlated to firm size and market-to-book ratio. Scherr and 
Hulburt [2001] examine debt maturity structure of only small firms. They find little 
evidence that tax status, growth options, and information asymmetries affect small firms' 
debt maturity choice. However, the hypotheses related to capital structure, default 
probability and asset maturity are found to be relevant to maturity decisions of such 
firms. 
In this study, potential determinants of corporate debt maturity structure are 
examined in the framework of tax, contracting-costs, signalling, liquidity risk, and 
maturity-matching hypotheses. This paper aims to extend the existing literature in several 
ways. First, except Ozkan's [2000, 2002] UK data and Cai et al.'s [1999] Japanese data, 
all other studies report their evidence based on the US firms' data. It is obviously 
important to investigate the relationship between the firm-specific characteristics and 
debt maturity choices of firms across countries. By this way, one can understand whether 
country-specific factors have any impact on firms' debt maturity decisions, and 
consequently whether the association of a certain firm-specific factor with debt maturity 
differs across countries. In this international study, France, Germany and the UK are 
chosen, since they are supposed to represent satisfactorily different financial structures of 
their classes, which is explained in the previous chapters in detail. Demirgiiy-Kunt and 
Maksimovic [1999] use aggregated data to examine the debt maturity determinants of 
firms in 30 countries. They provide some macroeconomic explanations to the variations 
in debt maturity structure across firms and report that financial and legal factors have 
impact on maturity decisions of firms. These findings support our view that debt maturity 
decisions should also be examined internationally. This international study, however, has 
some limitations. They use aggregated data not firm-level panel data, and do not control 
for some econometric problems to be explained below. Therefore, one could say that 
there is no rigorous empirical debt maturity study in an international context. In an 
attempt to fill this gap, this chapter explores cross-country differences with respect to 
debt maturity decisions of corporations. Necessity for such a work is already explained in 
Booth et al. [200 1] who find substantial differences in firms' capital structure choices 
across countries and conclude that 'knowing the country of origin is usually at least as 
important as knowing the size of the independent variables'. Meric et al. [200 1] examine 
the financial characteristics (liquidity, turnover, profitability, leverage) of French, 
German and UK manufacturing firms and report significant differences. Moreover, 
Claessens et al. [1999] argue that there is a mismatch between the maturity structure of 
209 
assets and liabilities in civil law countries. They further contend that lower profitability-
liquidity, higher leverage-overall risk, more unstable cash flows, and insufficient interest 
coverage prevail in civil law (France, Germany) countries than in code law (the UK) 
countries. They also find that firms in bank-based economies use more short-term debt 
than the ones in market-based countries. In addition, good shareholder protection and 
short-term debt usage is argued to be positively correlated. 
Second, we use a dynamic debt maturity model, which assumes that firms have a 
long-run optimal debt maturity structure and this optimality cannot immediately be met 
through adjustment process as a result of any change in market conditions. It is apparent 
that factors influencing firms' debt maturity structure change overtime. Thus, it would 
also be necessary to explain time-varying observed difference in debt maturity structure 
of firms. Our research focuses on this gap hitherto greatly neglected by debt maturity 
studies, Ozkan [2000] being the only exception. We adopt an autoregressive-distributed 
lag model, by which we are able to examine the determinants of debt maturity structure, 
the speed of adjustment process to desired optimal debt maturity level, and to provide the 
static long-run relationship between maturity and firm-specific factors. This is the first 
empirical debt maturity study to shed light on these three issues. 
Last, in the literature, except Ozkan [2000], no debt maturity study explicitly 
considers the endogeneity issue using GMM. It should be investigated as it is likely that 
random shocks affect both dependent variable and independent variables at the same 
time129. It is possible that observed relations between debt maturity and its proposed 
determinants indicate the effects of debt maturity on the latter rather than vice-versa. We 
control for this problem by using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedure. 
GMM also overcomes the problems of heteroscedasticity, normality, simultaneity and 
measurement errors, which are common for studies using firm-level data based on 
balance sheets. In order to eliminate any bias arising from unobserved firm-specific 
effects, a common practice in the literature has been to use difference-GMM after the 
seminal study by Arellano and Bond [1991]. In this methodology, the regression equation 
is first-differenced and the right-hand-side regressors are instrumented so as to control for 
possible parameter inconsistency stemming from simultaneity bias. Since traditional 
difference-GMM estimator has the weak instruments problem (see Arellano and Bover 
[1995], and Blundell and Bond [1998]), we prefer recently developed GMM estimator of 
129 See Barclay et al. [2002) who state that the previous studies using OLS suffer from the problems related 
to multiple endogenous variables. 
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differences- and levels-equations system. This consistent and efficient system-GMM 
methodology has not been used before to analyse the relationship between firm and 
market characteristics, and corporate debt maturity policy. 
Econometric results reveal that there are considerable differences in debt maturity 
patterns in France, Germany and the UK. It is found that French firms tend to adjust their 
maturity structure more quickly to attain their target level. In addition, debt maturity is 
found to be significantly and positively associated with leverage and insignificantly 
correlated to firm quality in all three countries. The results further reveal that the effects 
of size of the firm, market-to-book ratio, asset maturity, earnings volatility, tax rates and 
liquidity on debt maturity vary across these countries. In addition to these firm-specific 
factors, we find that the impact of market-specific factors on debt maturity decisions is 
also country-dependent. These factors (market equity premium, term structure of interest 
rates, share price performance, and interest rate volatility) are, not surprisingly, relevant 
especially in the UK, a market-oriented economy. Therefore, the findings indicate that the 
differences in institutional and financial arrangements, and the degree of monitoring 
agency problems may lead to different corporate debt maturity structure across countries. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes the 
variables and the related debt maturity hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the construction 
and analysis of data. Methodology and the model are developed in section 4. Section 5 
presents the empirical results. Last section concludes the paper with some future agenda. 
6.2. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE DEBT 
MATURITY STRUCTURE AND THE UNDERLYING THEORIES 
6.2.1. Proxies for Dependent Variables 
In general, long-term debt is used to finance capital investment while short-term debt is 
used to finance inventory and to meet short-term cash flow needs. Decomposition of debt 
is necessary as one set of explanatory variables might not explain the demand for both 
types of debt. However, there is no common definition of short- or long-term debt. Some 
define long-term debt payable after one year (e.g., Ozkan [2000], Scherr and Hulburt 
[2001]) and some others define payable after three (Barclay and Smith [1995]) or 5 years 
(Jaramillo and Schiantarelli [1996], Schiantarelli and Sembenelli [1997]). As a result, it is 
not unexpected to see that one of the most significant differences across empirical debt 
maturity papers is the choice of dependent variable. On the other hand, Morris [1992], 
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Titman and Wessels [1988], Michaelas et al. [1999], and Demirgti9-Kunt and 
Maksimovic [1999] use short- or long-term debt to total assets as debt maturity 
measurement. However, leverage related costs of short and long-term debt might not be 
similar. Therefore, scaling short- or long-term debt by total assets rather than by total 
debt would not directly be examining debt maturity structure as this definition is not 
independent from firms' capital structure. Morris [1992], and Dennis et al. [2000] use 
'duration'; Mitchell [1993] and Guedes and Opler [1996] use 'maturity ofnew issues'; and 
Stohs and Mauer [1996] use 'weighted average maturity of liabilities' as dependent 
variable. Scherr and Hulburt [2001] use two maturity specifications (long-term debt 
payable after one year to total debt; and weighted-average debt maturity) and report that 
sensitivity of the results to the definitions are minor. 
We use the ratio of debt that matures within (after) one year to total debt as short-term 
(long-term) debt ratio. 
6.2.2. Proxies for Explanatory Variables 
The attributes below have been predetermined in terms of their explanatory 
coherence in testing the existing theories of debt maturity and appropriateness to compare 
our results with other empirical findings. Although it is not easy to find exact proxies for 
the arguments discussed in the previous section, we argue that the present proxies 
covered in this empirical analysis have sufficient explanatory power to be taken into 
account. While analysing the empirical results, one should emphasise the fact that the 
nature of empirical studies of optimal debt maturity structure differs in terms of time-
period, firm characteristics, maturity definition, methodology and so forth. 
6.2.2.1. Lagged Maturity 
The inclusion of lagged dependent variable to the debt maturity model can have both 
short-term and long-term interlinks with other explanatory variables. It could be a 
benchmark to see whether firms have optimal debt maturity structure, and if any, the 
degree of divergence or convergence from (to) the target level may potentially be 
detected in the framework of adjustment costs. A recent study by Hovakimian et al. 
[200 1] reveals that firms adjust their capital structure towards target debt ratios. Jalilvand 
and Harris [1984] use partial adjustment model to empirically test whether firms' 
financing and dividend decisions are modelled as two-phase process, target value 
formation and adjustment to these target. They find that, being consistent with market 
imperfections, firms partially adjust to their long-run financial targets. Mitchell [1993] 
uses lagged long-term debt ratio to control for the maturity structure of a firm's 
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outstanding debt. Newberry and Novack [1999] consider cumulative effects of debt 
maturity prior to bond offering. Schiantarelli and Sembenelli [1997], Schiantarelli and 
Srivastava [1997] and Ozkan [2000] also include the lagged maturity as an explanatory 
variable. 
In this study, if the lagged maturity coefficient is statistically significant, positive 
and below unity, then, one can conclude that firms tend not to change debt maturity 
structure overtime. If it is greater than one, it implies firms do not have a target maturity 
ratio. The tax, bankruptcy, and monitoring-related arguments predict a positive impact of 
lagged maturity but the signalling hypothesis implies no effect on debt maturity choice 
(see, Mitchell [1993]). We expect a positively significant relationship between current 
and past maturity structure in a dynamic framework. 
6.2.2.2. Leverage 
Signalling arguments imply that leverage has no effect on debt maturity decisions (see, 
Mitchell [1993]). However, considering leverage as a proxy for firms' ability to raise 
external funding, it may have a positive effect on debt maturity. Liquidation concerns due 
to high leverage may cause the long-term debt choice to hedge against liquidation risk. 
Morris [1992] hypothesises that firms with higher debt ratios tend to issue longer-term 
debt in order to delay their exposure to bankruptcy risk. Leland [ 1994] argues that the 
probability of bankruptcy is higher for shorter-term debt. Leland and Toft [1996] 
theoretically show that if firms choose higher leverage they also choose longer maturity. 
On the other hand, as higher leverage implies higher default probability and higher 
monitoring costs, it may be negatively correlated especially with short-term debt. The tax 
and bankruptcy (trade-oft) arguments implying optimal debt policies predict a negative 
effect of leverage on debt maturity. Furthermore, Dennis et al. [2000] contend that 
leverage and maturity should be negatively correlated as agency costs ofunderinvestment 
can be mitigated by reducing leverage as well as shortening maturity. 
Mitchell [1993] uses debt-equity ratio as an explanatory variable to control for the firms' 
capital structure. Including leverage to the model could test the implications of term 
structure and interest rate volatility arguments which assume that capital structure 
decisions are held constant. One can also test the argument that little leverage implies 
immaterial bankruptcy probability and thus has no effect on debt maturity structure 
(Stohs and Mauer [1996]). We measure leverage as the ratio of book value of total debt 
to book value of total assets. Alternative definition is the ratio of book value of total debt 
to market value of equity plus book value of total debt. 
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6.2.2.3. Tax Rates and Interest Rates 
Brick and Ravid [ 1985] argue that when term structure of interest rates is upward sloping 
long-term debt is optimal since tax gains from leverage are accelerated (reduction in 
expected tax liability and increase in firm value are implied), assuming expectations 
hypothesis holds130. This implies that debt maturity is positively related to the term 
structure, i.e., more long-term debt is issued when the slope of the term structure is 
positive. In their model, Brick and Ravid first set leverage and then maturity. However, 
they are criticised by Lewis [1990], who argues that taxes (assumed to be only market 
imperfections) have no effect on debt maturity decisions if optimal leverage and debt 
maturity are simultaneously determined. Brick and Ravid [1991] further show the 
optimality of long-term debt even if yield curve is flat or downward sloping assuming 
interest rates are uncertain. On the other hand, Kane et al. [1985] demonstrate that the 
trade-off between bankruptcy and flotation costs of raising debt, and per-period tax 
advantage of debt financing leads to an optimal debt maturity structure. They argue that 
optimal maturity is negatively associated with tax advantage of debt and the volatility of 
firm value, and positively correlated with flotation costs. It is because firms increase their 
debt maturity as the tax advantage of debt decreases to assure that the remaining tax 
benefit is not less than amortised flotation costs. Therefore, they imply a negative 
relationship between debt maturity and tax rate. 
In a multi-period model with interest rate uncertainty, Kim et al. [1995] demonstrate that 
a long-term debt maturity strategy maximises investor tax-timing option value 
(repurchasing or reissuing the debt). The analysis, which is empirically supported, 
predicts that the firm lengthens debt maturity as interest rate volatility increases and as 
the slope of the term structure increases 131 • 
Scholes and Wolfson [1992] propose the tax clientele argument to predict the 
relationship between debt maturity and taxes. It is argued that not all firms can afford to 
issue (luxury) long-term debt although transaction costs stemming from rolling-over 
short-term debt become higher. The authors contend that corporations having high 
130 Expectations hypothesis implies that in early years the interest expense of long-term debt is higher than 
that of rolling short-term debt and the interest expense is less in later years if the yield curve is upward 
sloping. However, short-term debt becomes optimal if the curve is downward sloping. In addition, the slope 
of the term structure is measured by the difference between month-end yields on a 1 0-year and a 6-month 
wvernment bond (see, e.g., Kim et al. [1995] and Stohs and Mauer [1996]). 
31 Unlike the positive correlation prediction by tax-based theories, Guedes and Opler [1996], and Stohs and 
Mauer [1996] find a negative association between the slope of the yield curve and debt maturity. The 
reason is argued to be the attempt of firms to avoid term premium in long-term interest rates. Emery [200 I] 
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marginal tax rates construct a natural clientele of cheap long-term debt (long-term debt 
yields higher tax shield). They, then, expect a positive relation between debt maturity and 
marginal tax rates as firms can use the ongoing tax advantages oflong-term debt132• 
Dennis et al. [2000] and Guedes and Opler [1996] proxy marginal effective tax 
rate by taxes paid to assets. Scherr and Hulburt [200 1] measure tax rate using dummy 
variables, which is not appropriate for dynamic models. We measure effective tax rate 
(ETR) as the ratio of total tax charge to total taxable income. We measure term structure 
of interest rates as the difference between the month-end yields on long-term (10 years or 
more) government bond and three-months treasury-bills, with a six-month lag, matched 
to the month of firms' fiscal year-end. Interest rate-volatility is the standard deviation of 
monthly government bond yield over the previous year, matched with the month of firms' 
fiscal year-end. 
6.2.2.4. Market-to-book ratio 
This ratio can be a proxy for expected future growth opportunities. Hovakimian et al. 
[200 1] state that wealth transfer from equity holders to debtholders occurs when new 
equity is issued. This transfer is much larger for firms financed mainly with long-term 
debt and for financially distressed firms. Titman and Wessels [1988] argue that 
suboptimal investment problems (wealth appropriation from bondholders) are likely to 
occur for equity-controlled firms and such agency costs tend to be substantial for 
growing firms. Stulz [1990] argues that non-growth firms should use more long-term 
debt which effectively limits managerial discretion. Thus, long-term debt and expected 
future growth should be negatively correlated. On the other hand, Kanatas and Qi [2001] 
show that long-term debt is more likely to be chosen if such incentive problems 
(rejecting positive-NPV projects) are unimportant. As Myers [1977] and Barnea et al. 
[1980] contend that agency problems are mitigated if firms issue short-term debt, 
market-to-book ratio should be positively correlated to short-term debt. That is, the 
underinvestment problem is mitigated if growth firms use short-term debt which expires 
before exercising the growth options, thereby borrowers and lenders can recontract. 
Easterbrook [1984] contends that agency costs of monitoring are lower provided firms 
commit to periodic evaluations (through issuing short-term debt). Titman [1992] argues 
supports this inverse relationship in his model based on the interaction between the demand for fmns' 
f:roducts, their requirement for assets, and the debt maturity choice. 
32 Harwood and Manzon [1998] show that fmns with high marginal tax rates use more long-term debt than 
firms with low marginal tax rates. These findings are in line with the existence of tax clienteles for 
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that growth firms have both the greater likelihood of bankruptcy and optimistic future 
outlook, then they can benefit from borrowing short-term and swapping for a fixed-rate 
contract. Leland and Toft [ 1996] also favour the use of short -term debt to eliminate asset 
substitution problem in the presence of longer-term debt. In the end, there is a consensus 
in the literature that market-to-book ratio should be inversely correlated to debt maturity 
in the agency/contracting costs perspective. 
However, liquidity risk arguments (see, e.g., Diamond [1991b], Froot et al. [1993], Opler 
and Titman [1994]) predict the contrary: Firms with long-term investment opportunities 
requiring ongoing managerial discretion may prefer to hedge themselves against liquidity 
risk by issuing long-term debt. By this way, firms can avoid the inefficient liquidation of 
their risky growth opportunities. Moreover, short-term debt may cause loss of the 
investment rents if it is refinanced in the credit markets with high interest rates. Thus, a 
positive correlation between growth opportunities and debt maturity is predicted. 
Furthermore, Hart and Moore [1995] emphasise the role of long-term debt in controlling 
management's ability to raise funding for future projects. It is argued that long-term debt 
may prevent self-interested managers from financing unprofitable investments, which 
may imply a direct variation of long-term debt with market-to-book ratio. 
We measure market-to-book ratio as the ratio of book value of total assets less book 
value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of total assets133 • 
6.2.2.5. Firm Size 
In the literature, larger firms are argued to have lower asymmetric information and 
agency problems, higher collateralisable tangible assets relative future investment 
opportunities, and thus, easier access to long-term debt markets. There are several 
reasons why small firms are discouraged from issuing long-term public debt and forced 
to use short-term private (e.g., bank) debt. Small firms have higher failure rates than 
larger firms (Queen and Roll [1987]). The cost of issuing long-term debt is considerably 
higher for small firms (see, e.g., Smith [1977]) and such firms might not benefit from the 
scale economies. Titman and Wessels [1988], hence, argue that smaller firms may have 
higher short-term debt ratios. It is further argued that larger firms tend to use more long-
term debt due to their remaining financial needs (Jalilvand and Harris [1984], Marsh 
[1982]). Agency problems (risk shifting, claim dilution) between shareholders and 
financing with different debt maturities. Newberry and Novack [1999] also fmd a positive relation between 
tax rate and debt maturity. 
133 Due to data limitations we are unable to use alternative proxies such as, R&D plus advertising expenses 
to total assets ratio. 
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lenders may be particularly severe for small firms (Smith and Warner [1979]). Then, 
bondholders attempt to control the risk of lending to small firms by restricting the length 
of debt maturity. Large (small) firms, thus, are expected to have more long (short)-term 
debt in their capital structure (Barnea et al. [1980], Whited [1992]). Consequently, these 
arguments imply a positive relationship between firm size and debt maturity. We 
measure firm size as the natural logarithm of total sales or total assets. 
6.2.2.6. Liquidity 
One may expect that firms with greater liquid assets should more easily raise external 
funding. However, Myers and Rajan [1998] argue that great asset liquidity may reduce 
this capacity as excessive liquidity also reduces managers' ability to commit credibly to 
an investment action. Non-depreciating assets (e.g., land) are evinced to increase debt 
maturity. Their paradox is that non-depreciating but liquid assets (e.g., inventories) do not 
support long-term debt and 'maturity shortens even further with increases in intrinsic 
asset liquidity'. Ozkan [2001] argues that firms with higher liquidity ratios might support 
a relatively higher debt ratio due to greater ability to meet short-term obligations when 
they fall due. This implies a negative correlation between liquidity and maturity. On the 
other hand, by buying long-term bonds, lenders are also exposed to a risk that the firm's 
conditions may deteriorate or the management may shift to too risky projects before the 
bond is due. Morris [1992], thus, argues that lender may impose restrictions (e.g., 
minimum level of working capital or liquid balances) on the long-term borrowers to 
control such risks. He, then, hypothesises that firms with higher liquidity balances will be 
able to lengthen their debt maturity. We measure liquidity ratio as current assets divided 
by current liabilities. This ratio is also known as working capital ratio, which can give an 
indication ofthe ability of firms to pay their obligations134• 
6.2.2.7. Asset Maturity 
The immunisation hypothesis implies that firms match their debt maturities to their asset 
maturities. This maturity matching principle has been widely accepted in debt maturity 
discussions as it seems useful to control the risk and costs of financial distress. Myers 
[1977] argues that the underinvestment problem as a result of the conflicts between 
134 Another proxy for liquidity could be Altman's [ 1968] Z-score, defined below: 
Z=0.012*[WC/TA]+0.014*[RE/TA]+0.033*[EBIT/TA]+0.006*[MVE/TA]+0.999*[S/TA]; 
where WC is working capital; T A is total assets; RE is retained earnings; EBIT is earnings before interest 
and taxes; MVE is market value of equity; S is sales. Z>2.99 clearly non-bankrupt firm; Z<l.81 clearly 
bankrupt firm, and 1.81 <Z<2.99 zone of ignorance. See also Scherr and Hulburt [2001] who use Z-score as 
proxy for default risk. However, using this variable might cause multicollinearity among explanatory 
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bondholders and equityholders can be mitigated by the matching principle. Firms 
schedule their debt repayments in accordance with the decline in future value of assets-in-
place in this matching process 135• Mitchell [1991] argues that a firm with short-term debt 
(interest-insensitive) insulates shareholders by issuing short-term debt since the assets 
and bonds then become insensitive to change in interest rates. In an imperfectly 
competitive Coumot duopoly product market, Kanatas and Qi [2001] argue that short 
(long)-term debt should be used for financing assets with short (long) economic lives. 
Emery [200 1] argues that firms avoid the term premium by matching the maturity of their 
liabilities and assets. Hart and Moore [1994] confirm matching principle by showing that 
slower asset depreciation means longer debt maturity. Therefore, we expect a positive 
relationship between debt maturity and asset maturity136• Following Stohs and Mauer 
[1996], we measure asset maturity as net property, plant & equipment divided by 
depreciation expense. 
6.2.2.8. Firm Quality 
The studies on debt maturity under asymmetric information generally show the optimality 
of short-term debt financing as a vehicle of mitigating the adverse selection problem. The 
signalling hypothesis implies that firms with asymmetric information problems and high-
quality projects choose to issue shorter-term debt (See Mitchell [1991]). Similarly, Covitz 
and Harrison [2000] empirically show that long-term debt sends a negative signal relative 
to short-term debt, which is intensified during economic downturns and by increase in 
maturity. Goswami et al. [1995b] demonstrate that when good firms show a sufficiently 
high positive correlation between cash flows relative to bad firms, good (bad) firms issue 
short (long)-term debt in a separating equilibrium. Announcement of short-term debt 
issuance is considered as relatively good news (see, e.g., Goswami et al. [1995b]). Datta 
et al. [2000] report that maturity of the firm's debt and its stock price are negatively 
correlated such that the longer the maturity the more negative the stock price response. 
Under asymmetric information, Flannery [1986], and Kale and Noe [1990] argue that 
long-term debt, which is more sensitive to firm value, can potentially be more mispriced 
than short-term debt. Hence, high (low) quality firms are more likely to issue less (more) 
variables due to the relevance of its definition with the variables in our model. Hence, we did not include 
this variable to our model. 
135 Debt of maturity shorter than asset life may be more risky as sufficient cash flows might not be 
generated from the asset. Debt of maturity longer than asset life may also be risky as it is not certain that 
necessary cash flows will be obtained to service the debt after asset retirement (Morris [1976a]). This type 
of hedging policy allows us to know the cost offmancing the asset over its life. 
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undervalued (overvalued) short (long) term debt137• Datta and Iskandar-Datta [2000] find 
a negative relation between long-run abnormal returns and the maturity of debt-IPOs, 
which is predicted by Flannery [1986], and Kale and Noe [1990]. This negative 
relationship is also consistent with the long-run implications by Barclay and Smith 
[1995], Guedes and Opler [1996], and Datta et al. [2000]. This result implies that high 
(low) quality firms issue short (long) term debt. As a result, we expect a negative 
relationship between firm quality and debt maturity. 
Newberry and Novack [1999] use size and Z-score as proxy for firm quality. Following 
Barclay and Smith [1995] and Dennis et al. [2000], we measure firm quality determined 
by abnormal earnings, which is measured by the difference between the earnings per 
share in years [t+1] and [t] divided by share price in year [t]. Stohs and Mauer [1996] 
document that this measure is a robust proxy for unexpected component of the future 
change in earnings. Our alternative proxy (see, Ozkan [2000]) is the difference between. 
the earnings in years [t+ 1] and [t] divided by the earnings in year [t]. 
6.2.2.9. Earnings Volatility 
In their continuous-time model, Kane et al. [1985] show that optimal debt maturity is 
inversely related to the firm value volatility. Low variability in firm value causes firms to 
avoid rebalancing their capital structure frequently due to the concerns about expected 
bankruptcy costs. Thus, such firms are expected to issue long-term debt rather than short-
term debt. Our proxy for the firm value variability is the earnings volatility, which is 
measured by absolute difference between annual % change in earnings before interest, 
taxes and depreciation (EBITD) and average of this change. 
6.2.2.10. Control (Market-related) Variables 
Share Price Performance 
Signalling hypothesis argues that undervalued firms issue short-term debt, which is less 
sensitive to realisation of expected cash flows, to signal their undervaluation. The 
expectation is that these firms will have positive abnormal stock returns at the time of 
issue. Guedes and Opler [1996] state that past stock returns may be used as predictors of 
debt maturity as it is generally expected that issuing informationally disadvantaged 
securities (e.g., long-term debt) proceeds share price runup. 
136 In their survey of 392 US firms, Graham and Harvey [2001] fmd that matching maturity between 
liabilities and assets is important in choosing the issuance of short or long-term debt. 
137 Flannery [1986] shows that low-quality firm cannot afford to rollover short-term debt due to positive 
transaction costs, thus choose long-term debt in separating-equilibrium; if transaction costs do not exist 
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We, thus, expect a positive correlation between debt maturity and share pnce 
performance, which is measured as the first difference of log of annual price, with a six-
month lag, matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-end. 
Equity Premium 
Equity premium, which varies overtime, measures the cost of equity in relation to the 
return on risk-free investment. Higher equity premium causes higher cost of equity 
capital. If equity premium is high firms tend to prefer issuing debt rather than equity. 
Fama and French [1989] suggest that the premium of long-term share in total debt should 
have an impact on both equity and debt market. It is argued that expected excess bond 
returns are generally low when business conditions are good due to, e.g., the availability 
of profitable growth opportunities. Under such conditions, one may observe high equity 
returns. Baker and Wurgler [2000] examine the equity market-timing hypothesis, i.e., 
firms substitute between debt and equity depending on the cost of equity. They find that 
managers time the equity market as firms tend to issue equity instead of debt when the 
future cost of equity is relatively low. Similarly, Baker et al. [200 1] focus on debt market-
timing hypothesis, i.e., firms substitute between long- and short-term debt depending on 
the cost of long-term debt138• They document that, in an attempt to borrow at the lowest-
cost maturity, managers substitute toward long-term debt when the cost of long-term debt 
is low relative to that of short-term debt. Their finding based on the aggregate time-series 
data is opposite to the tax theory of optimal debt maturity structure that predicts a positive 
relationship between term-premium and debt maturity. Baker et al. [200 1] conclude that 
the success of managers to minimise the cost of capital depends on "whether the debt 
market is entirely efficient and integrated with the equity market". Fama and French 
[1989] also report that expected excess returns on stocks and corporate bonds move 
together. Consequently, we expect that equity risk premium may have different impact on 
short- and long-term debt. We use six-month lagged equity premium, which is measured 
by the difference between return on stock market and return on treasury-bills, matched to 
the month of firms' fiscal year-end. 
low-quality firms can mimic high-quality firms and pooling-equilibrium occurs in short-term debt. Kale 
and Noe [1990] demonstrate the same conclusion without the existence of transaction costs. 
138 Graham and Harvey's [2001] survey reveals that frrms tend to issue short-term debt when the short-term 
interest rates are relatively low and while they wait for long-term rates to decline. 
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6.3. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA SET 
6.3.1. Introduction 
The procedure of data construction is the same as explained in the previous 
chapter, section 5.3.1. However, the database is different in terms of the number of firms 
and observations, and of variables. See the appendix at the end of this chapter for detailed 
information. 
6.3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 shows that average long-term debt ratio (Longl) is highest in France (58.8%) 
and lowest in the UK (45.7%), while Germany is in between (53.3%). This may confirm 
the idea that there is a short-term relationship between lenders and borrowers in the UK. 
In addition, the standard deviation of long-term debt is highest in the UK and lowest in 
France. This finding would imply that UK firms change their debt maturity structure most 
frequently. As UK firms have highest volatility in earnings, these findings confirm the 
theory that more volatile earnings cause firms to rebalance their capital structure more 
frequently and thus lower the optimal debt maturity. 
Further examination (see Table 6.A2 and figures in the appendix) of the long-term debt 
ratio in each year reveals the following conclusions. There is an apparent decline in the 
long-term debt ratios of French firms, from 72.6% in 1983 to 54.5% in 2000. The same 
trend can be seen for that of German firms as it is 67.5 %in 1987 and 48.8% in 2000. 
This decreasing trend may be due to the development of more advantageous and efficient 
commercial paper market, switching from long-term debt to equity as the stock market 
develops, and emergence of medium-term debt market139• This finding may also be 
relevant for the idea that short-term debt is more attractive than long-term debt when 
legal system is inefficient or costly (Demirgiiy-Kunt and Maksimovic [1999], Hart and 
Moore [1995]). On the other hand, the average long-term debt ratios of UK firms have 
been unstable during 1969-1984. From 1984 onwards, this ratio has been rising at a 
decreasing rate. Thus, one could say that the long-term debt ratios of firms in these 
countries tend to converge to each other. It seems in the UK that the maturity 
composition of debt becomes shorter during the recessions and lengthens during 
expansions (due to its possible correlation with GDP growth). Moreover, the fact that 
139 Until recently public issue of commercial papers and longer-term bonds were discouraged through the 
requirements of the issue authorisation procedure and the securities transfer tax in Germany (Bundesbank, 
Monthly Report, March 1992). 
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long-term debt to total assets ratio has been decreasing in France may indicate that the 
stock market is heating up. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics for France, Germany and the UK. 
France Mean Median Mode Std.dev Variance Kurtosis Skew. Min. Max. Obsrv. 
SHORT1 0.4324 0.4095 0 0.25765 0.0664 -0.5202 0.2931 0 1 3009 
SHORT2 0.09496 0.0794 0 0.08035 0.0065 8.16469 1.7696 0 0.9999 3009 
LONG1 0.58826 0.6067 1 0.26781 0.0717 -0.60174 -0.279 0 1 3160 
LONG2 0.14267 0.1177 0 0.11916 0.0142 3.57668 1.4903 0 0.9488 3160 
LEVERAGE1 0.23306 0.2207 0.049 0.1449 0.021 0.6268 0.652 8E-05 0.9985 3160 
LEVERAGE2 0.31144 0.2745 0.052 0.22726 0.0516 -0.44132 0.6139 2E-05 0.9753 3160 
ETR 0.31505 0.3544 0 0.45906 0.2107 62.3824 3.2036 -3.968 6.7836 3160 
MTBR 1.56172 1.2202 13.16 1.10617 1.2236 33.8066 4.7671 0.3968 13.155 3160 
SIZE1 14.8396 14.853 16.72 1.9347 3.7431 0.95938 -0.254 0 20.227 3160 
SIZE2 14.8557 14.763 13.07 1.8989 3.6058 -0.22165 0.107 9.2072 20.502 3160 
LIQUIDITY 1.49681 1.3383 0.853 0.77003 0.5929 67.6515 5.6043 0.0218 15.548 3160 
ASSETMAT 5.87294 4.91 7.509 5.78183 33.43 74.0468 7.0934 0.026 92.949 3160 
QUALITY1 0.01642 0.005 0 0.42453 0.1802 306.889 4.4427 -9.062 10.264 2806 
QUALITY2 0.0815 0.0912 0 3.9808 15.847 143.395 0.2205 -66.18 66.221 2806 
EARNVOL 0.7584 0.1994 0.0012 5.8530 34.2581 2058.76 42.274 0.0000 289.62 2889 
CHSHP 0.0930 0.0775 0.0000 0.4092 0.1674 2.6921 0.0912 -2.353 2.3690 2866 
German~ Mean Median Mode Std.dev Variance Kurtosis Skew. Min. Max. Obsrv. 
SHORT1 0.46721 0.4295 1 0.31336 0.0982 -1.10016 0.2929 0 1 5882 
SHORT2 0.09009 0.0408 0 0.12252 0.015 6.9606 2.2574 0 0.9977 6809 
LONG1 0.53279 0.5705 0 0.31336 0.0982 -1.10016 -0.293 0 1 5882 
LONG2 0.10748 0.0634 0 0.13261 0.0176 4.49199 1.9226 0 0.9955 6809 
LEVERAGE1 0.19745 0.1501 0 0.19017 0.0362 0.42268 0.9818 0 0.9977 6809 
LEVERAGE2 0.24561 0.1692 0 0.24728 0.0611 -0.15065 0.9108 0 0.9942 6239 
ETR 0.39311 0.4533 0 1.0299 1.0607 110.206 -0.143 -16.47 16.638 6782 
MTBR 2.01218 1.3113 1.285 4.24848 18.05 244.48 13.934 0.2536 93.883 6239 
SIZE1 12.3354 12.379 11.08 2.30539 5.3148 0.64579 -0.25 1.2306 19.402 6563 
SIZE2 12.2502 12.148 10.54 2.0225 4.0905 0.50858 0.2607 3.9219 19.594 6809 
LIQUIDITY 4.14811 1.7159 6.553 23.3093 543.32 429.341 18.961 0.0012 654 6793 
ASSETMAT 7.72738 5.2723 0 11.0058 121.13 76.9186 7.4382 0 174.33 6329 
QUALITY1 0.00867 0.0001 0 0.25041 0.0627 152.844 4.1379 -5.277 4.7472 6277 
QUALITY2 -0.0898 0 0 5.45219 29.726 123.734 -1.91 -96.79 80.542 6194 
EARNVOL 3.2986 0.3718 0.1266 19.9380 397.523 535.953 19.638 0.0000 653.94 6153 
CHSHP 0.0069 0.0000 0.0000 0.3452 0.1192 4.4917 0.3725 -2.227 2. 7783 5429 
UK Mean Median Mode Std.dev Variance Kurtosis Skew. Min. Max. Obsrv. 
SHORT1 0.54292 0.5273 1 0.33876 0.1148 -1.36466 -0.029 0 1 32339 
SHORT2 0.08442 0.0557 0 0.09542 0.0091 8.38427 2.2218 0 0.9903 35266 
LONG1 0.45708 0.4727 0 0.33876 0.1148 -1.36466 0.0289 0 1 32339 
LONG2 0.08262 0.0478 0 0.10237 0.0105 7.45464 2.1329 0 0.9896 35266 
LEVERAGE1 0.16694 0.1508 0 0.13746 0.0189 2.79683 1.2228 0 0.9958 35266 
LEVERAGE2 0.24313 0.1882 0 0.22112 0.0489 0.2251 0.9545 0 0.9991 34947 
ETR 0.35962 0.3607 0 0.55282 0.3056 470.554 -3.92 -18.5 18.43 35248 
MTBR 1.51927 1.1124 2.285 2.17534 4.7321 574.897 18.9 0.1318 97.176 34947 
SIZE1 9.03169 8.858 8.261 1.8893 3.5695 0.65115 0.1945 0.0156 16.224 35111 
SIZE2 8.8299 8.5697 11.45 1.81985 3.3119 0.33371 0.601 1.5076 16.674 35266 
LIQUIDITY 1.69656 1.4527 2 1.57749 2.4885 355.372 14.42 0.0242 61.42 35266 
ASSETMAT 13.5762 9.3443 0 17.8024 316.93 66.7523 6.7541 0 282.63 35157 
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QUALITY1 
QUALITY2 
EARNVOL 
CHSHP 
0.00628 
0.08574 
1.1169 
0.0544 
0.0062 
0.1133 
0.2498 
0.0691 
0 0.14052 0.0197 
0 3.17009 10.049 
0.0258 8.0445 64.7135 
0.0000 0.4660 0.2172 
324.737 0.5481 -4.933 4.8651 
156.193 -1.409 -68.09 64.314 
2767.908 44.649 0.0000 660.76 
3.5258 -0.355 -4.183 3.3032 
34092 
32796 
32835 
32671 
Short] (Short2) is the ratio of debt that matures in less than one year to total debt (total assets). Long] (Long2) is the ratio of 
debt that matures in more than one year to total debt (total assets). Leverage] is the ratio of book value of total debt to book 
value of total assets. Leverage2 is the ratio of book value of total debt to market value of equity plus book value of total debt. 
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) is the ratio of total tax charge to total taxable income. Market-to-Book Ratio (MTBR) is the ratio of 
book value of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of total assets. Size] (Size2) is the 
natural logarithm of total sales (total assets). Liquidity is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Asset-Maturity is the 
ratio of net property, plant &equipment to depreciation expense. Quality] is the difference between EPS in years [t+l] and [t] 
divided by share price in [t]. Quality2 is the difference between earnings in years [t+ 1] and [t] divided by earnings in [t]. 
Earnings volatility (EARNVOL) is the first-difference of earnings minus average of the first-differences. Change in share price 
(CHSHP), or share price performance, is the difference between share prices at times [t] and [t-1] to share price at time [t-1]. 
6.3.3. Correlation Matrix 
Table 6.2 shows that maturity and leverage are significantly positively correlated in all cases, 
which contradicts the trade-off and signalling arguments. Firm quality (Qualityl) is 
significantly negative only in the UK, which is predicted by the theory. The significantly 
positive association of maturity with firm size in France and in the UK, and with asset 
maturity and liquidity in all countries is predicted by the theory. Tax rate variable is 
significant and positive only in Germany; and market-to-book ratio variable is never 
significant, which are not predicted by the theories. 
If leverage is strongly positively correlated to debt maturity and strongly negatively to 
market-to-book ratio, then, we should control for leverage to prevent the downward bias in 
estimated coefficient of market-to-book ratio. (see, Stohs and Mauer [1996]). By this way, a 
spurious inverse relation between market-to-book ratio and debt maturity may be avoided. 
The results in Table 6.2 show that this is the case for all countries and thus leverage variable 
should be included in the model. 
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Table 6.2: Correlation Matrix for France, Germany and the UK. 
France SHORT1 LONG1 SHORT2 LONG2 LEVER1 LEVER2 ETR MTBR 
SHORT1 1 
LONG1 -1 * 1 
SHORT2 0.5100* -0.5100* 1 
LONG2 -0.5449* 0.5449* 0.0622* 1 
LEVER1 -0.1566* 0.1566* 0.5982* 0.8369* 1 
LEVER2 -0.0926* 0.0926* 0.4705* 0.5563* 0.7051* 1 
ETR 0.0098 -0.0098 -0.0424** -0.0739* -0.0831* -0.0659* 1 
MTBR 0.0237 -0.0237 -0.1683* -0.1510* -0.2138* -0.4860* 0.0062 1 
SIZE1 -0.0333 0.0333 0.0978* 0.0818* 0.1195* 0.3128* 0.0543* -0.2402* 
SIZE2 -0.0831* 0.0831* 0.0716* 0.1672* 0.1736* 0.3432* 0.0347 -0.2478* 
LIQUIDITY -0.1045* 0.1045* -0.2799* -0.0921* -0.2279* -0.2322* -0.0008 0.0867* 
ASSETMAT -0.1465* 0.1465* -0.0123 0.3910* 0.3070* 0.1873* -0.0448** -0.0959* 
QUALITY1 -0.0256 0.0256 0.0108 0.0319 0.0315 0.0491** -0.0097 -0.0060 
QUALITY2 0.0253 -0.0253 0.0301 0.0037 0.0190 0.0070 -0.0245 0.0108 
SIZE1 SIZE2 LIQUIDITY ASSETMAT QUALITY1 QUALITY2 
SIZE1 1 
SIZE2 0.9472* 1 
LIQUIDITY -0.3266* -0.2656* 1 
ASSETMAT 0.0618* 0.2056* -0.0842* 1 
QUALITY1 0.0094 0.0139 -0.0254 0.0254 1 
QUALITY2 0.0123 0.0264 0.0126 0.0198 -0.1030* 
Germanr_ SHORT1 LONG1 SHORT2 LONG2 LEVER1 LEVER2 ETR MTBR 
SHORT1 1 
LONG1 -1 * 1 
SHORT2 0.4665* -0.466* 1 
LONG2 -0.5150* 0.5150* 0.0695* 1 
LEVER1 -0.059* 0.0595* 0.7053* 0.7562* 1 
LEVER2 -0.0202 0.0202 0.5710 0.5315* 0.7525* 1 
ETR -0.0416* 0.0416* -0.0309** -0.0020 -0.0210 -0.0371** 1 
MTBR -0.0019 0.0019 -0.0442* -0.0320* -0.0520* -0.2416* 0.0001 1 
SIZE1 0.0704* -0.0704* -0.1012* -0.2360 -0.2340* 0.0323** 0.0108 -0.2106* 
SIZE2 -0.0008 0.0008 -0.1171* -0.1480 -0.1820* 0.0548* -0.0010 -0.2011* 
LIQUID -0.0938* 0.0938* -0.1376* -0.0300 -0.1120* -0.1267* -0.0090 0.0219 
ASSETMAT -0.1070* 0.1070* 0.0527* 0.2417* 0.2064* 0.0991* -0.0180 0.0233 
QUALITY1 0.0122 -0.0122 0.1171* 0.0281 0.0953* 0.0876* -0.0550* 0.0072 
QUALITY2 -0.0042 0.0042 -0.0332** 0.0020 -0.0200 -0.0430* 0.0352** 0.0283 
SIZE1 SIZE2 LIQUIDITY ASSETMAT QUALITY1 QUALITY2 
SIZE1 1 
SIZE2 0.9189* 1 
LIQUID -0.1440* -0.1076* 1 
ASSETMAT -0.2740* -0.1014* 0.0821* 1 
QUALITY1 -0.0040 -0.0039 -0.0176 -0.0130 1 
QUALITY2 -0.0120 0.0044 -0.0123 0.0098 0.0175* 1 
UK SHORT1 LONG1 SHORT2 LONG2 LEVER1 LEVER2 ETR MTBR 
SHORT1 1 
LONG1 -1 * 1 
SHORT2 0.4930* -0.4930* 1 
LONG2 -0.6476* 0.6476* -0.1004* 1 
LEVER1 -0.1455* 0.1455* 0.6409* 0.6985* 1 
LEVER2 -0.0243* 0.0243* 0.5057* 0.3803* 0.6590* 1 
ETR -0.0033 0.0033 -0.0541* -0.0372* -0.0675* -0.0022 1 
MTBR -6E-05 6E-05 -0.0172* -0.011 0* -0.0217* -0.2744* -0.0463* 1 
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UK SHORT1 LONG1 SHORT2 LONG2 LEVER1 LEVER2 ETR MTBR 
SIZE1 -0.2781* 0.2781* -0.1296* 0.2322* 0.0867* 0.0945* 0.0675* -0.1119* 
SIZE2 -0.3535* 0.3535* -0.1597* 0.3347* 0.1446* 0.1065* 0.0471* -0.0909* 
LIQUIDITY -0.0483* 0.0483* -0.2457* -0.0784* -0.2376* -0.1698* 0.0031 0.0418* 
ASSETMAT -0.1346* 0.1346* -0.0350* 0.1690* 0.1059* 0.0882* -0.0107 -0.0705* 
QUALITY1 0.0149** -0.0149** 0.0359* 0.0023 0.0290* 0.0043 -0.0218* 0.0084 
QUALITY2 -0.0174* 0.0174* -0.0202* 0.0083 -0.0081 -0.0242* 0.0002 0.0208* 
SIZE1 SIZE2 LIQUIDITY ASSETMAT QUALITY1 QUALITY2 
SIZE1 1 
SIZE2 0.9357* 1 
LIQUIDITY -0.1524* -0.0790* 1 
ASSETMAT -0.0720* 0.0442* -0.1067* 1 
QUALITY1 -0.0228* -0.0316* -0.0149** -0.0145** 1 
QUALITY2 0.0076 0.0135** -0.0026 0.0173* 0.0267* 1 
The statistics reported here are the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in the analysis. (*)and(**) 
represent that the correlation coefficient is significant at l percent level and 5 percent level, respectively. See Table 6.1 for 
variable definitions. 
6.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
6.4.1. THE MODEL 
We use the same econometric model which is explained in the previous chapters (see, 
equation [5.1]). Our general dynamic model for the empirical study of corporate debt 
maturity structure is as follows (subscript-i stands for firm-i; P's are the unknown 
parameters to be estimated and ffit is the disturbance term): 
MATURITY; t = f3t[MA TURITY]it-1 
+ fh{LEVERAGE]it + /h[LEVERAGE]it-1 
+ f34[EFFECTIVE TAX RATE]it + f3s[EFFECTIVE TAX RATE]it-1 
+ /36[MARKET-TO-BOOK]u + P,[MARKET-TO-BOOK]it-1 
+ f38[FIRM- SIZE]it + /39[FIRM- SIZE]it-1 
+ fJw[LIQUIDITY}u + f3tt[LIQUIDTY]it-1 
+ f312[ASSET MATURITY]it + /313[ASSET MATURITY]u-1 
+ f3t4[QUALITY}it + f3ts[QUALITY]it-1 + OJ;r. 
(6.1)140 
Furthermore, in order to investigate the existence of target debt maturity structure 
in the framework of adjustment costs, the following procedure will be used. Assume that 
desired target level, MATURITY;;, is determined by several explanatory variables, X5 • 
140 In the next section, for the sake of simplicity, we will estimate the model (6.1) with only the stated 
variables here in order to compare the methodologies. Later, the model will be extended by including more 
variables. 
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MATURITY;; = LlflkXku + mu 
k=1 
(6.2) 
where ffiit is disturbance term serially correlated with mean zero and possibly 
heteroscedastic, and o/k's are estimable unknown parameters which are common to each 
firms. The model assumes that firms adjust their current ratios, MATURITYu, with the 
degree of adjustment coefficient "8" to attain the desired maturity structure. 141 
MATURITYu - MATURITYu_1 =()(MATURITY;;- MATURITYu_1) (6.3) 
If 8 = 1, then, the actual change in maturity will equal to the desired change and firms will 
have a complete adjustment with zero transaction costs, being in equilibrium. If 8 = 0, 
however, there will not be any change due to unaffordable high transaction costs and 
firms will set their current debt-ratios to the past level, MATURITYu_1, 
Substituting (6.2) into (6.3), we get the following equation: 
MATURITY;, = (1- B)MATURITYu_1 + L()lflkXkit + Bm, 
k=1 
(6.4) 
This adjustment model assumes that 8 lies between zero and unity due to the existence of 
transaction costs. If the cost of being in disequilibrium is higher (lower) than the cost of 
adjustment, 8, which is inversely proportional to transaction costs, tends to unity (zero). 
What is more, as we want to compare the alternative methodologies, our model 
(6.1) will be estimated by OLS, Anderson-Hsiao Instrumental Variable technique, GMM-
differences and GMM-level estimation procedures142• 
Harris and Raviv [1991] account for the industry classification by commenting 
that 'firms within an industry are more alike than those in different industries'. In 
addition, Ferri and Jones [1979] emphasise the statistical relationship between relative 
debt structure class and generic industry class. As it is expected that industry effects can 
also be important in determining maturity structure of the firms, we have included 
industry dummy variables to the analysis to control industry-specific effects143 . 
141 See Miguel and Pindado [2001], and Ozkan [2001] who also use this model. 
142 In the literature, most studies use OLS, censored Tobit, maximum likelihood, random and fixed effects,. 
Dennis et al. [2000] also criticise the previous empirical studies of debt structure with respect to their 
methodologies; one point is that exogeneity assumptions cause biased estimates. Therefore they use a 
simultaneous model of debt contract terms. 
143 See the Appendix for industry classification and the number offmn in each industry. 
226 
Obviously, the existence of such effects can only be investigated through the models in 
levels, not in differences. 
In addition, using yearly time dummies, Bevan and Dan bolt [200 1] show that there has 
been a change in the character of credit markets in the UK. Aarstol [2000] reports that 
inflation and debt maturity structure of US non-financial corporations is inversely related 
since short-term debt reduces uncertainty about the real value of loan repayments and the 
variability of relative price changes increases with inflation. Therefore, in order to control 
for the influence of time periods and for modelling time effects, time dummies will be 
utilised to test whether the corporate debt maturity decisions are related to time-varying 
elements, say, macroeconomic factors or aggregate business cycles. 
6.4.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.4.2.1. Comparison of the Results of Alternative Estimation Procedures 
In Table 6.3 to Table 6.5, we report estimation results of the dynamic capital structure for 
France, Germany and the UK. In these tables, Model 1 presents the OLS-type estimates 
in levels, where unobservable firm-specific fixed effect are not eliminated and all 
explanatory variables (including lagged dependent variable) are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous. Model2 give Anderson-Hsiao (AH)-type estimates in first differences, which 
uses !lMATURITYu-2 or MATURITYu-2 as an instrument for !lMATURITYit-1· Models 3 
and 4 show the GMM estimates in levels and in differences, respectively, where all 
explanatory variables except the lagged dependent variable (LDV) are treated as 
exogenous. Thus, in both models only MATURITYit-l is instrumented, in which case 
GMM instruments used increase in each period through the panel, unlike in case of AH 
instruments. In Model 5, we report GMM estimates in levels, where all right-hand side 
variables are treated as endogenous. The number of observations and the estimation 
period differ across alternative procedures, which are given in the tables. But in general 
one cross-section unit (first year) is lost due to first-differences and another (year-2000) 
due to the definition of quality variable. Six different type of test statistics were reported, 
three of which (Wald Tests) test the joint significance of the estimated coefficients, time 
and industry dummies, and time dummies only, respectively; distributed as chi-square 
under the null hypothesis of'no relationship'. Two tests (Correlation Tests) are performed 
for the first and second order autocorrelation of residuals; distributed as standard normal 
N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of'no serial correlation'. The last statistics (Sargan Test) 
is to test the validity of the instrument set (overidentifying restrictions); distributed as chi-
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square under the null hypothesis of 'valid instruments'. Only the two-step GMM estimates 
will be reported as they are more efficient than one-step estimates and Sargan Test is 
consistent only in this specification. All estimation procedures were executed using 
PcGive (Doomik and Hendry [2001]). 
Firstly, considering all countries, Correlation Tests reveal that in all cases the 
OLS and GMM-Level specifications violate the assumption of 'no serial correlation'. 
Apart from serial correlation in the error terms, OLS specification also suffers from 
endogeneity problem. The former is not surprising since LDV might be correlated with 
seemingly existent unobservable and time-invariant firm-specific effects. Furthermore, 
the estimated coefficient of LDV is relatively too high and significant in all OLS 
specifications ranging from 0.70 to 0.72. The same problem exists in the GMM estimates 
in levels and the upward bias is even higher in all cases (ranging from 0.82 to 0.84) as 
compared to the OLS coefficients. This upward bias, in spite of the industry dummies 
inclusion, can be attributed to the correlation between LDV and unobservable fixed 
effects. Moreover, the Sargan Test of GMM-Level (model-3) estimation results reveal 
that the instruments used are invalid in France and in the UK. This is because we 
assumed the strict exogeneity of all variables except LDV. However, it is likely that the 
explanatory variables constructed on the basis of balance sheet data of firms are 
endogenous. Therefore, due to the reasons stated above one can conclude that the OLS 
and GMM specifications in levels are not appropriate for a study of dynamic debt 
maturity structure model. 
In what follows, in order to overcome the problem in levels-specification, first-
differences of the variables were taken to control for fixed effects and the estimation 
results were reported in Models 2 and 4. Furthermore, the examination of standard 
deviation of the coefficients of model-2 in these tables (Table 6.3 to Table 6.5) exhibits 
that AH-type estimates using differenced instrument (AHD) generally result in larger 
variances than GMM estimates in differences (GMM-DIF). This is especially apparent 
with regard to the standard deviations of LDV s. The inference from this comparison can 
be regarded as a strong finding and is consistent with the findings of Arellano and Bond 
[ 1991] that AHD causes substantial efficiency loss. Furthermore, the AH instrumental 
variable technique does not use all available moment conditions, which is not the case for 
GMM methodology. In the end, as discussed earlier, although AH-type estimates do not 
suffer from serial correlation (even it does for France) and are consistent, they are far 
from being efficient. As for GMM estimates in differences (model-4), all Sargan Tests in 
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these tables indicate that the instruments used are not valid. The reason for the rejection 
of instrument validity is apparent as we assumed that all the variables, except LDV by 
definition, are exogenous. We allowed the possibility that the past and current values of 
the regressors are uncorrelated with current shocks by this way but that turned out to be a 
wrong assumption144. In model-5, the Sargan Tests again reject the validity of 
instruments only for the UK but the Correlation Tests show the presence of serial 
correlation problem in all countries. This, in tum, implies that even if we relax the 
exogeneity of variables by using GMM-instruments as lags of all variables dated (t-2) and 
earlier, the test statistics show the presence of misspecification in GMM-Level 
estimation 145 • Therefore, if serial correlation exists and the coefficient of LDV is too high 
in GMM-Level, controlling for firm heterogeneity is necessary despite the absence of 
endogeneity problem. In this case, GMM-DIF is used to control for potential unobserved 
firm-specific effects as the serious upward bias on the LDV of model-5 suggests its 
presence. 
The discussion above reveals that the specification of the OLS, AH, the GMM-
Levels specification and GMM-Differences specification assuming strict exogeneity of 
the variables are not appropriate for our dynamic debt maturity structure model. In the 
next section, we will relax the assumption of exogeneity in GMM-Differences models 
thereby using some more instruments to determine the most appropriate estimation 
procedure. 
144 As discussed in Blundell and Bond [ 1998, 1999], the pattern of signs on current and lagged regressors in 
the unrestricted models are consistent with the AR(l) specification as the signs are reverse in most cases. 
145 We did not, and will not in the next sections, use all available instruments in order to reduce finite 
sample biases due to having too much instruments relative to the cross-sectional sample size. This is 
discussed by Alonso-Borrego and Arellano [1999], Kiviet [1995]. As time dummies are added in all models 
and thus used as additional instruments. If level instruments dated (t-2) in GMM-DIF is rejected by 
Sargan, it shows the presence of measurement errors. 
229 
Table 6.3: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure in France: Alternative Estimations. 
Dependent Variable: MATURITY1,t 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Sign OLS-LEV AH-LEV GMM-LEV1 GMM-DIF1 GMM-LEV2 
MATURITY1.t-1 + 0.7041*** 0.3589*** 0.8218*** 0.3937*** 0.8425*** 
(0.0249) (0.0792) (0.0335) (0.0787) (0.0260) 
LEVERAGE1,t -I+ 0.0053 -0.1062 -0.0151 -0.1234 0.0573 
(0.0943) (0.1036) (0.1067) (0.1013) (0.2556) 
LEVERAGE1,t-1 0.1071 0.2252*** 0.1001 0.2562*** -0.0056 
(0.0899) (0.0825) (0.1036) (0.0674) (0.2298) 
TAXRATE1.t -/+ -0.0018 0.0057 -0.0043 0.0041 -0.0264 
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0356) 
TAXRATEi,t-1 -0.0008 0.0034 0.0031 0.0072 0.0046 
(0.0068) (0.0081) (0.0072) (0.0083) (0.0090) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1.t -/+ -0.0077 -0.0020 -0.0073 -0.0072 -0.0242 
(0.0081) (0.0112) (0.0081) (0.0110) (0.0296) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t-1 0.0182* 0.0159 0.0178* 0.0219 0.0360 
(0.0109) (0.0206) (0.0108) (0.0193) (0.0293) 
SIZEI,t + 0.0686*** 0.0813*** 0.0914*** 0.0797** -0.0282 
(0.0180) (0.0271) (0.0264) (0.0319) (0.0394) 
SIZE1.t-1 -0.0665*** -0.0667*** -0.0894*** -0.0604*** 0.0267 
(0.0177) (0.0215) (0.0256) (0.0231) (0.0387) 
LIQUIDITYi.t -/+ 0.1077** 0.1124** 0.1733*** 0.1480*** 0.0863* 
(0.0492) (0.0515) (0.0599) (0.0571) (0.0490) 
LIQUIDITYi,t-1 -0.0719* -0.0218 -0.1374*** -0.0422 -0.0773* 
(0.0407) (0.0293) (0.0533) (0.0328) (0.0415) 
ASSETMAT1.t + 0.0039** 0.0034 0.0048** 0.0047** -0.0027 
(0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0047) 
ASSETMAT11-1 -0.0033** -0.0037 -0.0042** -0.0037 0.0031 
(0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0044) 
QUALITYu 0.0208*** 0.0216*** 0.0230*** 0.0219*** -0.0084 
(0.0062) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0224) 
QUALITYu-1 -0.0076* 0.0041 -0.0110*** 0.0013 -0.0103* 
(0.0039) (0.0088) (0.0042) (0.0088) (0.0054) 
Correlation1 -4.062*** -7.677*** -4.068*** -5.382*** -4.666*** 
Correlation2 2.772*** 2.266** 1.241 1.747* 0.9569 
Sargan Test (df) 25.58 (14)** 22.45 (14)* 104.9(112) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 1301 (15)*** 104.9 (15)** 1335 (15)*** 91.75 (15)*** 1791 (15)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 295.9 (30)*** 32.12 (30) 26.90 (30) 
Wald Test-3 (df) 9.475 (15) 13.14 (15) 5.547 (15) 12.39 (15) 10.35 (15) 
R2 0.5580 0.4790 0.5200 
Firms I Observations 358/2448 299/2090 358/2448 299/2090 358/2448 
Estimation Period 1984-1999 1985-1999 1984-1999 1985-1999 1984-1999 
See notes in Table 6.1 for variable definitions. Model-l is OLS estimation in levels. Model-2 is Anderson-Hsiao type 
estimation in differences, where MATURITY;1•2 is instrumented for dMATURITYu.1• Models 3 and 4 are GMM estimates 
in levels and first differences, respectively, where only MATURITY1• 1 is treated as endogenous. Model 5 is GMM 
estimates in levels, where all variables are treated as endogenous. Industry dummies are included in models 1, 3 and 5. 
Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation I and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, 
respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the 
overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as ;((dt) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests 1, 2 and 
3 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, of time and industry dummies, and of time dummies, respectively; 
asymptotically distributed as ;(( dt) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term is not reported. (*), 
(**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6.4: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure in Germany: Alternative 
Estimations. 
Dependent Variable: MATURITYu 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Sign OLS-LEV AH-DIF GMM-LEV1 GMM-DIF1 GMM-LEV2 
MATURITY1.t-1 + 0.6968*** 0.3298*** 0.8356*** 0.4515*** 0.8204*** 
(0.0167) (0.1303) (0.0217) (0.0604) (0.0244) 
LEVERAGEi.t -/+ -0.1734*** -0.2186*** -0.1920*** -0.2456*** 0.1932 
(0.0583) (0.0759) (0.0593) (0.0803) (0.2014) 
LEVERAGE1,t-1 0.2400*** 0.1724** 0.2647*** 0.2134*** -0.0870 
(0.0593) (0.0714) (0.0612) (0.0711) (0.1801) 
TAXRATE1,t -I+ 0.0023 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0731* 
(0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0381) 
TAXRATE1,1-1 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0066* 
(0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0040) 
MKT-TO-BOOK,t -/+ 0.0062** 0.0085 0.0085*** 0.0067 0.0246** 
(0.0026) (0.0080) (0.0025) (0.0092) (0.0112) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1.t-1 -0.0094*** -0.0011 -0.0103*** -0.0027 -0.0160*** 
(0.0012) (0.0087) (0.0012) (0.0088) (0.0060) 
SIZE1,t + -0.0052 0.0195 -0.0138 -0.0052 0.0056 
(0.0124) (0.0151) (0.0128) (0.0152) (0.0544) 
SIZE1.1-1 0.0057 0.0129 0.0158 0.0158 -0.0032 
(0.0125) (0.0117) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0539) 
LIQUIDITYi.t -/+ 0.0036*** 0.0044*** 0.0036*** 0.0046*** 0.0009 
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
LIOUIDITY1,t-1 -0.0014 0.0014 -0.0022** 0.0011 -0.0004 
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
ASSETMAT1.t + 0.0015** 0.0019*** 0.0014** 0.0024*** 0.0010* 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
ASSETMATn-1 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0004 
(0.0005) (0.001 0) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
QUALITYu -0.0143 -0.0036 -0.0124 -0.0041 -0.0654 
(0.0101) (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.0130) (0.0575) 
QUALITYu-1 -0.0367** -0.0191 -0.0404*** -0.0162 -0.0459 
(0.0151) (0.0159) (0.0150) (0.0173) (0.0320) 
Correlation1 -4.879*** -4.673*** -5.777*** -10.16*** -5.860*** 
Correlation2 1.624 -0.599 -1.309 0.835 -1.105 
Sargan Test (df) 7.454(11) 18.11 (11)* 86.17 (88) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 2084 (15)*** 91.14 (15)*** 1877 (15)*** 146.5 (15)*** 2237 (15)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 243 (26)*** 64.38 (26)*** 36.03 (26)* 
Wald Test-3 (df) 39.61 (12)*** 79.47(11) 24.26 (12)** 29.78 (12)*** 18.24 (12) 
R2 0.5289 0.3802 0.4087 
Firms I Observations 508/3993 451/3286 508/3993 470/3485 508/3993 
Estimation Period 1988-1999 1990-1999 1988-1999 1989-1999 1988-1999 
See notes in Table 6.1 for variable definitions. Model-l is OLS estimation in levels. Model-2 is Anderson-Hsiao type 
estimation in differences, where ~MATURITY;1•2 is instrumented for ~TURITYu.1 . Models 3 and 4 are GMM 
estimates in levels and first differences, respectively, where only MATURITY1•1 is treated as endogenous. Model 5 is 
GMM estimates in levels, where all variables are treated as endogenous. Industry dummies are included in models I, 3 and 
5. Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation I and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, 
respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O,l) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the 
overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as r(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests I, 2 and 
3 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, of time and industry dummies, and of time dummies, respectively; 
asymptotically distributed as x2(df) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term is not reported. (*), 
(**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and I percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6.5: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure in the UK: Alternative Estimations 
Dependent Variable: MATURITYu 
Independent Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Sign OLS-LEV AH-DIF GMM-LEV1 GMM-DIF1 GMM-LEV2 
MATURITYu-1 + 0.7191*** 0.3261*** 0.8134*** 0.5268*** 0.8232*** 
(0.0069) (0.0587) (0.0085) (0.0181) (0.0080) 
LEVERAGE,,, -/+ -0.0013 -0.0335 -0.0027 -0.0394 -0.1632 
(0.0336) (0.0411) (0.0371) (0.0454) (0.1475) 
LEVERAGE1.t-1 0.1424*** 0.2130*** 0.1119*** 0.1914*** 0.2234* 
(0.0321) (0.0376) (0.0366) (0.0414) (0.1189) 
TAXRATE,,t -I+ 0.0012 -0.0007 0.0015 0.0007 -0.0468 
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0304) 
T AXRATEi,t-1 -0.0031 -0.0048 -0.0040 -0.0040 0.0004 
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0056) 
MKT-T0-800~.t -/+ -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0008 0.0066 
(0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0051) 
MKT-T0-800~.t-1 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0023 
(0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0028) 
SIZE1,1 + 0.0489*** 0.0423*** 0.04464*** 0.0407*** 0.0116 
(0.0069) (0.0105) (0.0077) (0.0103) (0.0269) 
SIZE1,t-1 -0.0335*** -0.0055 -0.0344*** -0.0088 -0.0022 
(0.0069) (0.0096) (0.0076) (0.0096) (0.0262) 
LIQUIDITY1,1 -I+ 0.0632*** 0.0934*** 0.0664*** 0.0921*** 0.0079 
(0.0143) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0207) (0.0120) 
LIQUIDITY,,t-1 -0.0459*** -0.0155 -0.0547*** -0.0301** -0.0155 
(0.0120) (0.0160) (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0096) 
ASSETMAT,,t + 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0004 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
ASSETMATn-1 -0.0005*** 0.0004 -0.0006*** 0.0001 0.0000 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
QUALITYu -0.0181** -0.0252** -0.0198** -0.0338*** -0.1904** 
(0.0087) (0.0100) (0.0088) (0.0105) (0.0849) 
OUALITYu-1 0.0300** 0.0014 0.0314** 0.0035 0.0196 
(0.0118) (0.0109) (0.0131) (0.0119) (0.0221) 
Correlation 1 -9.900** -10.09*** -12.01*** -24.39*** -12.36-* 
Correlation2 3.014*** 1.011 -3.875*** 2.347** -3.626*** 
Sargan Test (df) 79.32 (29)*** 78.69 (29)*** 275 (232)** 
Wald Test-1 (df) 23440 (15)*** 231.5 (15) 22520 (15)*** 1188 (15)*** 24620 (15)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 276.1 (45)*** 136.6 (30)*** 202.9 (45)*** 
Wald Test-3 (df) 152.4 (30) 112.2 (29)*** 79.32 (29)*** 103.7 (30)*** 146.9 (30)*** 
R2 0.6086 0.6010 0.5748 
Firms I Observations 2311/28029 1945/23318 2311/28029 2175/25718 2311/28029 
Estimation Period 1970-1999 1972-1999 1970-1999 1971-1999 1970-1999 
See notes in Table 6.1 for variable definitions. Model-l is OLS estimation in levels. Model-2 is Anderson-Hsiao type 
estimation in differences, where ~MATURITY;1•2 is instrumented for ~MA TURITY11•1• Models 3 and 4 are GMM 
estimates in levels and first differences, respectively, where only MATURITY1•1 is treated as endogenous. Model 5 is 
GMM estimates in levels, where all variables are treated as endogenous. Industry dummies are included in models l, 3 and 
5. Time dummies are included in all models. Correlation l and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, 
respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O,l) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the 
overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as t(dt) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests l, 2 and 
3 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, of time and industry dummies, and of time dummies, respectively; 
asymptotically distributed as t(dt) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term is not reported. (*), 
(**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and l percent level, 
respectively. 
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6.4.2.2. The GMM-DIF and Within Groups (WG) Estimation Results 
In Table 6.6, we report Within Groups, and GMM-DIF estimation results assuming the 
endogeneity of explanatory variables. Correlation Tests confirm the validity of the 
assumption of serially uncorrelated errors in levels as Correlation! is significant but 
Correlation2 is insignificant in all cases (except the significant Correlation2 for the UK). 
Furthermore, two-step Sargan Tests accept the validity of lagged level instruments dated 
(t-2) and earlier for France and Germany, and the validity of instruments dated (t-3) and 
earlier for the UK. 
Although the results in Table 6.6 do not suffer from serial correlation, endogeneity 
problem and instrument invalidity, recent econometric studies document that standard 
GMM-DIF estimator has the problem of weak instruments. As discussed by Blundell et 
al. [2000], the weak instruments problem can be seen by comparing GMM-DIF estimates 
with WG (deviation from individual means) in Table 6.6. The results in these tables are 
generally similar and the estimated coefficient of lagged maturity of GMM-DIF is not 
substantially higher than that of WG (it is even lower for France). It is known that in the 
presence of firm-specific effects that OLS-Levels specification appears to cause an 
upward bias in the estimate of LDV while WG appears to cause a downward bias in the 
same coefficient's estimate. Consequently, one can expect this coefficient to be biased 
downwards in case of weak instruments usage. Therefore, system GMM (GMM-SYS) 
estimation procedure, in the end, has been shown to be the most efficient and consistent 
methodology for our dynamic debt maturity structure model 146• 
146 Controlling for unobserved fmn heterogeneity and endogeneity problem in dynamic debt maturity structure 
seem very important as some variables have turned out to be insignificant after using correct methodology 
(GMM-SYS) in the following sections. 
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Table 6.6: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure: GMM-DIF vs. Within Groups 
Estimations. 
Dependent Variable: MATURITYtt 
Independent Predicted FRANCE GERMANY UK 
Variables Sign WITHIN GMM-DIF2 WITHIN GMM-DIF2 WITHIN GMM-DIF2 
MATURITY1.t-1 + 0.3371*** 0.3321*** 0.3504*** 0.4168*** 0.5226*** 0.5788*** 
(0.0371) (0.0579) (0.0244) (0.0467) (0.0095) (0.0232) 
LEVERAGE,,1 -I+ 0.0243 -0.1539 -0.1360** -0.1987* 0.0208 -0.0805 
(0.0914) (0.1357) (0.0610) (0.1135) (0.0379) (0.0764) 
LEVERAGE1,t-1 0.1432** 0.2059** 0.2420*** 0.2144*** 0.1974*** 0.2017*** 
(0.0693) (0.0802) (0.061 0) (0.0675) (0.0316) (0.0340) 
TAXRATE,,t -I+ -0.0033 -0.0032 0.0027 0.0060 0.0009 0.0170 
(0.0063) (0.0082) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0022) (0.0246) 
TAXRATE1,1-1 -0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0001 0.0013 -0.0027 0.0052 
(0.0070) (0.0082) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0136} 
MKT-T0-800~.t -/+ 0.0024 0.0016 0.0111* -0.0213 -0.0007 0.0034 
(0.0120) (0.0211) (0.0066) (0.0199} (0.0015} (0.0050) 
MKT-T0-800~.t-1 0.0103 0.0138 0.0015 0.0013 -0.0011 0.0002 
(0.0160) (0.0217) (0.0054) (0.0078) (0.0017) (0.0022) 
SIZE,,t + 0.0548*** 0.0665** 0.0092 -0.0049 0.0522*** 0.0118 
(0.0186} (0.0329) (0.0133} (0.0278) (0.0076) (0.0215) 
SIZEI,t-1 -0.0464** -0.0583*** 0.0080 0.0093 -0.0266*** -0.0050 
(0.0180) (0.0208) (0.0123) (0.0153} (0.0074) (0.0115) 
LIQUIDITY1,t -/+ 0.1181** 0.0733 0.0044* 0.0046*** 0.0772*** 0.0476*** 
(0.0530) (0.0465) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0174) (0.0179} 
LIQUIDITY,,t-1 -0.0162 -0.0306 0.0011 0.0003 -0.0317*** -0.0401** * 
(0.0294) (0.0259) (0.0009) (0.0009} (0.0122) (0.0104} 
ASSETMAT,,t + 0.0045** 0.0020 0.0027*** 0.0023** 0.0014*** 0.0004 
(0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0002} (0.0005} 
ASSETMATtt-1 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0011* -0.0014** -0.0001 -0.0003 
(0.0018) (0.0021} (0.0006} (0.0007) (0.0002} (0.0003} 
QUALITY~.~ - 0.0147*** 0.0164*** -0.0103 -0.0055 -0.0163* -0.0614 
(0.0043) (0.0061} (0.0132) (0.0193} (0.0095} (0.0515} 
QUALITYi.t-1 -0.0049 -0.0036 -0.0298** -0.0258 0.0255** -0.0052 
(0.0039} (0.0057} (0.0146) (0.0182} (0.0109} (0.0312) 
Correlation 1 -3.080*** -5.367*** -2.569*** -8.294*** -4.061*** -19.10*** 
Correlation2 0.0649 1.605 -3.432*** 0.6711 1.458 2.199** 
Sargan Test (df) - 232.3 (512) - 311.6 (328) - 404.6 (448) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 188.8 (15)*** 61.65 (15)*** 300.9 (15)*** 125.4 (15)*** 4555 (15)*** 760.6 (15)** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 14.90 (15) 13 (15) 102.1 (12)*** 32.93 (12)*** 140.4 (30)*** 106.8 (30)** 
Firms I Observations 29912389 29912090 470 I 3955 470 I 3485 2175 I 27893 2175/2571 8 
Estimation Period 1984-1999 1985-1999 1988-1999 1989-1999 1970-1999 1971-1999 
.. See notes m Table 6.1 for vartable defintttons. Ttme dummtes are mcluded m all models. Correlatton 1 and 2 are first and 
second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O, 1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentizying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as r(df) under the null of 
instruments' validity. Wald Tests 1 and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of time dummies, 
respectively; asymptotically distributed as r(df) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of intercept term is not 
reported.(*),(**) and(***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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6.4.2.3. The Comparison of System-GMM and Difference-GMM Estimators 
Standard GMM-DIF estimator is biased either when the lagged and current dependent 
variables are highly correlated or when heteroscedasticity is high across cross-sections. It 
causes downward bias as the coefficient of lagged dependent variable (LDV) increase or 
relative variance of fixed effects increases. This is very important with respect to our 
adjustment coefficient which has long-run implications (see equation (6.5)). It also 
eliminates valuable information by taking first-differences and uses weak instruments. 
The results in Table 6.7 show that GMM-SYS estimates, which are produced as a result 
of the shortcomings of GMM-DIF, are more reasonable than GMM-DIF estimates. This 
is particularly apparent in the estimated coefficient of lagged leverage, which is 
substantially higher in GMM-SYS case than in WG case. Hence, GMM-SYS estimator 
produces higher estimated coefficient ofLDV than GMM-DIF does, which is higher than 
WG estimate and below than OLS estimate. Consequently, the reported results are 
consistent with the analysis of Blundell and Bond [1998] that in autoregressive models 
with persistent series, GMM-DIF can cause serious finite sample biases due to weak 
instruments and these biases can be greatly reduced by including level equations in the 
system estimator. In what follows, therefore, we report the results of system-GMM 
estimator specification. 
It would be noteworthy to mention about the implications of test statistics in Table 
6.7. Sargan Tests accept the validity of instruments used in all countries. The instruments 
used for France and Germany are "lagged-levels dated [t-2] and earlier for differenced 
equations, and lagged-differenced dated [t-1] for level equations". The instruments used 
for the UK are "lagged-levels dated [t-3] and earlier as instruments in the first-differenced 
equations combined with lagged first-differences dated [t-2] as instruments in levels". In 
addition, the correlation tests are robust in all countries. The reason why Correlation-2 
rejects the null of no serial correlation for the UK is because the instruments are dated at 
[t-3]. We assume that our error has a MA(l) structure for the UK and therefore, in 
differences, there is correlation up to order 2 (See Bond and Meghir [1994]). 
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Table 6.7: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure: GMM-SYS Estimations. 
Dependent Variable: MATURITY, 1 
Independent Predicted FRANCE GERMANY UK 
Variables Sign General Specific General Specific General Specific 
MATURITY1,t-1 + 0.3966*** 0.3895*** 0.4908*** 0.4547*** 0.6517*** 0.6472*** 
(0.0487) (0.0507) (0.0416) (0.0360) (0.0213) (0.0220) 
LEVERAGE,,t -/+ -0.0300 -0.0275 0.1253 0.0627 -0.1576 -0.1515 
(0.1189) (0.1138) (0.1213) (0.0687) (0.1012) (0.1016) 
LEVERAGE1,t-1 0.1943* 0.1646* 0.0096 - 0.2697*** 0.2676*** 
(0.0998) (0.0906) (0.0975) 
-
(0.0609) (0.0605) 
TAXRATE,,t -/+ -0.0143 -0.0333** 0.0123** 0.0214** 0.0308 0.0351 
(0.0124) (0.0181) (0.0062) (0.0106) (0.0248) (0.0267) 
T AXRATE1.t-1 -0.0047 - 0.0025 - 0.0055 -
(0.0081) - (0.0031) - (0.0086) -
MKT-TO-BOOK,,t -/+ 0.0029 0.0115 0.0079 0.0165* 0.0069* 0.0062 
(0.0171) (0.0143) (0.0199) (0.0096) (0.0039) (0.0040) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t-1 0.0214 - -0.0070 - 0.0006 -
(0.0166) - (0.0135) - (0.0016) -
SIZE,,1 + 0.03456 0.0100 -0.0369 -0.0007 0.0071 0.0231*** 
(0.0270) (0.0081) (0.0248) (0.0082) (0.0260) (0.0039) 
SIZE1.t-1 -0.0301 - 0.0344 - 0.0103 -
(0.0265) - (0.0250) - (0.0251) -
LIQUIDITY,,t -/+ 0.0450 0.0316 0.0020** 0.0026*** 0.0220** 0.0195** 
(0.0374) (0.0282) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0093) (0.0096) 
LIQUIDITY,,t-1 -0.0194 - 0.0002 - -0.0257*** -0.0232** * 
(0.0202) - (0.0004) - (0.0075) (0.0077) 
ASSETMAT,,t + 0.0013 0.0016 0.0011 0.0007 0.0003 0.0000 
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
ASSETMA T n-1 -0.0000 - -0.0003 - 0.0003 -
(0.0016) 
-
(0.0006) - (0.0004) -
QUALITY1.1 - 0.0166* 0.0198** -0.0207 -0.0167 -0.0758* -0.0463 
(0.0092) (0.0088) (0.0249) (0.0315) (0.0433) (0.0544) 
QUALITYi.t-1 -0.0057 - -0.0276 - 0.0043 -
(0.0059) - (0.0190) - (0.0213) -
Correlation 1 -5.858*** -6.002*** -9.035*** -9.377*** -20.25*** -20.07*** 
Correlation2 1.878 1.880 0.7428 0.6228 2.441** 2.422** 
Sargan Test (df) 237.4 (632) 240.6 (632) 330.2 (352) 340.9 {352) 607.9 (680) 624.2 (680) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 155.6 (15)*** 99.18 (9)*** 378.7 (15)*** 182.7 (8)*** 3845 (15)*** 1712 (10) 
Wald Test-2 (df) 63.01 (30)*** 56.96 (30)*** 77.18 (26)*** 115 (26)*** 216.1 (45)*** 216.4 (45)** 
Wald Test-3 (df) 25.86 (15)** 21.94(15) 22.53 (12)** 33.44 (12)*** 146 (30)*** 149.1 (30)-
R2 0.4689 0.4560 0.4769 0.4390 0.5909 0.5872 
Firms I Observations 299/2389 299/2389 470/3955 470/3955 2175 /27893 2175 I 2789 3 
Estimation Period 1985-1999 1985-1999 1989-1999 1989-1999 1971-1999 1971-1999 
.. See notes m Table 6.1 for vartable defimttons. Time and mdustry dummies are mcluded m all models. CorrelatiOn 1 and 2 are 
first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O, 1) under the null of 
no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as i"( df) under the null of 
instruments' validity. Wald Tests 1, 2 and 3 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, of time and industry dummies, 
and of time dummies, respectively; asymptotically distributed as i"(df) under the null of no relationship. The coefficient of 
intercept term is not reported. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 
5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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6.4.2.4. The results of system-GMM estimator specification 
In this section, we discuss our main results based on the model for which all relevant 
variables are shown in equation (6.5). Although the main focus will be the static long-run 
results in Table 6.9, the implications of short-run models in Table 6.8 will be referred to 
where appropriate. 
The 'specific' GMM estimates in Table 6.8 were obtained, following general-to-
specific approach, after excluding the insignificant lagged independent variables from the 
·estimation of general dynamic model. Focusing on the lagged independent variables, one 
can see that past leverage variable is significant at 1 % in France and in the UK; past 
liquidity and past size are significant in the UK. Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1996] also 
report a significantly positive relationship between lagged leverage and maturity, and 
argue that obtaining debt in the past implies obtaining long-term debt in the future. 
Together with highly significant lagged maturity coefficients in all cases, a significant 
lagged variable would imply some transitional effects on debt maturity structure. This 
necessitates the discussion of long-run relationships between maturity, and firm-specific 
and market-related factors: 
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Table 6.8: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure: GMM-SYS Estimations. 
Dependent Variable: MATURITYit 
Independent Predicted FRANCE GERMANY UK 
Variables Sign General Specific General Specific General Specific 
MATURITYt,t-1 + 0.4370*** 0.4258*** 0.4970*** 0.4588*** 0.6412*** 0.6347*** 
(0.0535) (0.0488) (0.0433) (0.0381) (0.0216) (0.0223) 
LEVERAGEt.t -/+ -0.0387 -0.1017 0.1187 0.0480 -0.1044 -0.0884 
(0.1162) (0.0999) (0.1516) (0.0732) (0.0887) (0.0945) 
LEVERAGE1.t-1 0.1737* 0.2360*** 0.0043 - 0.2380*** 0.2370*** 
(0.0897) (0.0814) (0.1218) 
-
(0.0544) (0.0573) 
TAXRATE1,t -/+ -0.0212 -0.0181 0.0092 0.0186* 0.0020 0.0034 
(0.0155) (0.0185) (0.0057) (0.01 02) (0.0185) (0.0205) 
T AXRATEt,t-1 -0.0056 - 0.0014 - -0.0014 -
(0.0088) - (0.0031) - (0.0058) -
MKT-TO-BOOI<t,t -/+ 0.0023 0.0071 0.0256 0.0094 0.0059* 0.0073** 
(0.0176) (0.0127) (0.0209) (0.0107) (0.0035) (0.0036) 
MKT-TO-BOOI<t,t-1 0.0102 - -0.0233 - 0.0008 -
(0.0186) - (0.0154) - (0.0017) -
SIZE~,~ + 0.0288 0.0044 -0.0161 0.0063 -0.0178 -0.0269 
(0.0231) (0.0085) (0.0275) (0.0088) (0.0205) (0.0201) 
SIZEt,t-1 -0.0276 - 0.0142 - 0.0355* 0.0440** 
(0.0229) - (0.027) - (0.0199) (0.0194) 
LIQUIDITYt,t -/+ 0.0417 0.0277 0.0030*** 0.0028*** 0.0326*** 0.0278** 
(0.0322) (0.0243) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
LIQUIDITY,,t-1 -0.0200 - -0.0001 - -0.0382*** -0.0301 *** 
(0.0166) - (0.0005) - (0.0099) (0.0090) 
ASSETMATt,t + 0.0020 0.0013 0.0013* 0.0014 0.0007 0.0004 
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
ASSETMAT n-1 -0.0002 - -0.0005 - 0.0003 -
(0.0015) - (0.0006) - (0.0004) -
OUALITY1.1 - 0.0191 0.0087 -0.0033 -0.0006 -0.0708* -0.0613 
(0.0138) (0.0093) (0.0313) (0.0299) (0.0402) (0.0462) 
QUALITYi.t-1 -0.0056 - -0.0128 - 0.0023 -
(0.0075) - (0.0257) - (0.0212) -
EARNINGS VOLt,t - 0.0056** 0.0052* -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0009 
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
EARNINGS VOLt,t-1 0.0001 - 0.0001 - -0.0005 -
(0.0002) - (0.0003) - (0.0003) -
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TERM-STRUCTR + -0.0034 -0.0038 0.0027 0.0017 0.0016*** 0.0021*** 
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
SHARE PRICE + 0.0103 0.0167 0.0253* 0.0150 0.0079* 0.0068 
(0.0129) (0.0123) (0.0151) (0.0132) (0.0050) (0.0052) 
INTEREST VOL + -0.0002 0.0053 0.0117 0.0191 -0.0102** -0.0119** 
(0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0233) (0.0218) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
Constant 0.1945* 0.1442 0.2593*** 0.1697 -0.0182 -0.0091 
(0.1094) (0.1333) (0.0724) (0.1369) (0.0260) (0.0273) 
Correlation1 -5.681*** -6.065*** -8.810*- -9.094*** -19.81*** -19.76*** 
Correlation2 1.0815 1.0909 0.5639 0.3629 2.662*** 2.659*** 
Sargan Test (df) 210.2 (602) 248.9 (611) 261.3 (296) 283.2 (305) 731.2 (764) 645 (679) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 160.5 (21)*** 158.3 (14)*** 289.2 (21)*** 194.7 (13)*** 3853 (21)*** 3695 (16)*-
Wald Test-2 (df) 23.45 (14)* 37.22 (15)*** 45.12 (14)*** 36.51 (14)*** 51.26 (15)*** 60.73 (15)-
R2 0.4938 0.4749 0.4786 0.4493 0.5985 0.5906 
Firms I Observations 249/2104 283/2317 449/3583 455/3823 1981 /25787 2106/2733 3 
Estimation Period 1986-1999 1985-1999 1990-1999 1989-1999 1972-2000 1971-1999 
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See notes in Table 6.1 for variable definitions. Industry dummies are included in all models. Correlation I and 2 are first and 
second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O,l) under the null of no 
serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as r(dt) under the null of 
instruments' validity. Wald Tests 1 and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of industry dummies, 
respectively; asymptotically distributed as r(dt) under the null of no relationship.(*),(**) and(***) indicates that coefficients 
are significant or the relevant null is rejected at I 0, 5 and l percent level, respectively. 
Table 6.9: Static long-run relationship between debt maturity and firm- and market-specific 
factors. 
a) Dependent Variable: MATURITY1t 
Independent Predicted FRANCE GERMANY UK 
Variables Sign General Specific General Specific General Specifi, c 
LEVERAGE1.t -I+ 0.2398* 0.2340** 0.2444** 0.0900 0.3724*** 0.4066*** 
(0.1409) (0.1135) (0.0980) (0.1356) (0.1236) (0.1242) 
TAXRATEi.t -/+ -0.0476 -0.0316 0.0210 0.0344* 0.0018 0.0094 
(0.0370) (0.0317) (0.0145) (0.0190) (0.0628) (0.0562) 
MKT-TO-BOOKi,t -I+ 0.0223 0.0124 0.0044 0.0173 0.0188** 0.0199** 
(0.0171) (0.0222) (0.0157) (0.0199) (0.0095) (0.0100) 
SIZEI.t + 0.0021 0.0076 -0.0039 0.0117 0.0493*** 0.0467*** 
(0.0092) (0.0148) (0.0072) (0.0163) (0.0042) (0.0044) 
LIQUIDITYi,t -I+ 0.0386 0.0483 0.0059*** 0.0052*** -0.0156 -0.0063 
(0.0346) (0.0418) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0194) (0.0181) 
ASSETMAT1.t + 0.0031* 0.0023 0.0017 0.0026 0.0029*** 0.0011 
(0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0012) 
QUALITY~.~ - 0.0239 0.0151 -0.0320 -0.0011 -0.1909 -0.1678 
(0.0364) (0.0162) (0.1086) (0.0552) (0.1608) (0.1266) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t - 0.0101** 0.0091* -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0027 -0.0024 
(0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.003) 
EQUITY PREMIUM -I+ -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
TERM-STRUCTR + -0.0061 -0.0067 0.0054 0.0032 0.0044*** 0.0059*** 
(0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
SHARE PRICE + 0.0182 0.0291 0.0502* 0.0277 0.0219* 0.0186 
(0.0228) (0.0214) (0.0293) (0.0239) (0.0133) (0.0140) 
INTEREST VOL + -0.0003 0.0092 0.0233 0.0353 -0.0284** -0.0326** 
(0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0465) (0.0403) (0.0144) (0.0146) 
These results are based on the models m Table 6.8. See notes m Table 6.8. 
Table 6.9 shows the static long-run relationship between debt maturity and firm-
specific factors based on specific and general dynamic specification (see equation [6.1]) 
with reference to Table 6.8. The GMM estimates for the long-run model are obtained 
using the following general equation. The implications of these long-run relationships 
will be discussed in depth in the next sections. 
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Maturity:= (p2 + p3 )Leverage: +(p4 + Ps )raxRate: +(p6 + p1 )Market to Book:+ 
I - pl I - PJ I - PJ 
( Ps + p9 )Firm Size • + ( PJO + p11 )Liquidity• + ( p12 + Pn )Asset Maturity~ + I - pl II I - pl II I - pl II 
( p14 + p15 )Firm Quality;,+ (p16 + Pn )Earnings Volatility:+ (Pis+ p19 )Market Equity Premium:+ I - pl 1 - pl I - pl 
( p20 + p21 )Term Structure;, + ( p22 + p23 )share Price Change: + ( p24 + p25 )Interest Rate Volatility: ( 6.5) I - pl I - PJ I - pl 
6.4.2.4.1. Lagged Maturity 
Our model captures the dynamics in firms' debt maturity decisions as the lagged-maturity 
coefficient is significantly positive at 1% level and less than unity for all cases in Table 
6.8. It implies the presence of costly and non-instantaneous adjustment process towards 
target maturity structure147 • (Firms may not immediately change their maturity structure, 
which indicates the presence of adjustment costs). Thus, our proposed model for dynamic 
debt maturity structure is shown to be relevant with these results. 
With respect to the adjustment speed (8=1-[coefficient of lagged-maturity], see equation 
[6.4]), with the highest adjustment coefficients French firms are the quickest ones in 
adjusting themselves to desired debt maturity structure. This is consistent with the idea 
that time dimension constructs a very important variable explaining the evolution of 
firms' debt ratios in France (Kremp et al. [1999]). It seems the adjustment process is 
relatively very costly and slow in the UK, where the adjustment coefficient is lowest. It 
can also be argued that the cost of not being on the targeted (equilibrium) debt ratio is 
insignificant for UK firms. Thus, it may not be very important for UK firms to adjust 
quickly their maturity structure. Germany seems to be the middle case in this adjustment 
process. Overall, the results seem to reveal that the dynamic debt maturity structure 
implied by our model is not rejected as firms tend to trade-off between transaction costs 
of being on-target and disequilibrium costs of being off-target. 
6.4.2.4.2. Leverage 
The results in Table 6.9 reveal that the association of leverage with maturity is 
significantly positive in all countries148• This is in line with the idea that firms with higher 
147 Mitchell [1993], Schiantarelli and Srivastava [I997], Schiantarelli and Sembenelli [I997], Newberry and 
Novack [1999], and Ozkan [2000] also report significantly positive lagged maturity coefficient. 
148 Cai et al. [I999], Kim et al. [1995], Schiantarelli and Srivastava [I997] and Stohs and Mauer [I996] find 
the same association. However, Mitchell [1993], Dennis et al. [2000], and Barclay et al. [2002] fmd an 
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debt-ratios attempt to control bankruptcy risk and costs, and delay a crisis at maturity by 
lengthening debt maturity. (Boot and Frankfurter [1972], Morris [1976b], Morris [1992]). 
Higher leverage increases the liquidation probability, thus, issuing long-term debt 
becomes more advantageous. High leverage can be a proxy for lack of growth 
opportunities such that few growth options imply less severe agency problems between 
debtholders and shareholders; thus more debt with longer maturity. (Schiantarelli and 
Sembenelli [ 1997]). 
Thus, the results are inconsistent with the monitoring hypothesis that higher leverage 
causes higher monitoring costs and shorter maturity accelerates the frequency of creditors 
audit. In addition, tax-bankruptcy (signalling) arguments implying negative (no) 
relationship between leverage and maturity are not confirmed. 
6.4.2.4.3. Effective Tax Rate 
The results concerning the relation between tax rate and maturity differ across countries. 
The estimated coefficient of effective tax rate in Table 6.9 is statistically insignificant in 
the UK149• This may be due to the fact that unlike in France and Germany reported 
accounting income is not affected by tax considerations in the UK where financial 
accounting and tax accounting are separated. We detect a significantly positive tax 
coefficient in Germany ('specific' case in Table 6.9). Newberry and Novack [1999], and 
Ozkan [2000] report the same type of association. This is not in line with the trade-off 
hypothesis that firms increase their debt maturity as tax benefits decline such that 
remaining benefits are not less than amortised flotation costs. This positive impact is 
consistent with tax clientele argument that firms with high marginal tax rates and with 
ability to use interest tax shields effectively tend to issue long-term debt in current and 
future periods150• This finding may be due to relatively high rates in German tax system 
creating potential tax shields. It may also imply that lenders are not concerned about the 
possibility that the relatively high required rate of return for long-term debt causes firms 
to shift to risky projects. This story is consistent with the idea that corporate governance 
system in Germany is designed to mitigate agency costs. 
inverse causation. Our reported results are based on book-leverage. The alternative measurement, market-
leverage, did not change the quality of results. 
149 It is also argued by Lewis [1990], and reported by Guedes and Opler [1996], Dennis et al. [2000] and 
Ozkan [2002] that taxes have no impact on maturity policies. 
150 Gordon and Lee [2001] report that corporate tax rates have positive influence on both short-term and 
long-term debt but their effect is found to be 50% higher on the use of the former. This might be due to the 
flexibility of short-term debt in adjusting to annual changes in tax rates. 
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On the other hand, the same coefficient is insignificant in France. In fact, it is known that 
potential tax benefits are prone to diminish under French tax system due to declining tax 
rates. This in tum reduces the importance of tax considerations while deciding debt 
maturity structure. 
6.4.2.4.4. Market-to-book ratio 
It is revealed in Table 6.9 that market-to-book ratio and debt maturity are significantly 
positively correlated in the UK. In the literature 151 , consistent with Myers' [1977] 
argument that shortening debt maturity mitigates underinvestment problems, mostly a 
significantly negative association between growth opportunities and maturity is reported. 
However, our results do not confirm contracting-cost hypothesis and the argument that 
firms with greater information asymmetries issue less long-term debt. Similarly, Stohs 
and Mauer [1996] find no evidence for the agency cost hypothesis as the estimated 
market-to-book ratio coefficient is either insignificant or significantly positive152• 
Consequently, our results for the UK confirm the liquidity risk argument that firms can 
avoid inefficient liquidation of their risky growth opportunities by issuing long-term debt. 
Another reason for this positive impact could be that high growth firms face substantial 
hold-up problems and thus choose long-term debt. 
The non-negative and insignificant market-to-book ratio coefficient in Germany, 
according to Myers [1977], should imply the insignificance of suboptimal investment 
concerns. This may be due to Chan-Lau's [2001] argument that the advantages of a 
specific corporate governance system are not necessarily related to information 
asymmetries; apart from mitigating the shareholders-managers conflicts, bank-oriented 
systems may also curtail underinvestment problems. Furthermore, Bah and Dumontier 
[200 1] document that R&D-intensive (growth) firms in Europe and the USA use 
significantly higher levels of short-term debt due to underinvestment risks. They do not 
151 See, e.g., Barclay and Smith [1995], Datta and Iskandar-Datta [2000), Dennis eta!. [2000), Guedes and 
Opler [ 1996], Ozkan [2000]). 
15 Barclay and Smith [1995] fmd market-to-book ratio and maturity to be significantly inversely related by 
omitting leverage from the model and thus implicitly assuming the endogeneity of leverage. However, 
Stohs and Mauer [1996) assume leverage is exogenous and find a significantly positive relationship 
between maturity and leverage, and insignificant estimate of market-to-book ratio variable in the cross-
section regression. Later Barclay et a!. [2002] use 2SLS estimation including leverage and again report 
significantly negative association of maturity with leverage and market-to-book ratio. Dennis et a!. [2000] 
show ignoring endogeneity substantially biases the results: Assuming endogeneity of leverage and contract 
terms, they find both leverage and market-to-book ratio are significantly negatively related to maturity, as 
in Barclay and Smith. If they ignore the endogeneity, leverage (market-to-book ratio) and maturity are 
reported to be significantly (insignificantly) positively (negatively) correlated. After excluding leverage 
from the model in our country-samples, the downward bias in the estimate of market-to-book ratio is 
confirmed for France and Germany but not for the UK. 
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find any differences among firms in UK, France, Germany in this respect but imply 
negative relationship between maturity and growth. However, our results show that the 
relationship between maturity and growth opportunities varies across countries. 
Dennis et al. [2000] argue that reducing leverage is a substitute for pledging collateral to 
control agency problems, which increases debt maturity as agency problems are curtailed. 
We do not find supportive evidence for this idea as we obtain that maturity is positively 
associated with market-to-book ratio in the UK and positively associated with leverage in 
all countries. 
6.4.2.4.5. Firm Size 
The results in Table 6.9 show that firm size has no significant impact on firms' debt 
maturity decisions in France and in Germany153 • This is an uncommon finding as there is 
no study in the literature reporting insignificant estimate of size coefficient. It should be 
emphasised that no study has examined the determinants of debt maturity structure of 
French and German firms. Thus, this insignificance may be due to the country-specific 
factors that should be focused on. For instance, this finding is in line with the 
conventional wisdom that indirect bankruptcy costs (implicit in firm size) are less in 
Germanic and Latinic economies than in Anglo-Saxon economies due to corporate 
ownership structure and long-run relationship between firms and external financiers in 
the former154 . On the other hand, confirming the above argument we find that firm size 
and debt maturity are significantly and positively associated at 1% level in the UK. This 
is a very common finding in the literature155• This commonality may be due to the fact 
that mostly US firms are examined in empirical debt maturity studies and it is known that 
financial and institutional environments in the US and UK are similar. This finding 
confirms the arguments related to affordable transaction costs, easy access to capital 
markets, lower information asymmetries, reputational considerations, and weak incentive 
problems, which are all relevant for larger firms to be able to issue long-term debt. 
153 The results are based on finn size measured by total sales. Alternative size measurement by total assets 
did not change the quality of results. 
1
s
4 In fact, the proportion of long-term credit to total credit in the corporate sector is 78%, 73%, 50% in 
Germany, France and the UK, respectively (Borio [1996]). 
Iss See, e.g., Barclay and Smith [1995], Dennis et al. [2000], Ozkan [2000], Stohs and Mauer [1996]. On 
the other hand, Guedes and Opler [1996], Scherr and Hulburt [2001] are two exceptions who fmd 
significantly negatively relationship between size and maturity. This may be due to the liquidity risk 
argument that higher bankruptcy probability (lower finn size) is associated with longer debt maturity. 
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6.4.2.4.6. Liquidity 
The association between debt maturity and liquidity is insignificant in France and in the 
UK (Table 6.9). However, the same association is significantly positive at 1% level in 
Germany. Morris [1992] and Schiantarelli and Srivastava [1997] also fmd a direct effect 
of liquidity on maturity. It may be that German firms with longer maturity hold greater 
liquidity in case they will not be able to meet the fixed payments of long-term debt during 
economic recessions (shortage problem). It is also known that bankruptcy costs, 
probability of being liquidated once entered the lengthy insolvency procedure are 
relatively high in Germany. This would motivate German firms to be liquid if they decide 
to issue long-term debt since healthier balance sheet conditions could improve the access 
to long-term finance. This motivation may also come from the German banks who are 
capable of reducing the financial distress costs via close control and monitoring of 
management. Likewise, the insignificant liquidity coefficient in France may be due to the 
underlying philosophy of French bankruptcy laws, which is the rehabilitation of firms 
through reorganisation rather than liquidation. This will make French firms have 
relatively low incentives to be liquid while borrowing long-term. 
Although insignificant, negative liquidity coefficient in the UK may imply that, due to 
liquidity risk of short-term debt, firms may be asked by short-term financiers (e.g., banks) 
to hold compensating liquid balances (Schiantarelli and Sembenelli [1997]). More 
plausibly, as liquidity is promoted in market-oriented economies UK firms may have 
better opportunities to avoid liquidity risk than their counterparts. With the same token, 
this also implies that German firms who might have liquidity problems do not necessarily 
get immediate help from the banks. 
6.4.2.4.7. Asset Maturity 
It is known as a stylised fact that firms match their debt maturities to asset maturities (the 
immunisation hypothesis). Except Dennis et al. [2000], all other empirical studies report a 
significantly positive relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity. We have 
been able to find the same association for the UK firms (Table 6.9, 'general' 
specification). This finding is in line with the idea that firms match the maturities of their 
liabilities and assets as a hedging policy, in part to control underinvestment and 
bankruptcy problems. 
However, asset maturity has no significant impact on debt maturity decisions in Germany 
and the asset maturity coefficient is significantly positive only at 10 % in France. This 
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finding confirms Claessens et al.'s [1999] argument that there is a mismatch between the 
maturity structure of assets and liabilities in civil law countries. The estimated 
coefficients of non-negative market-to-book ratio and insignificant asset maturity 
variables in Germany may imply the absence of underinvestment problems. Concentrated 
share-ownership and firms' close relationship with their financiers in Germany may be 
driving forces to mitigate such agency problems. Furthermore, Goswami [2000] shows 
that costs of adverse selection may induce some mismatching of debt maturity and asset 
maturity in the presence of significant transaction costs. 
6.4.2.4.8. Firm Quality 
Barclay and Smith [1995], Stohs and Mauer [1996] and Scherr and Hulburt [2001] find 
that firm quality and maturity are significantly and negatively correlated, which supports 
the signalling hypothesis that high-quality firms with expected superior future earnings 
issue short-term debt156• In this case, positive information effect outweighs the liquidity 
risk. However, like Dennis et al. [2000], we find little support for the signalling 
hypothesis in Germany and in the UK as the coefficients of quality variable are only 
insignificantly negative (Table 6.9). Further support to the signalling hypothesis is due to 
the negative relation between maturity and current quality variable in the UK, which is 
significant at 10% in the short-run model (Table 6.8). In addition, the association of debt 
maturity with firm quality is positive but insignificant in France. No theory predicts a 
positive relationship and only Schiantarelli and Sembenelli [1997] report a significantly 
positive effect of firm quality (but proxied by cash flow) on debt maturity. One possible 
explanation to this non-negative association can be Diamond's [1993] contention that 
short-term debt may cause inefficient liquidation and thus good firms may prefer a 
combination of short- and long-term debt due to liquidity risk. Another one may be due 
to Diamond [1991 b] who proposes a non-monotonic relationship between debt maturity 
and firm quality such that only medium-rated firms issue long-term debt, and very low-
rated and highly-rated firms choose short-term debt157• If these explanations are not 
satisfactory, then, country-specific factors may partially be responsible for such a 
156 However, Barclay and Smith argue that finn quality tends to be unstable overtime: signalling hypothesis 
is relevant especially for time-series analysis; thus, may not be well captured by cross-sectional analysis. 
157 The prediction of reverse-U shape relation between quality and maturity gets strong empirical support 
from Stohs and Mauer [1996]. To test this prediction, we used SQUARED-QUALITY variable, which 
takes the square of QUALITY variable. To retain the original sign, it is multiplied by (-I) if QUALITY<O. 
It is expected that maturity is positively correlated with QUALITY and negatively correlated with 
SQUARED-QUALITY such that maturity increases as firm quality deteriorate at a decreasing rate. The 
regression results show that for France the coefficients have expected signs but they are insignificant, for 
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relation. Ball et al. [2000] argue that asymmetric information is more likely to be 
resolved in code-law countries than in common-law countries due to firms' close relations 
with major stakeholders. The insignificant quality coefficients in Germany and France 
may partially be explained by this view. 
6.4.2.4.9. Earnings Volatility 
Our results in Table 6.9 show that earnings volatility has no significant influence upon 
debt maturity decisions for German and UK firms. The insignificant but negative 
estimated coefficients of earnings volatility in these countries give only limited support to 
the theory. Cai et al. [1999] also report insignificant and negative coefficients. Contrary 
to the theory's prediction and empirical findings of Dennis et al. [2000] and Ozkan 
[2002], debt maturity and earnings volatility are significantly and positively correlated in 
France. One possible explanation could be that firms with more volatile earnings prefer to 
issue long-term debt due to liquidation concerns. Consequently, the theory fails to explain 
the positive relationship in France. This may lead us to conclude that theories should also 
consider, e.g., the corporate governance systems of countries in order to produce more 
comprehensive propositions. 
6.4.2.4.10. Control (Market-related) Variables 
Equity Premium 
The results in Table 6.9 show that the association of debt maturity with equity premium is 
country dependent. The relationship between debt maturity and market equity premium is 
insignificant in France and Germany. This finding implies that debt markets and equity 
markets do not seem to be integrated. On the other hand, there is a significantly positive 
correlation between equity premium and debt maturity. Thus, UK firms tend to issue 
long-term debt if equity premium is high. As discussed in Baker et al. [200 1 ], this can be 
managers' attempt to minimise the cost of capital in an environment where debt and 
equity markets are integrated. This is parallel to the argument that returns on equity and 
debt markets move together (Fama and French [1989]). 
Term Structure of Interest Rates 
Table 6.9 results provide no support for the tax hypothesis of Brick and Ravid in France 
and Germany as the estimated coefficient of term-structure variable is insignificantly 
different from zero158• On the other hand, the coefficient estimate on term-structure 
Germany and the UK the coefficients are insignificant with unexpected signs. Since including SQUARED-
QUALITY in the model did not change the results for other variables, we do not report them. 
158 Cai et al. [1999], Kim et al. [1995], and Stohs and Mauer [1996] also find an insignificant term-structure 
coefficient. 
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variable is positive and significant at 1 % in the UK. This lends strong support to the tax 
hypothesis that debt maturity is positively related to the slope of the term-structure159• It 
implies that UK firms issue more long-term debt when the slope of term-structure is 
positive in order to accelerate the tax benefits of debt. Hence, French and German firms 
do not seem to give importance to these tax considerations while deciding the debt 
maturity structure. 
Share Price Performance 
We find that the association of debt maturity with share price performance is not uniform 
across countries. In France, any change in stock prices does not seem to affect the debt 
maturity decisions. Guedes and Opler [1996] also report that past stock price runup and 
the maturity of new debt issues are not significantly correlated. However, the same 
relationship is positive and significant at 10% in Germany and in the UK under 'general' 
specification in (Table 6.9). This positive impact confirms the asymmetric information 
models (see Lucas and McDonald [1990]) that firms issue informationally disadvantaged 
securities (long-term debt) after the rise in their share prices. 
Interest Rate Volatility 
Table 6.9 findings reveal that debt maturity structure is not affected by interest rate 
volatility in France and Germany as the relevant coefficients are insignificant, which is 
consistent with the empirical finding of Guedes and Opler [1996]. This is not in line with 
the theory which predicts a significantly positive relation160• On the other hand, the 
association of debt maturity with interest rate volatility is significantly negative in the 
UK. Thus, UK firms tend to shorten their debt maturity if interest rates are volatile. This 
negative finding is inconsistent with the positive findings of Kim et al. [1995] and Dennis 
et al. [2000]. 
In general, it appears that the market-related factors have significant impact on 
debt maturity decisions in the UK but not in other sample countries. 
6.4.2.5. GMM Estimates of Static Models 
In this section, the results for a static debt maturity model are presented in Table 6.10 
assuming that target debt maturity is instantaneously adjusted as a reaction to random 
159 The same association is found by Newberry and Novack [ 1999], and Dennis et al. [2000]. However, our 
fmding for the UK is not in line with the findings of Barclay and Smith [1995], and Guedes and Opler 
[ 1996], who report significantly negative term-structure coefficients. 
160 The tax-timing option theory argues that an increase in interest rate volatility reduces the present value 
of the tax shields from short-term debt financing while the present value of the tax shields from long-term 
debt fmancing does not change, assuming a convex corporate tax function. In this case, issuing long-term 
debt would be advantageous. 
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changes in the business and firms' conditions. In other words, it is assumed that there is 
no lag in adjustment process toward an optimal debt maturity structure. 
It is especially noteworthy to discuss the results of static models for the UK in Table 
6.1 0, which are different from the results in Table 6.9 in some cases. As predicted by the 
signalling hypothesis, firm quality now exerts strongly negative influence on debt 
maturity as the coefficient is significant at 1%. The tax rate and liquidity variables have 
significantly positive coefficients, which were insignificant in Table 6.9. However, 
market-to-book ratio and share price performance coefficients have become insignificant, 
which were significant in Table 6.9. The results for the remaining variables are the same 
in both tables. The significant variables in static models for France are tax rate and share 
price performance, which were insignificant in Table 6.9. As for Germany, the findings 
of static debt maturity structure generally support the results of dynamic models. 
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Table 6.10: Static debt maturity structure using GMM-SYS estimations. 
Independent Predicted Dependent Variable: MATURITY1,t 
Variables Sign FRANCE GERMANY UK 
LEVERAGE1,t -/+ 0.2184** 0.0514 0.2778*** 
(0.1107} (0. 1006} (0.0836} 
TAXRATE1,t -/+ -0.0458** 0.0280* -0.0386* 
(0.0222} (0.0162} (0.0215} 
MKT-T0-800~.1 -/+ -0.0073 -0.0021 0.0085 
(0.0147} (0.0127) (0.0055) 
SIZE1,t + 0.0142 0.0149 0.0776*** 
(0.0118) (0.0135) (0.0067) 
LIQUIDITYI,t -I+ 0.0330 0.0033** 0.0356** 
(0.0345) (0.0013) (0.0174) 
ASSETMATi.t + 0.0012 0.0007 0.0012** 
(0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0006) 
OUALITY1.t - 0.0108 -0.0165 -0.1817*** 
(0.0075) (0.0305) (0.0681) 
EARNINGS VOL1,t - 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0008} 
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ -0.0003 -0.0007* 0.0007*** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
TERM-STRUCTR + -0.0023 -0.0012 0.0043*** 
(0.004) (0.0028) (0.0009) 
SHARE PRICE + 0.0362* 0.0829*** 0.0067 
(0.0214) (0.0321} (0.0134) 
INTEREST VOL + 0.0061 -0.0345 0.0148** 
(0.0075} (0.0264} (0.0074) 
Constant 0.2264 0.3800* -0.3671*** 
(0.1862) (0.1969} (0.0861) 
Correlation 1 -5.292*** -7.627*** -17.16*** 
Correlation2 0.0501 0.8470 -6.614*** 
Sargan Test (df) 239.9 (340) 257.5 (267) 409.8 (451) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 28.51 (12)*** 21.43 (12)** 251.4 (12)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 61.54 (15)*** 45.92 (14)*** 115.3 (15)*** 
R2 0.0783 0.0463 0.1310 
Firms I Observations 283/2322 458/3894 2152/28113 
Estimation Period 1985-1999 1989-1999 1971-1999 
See notes m Table 6.8. 
It emerges that the corresponding coefficients of determination (R2) and Wald Test-1 
(joint significance) statistics of the dynamic models in Table 6.8 are much higher than 
that of static models in every case in Table 6.1 0. It shows the success and explanatory 
power of dynamic models relative to static ones. In general, the findings in both tables do 
not contradict each other in a way that if a coefficient is significantly positive in one case; 
it is not significantly negative in other case. Consequently, these findings can be a 
verification of appropriateness of dynamic models using GMM in debt maturity structure 
studies. 
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6.4.2.6. GMM Estimates based on Size classification 
This section investigates the size-specific behaviour of firms while deciding maturity of 
debt by focusing on the long-run implication of the models. Size classification is useful to 
reduce the heterogeneity bias and hence to improve the precision of results. It is known 
that GMM estimates are valid especially for large samples. However, the results based on 
reduced sample size due to size classification are still robust as they are corrected for 
small sample bias using Windmeijer [2000] procedure. As a general note for specification 
tests, all Correlation and Sargan tests strongly confirm that the models in all countries are 
correctly specified. 
Size classification results reveal the presence of adjustment process toward target 
debt maturity irrespective of country and size specification. Jalilvand and Harris [1984] 
report that large firms tend to adjust faster to the target long-term debt level than do small 
firms. In our sample, this is confirmed only for Germany (Table 6.13, 'specific' case) as 
large firms have the highest adjustment coefficient. For the UK (Table 6.15), we detect 
the reverse case as large firms have the lowest and small firms have the highest 
adjustment coefficients. There is a non-monotonous order for the French sample (Table 
6.11) such that small firms have the highest and medium firms have the lowest 
adjustment coefficients. 
The size-classification results for France show that significantly positive relation 
between maturity and leverage in Table 6.9 seems to be driven by small firms. It implies 
that liquidation concerns are substantial especially for small firms in France. The 
coefficient estimate of tax variable is insignificant across size groups, which may be due 
to French tax system stressing the retention of earnings via reduced tax rates, which ends 
up with reduced tax shields. Similarly, the impact of firm quality on maturity seems to be 
insignificant across size classes, except in the short-run model for medium firms in which 
the coefficient of current quality variable is significantly positive. The results with respect 
to the long run effects of market-to-book ratio on maturity in 'general' case are 
interesting. The positive effects of growth opportunities for the full sample in Table 6.9 
appear to be driven by again small firms. However, the association of maturity with 
market-to-book ratio is significantly negative for large firms, which implies the 
possibility of suboptimal investment policies due to agency costs. As a result, large 
French firms issue short-term debt to mitigate underinvestment problems. Furthermore, 
liquidity ratios exert significantly positive impact debt maturity across all size classes 
especially small firms. In Table 6.8 for the full sample, we reported the same direction 
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but size classification seems to reduce heterogeneity bias as it yields significant estimated 
coefficients in Table 6.12. The stylised fact of maturity matching principle is confirmed 
only by medium-sized French firms with the significantly positive asset maturity 
coefficient. The relationship between earnings volatility and maturity is significantly 
positive for small and medium firms but insignificant for large firms. Another discernible 
pattern is that the association of maturity with share price performance is significant and 
positive only for large firms. Finally, the remaining market-related factors, i.e., interest 
rate volatility, term structure of interest rates and equity premium, have no significant 
influence on maturity decisions of any of the size classes. 
We report the long-run regression results for size classification for Germany in 
Table 6.14. The results with respect to leverage, tax rate, asset maturity, earnings 
volatility and interest rate volatility variables do not change across size classes and they 
have all insignificant coefficients. However, the findings of short-run models in Table 
6.13 show that maturity is significantly and positively associated with lagged-leverage 
and current asset maturity variable only for medium firms. On the other hand, as 
predicted by the theory, market-to-book ratio is significant and negative only for medium 
firms (under 'specific' case in Table 6.14). It seems that large German firms, with the 
insignificant coefficient of liquidity variable, dot not consider the liquidity risk as an 
important concern. On the other hand, it is the medium and especially small firms who 
hold greater liquidity against the possible shortage problems, which otherwise might 
cause them to be in an insolvency situation. As found in France, only medium-sized 
German firms tend to match the maturity of their assets and liabilities. Contrary to what 
theory expects, firm quality seems to directly affect debt maturity decisions of only 
medium firms. It is again only for medium firms in which debt maturity and equity 
premium are significantly and negatively correlated. As predicted by the theory, the 
relationship between term-structure and debt maturity is significantly positive for 
medium firms. Finally, similar to the case in France, only for large firms is there 
significant and positive relationship between debt maturity and share price performance. 
In Table 6.16, long-run size classification results for the UK are reported. The 
association of maturity with leverage is insignificant only for medium firms and 
significantly positive for small and large firms confirming the results in Table 6.9. 
Surprisingly, term-structure and share price performance variables do not play any 
significant role in debt maturity decisions across different size classes. The coefficients of 
both variables were significantly positive for the full sample case in Table 6.9. It seems 
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that liquidity risk argument related to growth opportunities is pertinent for medium UK 
firms as the coefficient estimate of the market-to-book ratio variable is significant and 
positive only in this category. The tax clientele argument receives some support from the 
significantly positive relationship between tax rate and maturity for large firms. It seems 
apparent that all size classes of UK firms match their debt maturities with asset maturities 
as the asset maturity coefficient is significantly positive in all cases. Furthermore, it is 
only for large firms where debt maturity is significantly and positively associated with tax 
rate and liquidity ratio. The same associations were not significant for the full sample 
case in Table 6.9. Another success of size classification is due to the significantly 
negative correlation between debt maturity and earnings volatility for large firms, which 
is predicted by the theory. In the full sample, the coefficient estimate of earnings 
volatility variable was insignificant. Consistent with the signalling theory, debt maturity 
and firm quality are significantly and negatively correlated only for small firms ('general' 
case in Table 6.16). Finally, confirming the findings in the full sample, the association of 
debt maturity is significantly positive with equity premium and significantly negative 
with interest rate volatility for large firms. 
In brief, the reported results based on the different firm size categories in our 
sample countries show that the implications of estimations in full sample and that of in 
size classification are not uniform. Thus, we capture some notable results which are 
attributable to only specific size groups. For instance, only medium-sized firms in France 
and Germany seem to apply maturity-matching principle. On the other hand, it seems 
that the results of size classification especially in the UK generally support our fmdings 
in the full sample. Hence, size classification results do not tend to be inconsistent with the 
full sample results and they give useful insights into our analysis. 
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Table 6.11: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure in France: Size Classification. 
Dependent Variable: MATURITY1 1 
Independent Predicted General Specific 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
MATURITY1.1-1 + 0.2462** 0.4367*** 0.4247*** 0.2467** 0.4940*** 0.4136*** 
(0.1159) (0.1139) (0.0983) (0.1151) (0.1146) (0.0851) 
LEVERAGEt.t -/+ 0.3922* 0.0007 0.1384 0.4938*** -0.0658 0.2802 
(0.2060) (0.1950) (0.2899) (0.1732) (0.1848) (0.1899) 
LEVERAGEt,t-1 0.1752 0.0129 0.0327 - - -
(0.1816) (0.1674) (0.2348) - - -
TAXRATEt,t -/+ 0.0041 -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0078 0.0002 
(0.0178) (0.0312) (0.0348) (0.0172) (0.037) (0.0372) 
T AXRA TEt,t-1 0.0170 -0.0086 0.0021 - - -
(0.0279) (0.0142) (0.0119) - - -
MKT-TO-BOOKt,t -/+ -0.0398 0.0217 -0.0172 -0.0326 0.0127 -0.0175 
(0.0384) (0.0172) (0.0323) (0.0386) (0.0121) (0.0288) 
MKT-TO-BOOKt,t-1 0.0824** 0.0013 -0.0303 0.0729* 
- -
(0.0410) (0.016) (0.0335) (0.0395) - -
LIQUIDITYt,t -/+ 0.0462** 0.2173*** 0.2003** 0.0463** 0.2079*** 0.2264*** 
(0.0206) (0.0493) (0.0875) (0.021 0) (0.0509) (0.0821) 
LIQUIDITY,,t-1 0.0223** -0.1476*** -0.1333* 0.0217** -0.1539*** -0.1218* 
(0.0096) (0.0479) (0.0703) (0.0094) (0.0460) (0.0676) 
ASSETMATt,t + 0.0022 0.0076** 0.0042 0.0024 0.0076** 0.0021 
(0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0022) 
ASSETMAT n-1 -0.0046* -0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0043* - -
(0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0026) (0.0024) - -
QUALITYi.t - -0.0019 0.0299 0.0224 -0.0122 0.0524* 0.0226 
(0.0280} (0.0392) (0.0366) (0.0258) (0.0307) (0.0231) 
QUALITYi.t-1 0.0113 -0.0062 -0.0039 - - -
(0.0282) (0.0390) (0.0178) - - -
EARNINGS VOLt,t - 0.0043 0.0193** 0.0058 0.0054 0.0141* 0.0095 
(0.0042) (0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0040) (0.0082) (0.0078) 
EARNINGS VOLt,t-1 0.0196** 0.0052* 0.0000 0.0189** 0.0040 -
(0.0079) (0.0031) (0.0002) (0.0076) (0.0035) -
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0005 
(0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
TERM-STRUCTR + 0.0118 -0.005 0.0029 0.0111 -0.0054 0.0022 
(0.0085} (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0085) (0.0042) (0.0039) 
~SHARE PRICE + 0.0256 -0.0031 0.0283* 0.0238 0.0009 0.0329** 
(0.0354) (0.0197) (0.0168) (0.0351) (0.0212) (0.0159) 
INTEREST VOL + 0.0238 -0.0026 -0.0013 0.0220 -0.0012 0.0043 
(0.0288) (0.0110) (0.0082) (0.0280) (0.0129) (0.0081) 
Constant 0.0256 -0.0648 0.1911* 0.0493 -0.0212 0.1074 
(0.0948) (0.1156) (0. 1113) (0.0957) (0.1469) (0.1183) 
Correlation 1 -2.861*** -3.791*** -4.211*** -2.873*** -3.811*** -4.697*** 
Correlation2 1.305 0.7235 0.9091 1.352 0.9774 1.180 
Sargan Test (df) 398.4 (535) 60.87 (535) 85.14 (535) 401 (535) 73.05 (535) 95.12 (543) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 90.77 (19)*** 208.9 (19)*** 77.51 (19)*** 72.51 (16)*** 114.5 (14)*** 59.80 (13)-
Wald Test-2 (df) 54.62 (13)*** 24.35 (14)** 34.23 (13)*** 57.42 (13)*** 14.79 (14) 29.49 (14)** 
R2 0.4319 0.5802 0.5485 0.4286 0.6115 0.5492 
Firms I Observations 41/228 98/722 110/1155 41/228 98/722 112/1227 
Estimation Period 1986-1999 1986-1999 1986-1999 1986-1999 1986-1999 1985-1999 
The firms were sorted accordmg to average total sales. See also notes m Table 6.8. 
253 
Table 6.12: Size classification for debt maturity in France: Static Long-run Relationship 
Independent Predicted General Specific 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
LEVERAGE1,t -/+ 0.7527*** 0.0243 0.2973 0.6554*** -0.1300 0.4779 
(0.2465) (0.2459) (0.2488) (0.2277) (0.3624) (0.3199) 
TAXRATE1,t -/+ 0.0279 -0.0180 0.0025 -0.0001 0.0155 0.0003 
(0.0553) (0.0674) (0.0738) (0.0229) (0.0716) (0.0635) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t -I+ 0.0566** 0.0410 -0.0825** 0.0534** 0.0252 -0.0298 
(0.0246) (0.0267) (0.0395) (0.0249) (0.0240) (0.0491) 
LIQUIDITYI,t -/+ 0.0910*** 0.1236** 0.1165 0.0903*** 0.1067* 0.1784** 
(0.0342) (0.0543) (0.0851) (0.034) (0.0599) (0.0712) 
ASSETMAT1,t + -0.0032 0.0134*** 0.0037 -0.0025 0.0150** 0.0035 
(0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0030) (0.0073) (0.0038) 
QUALITY~.~ - 0.0125 0.0421 0.0321 -0.0162 0.1036 0.0385 
(0.0602) (0.1000) (0.0928) (0.0345) (0.0657) (0.0398) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t - 0.0317** 0.0436*** 0.0101 0.0322** 0.0339* 0.0162 
(0.0125) (0.0159) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0193) (0.0133) 
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0008 
(0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
TERM-STRUCTR + 0.0157 -0.0088 0.0051 0.0147 -0.0107 0.0037 
(0.0107) (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0107) (0.0080) (0.0067) 
SHARE PRICE + 0.0340 -0.0055 0.0493* 0.0316 0.0017 0.0561* 
(0.0468) (0.0349) (0.0296) (0.0463) (0.0419) (0.0286) 
INTEREST VOL + 0.0315 -0.0047 -0.0022 0.0292 -0.0024 0.0074 
(0.0392) (0.0199) (0.0142) (0.0379) (0.0256) (0.0138) 
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Table 6.13: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure in Germany: Size Classification. 
Dependent Variable: MATURITY11 
Independent Predicted General Specific 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
MATURITY1,t-1 + 0.4427*** 0.4786*** 0.4538*** 0.4810*** 0.4586*** 0.4153*** 
(0.0787) (0.0730) (0.0662) (0.0622) (0.0673) (0.0605) 
LEVERAGE1,t -/+ 0.0241 -0.1992 -0.0466 0.0949 -0.2748 0.0939 
(0.1856) (0.1955) (0.2494) (0.0906) (0.1968) (0.1338) 
LEVERAGE1.t-1 0.1031 0.2793* 0.1478 - 0.3026* -
(0.1362) (0.1694) (0.2029) 
-
(0.1779) -
TAXRATE1.t -/+ 0.0057 0.0064 -0.0098 0.0000 0.0114 0.0068 
(0.0139) (0.0088) (0.0097) (0.0150) (0.0117) (0.0188) 
TAXRATE1.1-1 0.0066 -0.0021 -0.0066 - - -
(0.0080) (0.0058) (0.0053) - - -
MKT-TO-BOOK1,t -/+ 0.0129 -0.0674 0.0156 -0.0065 -0.0615* 0.0046 
(0.0236) (0.0518) (0.0184) (0.0177) (0.0337) (0.0268) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t-1 -0.0197 0.0328 -0.0141 - - -
(0.0181) (0.0389) (0.0150) - - -
LIQUIDITYi,t -/+ 0.0022** 0.0170* 0.0066 0.0030*** 0.0093 0.0132 
(0.0009) (0.0088) (0.0295) (0.0007) (0.0067) (0.0181) 
LIQUIDITYi,t-1 0.0004 0.0012 -0.0033 - - -
(0.0005) (0.0071) (0.0178) - - -
ASSETMAT1,t + 0.0004 0.0041*** 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0045*** 0.0029 
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0024) 
ASSETMATn-1 -0.0002 -0.0023** 0.0013 - -0.0024** -
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0024) - (0.0011) -
QUALITYu - 0.0289 0.0367 0.0036 0.0026 0.0712* -0.0281 
(0.0577) (0.0430) (0.0418) (0.0318) (0.0396) (0.0317) 
QUALITYI.t-1 0.0158 -0.0220 -0.0006 - - -
(0.0482) (0.0267) (0.0557) - - -
EARNINGS VOL~,~ - -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0044 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0025 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0073) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0046) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t-1 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 - - -
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0020) 
- - -
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ 0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0011** -0.0003 
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
TERM-STRUCTR + 0.0029 0.0075 0.0041 0.0019 0.0055 0.0019 
(0.0064) (0.0047) (0.0033) (0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0029) 
SHARE PRICE + 0.0346 0.0226 0.0378* 0.0361 0.0318 0.0329* 
(0.0327) (0.0208) (0.0199) (0.0312) (0.0206) (0.0198) 
INTEREST VOL + 0.0328 0.0423 -0.0145 0.0664 0.0140 -0.0267 
(0.0614) (0.0446) (0.0316) (0.0522) (0.0401) (0.0326) 
Constant 0.3749 0.3113*** 0.2499*** 0.2883* 0.3969*** 0.2685*** 
(0.2460) (0.0804) (0.0636) (0.1496) (0.0924) (0.0644) 
Correlation 1 -4.442*** -5.250*** -5.462*** -4.595*** -5.394*** -5.692*** 
Correlation2 0.3719 -0.0799 0.4559 0.3815 -0.0635 0.1742 
Sargan Test (df) 84.45 (239) 132 (239) 145.6 (263) 97.90 (247) 139.3 (247) 158.8 (271) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 195.8 (19)*** 212.4 (19)*** 121.1 (19)*** 129.3 (12)*** 112.8 (14)*** 72.48 (12)** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 39.71 (14)*** 52.41 (14)*** 32.42 (14)*** 39.95 (14)*** 36.26 (14)*** 38.09 (14)** 
R2 0.4904 0.4985 0.4580 0.4996 0.4748 0.4317 
Firms I Observations 115/895 159/1189 181/1535 118/931 160/1221 181/1666 
Estimation Period 1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 1989-1999 1989-1999 
The firms were sorted accordmg to average total sales. See also notes m Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.14: Size classification for debt maturity in Germany: Static Long-run Relationship 
Independent Predicted General Specific 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
LEVERAGE,,t -I+ 0.2282 0.1535 0.1852 0.1828 0.0515 0.1605 
(0.1651) (0.1229) (0.1798) (0.1756) (0.1218) (0.2276) 
TAXRATE,,t -/+ 0.0221 0.0083 -0.0301 0.0000 0.0211 0.0116 
(0.0299) (0.0245) (0.0231) (0.0290) (0.0218) (0.0319) 
MKT-TO-BOOKu -/+ -0.0122 -0.0665 0.0027 -0.0126 -0.1136* 0.0078 
(0.0229) (0.0439) (0.0417) (0.0339) (0.0616) (0.0459) 
LIQUIDITY1•1 -/+ 0.0047*** 0.0350*** 0.0061 0.0058*** 0.0172 0.0225 
(0.0017) (0.0122) (0.0279) (0.0014) (0.0124) (0.0312) 
ASSETMATu + 0.0005 0.0033 0.0039 -0.0002 0.0039 0.0050 
(0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0041) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0041) 
QUALITY~.~ - 0.0801 0.0282 0.0055 0.0050 0.1316* -0.0480 
(0.1732) (0.1270) (0.1700) (0.0611) (0.0788) (0.0543) 
EARNINGS VOL,,1 - -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0082 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0043 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0150) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0079) 
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ 0.0000 -0.0015 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0020** -0.0005 
(0.0013) (0.0010} (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0006) 
TERM-STRUCTR + 0.0052 0.0145* 0.0076 0.0037 0.0101 0.0033 
(0.0116) (0.0086) (0.0061) (0.0101) (0.0089) (0.0051) 
~SHARE PRICE + 0.0621 0.0433 0.0692* 0.0695 0.0587 0.0563* 
(0.0594) (0.0388) (0.0365) (0.0604) (0.0365) (0.0332) 
INTEREST VOL + 0.0589 0.0812 -0.0266 0.1280 0.0259 -0.0456 
(0.1098) (0.0841) (0.0578) (0.1011) (0.0740) (0.0556) 
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Table 6.15: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure in the UK: Size Classification. 
Dependent Variable: MATURITY1 1 
Independent Predicted General Specific 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
MATURITY1.t-1 + 0.6634*** 0.6235*** 0.7406*** 0.6600*** 0.6274*** 0.7385*** 
(0.0373) (0.0368) (0.0356) (0.0384) (0.0361) (0.0359) 
LEVERAGE1,t -/+ 0.0301 -0.0943 0.1000 0.0375 -0.1253 0.1680** 
(0.1166) (0.1243) (0.1394) (0.1212) (0.1229) (0.0689) 
LEVERAGE1.t-1 0.1586** 0.1811** 0.0960 0.1549** 0.1879** -
(0.0669) (0.0865) (0.0941) (0.068) (0.0851) 
-
TAXRATE~,~ -/+ 0.0131 -0.0073 0.0371** 0.0161 -0.0081 0.0381** 
(0.0156) (0.0091) (0.0188) (0.0160) (0.0096) (0.0195) 
TAXRATE1.t-1 -0.0054 -0.0005 0.0072 - - -
(0.0096) (0.0049) (0.0073) 
- - -
MKT-TO-BOO~.t -/+ 0.0051 0.0164 -0.0028 0.0044 0.0206* 0.0019 
(0.0033) (0.0115) (0.0083) (0.0033) (0.0110) (0.006) 
MKT-TO-BOOKi,t-1 0.0000 0.0038 0.0089 
- - -
(0.0017) (0.0067) (0.0066) - - -
LIQUIDITYi,t -/+ 0.0158* 0.1289*** 0.2449*** 0.0121* 0.1265*** 0.2481*** 
(0.0082) (0.0373) (0.0371) (0.0074) (0.0374) (0.0337) 
LIQUIDITYi,t-1 -0.0155** -0.1192*** -0.2140*** -0.0104** -0.1207*** -0.2196** * 
(0.0063) (0.0275) (0.0295) (0.0051) (0.0271) (0.0271) 
ASSETMAT1.t + 0.0008** 0.0008 0.0025** 0.0006** 0.0009* 0.0026** 
(0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0011) 
ASSETMAT11-1 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0015* - - -0.0015* 
(0.0003) (0.001 0) (0.0008) - - (0.0008) 
QUALITY~.~ - -0.1306** -0.0971* 0.0137 -0.1223 -0.0789 0.0095 
(0.0670) (0.0516) (0.0580) (0.0810) (0.0611) (0.0660) 
QUALITYi.t-1 -0.0351 -0.0080 0.0201 - - -
(0.0343) (0.0241) (0.0327) - - -
EARNINGS VOL1,t - -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003 
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0003) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t-1 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0010** - - -0.0010** 
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
- - (0.0005) 
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003*** 
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TERM-STRUCTR + -0.0007 0.0017 0.0008 -0.0007 0.0016 0.0010 
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.001) (0.0008) 
SHARE PRICE + 0.0087 0.0024 -0.0039 0.0088 0.0002 -0.0025 
(0.0086) (0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0087) (0.0072) (0.0073) 
INTEREST VOL + -0.0150 -0.0073 -0.0137** -0.0118 -0.0085 -0.0142** 
(0.0123) (0.0088) (0.0063) (0.0123) (0.0083) (0.0064) 
Constant 0.0925*** 0.1133*** 0.0371 0.0975*** 0.1200*** 0.0548* 
(0.0358) (0.0363) (0.0295) (0.0353) (0.0377) (0.0305) 
Correlation1 -10.29*** -11.17*** -13.63*** -10.52*** -11.34*** -13.62*** 
Correlation2 -0.1795 1.029 3.968*** -0.0800 1.034 3.958*** 
Sargan Test (df) 411 (454) 466.9 (455) 492.6 (439)** 420.7 (454) 454.7 (455) 494.1 (439)* 
Wald Test-1 (df) 619.4 (19)*** 732.2 (19)*** 1337*** 509.8 (14)*** 614.9 (14)*** 938.7 (15)** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 31.74 (15)*** 41 (15)*** 30.99 (15)*** 40.51 (15)*** 36.02 (15)*** 32.15 (15)** 
R2 0.5662 0.5731 0.6482 0.5541 0.5704 0.6487 
Firms I Observations 558/4891 693/8938 732/ 11987 621 /5318 729/9456 732/11988 
Estimation Period 1972-1999 1972-1999 1972-1999 1971-1999 1971-1999 1972-1999 
The firms were sorted accordmg to average total sales. See also notes m Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.16: Size classification for debt maturity in the UK: Static Long-run Relationship 
Independent Predicted General Specific 
Variables Sign Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
LEVERAGEi,t -/+ 0.5606*** 0.2307 0.7555*** 0.5658*** 0.1681 0.6422*** 
(0.1935) (0.1646) (0.2205) (0.1966) (0.1569) (0.2465) 
TAXRATEi,t -/+ 0.0229 -0.0207 0.1708* 0.0475 -0.0217 0.1455* 
(0.0553) (0.0295) (0.0985) (0.0469) (0.0254) (0.0757) 
MKT-TO-BOOKi,t -/+ 0.0150 0.0537*** 0.0238 0.0129 0.0554* 0.0073 
(0.0107) (0.0242) (0.0179) (0.0098) (0.0298) (0.0229) 
LIQUIDITYI,t -/+ 0.0010 0.0258 0.1193** 0.0050 0.0154 0.1087** 
(0.0165) (0.0416) (0.0484) (0.0160) (0.0410) (0.0466) 
ASSETMAT1,t + 0.0028*** 0.0031*** 0.0041*** 0.0018** 0.0025* 0.0041*** 
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
QUALITYu - -0.4923* -0.2791 0.1303 -0.3597 -0.2116 0.0362 
(0.2974) (0.1830) (0.3336) (0.2500) (0.1637) (0.2523) 
EARNINGS VOL~,~ - -0.0015 0.0015 -0.0054*** -0.0016 0.0005 -0.0053** * 
(0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0020) 
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ 0.0002 0.0004 0.0013*** 0.0002 0.0005 0.0013*** 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
TERM-STRUCTR + -0.0019 0.0044 0.0030 -0.0021 0.0042 0.0038 
(0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0041) (0.0027) (0.0030) 
SHARE PRICE + 0.0258 0.0065 -0.0150 0.0260 0.0004 -0.0095 
(0.0256) (0.0187) (0.0261) (0.0256) (0.0194) (0.0282) 
INTEREST VOL + -0.0447 -0.0193 -0.0528** -0.0348 -0.0228 -0.0542** 
(0.0364) (0.0233) (0.0254) (0.0360) (0.0222) (0.0258) 
6.4.2.7. GMM Estimates based on Industry classification 
It is obvious that the firms in manufacturing and service sectors have some differences 
with respect to their asset structure and the degree of vulnerability to the changes in 
financial markets. Goswami et al. [1995] argue that industries in which the cash flows are 
serially independent should issue mainly short-term debt. Some firms may want to keep 
their debt levels around the industry debt level. It is known that short-term debt mitigates 
insider agency problems. However, Kanatas and Qi [2001] argue that as refinancing 
depends on the new information about the firms' performance supplied by managers, such 
information required by lenders may be manipulated. Furthermore, short-term debt usage 
could also be an opportunity for rival firms in the same industry to . take advantage of 
refinancing needs of the firms by taking hostile actions. Emery [200 1] argues that firms' 
debt maturity choice depends also on the type of their investments and operations. 
Guedes and Opler [1996] find that firms in industries with more volatile earnings (service 
sector, in our case) tend to issue less long-term debt. Furthermore, regulated industries 
have lower growth opportunities and less management discretion, and thus are expected 
to use less short-term debt. 
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Therefore, further systematic differences may be detected by dividing the full 
sample into two industry groups; manufacturing and service sectors. In this section, we 
will focus on the long-run relationships between debt maturity and firm-specific factors 
in terms of the industry classification in France, Germany and the UK (Table 6.19) 161 • 
Before that, the regression results for short-run models (Tables 6.17 and 6.18) indicate 
the existence of target debt maturity structure as the coefficient of lagged-maturity is 
statistically significant at 1% in all cases. With respect to the adjustment speed, German 
and UK companies in service sector reveal the higher speed of adjustment toward desired 
maturity level than the ones in manufacturing sector. However, it is the manufacturing 
firms which have higher adjustment coefficients than service firms in France. 
In Table 6.19, the long-run results in France with respect to tax rate, firm-quality, 
size and equity premium variables do not vary according to industry classification and 
they are in line with the full sample results (all being insignificant). On the other hand, 
significantly positive association of debt maturity with leverage and earnings volatility 
variables for the full sample appears to be caused by manufacturing firms. Another 
pattern for manufacturing firms is that while the relationship between market-to-book 
ratio and maturity is significantly positive for manufacturing firms (Table 6.19, panel-b), 
it is insignificant for service firms. Thus, it is essential for French manufacturing firms to 
avoid inefficient liquidation of their promising growth prospects by issuing long-term 
debt. Moreover, the maturity matching principle is marginally confirmed only by 
manufacturing companies as the asset maturity coefficient is positive and significant at 
10% (Table 6.19, panel-a). One important thing with the industry classification is that the 
insignificant coefficient of the liquidity variable for the full sample has turned out to be 
significant for service firms (Table 6.19, panel-b). There is a significantly negative 
relationship between term-structure and debt maturity for manufacturing firms (Table 
6.19, panel-b). This is inconsistent with the theory and may be explained by the argument 
that the managers tend to avoid the term premium in long-term interest rate by timing the 
debt market. Another success of industry classification in France is the significantly 
positive association of debt maturity with share price performance and its significantly 
negative association with interest rate volatility for manufacturing firms. These two 
variables were insignificant in the full sample estimations. 
161 Correlation and Sargan tests in Tables 6.14 and 6.15 show that all models are correctly specified. 
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As for the industry classification findings for Germany in Table 6.19, the 
estimated long-run coefficients of market-to-book ratio, size, asset maturity, quality, 
earnings volatility, equity premium and interest rate volatility variables are all 
insignificant for both industries. However, the results with respect to these variables 
concerning the short-run models in Tables 6.17 and 6.18 reveal a slightly different 
picture. For instance, debt maturity is significantly and positively associated with current 
market-to-book ratio and with current asset maturity variables for manufacturing firms. 
Furthermore, debt maturity is significantly and positively associated with current asset 
maturity and with past earnings volatility variables for service firms. The significantly 
positive association of debt maturity with leverage and tax rate for the full sample in 
Table 6.9 is revealed to be caused by manufacturing firms in Table 6.19. These firms are 
also responsible for the significantly positive association of maturity with liquidity ratio 
in the full sample results. This may imply the concerns about the liquidity risk and 
liquidation of profitable growth opportunities for manufacturing firms. Although we 
could not find any significant relationship between debt maturity and term-structure, 
Table 6.19 results show that this association is significantly positive, as predicted by the 
tax theory, for service firms only. Finally, significantly positive relationship between debt 
maturity and share price performance for the full sample seems to be driven by service 
firms in Table 6.19. 
The long-run equilibrium results for the UK in Table 6.19 suggest that debt 
maturity decisions are uniform for both industry classes for the following variables which 
have significantly positive coefficients confirming the full sample results: Leverage, size, 
asset maturity, equity premium and term structure. Furthermore, the long-run coefficients 
of tax rate, quality and earnings volatility are all insignificant for both industry classes. 
Among these three, only the coefficient of lagged earnings volatility variable is 
significant and negative for manufacturing firms, as predicted by the theory. On the other 
hand, there are some differences across industry classes with respect to several variables. 
Market-to-book ratio seems to have positive effect on the maturity of debt only for 
manufacturing firms. An interesting finding is due to the significantly negative 
relationship between debt maturity and liquidity ratio for service firms only. This finding 
is consistent with the theory of Myers and Rajan [1998]. It may also be due to the 
argument that high liquidity enables firms to issue more short-term debt. Lastly, share 
price performance and interest rate volatility appear to be relevant only for manufacturing 
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firms while deciding their debt maturity as the estimated coefficients are significant 
positive and significantly negative, respectively. 
In general, the findings in France and in the UK tend to show that industry 
categorisation supports the main findings in the full sample (Table 6.9) without 
significant variation across industry classes. However, in Germany, there seems to be a 
strong relationship between the debt maturity strategies and the characteristics of 
particularly manufacturing firms. Overall, the results based on industry classification are 
not inconsistent with the ones based on full sample estimations. 
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Table 6.17: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure: Industry Classification (General). 
Dependent Variable: MATURITYtt 
Independent Predicted FRANCE GERMANY UK 
Variables Sign Manufact. Service Manufact. Service Manufact. Service 
MATURITYt,t-1 + 0.4862*** 0.5292*** 0.5397*** 0.5125*** 0.6590*** 0.6002*** 
(0.0539) (0.1256) (0.0433) (0.1084) (0.0306) (0.0417) 
LEVERAGE;,1 -/+ -0.1050 0.0770 0.0553 0.0669 -0.2996** 0.0502 
(0.1090) (0.3566) (0.1505) (0.2589) (0.1261) (0.1419) 
LEVERAGEt,t-1 0.2455*** -0.0901 0.0815 0.0254 0.3903*** 0.1359 
(0.0867) (0.2791) (0.1201) (0.2692) (0.0774) (0.0878) 
TAXRATEt,t -/+ -0.0191 -0.0234 0.0016 0.0127 -0.0108 0.0316 
(0.0206) (0.0343) (0.0063) (0.0144) (0.0184) (0.0197) 
T AXRATEt,t-1 -0.0010 0.0014 0.0017 -0.0091 -0.0068 0.0087 
(0.0123) (0.0151) (0.0033) (0.0114) (0.0067) (0.0065) 
MKT-TO-BOOI<t,t -/+ 0.0096 -0.0111 0.0403* 0.0090 0.0077 0.0033 
(0.0253) (0.0227) (0.023) (0.0176) (0.0048) (0.0047) 
MKT-TO-BOOK;,t-1 0.0059 0.0001 -0.0307* -0.0188 0.0002 0.0019 
(0.0294) (0.027) (0.0182) (0.0154) (0.0032) (0.0024) 
SIZEt,t + 0.0148 0.0625 -0.0239 0.0666 -0.0059 -0.0030 
(0.0269) (0.0508) (0.0263) (0.0658) (0.0246) (0.0352) 
SIZEt,t-1 -0.0175 -0.0687 0.0229 -0.0701 0.0238 0.0217 
(0.0259) (0.0512) (0.026) (0.0633) (0.0238) (0.0339) 
LIQUIDITY~,~ -/+ 0.0278 0.1897** 0.0031*** 0.0092 0.0242 0.0325** 
(0.0259) (0.0753) (0.001) (0.01 07) (0.0189) (0.0143) 
LIQUIDITYt,t-1 -0.0150 -0.1450** -0.0005 -0.0024 -0.0312** -0.0487** * 
(0.0141) (0.0711) (0.0007) (0.0071) (0.0129) (0.0173) 
ASSETMAT;,t + 0.0038* 0.0035 0.0015** 0.0077* 0.0010 0.0010 
(0.002) (0.0047) (0.0008) (0.0046) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
ASSETMATn-1 -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0032 -0.0001 0.0004 
(0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0005) (0.0034) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
QUALITYt.t - 0.0211 0.1926 -0.0042 0.0266 -0.0377 -0.0501 
(0.0152) (0.1298) (0.029) (0.0637) (0.0460) (0.0833) 
QUALITYi.t-1 -0.0045 0.1072 -0.0172 -0.0079 0.0058 0.0133 
(0.0076) (0.1023) (0.0224) (0.0768) (0.0248) (0.0337) 
EARNINGS VOL;,1 - 0.0046 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0020 
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0025) 
EARNINGS VOLt,t-1 0.0048 0.0002 0.0000 0.0007* -0.0006* 0.0008 
(0.0037) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002* 0.00026* 
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.00013) 
TERM-STRUCTR + -0.0053 -0.0008 0.0024 0.0094 0.0016** 0.0018* 
(0.0034) (0.0051) (0.0027) (0.0066) (0.0008) (0.0011) 
~SHARE PRICE + 0.0259* -0.0482 0.0188 0.0587* 0.0087 0.0152 
(0.0148) (0.0303) (0.016) (0.0361) (0.0057) (0.0094) 
INTEREST VOL + -0.0126* 0.0161 0.0137 0.0125 -0.0113* -0.0137 
(0.0073) (0.0159) (0.0228) (0.0619) (0.0064) (0.0090) 
Correlation 1 -5.919*** -2.751*** -7.835*** -4.594*** -15.05*** -11.61 *** 
Correlation2 1.352 0.8306 0.7300 -0.0947 2.100** 1.263 
Sargan Test (df) 147.5 (602) 52.63 (377) 265 (269) 63.14 (296) 594 (512)*** 414.2 (397) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 215.5 (21)*** 157.7 (21)*** 296.8 (21)*** 160.3 (21)*** 2748 (21)*** 1563 (21)*** 
R2 0.5158 0.5491 0.4818 0.4602 0.6024 0.5771 
Firms I Observations 170/1443 79/661 361/2903 88/680 1174/16864 807/8923 
Estimation Period 1986-1999 1986-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 1972-1999 1972-1999 
See notes m Table 6.1 for variable definitions and notes in Table 6.8 for test statistics. The industries were classified as manufacturin g 
(sectors 1-8, 14) and service (sectors 9-13, IS). See Appendix for industry classification of sectors. 
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Table 6.18: Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure: Industry Classification (Specific). 
Dependent Variable: MATURITY1t 
Independent Predicted FRANCE GERMANY UK 
Variables Sign Manufact. Service Manufact. Service Manufact. Service 
MATURITY1.t-1 + 0.4319*** 0.4718*** 0.4753*** 0.4555*** 0.6570*** 0.6123*** 
(0.0448) (0.1116) (0.0391) (0.0796) (0.0302) (0.0442) 
LEVERAGEi.t -I+ -0.2084** 0.0271 0.0361 0.2049 -0.2493** 0.1396* 
(0.1058) (0.1067) (0.0774) (0.1670) (0.1199) (0.0825) 
LEVERAGE1,t-1 0.3466*** - - - 0.3614*** -
(0.0915) - - - (0.0759) -
TAXRATE1.t -/+ -0.0090 -0.0341 0.0241* 0.0093 -0.0025 0.0289 
(0.0183) (0.0233) (0.0139) (0.0171) (0.0187) (0.0200) 
TAXRATEi,t-1 - - - - - -
- - - - - -
MKT-TO-BOOK1,t -/+ 0.0231* -0.0019 0.0316* 0.0011 0.0062 0.0012 
(0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0039) (0.0048) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t-1 - - -0.0184 - - -
- - (0.0141) - - -
SIZE1,t + 0.0029 0.0087 0.0079 0.0262 0.0276*** 0.0162** 
(0.0092) (0.0101) (0.0083) (0.0218) (0.0049) (0.0072) 
SIZEI,t-1 - - - - - -
- - - - - -
LIQUIDITYi.t -/+ 0.0210 0.2387*** 0.0026*** 0.0196 0.0236** 0.0249* 
(0.0248) (0.0608) (0.0009) (0.0132) (0.0179) (0.014) 
LIQUIDITYi,t-1 - -0.1488*** - - -0.0293 -0.0370** 
- (0.0537) - - (0.0133) (0.0175) 
ASSETMAT1.t + 0.0022 0.0030 0.0011 0.0055 -0.0006 0.0012*** 
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0044) (0.0009) (0.0004) 
ASSETMAT it-1 - - - - - -
- - - - - -
QUALITYi.t - 0.0104 0.0359 -0.0131 -0.0738 0.0448 -0.0512 
(0.0095) (0.1002) (0.0284) (0.0570) (0.0607) (0.0882) 
QUALITY~.t-1 - - - - - -
- - - - - -
EARNINGS VOL1,t - 0.0027 0.0050 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0020 
(0.0035) (0.004) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0024) 
EARNINGS VOLi,t-1 - - - 0.0008** -0.0006* -
- - -
(0.0004) (0.0003) 
-
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.00026** 
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.00013) 
TERM-STRUCTR + -0.0066** 0.0002 0.0012 0.0133** 0.0014* 0.0021** 
(0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0058) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
ASHARE PRICE + 0.0167 -0.0242 0.0054 0.0494 0.0090* 0.0104 
(0.0141) (0.0265) (0.0147) (0.0353) (0.0054) (0.0085) 
INTEREST VOL + -0.0061 0.0225 0.0206 0.0280 -0.0120* -0.0128 
(0.0076) (0.0153) (0.0232) (0.0705) (0.0063) (0.0087) 
Correlation 1 -6.098*** -3.017*** -8.035*** -4.771*** -15.12*** -11.50*** 
Correlation2 1.229 0.7101 0.6711 -0.2095 1.990* 1.333 
Sargan Test (df) 172.3 (611) 84.32 (386) 287 (278) 76.57 (296) 580.8 (512)** 406.9 (397) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 161.5 (14)*** 110.8 (14)*** 203.5 (14)*** 76.69 (14)*** 1402 (16)*** 473.4 (14)** 
R2 0.4693 0.5236 0.4367 0.4061 0.5973 0.5700 
Firms I Observations 187/1579 96/738 367/3096 88/700 117 4 /16876 880 I 9565 
Estimation Period 1985-1999 1985-1999 1989-1999 1990-1999 1972-1999 1971-1999 
.. .. See notes m Table 6.1 for vanable defimtions and notes m Table 6.8 for test statistics. The mdustnes were classified as manufacturing 
(sectors l-8, 14) and service (sectors 9-13, IS). See Appendix for industry classification of sectors. 
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Table 6.19: Long run relationship for debt maturity: Industry Classification. 
a) General: Dependent Variable: MATURITY11 
Independent Predicted FRANCE GERMANY UK 
Variables Sign Manufact. Service Manufact. Service Manufact. Service 
LEVERAGE1.t -/+ 0.2736 -0.0279 0.2972*** 0.1893 0.2660 0.4654** 
(0.1825) (0.3597) (0.1076) (0.2836) (0.1784) (0.1848) 
TAXRATE1,t -/+ -0.0392 -0.0468 0.0071 0.0073 -0.0518 0.1008 
(0.0568) (0.0980) (0.0176) (0.0395) (0.0659) (0.0636) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t -/+ 0.0301 -0.0232 0.0210 -0.0201 0.0232* 0.0130 
(0.0207) (0.0397) (0.0194) (0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0126) 
SIZE1.t + -0.0052 -0.0133 -0.0024 -0.0074 0.0525*** 0.0466*** 
(0.0124) (0.0275) (0.0079) (0.0204) (0.0055) (0.0070) 
LIQUIDITYi.t -/+ 0.0249 0.0950 0.0057** 0.0140 -0.0203 -0.0405** 
(0.0317) (0.0656) (0.0025) (0.0242) (0.0362) (0.0177) 
ASSETMAT1.t + 0.0034* 0.0079 0.0025 0.0091 0.0025* 0.0034*** 
(0.0020) (0.0058) (0.0016) (0.0068) (0.0015) (0.0007) 
QUALITYu - 0.0324 0.6367 -0.0465 0.0384 -0.0935 -0.0922 
(0.0422) (0.4791) (0.1061) (0.2710) (0.1972) (0.2673) 
EARNINGS VOL,,t - 0.0182* 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0010 -0.0036 -0.0031 
(0.0111) (0.0068) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0071) 
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0005* 0.0007** 
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
TERM-STRUCTR + -0.0103 -0.0016 0.0051 0.0193 0.0046** 0.0045* 
(0.0068) (0.0108) (0.0058) (0.0129) (0.0023) (0.0026) 
~SHARE PRICE + 0.0504* -0.1024 0.0409 0.1204* 0.0256 0.0379 
(0.0279) (0.0683) (0.0345) (0.0697) (0.0168) (0.0236) 
INTEREST VOL + -0.0245* 0.0343 0.0299 0.0256 -0.0330* -0.0342 
(0.0149) (0.0358) (0.0492) (0.1283) (0.0190) (0.0227) 
.. b) Spec1f1c: DependentVanable: MATURITY11 
Independent Predicted FRANCE GERMANY UK 
Variables Sign Manufact. Service Manufact. Service Manufact. Service 
LEVERAGE1,t -/+ 0.2431* 0.0512 0.0689 0.3764 0.3266* 0.3600* 
(0.1448) (0.2022) (0.1477) (0.3036) (0.1691) (0.2120) 
TAXRATE1,t -/+ -0.0158 -0.0646 0.0460* 0.0171 -0.0073 0.0745 
(0.0322) (0.0438} (0.0268) (0.0312) (0.0545) (0.0527) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t -/+ 0.0406* -0.0037 0.0250 0.0019 0.0180 0.0031 
(0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0192) (0.0344) (0.0114) (0.0122) 
SIZE1,t + 0.0051 0.0166 0.0151 0.0482 0.0805*** 0.0418** 
(0.0162) (0.0194) (0.0158) (0.0411) (0.0129) (0.0169) 
LIQUIDITYi,t -/+ 0.0370 0.1703*** 0.0050*** 0.0361 -0.0164 -0.0311 * 
(0.0437) (0.0427) (0.0018) (0.0244) (0.034) (0.0165) 
ASSETMAT1,t + 0.0039 0.0056 0.0020 0.0101 -0.0017 0.0032*** 
(0.0031) (0.0049) (0.0017) (0.0079) (0.0028) (0.0010) 
QUALITYu - 0.0183 0.0680 -0.0249 -0.1356 0.1306 -0.1320 
(0.0166) (0.1915) (0.0543) (0.1028) (0.1769) (0.2291) 
EARNINGS VOL1,t - 0.0048 0.0094 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0042 -0.0052 
(0.0063) (0.0081) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0060) 
EQUITY PREMIUM -/+ 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007* 
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
TERM-STRUCTR + -0.0116* 0.0004 0.0022 0.0244** 0.0041* 0.0053** 
(0.0061) (0.0078) (0.0049) (0.0105) (0.0022) (0.0027) 
~SHARE PRICE + 0.0294 -0.0457 0.0103 0.0907 0.0263* 0.0269 
(0.0248) (0.052) (0.0278) (0.0641) (0.0159) (0.0218) 
INTEREST VOL + -0.0107 0.0427 0.0393 0.0513 -0.0349* -0.0331 
(0.0136) (0.0305) (0.0442) (0.1299) (0.0186) (0.0229) 
These results are based on the models m Table 6.17 (panel-a) and on Table 6.18 (panel-b). See notes m Tables 6.17 and 6.18. 
264 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
The main focus of this chapter has been to investigate the variations in debt maturity 
decisions of firms across European countries. The empirical evidence based on the GMM 
results discovers that the degree and type of association of debt maturity with firms-
specific factors are not separated from the corporations' financial and economic 
environment in which they are operating. The results in all countries with respect to the 
dynamics in firms' debt maturity decisions imply that there is an adjustment process 
towards target debt maturity structure. The significantly positive coefficient estimates of 
lagged-maturity variable suggest that this adjustment process is costly and the adjustment 
speed is highest in France in terms of responding to the new circumstances. 
This study identifies several firm-specific and market-related factors responsible for the 
corporate debt maturity decisions. First, a significantly positive association between 
leverage and maturity is found in all countries, which may be due to liquidation concerns 
of firms. Second, the results with respect to the relation between tax rate and maturity 
differ across countries, which may be due to different taxation systems. We find that 
taxes have no significant impact on debt maturity decisions of UK firms. However, the 
tax clientele argument is confirmed in Germany with the significantly positive effect of 
tax rate on maturity. In addition, the negative but insignificant association of maturity 
with tax rates in France partially supports the trade-off hypothesis. Third, market-to-book 
ratio is found to be significantly and positively correlated with debt maturity in the UK, 
which confirms the liquidity risk arguments. This variable does not exert any significant 
effect on debt maturity in France and Germany. Thus, the contracting-cost hypothesis is 
rejected as it predicts negative relationship between debt maturity and market-to-book 
ratio. Instead, the liquidity risk hypothesis is confirmed, i.e., firms issue long-term debt to 
avoid inefficient liquidation of their risky growth opportunities. Our finding for Germany 
supports the idea that bank-based systems may curtail underinvestment problems. Fourth, 
firm size and debt maturity are insignificantly associated in France and Germany but 
significantly and positively associated in the UK. This may suggest that indirect 
bankruptcy costs, incentive problems and information asymmetries are less in Germanic 
and Latinic economies than in Anglo-Saxon economies due to corporate ownership 
structure and long-run relationship between firms and external financiers. Fifth, there is 
no significant relationship between liquidity and maturity in France and the UK while the 
same association is positive and significant at 1 % in Germany. It may be that French 
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firms do not consider being liquid when they borrow long-term as French bankruptcy 
rules favour the saving of ailing firms. However, it is not the case for German firms since 
bankruptcy procedures in Germany emphasise the liquidation of insolvent firms. Sixth, 
the relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity is significantly positive in the 
UK, which supports the maturity-matching hypothesis that firms pursue a hedging policy 
to control agency and bankruptcy problems. However, it seems that German firms do not 
apply this matching principle and the situation is marginal in France. One explanation to 
the violation of this principle is that concentrated corporate ownership, long and close 
relationship between firms and investors in civil-law countries may curtail the problems 
which stipulates the application of maturity matching principle. Furthermore, we find 
little support for the signalling hypothesis in Germany and the UK that high-quality firms 
prefer short-term debt as the quality coefficients are negative but insignificant. In France, 
however, the quality coefficient is insignificantly positive. On the other hand, Diamond's 
hypothesis arguing that there is a non-monotonous relationship between maturity and 
quality is not supported in any of sample countries. As being the final finn-specific 
factor, earnings volatility has significantly positive impact on debt maturity only in 
France, which is not predicted by the theory. The same variable seems to be irrelevant to 
debt maturity decisions of German and UK firms. 
The results show that debt markets and equity markets tend to be integrated only in the 
UK, which may not be surprising in a market-oriented economy. This inference is due to 
the highly significant coefficient of equity premium variable, which is insignificant in 
other countries. The second market-related factor is the term structure of interest rates, 
which is only significant again in a market-based country, the UK. The significantly 
positive coefficient of the term-structure support the tax-hypothesis that firms lengthen 
their debt maturity if the term-premium is high in order to accelerate the tax benefits of 
debt. Share price performance is the third market factor which can be used to test the 
signalling hypothesis that firms issue long-term debt (infonnationally disadvantaged 
security) after an increase in their share price. This hypothesis is marginally validated 
only in Germany and the UK as the relevant coefficient is positive and significant at 10 
%. Finally, the estimation results with respect to the interest rate volatility do not confirm 
the theory. Its association with debt maturity is significantly negative in the UK and 
insignificant in other sample countries. 
Moreover, this study examines the debt maturity behaviour of firms according to 
size and industry classification. In France, the liquidation concerns, liquidity risk and 
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signalling problems are especially relevant for small firms while underinvestment 
problems are specific to large firms. Only medium firms in France tend to apply the 
matching principle. In Germany, only large firms do not consider the liquidity risk 
whereas the same risk is substantial for small and large UK firms. However, liquidation 
concerns of investment projects seem quite considerable for medium UK firms. In the 
UK, only large firms behave according to tax clientele and earnings volatility arguments. 
Yet, the findings based on large UK firms invalidate interest rate volatility hypothesis. 
With respect to the industry classification results, we find that maturity-matching 
hypothesis is confirmed only by manufacturing firms in France; but by both industries in 
the UK, and by neither in Germany. In all countries, especially manufacturing firms tend 
to avoid the liquidation of their growth opportunities. In Germany, only manufacturing 
firms set their debt maturity decisions according to the tax clientele argument. Market-
related factors do not seem to be important for service firms but manufacturing firms in 
France. The situation is the reverse in Germany where market factors play more 
important role in debt maturity decisions for service firms. In the UK, however, these 
factors appear to be equally important for both industries. 
In conclusion, capital structure, tax rates, quality and size of firms, growth 
opportunities, asset maturity and liquidity seem to play central role in determining the 
debt maturity structure of a firm. Apart from these firm-specific factors, this study obtains 
some market-specific factors that have substantial impact on debt maturity strategies of 
corporations especially in the UK. However, the nature and the dominance of the impact 
of these factors depend on the financial environment and tradition of the specific country 
as their effects vary across countries. Moreover, country specific factors do play 
significant roles on how quickly the firms can and need to adjust their maturity position 
to achieve the target maturity structure. Consequently, the debt maturity decision of a 
firm is not only the result of its own characteristics but also the result of environment and 
tradition in which it operates. 
Future research may examine the interaction of debt maturity with source of 
financing (use of commercial paper, bank relationship, distinguishing between public and 
private debt), which could improve the results further. 
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6.6. APPENDIX 
Table 6.Al: Panel Structure: a) Number of firms having 'n' continuous observations during 
the period; b) number of observations in each year; c) number of firms in each industry class; 
and d) number of observations in each industry class. 
a) Number of firms b) Number of observations 
n (years) France Germany UK Years France Germany UK 
3 60 22 207 1969 - - 466 
4 54 26 218 1970 - - 479 
5 33 35 196 1971 - - 489 
6 13 26 128 1972 - - 866 
7 22 9 98 1973 - - 903 
8 17 9 67 1974 - - 930 
9 14 8 56 1975 - - 936 
10 12 8 52 1976 - - 940 
11 1 13 87 1977 - - 951 
12 47 24 91 1978 - - 962 
13 16 38 82 1979 - - 979 
14 5 364 89 1980 - - 1000 
15 3 - 85 1981 - - 1029 
16 3 - 65 1982 - - 1067 
17 5 - 73 1983 59 - 1122 
18 53 - 68 1984 64 - 1200 
19 - - 64 1985 67 - 1260 
20 - - 50 1986 70 - 1303 
21 - - 34 1987 75 401 1314 
22 - - 21 1988 92 418 1325 
23 - - 26 1989 142 437 1312 
24 - - 20 1990 142 446 1288 
25 - - 26 1991 151 454 1247 
26 - - 23 1992 163 456 1216 
27 - - 44 1993 175 465 1222 
28 - - 44 1994 197 473 1269 
29 - - 165 1995 207 500 1318 
30 - - 27 1996 242 535 1402 
31 - - 39 1997 291 557 1483 
32 - - 178 1998 345 572 1471 
1999 344 563 1340 
2000 334 532 1177 
Total 358 582 2423 Total 3160 6809 35266 
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c) Number of firms 
Industry France German. UK 
1 23 49 165 
2 10 44 31 
3 19 56 199 
4 31 37 162 
5 48 59 261 
6 16 35 28 
7 41 89 315 
8 22 16 87 
9 25 21 191 
10 1 0 55 
11 19 22 147 
12 31 23 254 
13 46 34 319 
14 17 64 142 
15 9 33 67 
d) No. of observations 
Industry France German. 
1 253 575 
2 94 565 
3 235 689 
4 268 462 
5 375 593 
6 153 437 
7 397 1120 
8 186 199 
9 217 238 
10 4 0 
11 143 269 
12 296 275 
13 348 225 
14 141 760 
15 50 402 
UK 
258 0 
611 
360 
232 
324 
0 
3 
8 
476 
539 
136 
5 
7 
2311 
585 
2161 
395 
341 
269 
4 
7 
4 
544 
Table 6. A2: Mean values of Long-term Debt ratios. 
France Germany UK 
YEARS LONG1 LONG2 LONG1 LONG2 LONG1 LONG2 
1969 - - - - 0.5151 0.0934 
1970 - - - - 0.5071 0.0956 
1971 - - - - 0.5382 0.0989 
1972 - - - - 0.4696 0.0806 
1973 - - - - 0.4457 0.0729 
1974 - - - - 0.3972 0.0718 
1975 - - - - 0.4302 0.0722 
1976 - - - - 0.459 0.0705 
1977 - - - - 0.4577 0.0676 
1978 - - - - 0.4695 0.0676 
1979 - - - - 0.4252 0.062 
1980 - - - - 0.4135 0.0631 
1981 - - - - 0.42 0.0629 
1982 - - - - 0.406 0.0644 
1983 0.7256 0.1752 - - 0.3989 0.0632 
1984 0.693 0.1751 - - 0.3906 0.0632 
1985 0.6922 0.1644 - - 0.395 0.0693 
1986 0.6662 0.1587 - - 0.4099 0.0705 
1987 0.6472 0.1433 0.6752 0.1118 0.426 0.0681 
1988 0.6261 0.1422 0.6137 0.1056 0.4265 0.0713 
1989 0.62 0.1565 0.5805 0.1022 0.4298 0.0825 
1990 0.6002 0.1553 0.5423 0.0974 0.44 0.089 
1991 0.604 0.158 0.5293 0.0995 0.4456 0.0928 
1992 0.5895 0.1574 0.5209 0.0995 0.4775 0.0994 
1993 0.6029 0.1564 0.5455 0.1142 0.4879 0.0956 
1994 0.5941 0.1445 0.539 0.1117 0.5039 0.0917 
1995 0.5702 0.1357 0.4929 0.1105 0.4953 0.0936 
1996 0.5607 0.1261 0.5108 0.1159 0.5097 0.0959 
1997 0.5632 0.1275 0.4929 0.1081 0.5163 0.0957 
1998 0.5705 0.1289 0.5056 0.1054 0.5164 0.1085 
1999 0.5609 0.1369 0.4927 0.1108 0.5174 0.1175 
2000 0.5453 0.1391 0.4878 0.1108 0.516 0.1172 
Long its long-term debt to total debt; Long2 ts long-term debt to total assets 
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Figure 6.Al: Plots of Long-term debt ratios for France. 
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Figure 6.A3: Plots of Long-term debt ratios for the UK. 
0.55 
1--LONGI · pp LONG2I 
0.50 
0.45 
0.40 
0.35 
0.30 
0.25 
0.20 
0.15 
0.10 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
271 
7. CHAPTER 6: DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE DEBT 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known in capital structure debate that there are different costs and benefits of 
debt or equity financing. Recent research also sheds light on firms' cost-benefit analysis 
of obtaining external financing from different providers. It is known that privately placed 
debt is arguably the most important source of external financing for small firms due to 
their limited access to capital markets, transaction costs and information asymmetries. 
However, one should examine why firms use private debt financing even they have 
access to public debt markets or vice-versa, and why they use both types of debt 
financing. To examine the mix of public and private debt choice, large listed firms are 
appropriate as they have at least two options. 
There are three main hypotheses which attempt to explain the variations in the 
m1x of public and private debt. First strand focuses on moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. Financial intermediation literature argues that (monitored) bank 
loans are different from other (arm's-length) public debt as banks have cost advantage in 
lending and have more information about the prospects of firms (Diamond [1984], 
Leland and Pyle [1977]). Fama [1985] argues that bank debt is like inside debt (financial 
slack in the context of Myers and Majluf [1984]), which may mitigate underinvestment 
problems due to information asymmetries. Hence, firms with potential agency conflicts 
are contended to benefit more from issuing private (e.g., bank) debt rather than non-
monitored public debt. Second line of the literature is based on the liquidation and 
renegotiation arguments. Financial distress costs of public debt in renegotiations are 
generally higher than those of private debt, and public debt agreements are more difficult 
to renegotiate and emphasise more on the liquidation of distressed firms (Berlin and 
Loeys [1988], and Chemmanur and Fulghieri [1994a]). Thus, such firms are predicted to 
avoid issuing public debt. Finally, transaction costs hypothesis states that there are 
economies of scale in issuing substantial amount of public debt. It follows that only large 
firms are likely to benefit from the cost-advantageous public debt (Blackwell and 
Kidwell [1988], and Coase [1937]). 
The relevance of such a topic can be confirmed with the following arguments. 
James [1987] finds that announcement of bank loan issuance causes positive abnormal 
stock returns. Among others, he shows that the evidence of firm-bank relationship 
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increases firm value. He also finds issuing non-bank private debt or straight debt to 
repay bank debt has negative impact on firms' stock prices. Similarly, Datta et al. [2000] 
state that change in debt ownership structure can substantially affect shareholders' wealth 
as they report a significantly negative share pnce response to public debt IPO 
announcements. One important aspect of the mix of public and private debt is 
highlighted by James [1996]. He finds that this mix is relevant for distressed firms to be 
able to alter their capital structure through non-court restructurings. Cantillo and Wright 
[2000, p.155] state that 'understanding how firms choose their lenders may unveil the 
mechanism through which recessions and booms propagate and persist in the economy'. 
Moreover, Mayer [1988] indicates that banks are the largest sources of external financing 
for non-financial firms in Western Europe. 
In this study, potential determinants of issuing bank debt are investigated in the 
framework of flotation costs, signalling, contracting costs, liquidation and renegotiation 
arguments. This paper attempts to extend the existing literature in several ways. First, 
except two Japanese data (Anderson and Makhija [1999], and Hoshi et al. [1993]) and 
one Spanish data (Saa-Requejo [1996]), all others report their evidence using US data. 
Undoubtedly, it is important to examine the association of private debt use with market-
specific and firm-specific factors in an international context. By this way, one would 
discover whether country-specific factors have any influence on debt replacement 
decisions of corporations, and hence, whether the association of debt-type mix with a 
certain market- or firm-specific factor varies across countries. There is only one 
international paper: Esho et al. [2001] examine the mix between private and public debt 
within international debt markets for large Asian firms and find significant differences 
across countries. In an attempt to fill this gap, this chapter explores cross-country 
differences with respect to debt replacement decisions of corporations. In this study, 
France, Germany and the UK were chosen, since they are supposed to represent 
satisfactorily different financial structures of their classes, and no study has examined 
these countries. Rajan and Zingales [1995] argue that the difference between market-
based and bank-based countries can be obtained in the debt ownership structure (mix of 
private and public debt), not in capital structure (mix of debt and equity)162• They suggest 
162 The distinctions between capital markets and banks are pronounced by a recent survey: 'Because they 
cut out a layer of intermediation, capital markets are generally cheaper than banks. Capital markets are 
short-termist, volatile, react continuously-instantaneously to changes in perception of future economy. 
Banks can employ skilled loan officers to judge differences credit risks. Their intermediation transforms 
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that the ratio of bank loans made by private sector to the GDP can be a better measure of 
the importance of banking sector in financing firms. For our sample countries in 1999, 
this ratio is 103.1 % in France, 146.9 %in Germany, and 129.1 % in the UK (World 
Bank, WDR Report 2000/01). Thus, one could argue that Germany is a bank-oriented 
country, at least in relative terms whereas UK is a market-oriented country with 
developed financial markets. Schmidt et al. [1999] find that there are strong signs of 
transformation in French financial system from bank- to market-based country as they 
detect a general decline in role of French banks 163• However, they cannot find any trend 
toward disintermediation in Germany and the UK or orientation to capital markets in 
Germany. Mayer [1994] argues that dispersed corporate ownership in the UK is an 
obstacle to have a long-term relationship between firms and banks causing firms to rely· 
on stock markets for external financing. Modigliani and Perotti [2000] state that a sign of 
strong shareholders protection (low voting premium) makes equity markets greater and 
reduces the dominance of bank lending. These arguments may be further motivations to 
examine the corporate debt ownership structure in these countries with dissimilar 
characteristics. 
Second, we use a dynamic model, which assumes that firms have a long-run 
optimal debt ownership structure and this optimality cannot immediately be met through 
adjustment process as a result of any change in market conditions. It is obvious that 
factors affecting firms' debt composition structure change overtime. Hence, it would also 
be necessary to explain time-varying observed difference in debt ownership structure of 
firms. We adopt an autoregressive-distributed lag model, by which we are able to 
examine the determinants of bank debt use, the speed of adjustment process to desired 
optimal bank-debt ratio, and to provide the static long-run relationship between maturity 
and firm-specific factors. This is the first empirical debt ownership study to consider 
these three issues. 
Last, to our knowledge, no debt-mix study explicitly examines the endogeneity 
issue by using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). It should be investigated as it is 
likely that random shocks affect both dependent variable and independent variables at the 
same time. It may be the case that observed relations between debt-mix and its potential 
short-term, highly liquid cash (deposits) into long-term, largely illiquid assets (loans)'. (Source: The 
Economist, Survey: Global Equity Markets, 5 May 2001). 
163 Bertero [1994], on the other hand, argues that the banking reforms in France have enabled new 
universal French banks to be at the heart of the French financial sector. She states that large proportion of 
firms' activities in the financial markets are still intermediated by banks. 
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determinants indicate the effects of debt mix on the latter rather than vice-versa. We 
control for this important problem by using GMM procedure. GMM also overcomes the 
problems of heteroscedasticity, normality, simultaneity and measurement errors, which 
are common for studies using firm-level data based on balance sheets. 
Our evidence provides a few similarities in the debt-mix structure across countries: First, 
firm size and liquidity tend to inversely affect the use of bank debt in all countries, which 
may lend some support to flotation costs hypothesis. Second, asset collateral does not 
seem to play a significant role in any country. The regression results, however, indicate 
that there are substantial differences in firms' debt ownership structure in France, 
Germany and the UK. We find that French firms tend to adjust their debt-mix quicker 
than do their counterparts to attain their target level. In addition, our study detects a U-
shaped relation between bank-debt use and growth opportunities in the UK, which 
implies the presence of bank information monopolies (holdup problems) only in the UK. 
It seems interest coverage ratio and profitability exert no significant impact on debt-mix 
decisions in Germany and the UK while the former directly and the latter indirectly 
affect the use of bank debt by French firms. Another country-dependent pattern is due to 
earnings volatility and stock return volatility variables, which do not affect debt 
replacement decisions of French and German firms but negatively affect bank-debt ratios 
of UK firms. Moreover, debt maturity and leverage inversely affect the use of bank debt 
in Germany and the UK while they have no significant impact in France. It is only in 
France where share price performance has an impact while term structure of interest rates 
does not have any impact on debt-mix decisions. Finally, the way firm quality and 
dividend payments affect debt ownership structure is similar in France and the UK 
whereas they have different implications in Germany. Consequently, the relationship-
type of dependent and independent variables tends to be country-dependent, which can 
be attributed to the differences in corporate governance mechanisms and institutional 
features ofthe countries. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
variables and the related debt-mix hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the construction and 
analysis of data. Methodology and the model are developed in section 4. Section 5 
presents the empirical results. Last section summarises the chapter. 
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7.2. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE DEBT 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND THE UNDERLYING THEORIES 
7.2.1. Proxies for Dependent Variables164 
We use bank-debt ratio, bank debt to total debt, as a measure of debt composition (debt 
ownership) structure. See Houston and James [1996], Hoshi et al. [1993], MacKie-Mason 
[1990], Easterwood-Kadapakkam [1991], among others, who use the same definition. 
Bank debt details for France are not available in our main database (Datastream 
International). Instead, we use short-term debt as a proxy for bank debt. The following 
two studies may be supportive for our proxy: i) Bertero [1994] states that the decline in 
bank financing in France in early 1990s relative to 1970s is due to sharp reduction in 
short-term loans. ii) Carey et al. [1993] use short-term debt as a proxy for bank debt as 
the maturity distribution of their sample reveals that public debt has the highest 
proportion of long maturity, non-bank private debt has the medium to long maturity and 
bank debt has the short maturity. 
Some bank debt data of French firms are available and hand-collected from Extel 
Cards Database. However, the data are incomplete relative to our main data set with 
respect to number of firms and time period (mainly covering the period 1996 to 2000 for 
about 200 firms). We construct another dependent variable using these data, bank debt to 
total debt. The third supportive point related to our proxy could be the significantly 
positive relationship between short-term debt ratio and bank-debt ratio in the correlation 
matrix (see Table 7.2). 
In addition, this study also examines the maturity structure of bank debt. Thus, we 
construct several more dependent variables, i.e., short-term bank debt (payable within one 
year) to total debt; long-term bank debt (payable after one and five years) to total debt. 
7.2.2. Proxies for Explanatory Variables 
7.2.2.1. Target Debt Ownership Structure 
Banking theory points out that there are some potential costs of bank financing (hold-up 
problems, monitoring costs, occurrence of inefficient liquidations) beside its potential 
benefits (low moral hazard and adverse selection costs, flexible renegotiations). 
Blackwell and Kidwell [1988] document that firms minimise issuance cost of debt by 
164 As discussed by Fama [1985] and reported by Johnson [1997], there are important differences between 
bank debt and non-bank private debt. Due to data unavailability, however, we are unable to construct 
alternative defmitions for the dependent variable. 
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choosing the financing source providing the lowest transaction costs. Berlin and Loeys 
[ 1988] argue that firms can obtain an optimal debt ownership structure by trading-off the 
inefficiencies of harsh bond covenants of public debt and the agency costs of hiring a 
delegated monitor for bank debt. 
Flotation costs of public debt are generally higher than those of private debt. Unlike in 
the UK, bond market is not well developed in Germany (see Rajan and Zingales [1995]). 
One may expect that German firms have more motivations to adjust their debt ownership 
structure than UK firms due to high transaction costs of public debt. Diamond [ 1993] and 
James [1996] emphasise that the mix of public and private debt may curtail recontracting 
flexibility of bank debt because of the incentives originated from the seniority structure of 
debt (bank debt is senior to public debt). Asquith et al. [1994] argue that debt ownership 
structure is very important in affecting the outcome of financial distress. As we examine 
the determinants of the outstanding debt ownership structure, we implicitly assume that 
corporations have target bank-debt ratio. Inclusion of lagged bank-debt ratio in the model 
could be a benchmark to decide whether firms have an optimal debt ownership structure, 
and if any, the degree of divergence or convergence from (to) the target level may 
potentially be detected in the framework of adjustment costs. We expect the coefficient 
estimate of lagged dependent variable to be statistically significant, positive and below 
unity to conclude that firms optimally determine their debt ownership structure. 
7.2.2.2. Debt Maturity Structure 
Corporations should choose their debt maturity and debt ownership structure when 
financing an investment project. Schuhmacher [1998] shows that the financing source 
depends on the maturity choice. If a firm finances short-term it prefers bank debt whereas 
public debt is chosen by firms financing long-term. Fama [1985] argues that short-term 
bank loans are renewal process and involves periodic evaluation of borrowing firms. 
Thus, issuing bank loan may imply the good quality of firms regarding their expected 
earnings. Kanatas and Qi [2001] theorise that firms' use ofbank credit is inversely related 
to the intensity of incentive problems between managers and shareholders and directly 
related to the accuracy of bank monitoring. They further contend that bank debt is more 
suitable for financing assets with shorter economic lives. Hence, we expect that debt 
maturity and bank-debt ratio should be strongly negatively correlated. We use the ratio of 
debt that matures after one year to total debt as debt maturity measure. Esho et al. [2001] 
use this ratio as a proxy for firm reputation such that it will be inversely related to bank-
debt ratio. 
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7.2.2.3. Capital Structure 
It is also possible that firms' choices of debt financing source may depend on the amount 
of debt they employ in their capital structure. It is argued that bank monitoring generates 
a public good which reduces costs related to public debt (see, e.g., Fama [1985]). As a 
result, higher bank debt may imply higher leverage due to complementary effect of bank 
debt on public debt. Reorganisation of private debt is generally more flexible. Berlin and 
Loeys [1988] argue that private debt (especially bank debt) provides more emphasis on 
monitoring than public debt. Thus, as discussed by Easterwood and Kadapakkam [1991], 
firms with high leverage may prefer private debt financing in order to minimise the costs 
related to agency, bankruptcy and asymmetric information problems. Hoshi et al. [1993] 
argue that firms with low leverage will use public debt. The reason is that they have 
higher incentive to take optimal investment decisions as they risk their net worth while 
investing. Thus, bank-debt ratio and leverage are expected to be positively correlated165 . 
(High levered and risky firms tend to borrow form banks). 
On the other hand, the counter argument is that firms with higher debt ratios may restrict 
their bank borrowings in order to avoid frequent liquidations (Diamond [1993]). Banks' 
motivation to monitor (public good) on behalf of junior public debtholders may be 
lessened by high public debt to private debt ratio. Anderson and Makhija [1999] argue that 
leverage is endogenously determined such that higher leverage may mean lower potential 
agency costs, which supports higher public debt. Hooks and Opler [1993] find that bank 
borrowing is highest among firms employing relatively little debt in their capital structure. 
Hence, a negative relationship is suggested between these variables. One may expect the 
same association if leverage is considered as proxy for financial distress probability. In 
France, a comparable protection from bad debt losses in the event of bankruptcy exists 
only for the simple reservation of ownership for creditors with rights of lien. 
Consequently, the insolvency losses of French banks are considerably larger than those of 
their German competitors. Then, it is likely that French banks would be reluctant to lend 
firms with high debt ratios, thus the impact of leverage should not be positive in France. 
165 Johnson [ 1998] regresses leverage on bank debt use and control variables and fmds that optimal leverage 
increases with bank debt ratio. This is argued to be due to banks' ability, through monitoring and screening, 
to mitigate asymmetric information problems that lower optimal debt ratios. 
Moreover, he attempts to explain the reasons why ftrms with bank debt have higher leverage: Firms with 
high market-to-book ratios have relatively more investment opportunities and hence experience potentially 
higher underinvestment problems lowering optimal debt ratio. He argues that banks are well-positioned to 
reduce such problems as they are more effective and efficient than other lenders for reducing asymmetric 
information. 
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We measure capital structure (leverage) as the ratio of book value of total debt to book 
value of total assets. Alternative definition is the ratio of book value of total debt to 
market value of equity plus book value of total debt. Finding a significant coefficient of 
leverage will not be in line with Myers and Majlufs [1984] Pecking Order theory which 
implies that current leverage has no impact on financing choices. 
7.2.2.4. Agency Costs and Growth Opportunities 
Outside public investors are generally weakly-informed about firms' growth options and 
are concerned about agency problems raised by Jensen and Meckling [1976] and Myers 
[1977]. Thus, they require high premium in such cases due to anticipated possible 
opportunistic behaviour of insiders. It is argued that negotiable bank debt financing is 
preferred to public debt in order to mitigate asset substitution and underinvestment 
problems (Berlin and Loeys [1988], Boyd and Prescott [1986], Diamond [1984]). As a 
proxy for growth opportunities, market-to-book ratio may have a mixed influence on the 
composition of public and private debt. Blackwell and Kidwell [1988], and Smith and 
Warner [1979] argue that less risky firms are more likely to issue public debt which 
contains less detailed restrictive covenants. Then, agency costs of private debt may be 
less than those of public debt. MacKie-Mason [1990b] argues that R&D-intensive firms 
should avoid borrowing from the public debt markets due to information asymmetries 
between managers and outside investors. Yosha [1995] contends that firms with 
potentially valuable future growth projects will not borrow from public debt markets due 
to high disclosure costs of revealing sensitive information166• Houston and James [1996] 
predict a positive correlation between market-to-book ratio and bank-debt ratio assuming 
the absence of bank information monopolies. These arguments imply that market-to-
book ratio and bank-debt ratio should be positively associated. 
However, Hoshi et al. [1993] show that firms with value-enhancing investment 
opportunities will tend to use public debt at lower rate as it will be costly for such firms 
to forego positive-NPV projects. They further argue that firms without attractive 
investment opportunities will only invest if they are monitored. Thus, they imply a 
negative relationship between bank-debt ratio and market-to-book ratio debt assuming 
managers give importance to shareholder value. Houston and James [1996] also argue 
that hold-up problems together with bank information monopolies may lead to a negative 
166 Carey eta!. [1993], for example, note that US finns with takeover plans relied on private placement 
market to protect the confidentiality of their transactions in an attempt to prevent the competing offers. In 
our case, this should be relevant especially for the UK firms. 
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relationship between market-to-book ratio and the reliance on bank debt. The reason is 
that rents banks can extract from firms with profitable growth opportunities will be 
relatively high (see Diamond [1993] and Rajan [1992])167• Bank can hold up borrowing 
firms especially if firms do not have alternative financing sources. 
On the other hand, in the literature a non-monotonic relationship between market-
to-book ratio and bank debt use is implied. Hoshi et al. [1993] propose a reverse-D 
relation but fail to detect one for their sample of Japanese firms. Firms with valuable 
growth prospects may not issue bank debt if hold-up costs are higher than the benefits of 
monitoring. As discussed in Diamond [1991a], the relation turns out to be negative for 
low-growth firms assuming investment opportunities are profitable and carry low risk. 
However, this association may be positive for high-growth firms in some cases. For 
instance, issuing bank debt could prevent the disclosure of valuable information about 
high-growth firms (Yosha [1995]). Bank loans tend to have short-term maturity. 
According to Myers [1977], firms with high growth opportunities should use short-term 
debt to mitigate agency problems. Moreover, under uncertain macroeconomic conditions 
flexible bank debt may be more attractive for such firms in case of financial distress as 
they would not like their valuable projects to be liquidated (Berlin and Mester [1992]). 
These arguments imply that there might beaU-shaped relation rather than a reverse one: 
bank-debt ratio first decreases at the lowest market-to-book ratio range then increases at 
the highest market-to-book ratio range. Low-growth firms choose bank debt to curtail 
agency costs via monitoring, or to establish reputation (Diamond [1991a]); high-growth 
firms prefer the same source of financing in order to mitigate information asymmetries 
through close relations with banks; and medium-growth firms choose public debt as they 
need less monitoring for their projects which carry moderate risks. In order to test this 
argument we also include the squared-market-to-book ratio variable in the model168 • 
We measure market-to-book ratio as the ratio of book value of total assets less book value 
of equity plus market value of equity to book value of total assets. Johnson [1997] uses 
this ratio as a proxy for project quality: high market-to-book ratio may be caused by the 
capital markets' perception of the project as a high quality one. Following Barclays and 
Smith [1995] and Krishnaswami et al. [1999] we use depreciation ratio (depreciation 
167 In fact, Houston and James [1996] document that high-growth US firms relying on a single bank and 
having no public debt issue relatively low bank debt, which may indicate the presence of the hold-up 
problem by US banks. This fmding highlights the importance of diversification of debt financing sources 
for such firms. 
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expense to total assets) as an alternative proxy for growth opportunities. As higher 
depreciation ratio implies higher tangible assets it can be an inverse proxy for growth 
options. Another alternative measure is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. 
7.2.2.5. Transaction Costs and Firm Size 
Size of the firm can have several implications on the choice of public and private debt. 
Oliner and Rudebusch [1992] use firm size as a proxy for transaction costs. The costs of 
issuing long-term public debt are considerably higher for small firms. Coase [193 7] also 
argues that deterrent transaction and contracting costs discourage small firms from raising 
external equity, thus, cause them to rely on their retained earnings. Small firms are more 
likely to be financially distressed than large firms (Queen and Roll [1987]) and they are 
likely to have higher information asymmetries. Hence, small firms are likely to borrow 
short-term debt through banks in order to avoid diseconomies of scale and financial 
distress costs. In fact, distinct features of banks are mostly benefited by small firms 
(Fama [1985]). Large firms are generally mature, less risky and have relatively low 
growth opportunities, thus, low potential agency problems. Moreover, large firms tend to 
have more constructed reputations and publicly available information which lead them to 
issue costly-efficient public debt (Diamond [1991a]). If bank loans typically involve 
small and medium firms due to flotation costs and contracting costs hypotheses, bank-
debt ratio and firm size should be negatively correlated. 
The evidence by Mayer and Alexander [1990] show that large firms in UK raise less 
bank loan than do other UK firms. This may be because of the fact that asymmetric 
information between insiders-outsiders is less for large firms. Moreover, size effect 
seems important in market-based countries where cost of financial distress is relatively 
high and firms have no strong supports from banking sector. 
We measure firm size in three ways as the natural logarithm of i) total sales, ii) total 
assets, and iii) total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. 
7.2.2.6. Liquidity 
The importance of firm liquidity as a determinant of choosing the lender has been by-
passed by the empirical studies, except Saa-Requejo [1996]. As it is an important 
determinant of financing choices, firm liquidity should be controlled for. Saa-Requejo 
uses this variable to test whether past profitability (thus, the amount of retentions) affects 
firms' financing decisions. 
168 The estimated coefficients of market-to-book ratio and squared-market-to-book ratio should be 
significantly negative and significantly positive, respectively, for the confirmation of aU-shaped relation. 
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With respect to the institutional framework, according to conventional wisdom, banks 
should provide cash internally to mitigate firms' liquidity problem in Germany. Then, one 
may expect that liquidity should be less important for German firms while choosing 
source of debt financing than for UK and French firms. We measure liquidity ratio as 
current assets divided by current liabilities. 
7.2.2.7. Asymmetric Information and Firm Quality 
The quality of firm can be a proxy for adverse selection problems and for firm reputation. 
Diamond [ 1991 a] contends that highly-rated firms issue public debt after obtaining 
reputation through their established successful bank debt repayments; and medium- and 
low-quality firms use bank debt169• On supply side, the importance of firm quality is 
emphasised in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] who argue that banks ration credits if they 
cannot distinguish between good and bad firms. Then, firms with high degree of 
information asymmetries and favourable information concerning their future earnings 
should issue private debt. On demand side, hidden-information view contends that firms 
will seek better-informed financier when the advantage of hidden information is 
substantial (MacKie-Mason [1990b ]). If lenders of private debt are better informed than 
those of public debt (see, e.g., Yosha [1995]), then it might be cost-efficient for firms 
with potential information asymmetries to borrow from private sources. James [1987] 
argues that firms disclose the terms of private financing to signal their true value to the 
market. Oliner and Rudebusch [1996] contend that lenders would not be funding low-
quality firms under tight monetary policy conditions. 
We measure firm quality determined by abnormal earnings, which is measured by the 
difference between earnings per share in years [t+ 1] and [t] divided by share price in year 
[t] (see, e.g., Stohs and Mauer [1996]). If firms have favourable information about their 
future profitability, then they should have high future abnormal earnings. Thus we expect 
firm quality and bank-debt ratio to be positively correlated, according to the adverse 
selection hypothesis. 
7.2.2.8. Dividend Policy 
The potential impact of dividend policy on debt ownership structure is largely ignored by 
the empirical studies. Among those who do not, MacKie-Mason [1990b] argues that 
hidden-information problem may be exacerbated for non-dividend paying firms if paying 
dividends reveals hidden information. Then, one should expect non-dividend paying 
169 Diamond's reputation hypothesis is empirically supported by Datta et al. [ 1999] who find that the length 
of firm-bank relationship significantly reduces the at-issue yield spread, thus, the cost of external debt. 
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firms to avoid issuing public debt assuming dividends reveal information about firms' 
prospects. The expected relation between payout ratio and bank-debt ratio should, thus, 
be negative. Furthermore, Low et al. [200 1] show that investors regard small firms' 
dividend decision as a function of bank monitoring. They find that market reaction to 
dividend omission by small firms with high levels of bank debt is much less negative than 
that to by the ones with little or no bank debt. We use the ratio of dividends to net 
earnings (payout ratio) as a proxy for dividend policy. 
7.2.2.9. Firm Performance 
This variable may be useful especially to test the hypotheses related to country-specific 
factors. Hoshi et al. [1993] contend that firms with good performance are likely to issue 
public debt assuming managers give importance to shareholder value. Since profitability 
(proxy for firm performance) is an important capital structure determinant, this effect 
should be controlled for. Jensen's [1986] free cash flow hypothesis predicts that 
profitability and leverage are positively correlated. If private debt mitigates agency costs 
of free cash flow, then, bank-debt ratio and profitability should not be significantly 
associated. Free cash flow problem should be inconsiderable in countries where share 
ownership is concentrated because shareholders will have high motivations to monitor 
managers. On the other hand, since UK firms have the chance to tap the developed bond 
market they should not have significant financial constraints caused by fluctuations in 
internal resources. This implies that profitability and bank-debt ratio should not be 
significantly correlated in the UK either. According to screening theory of banking 
closely held or family firms are less likely to borrow from intermediaries (see Cantillo 
and Wright [2000]). Thus, we expect profitability and bank-debt ratio to be negatively 
correlated especially in France. We measure profitability by the ratio of EBITD to total 
assets. 
7.2.2.10. Asset Collateral 
James [1996] emphasises that almost all bank debt of financially distressed firms is 
secured while public debt is rarely secured. Berger and Udell [1995] argue that bank 
specialise in lending to the firms with substantial asymmetric information problems. 
These can be reflected in the nature of loan contract terms such as interest rate charged 
and collateral required. As also explained by Hoshi et al. [1993], the expected relation 
between bank-debt ratio and fixed-assets ratio is negative if non-financial assets are 
valuable collateral to borrow from public debt markets with lower interest rates. With 
respect to the institutional factors, Edwards and Fischer [1994] state that collateral seems 
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to be one of the requirements for majority of bank loans in Germany and the UK. Then, 
the expected relation may be positive in these countries. We use the ratio of net tangible 
assets to total assets as a proxy for asset collateral. 
7.2.2.11. Financial Distress 
Firms may be financially distressed if they cannot adjust themselves to adverse shocks. 
James [1996] use this ratio as a proxy for the severity of financial distress. Financially 
distressed firms may prefer private debt by paying higher interest rates due to its 
recontracting flexibility. Distress costs of public debt in renegotiations tend to be higher 
than those of private debt. Chemmanur and Fulghieri [1994a] theorise that firms with 
lower financial distress probability choose public debt over bank debt since the benefits 
of lower interest charges of public debt outweigh the benefits of flexible renegotiations in 
private debt. We thus expect a negative relationship between coverage ratio (proxy for 
financial distress) and bank-debt ratio. We measure this ratio as EBITD to total interest 
expense (see Johnson [1997], Anderson and Makhija [1999]). 
7.2.2.12. Asymmetric Information and Earnings Volatility 
In accounting literature (see e.g., Watts and Zimmerman [1986]) earnings are argued to 
follow random walk. If the volatility in earnings is high, then, it becomes even more 
difficult to forecast future earnings. MacKie-Mason [1990b] argues that managers are 
likely to have advantageous hidden information in such cases170• Then, issuing public 
debt will be costlier for them as public investors will stipulate high 'lemons' premia. 
Johnson [1997] uses this variable as a proxy for observable credit risk and probability of 
financial distress. Sy [1999] demonstrates theoretically that high credit risk firms' 
managers will issue private debt due to benefits from renegotiating tighter restrictions. 
On the other hand, low credit risk firms' managers will issue public debt due to benefits 
from increased flexibility rather than reduced restriction and monitoring. Thus, we 
expect earnings volatility (proxy for potential information asymmetries) and the reliance 
of bank debt to be positively correlated. 
We measure earnings volatility as absolute annual percentage change in earnings minus 
average of this percentage change in the whole period. 
170 MacKie-Mason suggests modified pecking order in which firms prefer private debt over public debt if 
information asymmetries are substantial. If firms' public debt issues are undervalued by the market, then, 
they tend to choose bank debt which provides information benefits assuming banks as insiders (Hadlock 
and James [2002]). Similarly, Bolton and Freixas [2000] theorise that riskier firms choose bank debt, safer 
firms issue bond and the ones in between prefer both bond and equity. 
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7.2.2.13. Macroeconomic and Stock Market Factors 
Stock Return Volatility 
It is likely that under uncertain macroeconomic conditions firms will have difficulty in 
raising external funding from the capital markets (e.g., arm's-length debt). The 
uncertainty within an entity could exacerbate the bad conditions mainly due to highly 
potential agency costs. Hadlock and James [2002] state that firms with high stock return 
volatility tend to have substantial information asymmetries between outsider and insiders, 
which causes security undervaluation problem. This measure is used as a proxy for 
potential undervaluation, measured as standard deviation of daily stock returns measured 
in the year prior to announcement. They find that undervalued firms tend to use bank debt 
due to information benefits. Thus, one may expect a direct relationship between bank-
debt ratio and stock return volatility which may quantify the risk due to the uncertainty of 
firms' economic environment (Demsetz and Lehn [1985]). We measure this variable by 
the standard deviation of weekly stock returns over the previous year, matched to the 
month of firms' fiscal year-end. 
Change in Stock Price 
Macl<ie-Mason [1990b] contends that rising share price of a company implies that 
investor are convinced about the improvement in the firm's prospects. In this case, firms 
will be more advantageous if they borrow from the public debt markets. Thus, a negative 
relation is expected between bank-debt ratio and change in share price. We measure this 
variable as the first difference of log of annual share price, with a six-month lag, matched 
to the month of firms' fiscal year-end. 
Term Structure of Interest Rates 
If most of the bank debt short-term debt, that may warrant the use of term-structure in the 
analysis. Kashyap et al. [1993] argue that tight monetary policies increase cost of bank 
capital, which in turn discourages firms from borrowing and investing. However, Oliner 
and Rudebusch [1996] contend that lenders would not be funding low-quality firms under 
such conditions, thus, causing those firms not to invest. French firms are family 
controlled with relatively low reliance on banks, UK firms rely on capital markets, 
German firms are argued to rely on bank-debt financing. Thus, as highlighted by Bolton 
and Freixas [2000], the effect of monetary policies on corporate sector may not be similar 
across countries. Mayer [1994] argues that the credit constraints have much more 
pronounced impact on real sector in the bank-based than the market-based countries. Our 
empirical analysis that incorporates term-structure in the model may shed light on these 
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issues. This variable is measured as the difference between the month-end yields on long-
term government bond and three-months treasury-bills, with a six-month lag, matched to 
the month of firms' fiscal year-end. 
7.3. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA SET 
7.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 7.1 we report descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The 
results show that, as one expects from a bank-oriented economy, Germany has the highest 
bank-debt (BANK) ratio (94.5 %). The short-term bank debt payable within 1 year to 
total debt (BANK-S) is 45.6 % while the long-term bank debt payable after five years 
(BANK-L5) is only 15.8% ofthe total debt. This finding is not in line with the argument 
that there is a long-term relationship between firms and banks in Germany. The French 
firms, on average, have the lowest bank-debt ratio (43.1 %). This figure is close to what 
Belletante and Paranque [1998] find for the non-financial listed French firms (39.3%). On 
the other hand, the UK firms' average bank-debt ratio is in between these ranges (60.4 
%). Comparing the ratios of long-term bank debt payable after one year to total debt 
(BANK-L1) in Germany and the UK, one can see the discernible difference between the 
ratios as it is 48.9 % for the former and 14.7 % for the latter. This may imply 
unimportance of the banks in the UK where the financing relationships between firms and 
banks are in short-horizons. 
The details of these ratios in each year are reported in the appendix (see Table 7.A2 and 
the figures). In Germany, the bank-debt ratio seems stable during 1987-2000, which 
ranges between 90 %- 96 %. However, this ratio has been in the declining trend since 
1996 and it takes its minimum value in 2000. The reduction in bank-debt ratio in 
Germany is associated with the reduction in both long-term bank debt ratios. In fact, 
while BANK-L1 is 63.4% in 1987 it drops to 43.3% in 2000. Similarly, while BANK-L5 
is 18.5% in 1987 it goes down to 14.6% in 2000. On the contrary, short-term bank debt 
ratio rises from 32 % in 1987 to 47 % in 2000. These figures may be related to the 
argument that decrease in bank debt may imply the development of financial markets. 
In the UK, there is an apparent increase in the long-term bank-debt ratio, which goes up 
from 11.9 % in 1983 to 26.5 % in 2000. We observe the reverse trend in the short-term 
bank debt ratio during 1969-2000 as it is 45.4% in 1969 and 33.3% in 2000. The overall 
bank-debt ratio has two different patterns during 1969-2000. In the first half of the period 
(1969-1985), the ratio fluctuates between 42.8 % and 74.6 %. In the second half, the 
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trend turns out to be decreasing in that bank-debt ratio falls from 72.4% in 1986 to 59.8 
%in 2000. 
In France: Delbreil et al. [2000] posit that the fall in firms' reliance on banks in France 
reflects the financial constraints, high levels of real interest rates and changing behaviour 
of banks from sustained expansion to augmented discretion about lending. Bertero [1994] 
states that apparent decline in short-term bank borrowing and increase in internal 
financing is due to the financial and banking reforms in France. It is argued that there 
might be a link between contractions in bank lending and macroeconomic activity, which 
has some implications on future economic growth (see, e.g., Stanton [1998]). The results 
in Germany and the UK do not seem to confirm the idea that bank capital typically rises 
in expansions and declines in recessions. Instead, they imply that the changing pattern in 
bank-debt ratios of firms are not only determined by macroeconomic conditions but also 
by firm-specific factors. 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics for France, Germany and the UK. 
France Mean Median Mode Std.dev Variance Kurtosis Skew. Min. Max. Obsrv. 
BANK-Total 0.4079 0.3586 0 0.3327 0.1107 -1.1537 0.3732 0 1 1126 
BANK-Proxy 0.4311 0.4080 0 0.2581 0.0666 -0.5334 0.2921 0 1 3243 
MATURITY 0.5929 0.6099 1 0.2687 0.0722 -0.6238 -0.279 0 1 3424 
LEVERAGE1 0.2344 0.2232 0 0.1464 0.0214 0.8319 0.6702 0 1 3444 
LEVERAGE2 0.3118 0.2764 0 0.2272 0.0516 -0.4272 0.6089 0 0.9968 3183 
MTBR 1.5584 1.2204 1.1480 1.1290 1.2746 52.344 5.5946 0.3968 20.602 3191 
DEPREC 0.0478 0.0404 0 0.0374 0.0014 22.517 3.4656 0 0.5467 3428 
INTANGIBLE 0.1076 0.0623 0 0.1254 0.0157 5.4573 1.9711 0 1 3419 
SIZE1 14.811 14.801 16.723 1.926 3.708 -0.047 -0.088 5.241 20.526 3432 
SIZE2 14.819 14.711 17.133 1.917 3.677 -0.233 0.131 9.207 20.502 3445 
SIZE3 15.1801 15.0748 17.271 1.8322 3.3571 -0.1732 0.1877 9.1 20.782 3181 
LIQUIDITY 1.4975 1.3384 4.1958 0.7870 0.6194 70.794 5.8866 0.0197 15.548 3444 
QUALITY -0.0023 0.0052 0 1.0402 1.0819 2209.64 -42.85 -53.09 10.263 3086 
DIVIDEND 0.1236 0.2327 0 3.165 10.014 208.503 -8.478 -66.89 51.768 3318 
PROFIT 0.1167 0.1112 0.3214 0.0974 0.0095 40.662 -2.228 -1.414 0.9935 3428 
FIX-ASSET 0.2318 0.2040 0 0.1587 0.0252 2.0622 1.2256 0 0.9855 3444 
COVERAGE 15.2405 5.6807 2.75 57.45 3300.13 108.83 5.26 -866.1 952.43 3286 
EARN-VOL 0.7893 0.2002 18.686 5.7614 33.1938 2063.45 41.804 0 289.62 3069 
RET-VOL 0.0528 0.0470 0.0264 0.0007 29.2011 3.5767 0.0047 0.4681 3180 
SHARE-PF 0.0930 0.0775 0.0000 0.4092 0.1675 2.6730 0.0903 -2.353 2.3690 2891 
German~ Mean Median Mode Std.dev Variance Kurtosis Skew. Min. Max. Obsrv. 
BANK-Total 0.9451 1 1 0.1616 0.0261 13.2826 -3.561 0 1 5840 
BANK-Short 0.4563 0.4109 1 0.3147 0.0990 -1.0850 0.3407 0 1 5840 
BANK-Long>1 0.4888 0.5008 0 0.3177 0.1010 -1.2386 -0.085 0 1 5840 
BANK-Long>5 0.1584 0.0760 0 0.2048 0.0420 2.3404 1.6359 0 1 5840 
MATURITY 0.5323 0.5701 0 0.3134 0.0982 -1.1009 -0.291 0 1 5860 
LEVERAGE1 0.1976 0.1503 0 0.1902 0.0362 0.4462 0.9840 0 1 6784 
LEVERAGE2 0.2447 0.1687 0 0.2462 0.0606 -0.1443 0.9111 0 0.9885 6216 
MTBR 1.9908 1.3093 1.2852 3.9352 15.4859 240.339 13.561 0.2536 92.288 6216 
DEPREC 0.0582 0.0518 0 0.0512 0.0026 48.6720 4.1092 0 0.9674 6776 
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INTANGIBLE 0.0302 0.0053 0 0.0633 0.0040 17.1009 3.7090 0 0.7298 6776 
SIZE1 12.3301 12.3761 11.076 2.3045 5.3109 0.6442 -0.249 1.2306 19.401 6542 
SIZE2 12.2461 12.1465 10.355 2.0200 4.0805 0.5115 0.2612 3.9219 19.594 6788 
SIZE3 12.728 12.574 10.794 1.8916 3.5782 0.3859 0.4466 7.4819 19.962 6216 
LIQUIDITY 4.3360 1. 7187 6.5531 27.4916 755.786 496.6131 20.587 0.0012 824.33 6768 
QUALITY 0.0146 0.0001 0 1.3298 1.7683 1354.234 -5.953 -64.51 50.527 6236 
DIVIDEND 0.3085 0 0 6.1017 37.231 303.996 0.669 -124.8 191.68 6754 
PROFIT 0.1158 0.1166 0.1602 0.1342 0.0180 54.2701 -1.943 -2.920 1.7416 6757 
FIX-ASSET 0.3255 0.2943 0 0.2097 0.0440 0.4145 0.7965 0 0.9985 6784 
COVERAGE 34.689 6.2733 192 286.584 82131 324.205 11.393 -3778 8936 6600 
EARN-VOL 3.2968 0.3735 0.1266 19.9204 396.823 536.8982 19.656 0 653.94 6164 
RET-VOL 0.0437 0.0387 0 0.0297 0.0009 51.916 4.2333 0 0.6710 6147 
SHARE-PF 0.0066 0 0 0.3447 0.1188 4.4888 0.3610 -2.227 2.7783 5412 
UK Mean Median Mode Std.dev Variance Kurtosis Skew. Min. Max. Obsrv. 
BANK-Total 0.6042 0.6969 1 0.3648 0.1331 -1.3071 -0.434 0 1 32028 
BANK-Short 0.4557 0.4048 1 0.3582 0.1283 -1.3822 0.2369 0 1 32028 
BANK-Long>1 0.1471 0 0 0.2637 0.0695 1.6883 1.7133 0 1 32526 
MATURITY 0.4568 0.4720 0 0.3391 0.1150 -1.3666 0.0304 0 1 32548 
LEVERAGE1 0.1761 0.1513 0 0.3993 0.1594 6278.19 69.817 0 38.903 35510 
LEVERAGE2 0.2453 0.1926 0 0.2204 0.0486 0.2206 0.9382 0 0.9998 35189 
MTBR 1.4924 1.1069 0.133 2.307 5.322 787.19 23.078 0.121 98.666 35065 
DEPREC 0.0359 0.0302 0.0000 0.0339 0.0012 743.43 18.202 0 1.8629 35499 
INTANGIBLE 0.0414 0 0 0.1376 0.0189 3952.66 39.113 0 14.972 35470 
SIZE1 9.0190 8.8503 12.621 1.8994 3.6078 0.6745 0.1728 0.0156 16.224 35340 
SIZE2 8.8185 8.5606 10.254 1.8285 3.3433 0.3560 0.5764 1.5018 16.674 35510 
SIZE3 9.0430 8.7609 10.027 1.8677 3.4882 0.2376 0.6266 3.4780 16.783 35005 
LIQUIDITY 1.7004 1.4503 1.3186 1.8484 3.4167 1344.77 26.569 0.0157 125.15 35489 
QUALITY 0.0093 0.0060 0 0.3156 0.0996 10553.09 -50.93 -41.73 26.79 34311 
DIVIDEND 0.3945 0.3595 0 3.19519 10.2093 359.710 2.0371 -94.25 98.6 35445 
PROFIT 0.1212 0.1289 0.1667 0.1574 0.0248 505.55 -13.38 -6.894 5.2959 35499 
FIX-ASSET 0.3476 0.3110 0.0000 0.2048 0.0419 0.3249 0.8104 0.0000 1.4209 35490 
COVERAGE 48.134 7.4872 8 464.63 215879 2451.96 39.189 -9286 37227 33381 
EARN-VOL 1.1264 0.2509 0.0258 8.0323 64.5173 2766 44.557 0 660.76 33060 
RET-VOL 0.0511 0.0445 0 0.0299 0.0009 27.0310 3.1186 0 0.6813 34964 
SHARE-PF 0.0538 0.069 0 0.4683 0.2193 3.5751 -0.370 -4.183 3.3032 32878 
BANK-Total is the ratio of total bank debt to total debt. BANK-Short is bank debt payable within one year; 
BANK-Long> I is bank debt payable after one year; BANK-Long>5 is bank debt payable after 5 years; all scaled 
by total debt. BANK-Proxy is the ratio of debt that matures in less than one year to total debt (only for France). 
MATURITY is the ratio of debt that matures in more than one year to total debt. LEVERAGE I is the ratio of book 
value of total debt to book value of total assets. LEVERAGE2 is the ratio of book value of total debt to market 
value of equity plus book value of total debt. MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO (MTBR) is the ratio of book value of 
total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of total assets, matched to the 
month of firms' fiscal year-end. DEPRECIATION (DEPREC) is the ratio of depreciation expenses to total assets. 
INTANGIBLE is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. SIZE I (SIZE2) is the natural logarithm of total sales 
(total assets). SIZE3 is the natural logarithm oftotal assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. 
LIQUIDITY is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. QUALITY is the difference between earnings per 
share in years [t+ I] and [t] divided by share price in [t], matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-end. 
DIVIDEND is the dividend payout ratio; dividends to net earnings. PROFIT ABILITY (PROFIT) is the ratio of 
EBITD to total assets. FIXED-ASSETS (FIX-ASSET) is the ratio of net tangible assets to total assets. 
COVERAGE is the ratio of EBITD to total interest expense. EARNINGS VOLATILITY (EARN-VOL) is 
absolute annual% change in earnings minus average of this change. RETURN VOLATILITY (RET-VOL) is the 
stock return volatility measured by the standard deviation of weekly stock returns over the previous year, matched 
to the month of fmns' fiscal year-end. SHARE PERFORMANCE (SHARE-PF) is the first difference of log of 
annual share prices, with a six-month lag, matched to the month of fmns' fiscal year-end. TERM is term structure 
of interest rates measured as the difference between the month-end yields on long-term (I 0 years or more) 
government bond and three-months treasury-bills, with a six-month lag, matched to the month of fmns' fiscal year-
end. 
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7.3.2. Correlation Matrix 
Tables 7 .2, 7.3 and 7.4 report the correlation matrix of the variables used in the analysis 
for France, Germany and the UK, respectively. These univariate results reveal that the 
associations of use of bank debt with the explanatory variables differ across countries. 
Hence, they give us motivation to conduct a multivariate analysis in the next section. 
PROXY 
LONG 
LEVER 
MTBR 
MTBR2 
DEPREC 
I NT AN 
SIZE 
LIQUID 
QUALITY 
DIVID 
PROFIT 
FIXAST 
COVER 
EARNVO 
RETVOL 
SHAREP 
TERM 
DIVID 
PROFIT 
FIXAST 
COVER 
EARNVO 
RETVOL 
SHAREP 
TERM 
Table 7.2: Correlation Matrix for France. 
BANK PROXY LONG LEVER MTBR MTB~ DEPRE I NT AN 
0.1081 
. . 
-0.1081 -1.0000 
. . 
-0.0492 -0.1415 0.1415 
. 
0.0640 0.0175 -0.0175 -0.1927 
. . 
0.1000 0.0040 -0.0040 -0.1173 0.8493 
. 
0.0040 -0.0668 0.0668 0.0356 -0.0318 -0.0152 
-0.0540 -0.0423 - 0.0423 
.. 
0.1038 
. 
0.1537 
. . 
-0.0422 
.. 
0.0638 
-0.2604 
. 
-0.0157 0.0157 0.0784 -0.1903 
. 
-0.0936 
. 
-0.0960 
. 
-0.0273 
0.1082 
. 
-0.1932 
. 
0.1932 
. 
-0.2188 
. 
0.0520 
. . 
-0.0766 
. . 
0.0548 -0.1792 
0.0220 -0.0286 0.0286 0.0277 -0.0065 -0.0048 0.0179 -0.0189 
-0.0250 0.0114 -0.0114 0.0166 0.0226 0.0072 0.0025 0.0115 
-0.0020 -0.0527 
.. 
0.0527 
.. 
-0.1019 
. 
0.1982 . 0.0732 
. 
0.4154 
. 
0.0055 
-0.0250 -0.2140 
. 
0.2140 
. 
0.3083 
. 
-0.1581 
. 
-0.0700 
. 
0.3269 
. 
-0.2758 
. 
-0.0460 -0.0206 0.0206 -0.2238 
. 
0.1056 
. 
0.0530 - 0.0302 -0.0215 
-0.0660 -0.0265 0.0265 0.0020 -0.0205 -0.0071 -0.0157 0.0092 
. . . . 
0.0341 -0.0050 0.0050 0.0964 0.1005 0.0900 0.0809 -0.0311 
0.0110 -0.0218 0.0218 -0.1365 
. 
0.3436 
. 
0.2031 
. 
-0.0521 0.0691 
. 
0.0323 0.0278 -0.0278 -0.1027 
. 
0.1340 
. 
0.0821 
. 
0.0041 
. 
0.1351 
QUALITY DIVID PROFIT FIXAST COVER EARNV RETVOL SHARE 
-0.0020 
-0.0794. o.o6of 
0.0164 -0.0158 0.1156. 
-0.0177 0.0241 0.2845 -0.0097 
0.0138 -0.0191 -0.0499- -0.0323 -0.0105 
0.0336 -0.0155 -0.1687. -0.072f -0.0533 .. 0.0487 
-0.0168 0.0054 0.1666. -0.0750. 0.0768. -0.0096 -0.1062. 
0.0330 -0.0078 -0.0205 -0.0467". 0.0891" -0.0255 0.0968. 0.0897" 
SIZE LIQUID 
. 
-0.3212 
0.0099 -0.0294 
0.0188 -0.0012 
-0.0185 -0.0100 
. 
0.1170 -0.2037 
. 
-0.0624 -0.0683 
0.0020 0.0076 
. 
-0.2588 0.0315 
. 
0.0685 -0.0371 
. 
-
-0.1069 0.0444 
The statistics reported here are the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in the analysis. (*) and 
(**) represent that the correlation coefficient is significant at I percent level and 5 percent level, respectively. See Table 
7.1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 7.3: Correlation Matrix for Germany. 
BANK BANK-S BANK-L1 BANK-L5 LONG LEVER MTBR MTBR' DEPREC I NT AN 
BANK-S 0.2501 
. . BANK-L1 0.2682 -0.8656 
. . . BANK-L5 0.1372 -0.5193 0.5878 
. . . . LONG 
-0.1121 -0.9711 0.9082 0.5420 
. . . . LEVER 0.0034 -0.0355 0.0370 0.1356 0.0441 
. . MTBR 
-0.0378 0.0179 -0.0373 0.0246 -0.0186 -0.0262 
MTBR2 
-0.0381 
. 
-0.0013 -0.0184 0.0211 0.0016 -0.0073 0.8596 
. 
DEPREC 0.0517 
. 
-0.1189 
. 
0.1451 
. 
0.0664 
. 
0.1262 
. 
-0.0498 
. 
-0.0615 
. 
-0.0301 
.. 
I NT AN -0.0404* 0.0250 -0.0458 
. 
-0.0624 
. 
-0.0306 
.. 
0.1012 
. 
0.0224 0.0018 -0.0886 
. 
SIZE 
-0.3324 
. 
-0.0603 
. 
-0.1119 
. 
-0.0680 
. 
0.0224 -0.1830 -0.2209 
. . 
-0.0189 0.1257 -0.0825 
LIQUID 
-0.0522 
. 
-0.0811 
. 
0.0537 
. 
0.0577 
. 
0.0715 
. 
-0.0947 
. 
0.0462 
. 
-0.0223 -0.045 0.0056 
. .. QUALITY 
-0.0049 0.0196 -0.0220 -0.0502 -0.0202 0.0327 0.0025 0.0002 0.0208 0.0013 
. DIVID -0.0047 -0.0119 0.0094 0.0024 0.0075 -0.0074 0.0418 0.0196 0.0257 0.0146 
PROFIT 0.0189 -0.0909 
. 
0.1002 
. 
0.0478 
. 
0.1025 
. 
-0.1455 
. 
-0.0584 
. 
-0.0768 
. 
0.4599 
. 
0.0246 
FIXAST 0.0136 -0.3195 
. 
0.3250 
. 
0.3194 
. 
0.3268 
. 
0.2061 -0.0767 
. 
-0.0385 
. 
0.3880 
. 
-0.157 
. . COVER 
-0.0028 0.0176 -0.0190 -0.0197 -0.0193 -0.0529 -0.0186 -0.0207 0.0378 -0.0070 
. EARNVOL 0.0041 -0.0127 0.0147 -0.0063 0.0146 0.0505 0.0100 0.0007 0.0097 -0.0083 
RETVOL 
-0.0462 
. 
0.1181 
. 
-0.1414 
. 
-0.1176 
. 
-0.1243 
. 
0.0920 
. 
0.0873 
. 
0.0619 
. 
-0.1421 
. 
0.1268 
SHAREPF 
-0.0188 -0.0581 
. 
0.0481 0.0474 
. 
0.0606 
. 
-0.1192 
. 
0.1421 
. 
0.0670 
. 
-0.0091 -0.0098 
TERM 0.0448 
. 
0.0256 -0.0024 -0.0006 -0.0141 -0.0159 -0.0289 
.. 
-0.0177 0.0965 
. 
-0.089 
SIZE LIQUID QUALITY DIVID PROFIT FIXAST COVER EARNVL RETVOL SHARE 
LIQUID 
-0.0977 
QUALITY 0.0088 -0.0025 
DIVID 
-0.0086 -0.0040 -0.0001 
. . PROFIT 0.0126 0.0049 -0.0616 0.0413 
. FIXAST 
-0.0082 -0.0931 0.0145 0.0381 0.1163 
COVER 0.0284 
.. 
0.0027 -0.0025 0.0074 0.1251 
. 
0.0234 
. . EARNVOL 
-0.0547 0.0092 0.0042 -0.0053 -0.0372 -0.0202 0.0043 
RETVOL 
-0.0489 
. 
0.0229 -0.0053 -0.0141 -0.2205 
. 
-0.1478 
. 
-0.0264 0.0762 
. 
SHAREPF 0.0362 
. 
0.0281 -0.0626 
. 
0.0134 0.1740 
. 
0.0004 0.0165 0.0032 -0.0949 
. 
. . TERM 
-0.0138 -0.0226 0.0002 -0.0186 0.0226 0.0596 -0.0142 -0.0118 -0.1523 -0.096 
The statistics reported here are the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in the analysis. (*)and 
(**) represent that the correlation coefficient is significant at l percent level and 5 percent level, respectively. See 
Table 7.1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 7.4: Correlation Matrix for the UK. 
BANK BANK-S BANK-L LONG LEVER MTBR MTBR' DEPREC INTAN 
BANK 
. BANK-S 0.7325 
. BANK-L 0.3871 -0.3442 
. . . LONG 
-0.5295 -0.8612 0.4362 
LEVER 0.0145 
. 
-0.0237 
. 
0.0520 
. 
0.0444 
. 
MTBR 
-0.0431 
. 
-0.0644 
. 
0.0278 
. 
0.0023 0.2376 
. 
MTBR2 
-0.0139 
.. 
-0.0073 -0.0093 -0.0056 0.1902 
. 
0.8104 
. 
DEPREC 
-0.0383 
. 
-0.0537 
. 
0.0199 
. 
0.0157 
. 
0.0834 
. 
0.0637 
. 
0.0184 
. 
I NT AN 
-0.0292 
. 
-0.1060 
. 
0.1032 
. 
0.0750 
. 
0.0090 0.0735 
. 
0.0143 -
. 
-0.0718 
SIZE 
-0.1908 
. 
-0.2862 
. 
0.1245 
. 
0.3522 
. 
-0.0041 
. . . . 
-0.1013 -0.057 -0.0644 0.0422 
LIQUID 
-0.0895 
. 
-0.0594 
. 
-0.043 
. 
0.0457 -0.1072 
. 
0.0473 
. . . 
0.0105 -0.1235 -0.0663 
QUALITY 
-0.0029 0.0074 -0.014 - -0.0110 
.. 
0.0344 
. 
0.0109 . 0.0102 -0.0312 -0.0039 
DIVID 
-0.0128 --0.0175 
. 
0.0060 0.0128 - -0.0061 -0.0066 -0.0039 0.0013 0.0021 
PROFIT 
-0.0156 
. 
-0.0346 
. 
0.0253 
. 
0.0612 
. 
-0.1639 
. 
-0.2795 
. 
-0.268 
. . 
-0.0759 
. 
0.1521 
FIXAST 
-0.1126 
. 
-0.1897 
. 
0.1016 
. 
0.2444 
. 
0.0263 
. 
-0.0903 
. 
-0.026 
. . . 
0.2280 -0.2227 
COVER 0.0122 - 0.0322 
. 
-0.027 
. 
-0.0363 
. 
-0.0283 
. 
0.0105 -0.0058 -0.0092 -0.0124 
EARNVOL 0.0199 
. 
0.0245 
. 
-0.0057 -0.0295 
. 
0.0214 
. 
0.0073 
. 
0.0044 0.0008 0.0298 
RETVOL 0.0144 
. 
0.0386 
. 
-0.032 
. 
-0.0754 
. 
0.1473 
. . . . . 
0.1464 0.0869 0.0601 0.1190 
SHAREPF 
-0.0575 
. 
-0.0534 
. 
-0.0070 0.0577 
. 
-0.0724 
. 
0.1459 
. 
0.0507 
. . . 
-0.0506 -0.0246 
TERM 
-0.0842 
. 
0.0041 -0.122 
. 
0.0275 
. 
-0.0073 -0.0361 
. 
-0.0039 . --0.0378 0.0113 
EQPRM 0.0082 -0.0300 . 0.0519 . 0.0198 . -0.0026 0.0422 . 0.0048 0.0271 . 0.0021 
SIZE LIQUID QUALITY DIVID PROFIT FIXAST COVER EARNV RETVOL SHARE 
LIQUID 
-0.0733 
. QUALITY 
-0.0187 -0.0062 
. DIVID 0.0279 -0.0062 -0.0031 
PROFIT 0.1514 
. 
-0.0596 
. 
-0.083 
. 
0.0215 
. 
FIXAST 0.1463 
. 
-0.2765 
. 
-0.0067 0.0073 0.0585 
. 
COVER 
-0.0066 -0.0098 -0.0017 0.0036 
. 
0.0862 -0.0070 
EARN VOL 
-0.0583 
. 
-0.014 
.. 
0.0117 - -0.0190 
. 
-0.0683 
. 
-0.019 
. 
-0.008 
RETVOL 
-0.1806 
. 
-0.0191 
. 
0.0330 
. 
-0.0128 
.. 
-0.2828 
. 
-0.109 
. 
-0.034 
. 
0.079 
SHAREPF 0.0200 
. 
0.0509 
. 
-0.0007 0.0022 0.1516 
. 
-0.009 0.015 
. 
-0.008 -0.112 
TERM 
-0.0028 0.0364 
. 
0.0323 
. 
-0.0009 0.0001 0.0140 
.. 
0.001 -0.008 
. 
0.065 
The statistics reported here are the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in the analysis. (*) 
and (**) represent that the correlation coefficient is significant at 1 percent level and 5 percent level, respectively. 
See Table 7.1 for variable definitions. 
7.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
7.4.1. The Model 
0.119 
We follow the same econometric approach which is explained in the previous chapters. 
Our general dynamic model for the empirical study of corporate debt ownership structure 
is as follows (subscript-i stands for firm-i; ~·s are the unknown parameters to be 
estimated and rods the disturbance term): 
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. 
BANK-DEBT; t = /31[BANK-DEBTJu-1 
+ /h.[MATURITY}it + /h[MATURITY}it-1 
+ /34{LEVERAGE}it + f3s[LEVERAGE}it-1 
+ /36[MARKET-TO-BOOK}u + P,[MARKET-TO-BOOK]it-1 
+ f3s[FIRM- SIZE]it + /39[FIRM- SIZE]it-1 
+ /3IO[LIQUIDITY}u + /3II[LIQUIDTY}u-1 
+ f312[FIRM-QUALITY]it + /313[FIRM-QUALITY]it-1 
+ /3I4[DIVIDEND-P AYOUT}u + /3Is[DIVIDEND-PAYOUT}it-1 
+ /3I6[PROFITABILITY }it+ /3I7[PROFITABILITY }it-1· 
+ /3Is[FIXED-ASSETS}it + /3I9[FIXED-ASSETS}it-1· 
+ /h.o[COVERAGE]u + /h.I[COVERAGE}it-1· 
+ fh2[EARNINGS VOLATILITY]it + fJn[EARNINGS VOLATILITY}u-1 
+ /h.4[RETURN VOLATILITY]u-1 
+ /h.s[SHARE PERFORMANCE}it-1 + /h.6[TERM]u-1 + m;1• (7.1) 
Model (7.1) will be estimated using difference-GMM (GMM-DIF) and system-GMM 
(GMM-SYS). Furthermore, we will also employ fixed-effects (within groups) estimator 
for comparative purposes. For the latter procedure, only a static version of the model will 
be considered, i.e., lagged dependent and lagged independent variables are to be removed 
from the model in order not to get biased estimations. 
What is more, in order to search for the existence of target debt ownership 
structure in the framework of adjustment costs, the following procedure is to be followed 
using GMM estimators. Assume that desired target level, BANK -DEBT;; , is determined 
by several explanatory variables, x5• 
BANK- DEBT;;= LllfkXkit + W;, 
k=l 
(7.2) 
where IDit is disturbance term serially correlated with mean zero and possibly 
heteroscedastic, and 'Ilk's are estimable unknown parameters which are common to each 
firms. The model assumes that firms adjust their current ratios, BANK-DEBT;,, with the 
degree of adjustment coefficient "9" to attain the target debt ownership structure. 
BANK- DEBT;, -BANK- DEBT;1_ 1 =(}(BANK- DEBT;; -BANK- DEBT;t-1) (7 .3) 
If e =1, then, the actual change in bank-debt ratio will equal to the desired change and 
firms will have a complete adjustment with zero transaction costs, being in equilibrium. 
If e = 0, however, there will not be any change due to unaffordable high transaction costs 
and firms will set their current debt-ratios to the past level, BANK-DEBT;,.1• 
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Substituting (7.2) into (7.3), we get the following equation: 
BANK- DEBTu = (1- fJ)BANK- DEBTu-J + LfJiflkXkit + Om1 
k~J 
(7.4) 
This adjustment model assumes that 9 lies between zero and one because of the presence 
of transaction costs. If the cost of being in disequilibrium is higher (lower) than the cost 
of adjustment, e, which is inversely proportional to transaction costs, tends to unity 
(zero). 
7.4.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we estimate our model using static (fixed-effects and static GMM-SYS) 
and dynamic (GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS) specifications. The Within Groups (WG) 
(fixed effects) results in tables 7.11 and 7.12 are reported assuming that there are 
unobservable firm-specific effects. In case of simultaneity and endogeneity problems 
additional to the firm heterogeneity problem, we produce GMM results in tables 7.5 to 
7.8 171 • The number of dependent variables differs across countries: There are two in 
France; total-bank debt ratio and bank-debt ratio proxied by short-term debt ratio. In 
Germany, we have four different dependent variables; total bank-debt ratio, short-term 
bank-debt ratio, long-term bank-debt ratio (payable after one year) and long-term bank-
debt ratio (payable after five years). In the UK we have three; total bank-debt ratio, short-
term bank-debt ratio and long-term bank-debt ratio. In order to have more accurate 
country comparisons, we split UK data into two time periods: 1969-2000 and 1983-2000. 
Cross-country comparisons will be mainly based on the 'bank-debt ratio' dependent 
variable. In the next section, the implications of the results will be discussed in detail with 
respect to dynamic models using GMM estimator. The emphasis will be given to the 
static long-run equilibrium results of (7 .1 ), which are obtained using equation (7 .5) and 
reported at the end of the tables. 
171 The regression results in tables 7.5 to 7.8 are obtained using the following procedure: First, model (7 .1) 
is estimated in its general format. Then, using 'general-to-specific' approach, the model is re-estimated after 
insignificant lagged independent variables in that estimation are removed from (7.1). The diagnostics 
(Correlation and Sargan tests) in the tables 7.5 to 7.8 show that the models are correctly specified. 
293 
Bank Debt: = ( /32 + /33 )Maturity: + ( /34 + /35 )Leverage;, + (/36 + /37 )Market to Book;: + 
I - fJ1 I - fJ1 I - fJ1 
( /3s + /39 )Firm Size· +(/310 + Pn )Liquidity~ +(/312 + /313 )Firm Quality• + I - /31 II I - /31 ,, I - /31 II 
( /314 + /315 )Dividend Payout;, +(/316 + /311 )Profitability;, +(/318 + /319 )Fixed Assets:+ I - /31 I - /31 I - /31 
( /320 + /321 )coverage;, + (/322 + /323 )Earnings Volatility;, + ( /324 + /325 )Return Volatility;,+ I - /31 I - /31 I - /31 
( /326 + /327 )share Price Change" + ( /328 + /329 )rerm Structure~ I - /31 '' I - /31 '' 
7.4.2.1. Dynamic Debt Ownership Structure using GMM 
7.4.2.1.1. Target Debt Ownership Structure 
(7.5) 
The GMM results in Tables 7.5a to 7.8a reveal that our model captures the dynamics in 
firms' debt ownership decisions. It is because the estimated coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variables (LDV) are significantly positive at 1% level and less than unity for 
all cases, except the 'bank-total' dependent variable using GMM-DIF for France172• It 
implies the presence of costly and non-instantaneous adjustment process towards desired 
debt ownership structure 173 • (Firms may not immediately change their debt composition, 
which indicates the presence of adjustment costs). Thus, our proposed model for dynamic 
debt ownership structure is shown to be relevant with these results. In fact, Hadlock and 
James [2002] document that firms trade-off the information benefits of bank debt against 
various contracting costs as to decide whether using bank debt is an optimal decision. 
With respect to the adjustment speed (8=1-[coe:fficient ofLDV], see equation [7.4]), the 
GMM results show a pattern which is common to all countries: The adjustment process 
gets quicker for shorter-term bank debt. This is not surprising as it should be easier to 
alter the composition of any short-term debt due to its maturity structure. 
The adjustment coefficients of total bank-debt ratio using GMM-SYS (tables 7.7a and 
7.8a) indicate that French firms are the quickest ones in adjusting themselves to desired 
debt ownership structure. This is consistent with the idea that time dimension constructs a 
very important variable explaining the evolution of firms' debt ratios in France (Kremp et 
al. [1999]). It seems the adjustment process is relatively very costly and slow in Germany, 
172 As expected, GMM-DIF estimator produces lower LDV coefficients than GMM-SYS does (see Blundeii 
and Bond [ I998]). 
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where the adjustment coefficient of total bank-debt ratio is lowest. It can also be argued 
that the cost of not being on the targeted (equilibrium) debt ratio is insignificant for 
German firms. Hence, it may not be very important for German firms to adjust quickly 
their debt composition. UK seems to be the middle case in this adjustment process. 
Overall, the results tend to reveal that the dynamic debt ownership structure implied by 
our model is not rejected as firms attempt to trade-off between transaction costs of being 
on-target and disequilibrium costs of being off-target. The relevance of dynamism is also 
confirmed due to the considerable amount of lagged independent variables being 
significant in tables 7.5a to 7.7a. 
7.4.2.1.2. Debt Maturity Structure 
The relationship between debt maturity and bank-debt ratio (BDR) is negative but 
insignificant in France. In the UK (tables 7.6b and 7.8b) and Germany (Table 7.7b), the 
relationship is significantly negative as predicted by the arguments174• Thus, it seems 
French firms' debt maturity decisions are independent from debt ownership decisions 
unlike their German and UK counter parts which tend to borrow privately if the debt is of 
shorter-maturity. 
7.4.2.1.3. Capital Structure175 
The insignificant coefficient estimates of leverage indicate that capital structure of French 
firms does not affect their debt composition decisions. Although the long-run leverage 
multiplier is insignificant in Germany, the lagged leverage and BDR in the short-run 
model are significantly negatively associated (Table 7.7a). This may partially confirm 
Drukarcyk et al's. [1985] who posit that debt-ratio is one of the most important factors in 
Germany to get bank debt. In the UK, only the long-run multiplier is significantly 
negative for the 1969-2000 period (Table 7.8b). These negative findings support 
Diamond's idea that firms with high debt ratios may restrict their bank borrowing to 
prevent frequent liquidations176• They may also be related to the idea that higher leverage 
means lower agency costs and hence less usage of monitored debt. Considering leverage 
173 Cantillo and Wright [2000], and Hoshi et al. [1993] also report significantly positive estimated 
coefficients ofLDV. 
174 Esho et al. [2001], and Houston and James [1996] report the same type or relation. Esho et al. argue that 
issuing long-term debt can imply firm reputation and serves a substitute for bank monitoring to mitigate 
a.Rency problems. 
1 The results are based on book-leverage. Using market-leverage as an alternative definition does not 
change the quality of results. 
176 Dennis and Mihov [2003], Hadlock and James [2002], Houston and James [1996] and MacKie-Mason 
[ 1990b] also detect a negative relation. Thus, our results contradict the findings of Anderson and Makhija 
[1999], Hoshi et al. [1993], Johnson [1997] and Esho et al. [2001] who report a significantly positive 
leverage coefficient. 
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as fmancial distress proxy, these results are not surprising in terms of bankruptcy rules: 
German bankruptcy laws allow for liquidation rather than reorganisation, UK laws may 
cause too many premature liquidations and French laws protect the ailing firms 177. 
Consequently, the argument that firms with high debt ratios borrow from banks in order 
to minimise agency, bankruptcy and asymmetric information costs is not confirmed. 
7.4.2.1.4. Growth Opportunities178 
Unlike in the UK, our experiments reveal that there is no a non-monotonous relation 
between market-to-book ratio (MTBR) and bank debt use in France and Germany179• The 
only discernible finding for the latter countries is the significantly positive coefficient on 
current MTBR in France (Table 7.5a)180• This implies that French firms with growth 
prospects tend to borrow from banks due to information asymmetries, high disclosure 
costs, low contracting costs, or the absence of bank information monopolies. It seems 
that costs related to information asymmetries, agency conflicts and monitoring, and 
holdup problems are not prevalent for German firms. This may be due to their corporate 
governance structure which is designed to mitigate agency and asymmetric information 
problems181 • 
On the other hand, there are two cases in which we can argue that there is aU-
shaped relation between bank debt ratio and MTBR in the UK: In Table 7.8b for the 
period 1983-2000, the coefficients on MTBR and MTBR2 are significantly negative and 
positive, respectively at 10 %. An even stronger finding is in Table 7.8b for the period 
1969-2000 using 'short-term bank debt ratio' as dependent variable, where the 
coefficients are significant at 1 % and have the predicted signs. Hence, one may state that 
177 As the theme of saving a ailing enterprise is emphasised by French laws relative to British and German, 
safeguarding of the jobs involved is the second most important goal, whereas satisfying creditors comes 
only in third place in France. Despite the bankruptcy reform in 1994, creditors' interests remain explicitly 
subordinated under French insolvency proceedings. This new law caused uncertainty as to future value 
guarantees in business failures, and hence tightened the selection criteria of fmns for bank loans. It is 
known that insolvency losses of French banks are considerably larger than their German counter parts. 
178 The results do not change substantially if we use depreciation ratio and intangible-assets ratio as 
alternative measures to market-to-book ratio. 
179 In the UK, excluding MTBR2 from the model does not change the quality of results of other variables. 
However, in some cases it makes the significant MTBR coefficient of non-linear model insignificant in the 
linear regression. Hence, we do not report the results of the regressions assuming linearity between bank-
debt ratio and MTBR in the UK. In France and Germany, there is no evidence of non-linearity and 
including MTBR2 in the regression reduces the power of the model. Thus, we only report results assuming 
linearity in these countries. 
180 Anderson and Makhija [1999], Houston and James [1996] for firms with multiple bank relations, and 
Krishnaswami et a!. [ 1999] also find a significantly positive MTBR coefficient. 
181 Similarly, Easterwood and Kadapakkam [1991], Esho et al. [2001], Hadlock and James [2002] and 
Hoshi et a!. [ 1993] cannot fmd a significant MTBR coefficient. 
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low-growth and high-growth firms borrow from banks due to different reasons while 
medium-growth firms borrow from public debt markets. 
With respect to the GMM-DIF results in Table 7.6b, the coefficient on MTBR2 is 
insignificant but has the predicted sign while that on MTBR is significantly negative182• 
As explained by Houston and James [2001], this strong negative impact implies that 
banks may focus their lending on fixed assets, working capital, etc. not on the firms with 
intangible growth opportunities (supply side). It may also be possible that firms with 
profitable growth opportunities restrict their bank borrowings due to potential holdup 
problems (demand side). 
7.4.2.1.5. Firm Size183 
The existing empirical studies have detected a kind of stylised fact that small firms 
borrow from banks as almost all papers report significantly negative coefficient on firm 
size. Similarly, our results for France and Germany (Table 7.7b), and the UK (7.6b) 
confirm this common fmding with significantly negative size coefficient. Hence, the 
flotation costs hypothesis that small firms do not prefer public debt due to high flotation 
costs is confirmed with these findings. Furthermore, the argument that small firms are 
immature, riskier, and have relatively high growth options, thus, tend not to borrow from 
public debt market is also confirmed. Consequently, debt composition decisions of firms 
in these countries are similar with respect to firm size and do not reflect the different 
institutional features in this respect. 
7.4.2.1.6. Liquidity 
The results show that the reliance on bank debt is negatively associated with firms' 
liquidity in France (tables 7.7b and 7.5a), in Germany (Table 7.7b), and in the UK for the 
period 1969-2000 (tables 7.6b, 7.8b) and for the period 1983-2000 (Table 7.8a). Hence, it 
seems that liquid firms avoid borrowing from banks possibly due to holdup problems or 
monitoring costs, which are not specific to arm's-length public debt. 
7.4.2.1.7. Firm Quality 
The impact of firm quality on debt replacement decisions seems to differ across 
countries. In Germany, it has no significant effect on debt ownership structure. This does 
not confirm Drukarcyk et al. [1985] who show that quality of management is one of the 
most important factors in Germany to get bank debt. On the other hand, bank-debt ratio is 
182 The studies which fmd a significantly negative MTBR coefficient are Houston and James [1996] for 
firms with single bank relation, Johnson [1997] and MacKie-Mason [1990b]. 
183 The results are based on Ln(Total Sales). Using Ln(Total Assets) as an alternative definition does not 
change the quality of results. 
297 
significantly positively associated with quality in France (Table 7.5a) and in the UK for 
the period 1969-2000 (Table 7.8). This positive association may be due to the argument 
that firms with future profitability and favourable information would prefer to borrow 
from better-informed lenders, such as banks, due to asymmetric information concerns. By 
this way, such firms would be able to signal their true value to the market. 
With the same token, the insignificance of firm quality in shaping debt ownership 
structure of German firms may be because of the close relations between companies and 
banks, which should mitigate asymmetric information problems. This is in line with the 
finding ofKrishnaswami et al. [1999] who conclude that adverse selection does not affect 
debt placement structure of firms with favourable information about future earnings but 
without considerable information asymmetries. 
7.4.2.1.8. Dividend Policy 
The association of bank-debt ratio with dividend payout ratio seems country-dependent 
with respect to GMM-DIF results. The correlation is significantly negative for France 
(Table 7.5) and the UK (Table 7.6), and significant positive for Germany (Table 7.5). As 
found by MacKie-Mason [1990b] and Saa-Requejo [1996], UK and French firms choose 
to use bank debt if they tend to decrease their payout ratios. This implies that firms in 
France and the UK avoid the adverse consequences of issuing public debt when they 
decide to cut dividend payments or not to pay at all. Hence, information content of paying 
dividends with respect to firms' growth prospects and future cash stream seems to be 
prevalent in these countries. 
On the other hand, this argument fails to explain the positive impact of dividends in 
Germany. This non-negative finding can be explained by the conventional wisdom that 
close relations between firms and banks in Germany reduce asymmetric information 
problems. If banks are both financiers and shareholders, then they would possible force 
managers to pay dividends. Yet, it seems a puzzle why firms should pay dividends and 
then borrow from banks 184• 
184 Cobham and Serre [2000] argue that the relationship between corporations and banks in France is 
different from the ones in Germany and the UK. Representation of French banks on firms' board are less 
frequent than that of German banks. Thus, no flow of information or risk-sharing and control is involved in 
this relationship. Bank-firm relations in France are closer and longer-term than in the UK. Credit 
relationship and refinancing of bank debt (contractual and conditional) depends on the past behaviour of 
firms and their information supply to banks. French firms are not generally subjected to close monitoring 
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7.4.2.1.9. Firm Performance 
The interaction between profitability and bank-debt ratio seems to be in line with the 
implications of institutional features. The association is significantly negative in France 
(Table 7 .5) and insignificant in Germany and the UK. The irrelevance of profitability in 
Germany can be explained by the argument that monitored bank debt and concentrated 
share ownership mitigates agency cost of free cash flow185 • What makes profitability 
ineffective in choosing the lender of UK firms may be developed public debt markets 
which can absorb the fluctuations of firms' internal sources. The inverse relationship 
between profitability and bank debt use in France can be explained by screening theory 
which contends that family controlled firms are less likely to borrow from banks186. 
7.4.2.1.10. Asset Collateral 
Static long-run results show that asset collateral does not seem to be important in 
choosing debt provider in any of the sample countries187• However, we do detect some 
differences with respect to the estimates of short-run models. While the coefficient on 
lagged fixed-assets ratio is significantly negative in France (Table 7.5a) the same 
coefficient is significantly positive in the UK (tables 7.6a and 7.8a, for the 1969-2000 
period). The negative finding in France may be due to the argument that firms with 
collateralisable non-financial assets choose to issue cost-efficient public debt. This 
implies that firms with lower incentive problems can be rewarded with lower interest 
rates. In addition, the current fixed-assets ratio coefficient is significantly positive in 
Germany (Table 7.7a) but it is significantly negative in the UK (tables 7.6a and 7.8a, for 
the 1969-2000 period). Drukarcyk et al. [1985] show that assets for collateral is one of 
the most important factors in Germany to get bank debt, which receives some support 
from the finding of significant fixed-assets ratio coefficient. The positive impact of 
by banks and managers retain relatively high control and independence. Rational risk management by 
banks and prudential behaviour by firms has been the essence. 
185 The panel study of Lehmann and Weigand [2000] for German corporations shows that having financial 
institutions as largest shareholders of listed firms improves profitability. This finding is consistent with the 
argument that banks are better and more efficient in monitoring to mitigate agency-type problems. However, 
as discussed by Franks and Mayer [2001], such close relationships may exacerbate the conflicts between 
banks and shareholders due to proxy votes held by banks. Becht [1999] argues that high voting power 
concentration through block holdings leads to liquidity costs but this cost can be alleviated by the role of 
banks in Germany. 
186 Cantillo and Wright [2000] fmd that, contrary to screening theory, closely held/family firms are more 
likely to borrow from intermediaries. This means banks' informational advantage over public debtholders 
can be attributed to the banks' power as (ex-post) reorganisers rather than (ex-ante) screeners. 
187 Cantillo and Wright [2000], Easterwood and Kadapakkam [1991], Hoshi et al. [1993] and Houston and 
James [1996] cannot fmd asset collateral to be significant in debt ownership structure decisions. One 
explanation maybe that non-financial assets do not serve as valuable collateral. 
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lagged collateral in the UK and current collateral in Germany could be due to banks' 
requirements for asset collateral while lending (Edwards and Fisher [1994])188• 
7.4.2.1.11. Financial Distress 
The results reveal that the relationship between coverage ratio and bank-debt ratio is not 
uniform across countries. It seems that high or low coverage ratio does not affect firms' 
debt ownership decisions in the UK and Germany. On the other hand, bank debt use is 
strongly positively associated with coverage ratio in France (Table 7.5). It means French 
firms with low probability of being distressed are more likely to issue bank debt. 
Obviously, this is contrary to what the theory predicts and hence might be peculiar to 
France189• 
7.4.2.1.12. Earnings Volatility 
The GMM-DIF results show that the association of bank debt use with earnings volatility 
is country-dependent. While earnings volatility has no significant impact on debt 
ownership decisions in Germany and France, it has significantly negative effect in the 
UK. Our finding that UK firms with high volatile earnings are likely to issue· public debt 
is not predicted by the theory and inconsistent with the findings of Johnson [1997] and 
Saa-Requejo [1996]. One explanation to this negative finding is that since public debt 
markets are developed, UK firms with high volatile earnings may not prefer to borrow 
from banks as they have less restrictions to the public debt access than their counter parts 
in France and Germany. 
7.4.2.1.13. Macroeconomic and Stock Market Factors 
Stock Return Volatility 
The GMM-SYS results show that the association of bank-debt ratio with stock return 
volatility varies across countries in a similar pattern with earnings volatility. As also 
found by Anderson and Makhija [1999] for Japanese firms, and Easterwood and 
Kadapakkam [1991] for US firms, the relationship is insignificant in France and 
Germany. However, contradicting the theory and the findings of Hadlock and James 
[2002], the correlation between bank debt use and stock return volatility turns out to be 
negative and significant at 1 % in the UK. Thus, it is interesting to note that UK firms 
with less volatile stock prices are more likely to issue bank debt despite the asymmetric 
188 Esho et al. [2001], Hadlock and James [2002], and Johnson [1997] also find direct impact of collateral 
on bank debt choice. 
189 Leverage could also serve as a financial distress proxy. Thus, we re-estimated the model after excluding 
leverage but the quality of the results remained to be the same. 
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information problems. It also means that UK firms with greater potential for 
undervaluation tend to avoid issuing bank debt. 
Change in Stock Price 
The association of bank -debt ratio with stock price change (share performance) seems to 
be insignificant in Germany and the UK. However, the results indicate that French firms 
are less likely to issue bank debt if their share prices have gone up as the relevant 
coefficient is significantly negative (tables 7.5 and 7.7). Hadlock and James [2002] and 
MacKie-Mason [1990b] find the same association for US firms. An increase in share 
price may refer to firms' quality and convince the public debtholders about their future 
prospects. In this case, it would be more advantageous for French firms not to borrow 
from banks. 
Term Structure of Interest Rates 
The results exhibit that the association of bank debt use with term structure of interest 
rates is country-dependent. In France, the trend in yield curve does not seem to affect 
managers' decisions about choosing the lenders. In Germany, term structure of interest 
rates has significantly positive coefficient (Table 7.7a) while the same coefficient is 
strongly negative in the UK (tables 7.6 and 7.8). Hence, one can conclude that when 
long-term interest rates are relatively higher UK firms are reluctant to raise bank debt 
while German firms tend to issue bank debt. It seems that the impact of monetary policies 
in relation to cost of bank capital on corporate sector may differ across countries. 
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Table 7.5: a) Corporate debt ownership structure in France and Germany: difference-
GMM ('specific' approach) 
Independent Predicted FRANCE GERMANY 
Variables Sign BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK-
TOTAL PROXY TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 LONG>S 
BANK1.t-1 + -0.0683 0.3141*** 0.6699*** 0.3656*** 0.3937*** 0.5325** 
(0.2306) (0.0669) (0.0991) (0.0507) (0.0540) (0.0688) 
MATURITY1,t -0.0165 -0.0354* 
(0.2156) (0.0215) 
MATURITY1,t-1 
LEVERAGE1,t +I- 0.2518 -0.2729** -0.0394 0.3555*** -0.3421*** -0.0030 
(0.9134) (0.1392) (0.0508) (0.1305) (0.1228) (0.0694) 
LEVERAGE1,1-1 -0.1765** -0.2250*** 0.1922*** -
(0.0729) (0.0686) (0.0727) -
MKT-TO-BOOK i,t +I- 0.0564* 0.0032 0.0033 -0.0034 0.0166 0.0011 
(0.0342) (0.0244) (0.0077) (0.0170) (0.0178) (0.0117) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1.t-1 
SIZE1.t -0.0621 0.0390 -0.0153 0.0015 -0.0154 0.0121 
(0.2521) (0.0461) (0.0175) (0.0312) (0.0302) (0.0108) 
SIZE1.t-1 0.0153** 
(0.0078) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +I- 0.0783 -0.2347*** 0.0003 -0.0026*** 0.0045** 0.0018 
(0.1136) (0.0471) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0019) 
LIQUI DITY1,t-1 -0.0040** 0.1027*** 
(0.0020) (0.0233) 
QUALITYi,t + 0.0188 -0.0189*** 0.0017 -0.0206** 0.0195** -0.0104* 
(0.0510) (0.0045) (0.0021) (0.0104) (0.0092) (0.0079) 
QUALITYI,t-1 0.0523* 
(0.0311) 
DIVIDEND1,t -0.0151*** 0.0006* 0.0030** -0.0014 0.0021 -0.0002 
(0.0059) (0.0036) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0021) 
DIVIDEND1.t-1 
PROFITABILITY1,t +I- -0.4558** -0.3739 -0.0234 0.0207 -0.0439 -0.0144 
(0.1769) (0.2667) (0.0230) (0.0909) (0.0884) (0.0575) 
PROFITABILITYi.t-1 
FIXED ASSETS1,t +I- -0.9879 -0.4671 0.0215 -0.3272* 0.2864* 0.0962 
(1. 7400) (0.4639) (0.0466) (0.1710) (0.1650) (0.0943) 
FIXED ASSETS1.t-1 -0.2043* 0.6565*** 0.1849** -0.1798** -0.0731* 
(0.1242) (0.1693) (0.0745) (0.0771) (0.0445) 
COVERAGE1.t 0.0018** -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001* -0.0001 0.0000 
(0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.00006) {0.0000) (0.0000) 
COVERAGEi,t-1 0.0010** 
(0.0004) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t + 0.0305 0.0078 -0.0004 0.0011* -0.0011** -0.0009 
(0.0360) (0.0052) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t-1 0.0007** -0.0007* -
(0.0003) (0.0004) -
RETURN VOL + -0.3107 -0.4789* 0.0257 -0.0937 0.0600 0.1008 
(1.3870) (0.2911) (0.0550) (0.2670) (0.2609) (0.1318) 
SHARE PERFORM -0.0682*** -0.0045 0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0010 0.0020 
(0.0265) (0.0133) (0.0044) (0.0147) (0.0151) (0.0064) 
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TERM +I-
Constant 
Correlation 1 
Correlation2 
Sargan Test (df) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 
Firms I Observations 
Estimation Period 
Independent Predicted 
Variables Sign 
MATURITY~,~ -
LEVERAGE1.t +I-
MKT-TO-BOO~.t +I-
SIZEi.t -
LIQUIDITYi,t +I-
QUALITYi,t + 
DIVIDEND1,t -
PROFITABI LITY1.t +I-
FIXED ASSETS1,t +I-
COVERAGE1,t -
EARNINGS VOL1,t + 
RETURN VOL + 
SHARE PERFORM -
TERM +I-
-0.0192 0.0010 0.0003 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0008 
(0.0205) (0.0027) (0.0005) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0013) 
0.0078 -0.0015 -0.0001 0.0040* -0.0018 -0.0003 
(0.0374) (0.0043) (0.0006) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0009) 
-0.4947 -4.498*** -4.376*** -7.765*** -7.655*** -6.537*** 
-0.8832 0.9034 -0.5638 0.1668 0.1302 0.1311 
19.53 (72) 161.3 (154) 105.5 (132) 231 (209) 235 (209) 110.5(121 
36.12 (19)*** 81.62 (18)*** 94.96 (15)*** 99.03 (17)*** 113.7 (17)*** 84.9 (14) 
191/325 274/1784 453/3424 
1993-1999 1985-1999 1989-1999 
0 b) Stat1c long-run results 
FRANCE 
BANK- BANK- BANK-
TOTAL PROXY TOTAL 
-0.0154 
-
-0.1072 
(0.1999) - (0.0715) 
0.2357 -0.6552** -0.1195 
(0.8546) (0.3342) (0.1535) 
0.0528 0.0047 0.0100 
(0.0721) (0.0357) (0.0223) 
-0.0581 0.0791 -0.0463 
(0.2382) (0.0637) (0.0540) 
0.0695 -0.1925*** 0.0009 
(0.1324) (0.0669) (0.0014) 
0.0666 -0.0276*** 0.0052 
(0.0630) (0.0078) (0.0064) 
-0.0142*** 0.0009 0.0090* 
(0.0055) (0.0062) (0.0053) 
-0.4267** -0.5451 -0.0708 
(0.1656) (0.3929) (0.0727) 
-1.1160 0.2760 0.0651 
(1.3560) (0.6711) (0.1437) 
0.0026*** -0.0001 0.0001 
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
0.0285 0.0113 -0.0011 
(0.0337) (0.0078) (0.0012) 
-0.2909 -0.6982 0.0780 
(1.3126) (0.4950) (0.1720) 
-0.0639*** -0.0065 0.0012 
(0.0248) (0.0196) (0.0133) 
-0.0180 0.0014 0.0010 
(0.0210) (0.0040) (0.0016) 
447/3278 
1990-1999 
447 /3278 453/341 
1990-1999 1989-199 
8 
9 
GERMANY 
BANK- BANK- BANK-
SHORT LONG>1 LONG> 5 
- - -
- - -
0.2057 -0.2472 -0.0063 
(0.1999) (0.2137) (0.1486) 
-0.0053 0.0274 0.0024 
(0.0268) (0.0292) (0.0251) 
0.0023 -0.0255 0.0258 
(0.0492) (0.0495) (0.0241) 
-0.0042*** 0.0074** 0.0039 
(0.0016) (0.0037) (0.0040) 
-0.0324** 0.0321** -0.0222 
(0.0165) (0.0153) (0.0168) 
-0.0023 0.0035 -0.0005 
(0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0044) 
0.0326 -0.0723 -0.0308 
(0.1431) (0.1459) (0.1236) 
-0.2243 0.1758 0.0494 
(0.2889) (0.2963) (0.2028) 
0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.00006) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
0.0027** -0.0031** -0.0019 
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0016 
-0.1477 0.0990 0.2156 
(0.4215) (0.4305) (0.2849 
-0.0030 -0.0016 0.0043 
(0.0231) (0.0249) (0.0137 
0.0009 0.0001 -0.0017 
(0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0029 
.. See notes m Table 7 .I for variable defm1tlons. Correlation I and 2 are first and second order autocorrelatiOn of 
residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O,I) under the null of no serial correlation. 
Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as x2(df) under the null of 
instruments' validity. Wald Test- I tests the joint significance of estimated coefficients; asymptotically distributed 
as l(df) under the null of no relationship. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the 
relevant null is rejected at I 0, 5 and I percent level, respectively. 
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RETURN VOL + 0.0562 -0.0889 0.1190 -0.3260 -0.3889 0.1184 
(0.2229) (0.1996) (0.1509) (0.2525) (0.3084) (0.2505) 
SHARE PERFORM - -0.0069 -0.0411*** 0.0062 0.0001 0.0119 -0.0040 
(0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0047) (0.0128) (0.0187) (0.0131) 
TERM +I- -0.0010 -0.0016** -0.0008* -0.0031** -0.0030** -0.0012 
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.001 0) 
Constant 0.0045*** -0.0011 0.0032*** -0.0004 0.0001 0.0008 
(0.0010) (0.001 0) (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0014) 
Correlation 1 -11.9*** -14.23*** -14.58*** -11.41** -13.52*** -13.68*** 
Correlation2 2.855*** 1.143 3.286*** 2.183** 2.281** 2.078** 
Sargan Test (df) 271 (260) 242 (236) 209 (207) 246.2 (253) 240.6 (228) 239.9 (225} 
Wald Test-1 (df) 1361 (20)*** 432.7 (16)*** 554.7 (17)*** 273.7 (17)*** 262.9 (15)*** 302.1 (18}** 
Firms I Observations 2080 124449 2080 124464 2093 I 25025 2028114478 2028114478 1920/1440 0 
Estimation Period 1971-1999 1971-1999 1971-1999 1985-1999 1985-1999 1985-1999 
. b) Static long-run results 
Independent Predicted Dependent Variables: 1969-2000 Dependent Variables: 1983-200 
Variables Sign BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK-
0 
TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 
MATURITY1,t - -0.8328*** - - -0.4525*** - -
(0.1293) - - (0.0917) - -
LEVERAGE1.t +I- 0.1121 -0.0192 0.1366 0.2103 0.1550 -0.0207 
(0.2532) (0.0824) (0.2634) (0.1810) (0.1290) (0.1134) 
MKT-TO-BOOKi,t - -0.0630** -0.0683*** -0.0477 -0.0377** -0.0416* -0.0296 
(0.0324) (0.0223) (0.0302) (0.0192) (0.0231) (0.0247) 
2 MKT-TO-BOOK i,t + 0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
SIZEI,t - -0.1211*** -0.1280*** -0.0647 -0.0942** -0.1521*** -0.0030 
(0.0480) (0.0305) (0.0470) (0.0420) (0.0446) (0.0405) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +I- -0.1647** -0.3031*** -0.3127*** -0.0032 -0.0660 0.0163 
(0.0882) (0.0735) (0.1133) (0.0324) (0.0553) (0.0434) 
QUALITYi.t + 0.1767 -0.0033 0.1818 0.0144 -0.0380 0.0784 
(0.1459) (0.0631) (0.1218) (0.0336) (0.0816) (0.0605) 
DIVIDENDi,t - -0.0268* 0.0042 -0.0028 0.0034 0.0147 0.0004 
(0.0157) (0.0091) (0.0049) (0.0062) (0.0115) (0.0058) 
PROFITABILITY1,t +I- 0.1578 -0.1935 0.2914 -0.2209 -0.1719 -0.4218* 
(0.3748) (0.2511) (0.3319) (0.1922) (0.269) (0.2489) 
FIXED ASSETS1,t +I- -0.3673 -0.9368*** 0.3906 0.0496 0.0006 -0.3225* 
(0.3291) (0.2222) (0.2444) (0.2227) (0.2449) (0.1925) 
COVERAGE1.t - -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.00001 ** 0.0000 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.00005) (0.0000) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t + -0.0033* 0.0005 0.0011 -0.0025 0.0114** 0.0037 
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0087) 
RETURN VOL + 0.1457 -0.1654 0.4657 -0.5660 -0.7635 0.2674 
(0.5735) (0.3736) (0.5896) (0.4536) (0.6227) (0.5662) 
SHARE PERFORM - -0.0180 -0.0764*** 0.0241 0.0001 0.0235 -0.0090 
(0.0283) (0.0211) (0.0180) (0.0222) (0.0367) (0.0295) 
TERM +I- -0.0025 -0.0031** -0.0032* -0.0054** -0.0060** -0.0028 
(0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0022) 
.. See notes m Table 7 .I for vartable defmtttons. Correlation I and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of 
residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O,I) under the null of no serial correlation. 
Sargan Test is test of the overidenticying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as i(df) under the null of 
instruments' validity. Wald Test-I tests the joint significance of estimated coefficients; asymptotically distributed 
as x2(df) under the null of no relationship. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the 
relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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TERM +I- -0.0156 -0.0005 0.0007* 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0006 
(0.0188) (0.0025) (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0012) 
Constant 0.5416 0.5623*** 0.2437*** 0.3209** 0.2575* 0.0522 
(0.5072) (0.1805) (0.0899) (0.1359) (0.1359) (0.0645) 
Correlation 1 -2.342** -5.247*** -4.756*** -9.046*** -8.937*** -6.91*** 
Correlation2 -0.7803 1.475 -0.3532 0.4638 0.4238 0.1504 
Sargan Test (df) 60.59 (243) 233 (318) 187.8 (275) 246.5 (252) 245.3 (252) 236.1 (252 
Wald Test-1 (df) 87.95 (15)*** 260.8 (16)*** 380.9 (17)*** 220.2 (14)*** 239.8 (14)*** 255 (14)-
Wald Test-2 (df) 19.31 (14) 25.9 (15)*** 15.31 (14) 36.67 (14)*** 33.26 (14)*** 23.8 (14)** 
R2 0.4388 0.5247 0.7631 0.4634 0.4843 0.6185 
Firms I Observations 196/527 274/2061 45313877 453 I 3877 453 I 3877 453/3877 
Estimation Period 1993-1999 1985-1999 1989-1999 1989-1999 1989-1999 1989-1999 
b) Static long-run results 
Independent Predicted FRANCE GERMANY 
Variables Sign BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK-
TOTAL PROXY TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 LONG> 5 
MATURITY1,t - -0.1830 - -0.1818** - - -
(0.2206) - (0.0712) - - -
LEVERAGE1,t +I- 0.0829 -0.5172*** -0.0788 0.0477 -0.0903 0.0820 
(0.5095) (0.1982) (0.0581) (0.1331) (0.1276) (0.1085) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1,t +I- 0.0481 0.0029 -0.0014 -0.0071 0.0056 -0.0151 
(0.0355) (0.0216) (0.0112) (0.0222) (0.0231) (0.0157) 
SIZE1.t - -0.0455* -0.0072 -0.0145** 0.0025 -0.0148*** -0.0064 
(0.0273) (0.0169) (0.0074) (0.0148) (0.0058) (0.0102) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +I- 0.1256** -0.1118*** 0.0006 -0.0041*** 0.0048** 0.0016 
(0.0603) (0.0368) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
QUALITYi,t + 0.0264 -0.0455*** 0.0123 -0.0193 0.0195* 0.0133 
(0.0765) (0.0133) (0.0092) (0.0208) (0.0118) (0.0124) 
DIVIDEND1.t - 0.0091 0.0000 0.0031 0.0052** 0.0004 -0.0008 
(0.0180) (0.0053) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0038) 
PROFITABILITY~,~ +I- -0.2829 -0.3948* 0.0144 -0.0962 0.0711 0.0369 
(0.4499) (0.2156) (0.0499) (0.1534) (0.1511) (0.1401) 
FIXED ASSETS1.t +I- 0.4912 -0.2095** 0.1405 -0.4165** 0.4342** 0.2406* * 
(0.3479) (0.1043) (0.1018) (0.1804) (0.1723) (0.1227) 
COVERAGE1,t - -0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0001 * 
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000 6 
EARNINGS VOL1,t + -0.0289 -0.0063** -0.0006 0.0018 -0.0022** 0.0004 
(0.0194) (0.0026) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
RETURN VOL + -1.0163 -0.6974 0.0842 0.4050 -0.4022 -0.3907 
(1.4931) (0.4784) (0.1826) (0.3962) (0.3966) (0.2838) 
SHARE PERFORM - -0.0847* -0.0524*** 0.0064 -0.0273 0.0186* 0.0354* * 
(0.0471) (0.0202) (0.0130) (0.0207) (0.0113) (0.0174) 
TERM +I- -0.0244 -0.0010 0.0032 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0013 
(0.0282) (0.0045) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0029) 
.. See notes m Table 7.1 for vanable defimt10ns. Industry dummtes are mcluded mall models. CorrelatiOn 1 and 2 
are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O,l) 
under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as x2(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests 1 and 2 test the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients, and of industry dummies, respectively; asymptotically distributed as x2(df) under the null of 
no relationship. (*), (* *) and (* * *) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 
and 1 percent level, respectively. 
307 
308 
RETURN VOL + -0.2575 -0.2527 -0.0009 -0.6249*** -0.6260** 0.2060 
(0.2085) (0.2135) (0.1319) (0.2006) (0.2543) (0.2065) 
SHARE PERFORM - 0.0059 -0.0268*** 0.0144*** -0.0044 0.0216 -0.0037 
(0.0087) (0.0095) (0.0052) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0129) 
TERM +I- -0.0034*** -0.0010 -0.0013** -0.0032*** -0.0032*** -0.0016* 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
Constant 0.3533*** 0.5541*** -0.1129 0.3486*** 0.4219*** -0.1129 
(0.0704) (0.0785) (0.1106) (0.0962) (0.1215) (0.0909) 
Correlation 1 -16.83*** -12.71*** -15.29*** -16.55*** -16.22*** -15.43*** 
Correlation2 4.516*** 3.46*** 2.996*** 3.609*** 3.067*** 2.771*** 
Sargan Test (df) 525.8 (484) 508 (486) 252.6 (226) 418.4 (393) 375.4 (353) 376.2 (352) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 3782 (20)*** 1262 (18)*** 1252 (17)*** 819.5 (17)*** 714.4 (16)*** 775.8 (17)** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 51.39 (15)*** 92.6 (15)*** 12.07 (15) 72.6 (15)*** 82.65 (15)*** 18.75 (15) 
R2 0.6181 0.5494 0.4638 0.5599 0.5140 0.4649 
Firms I Observations 2082 126520 2082 126520 2095 127132 2028 I 16506 2028 116506 1920 I 1632 0 
Estimation Period 1971-1999 1971-1999 1971-1999 1985-1999 1985-1999 1985-1999 
. b) Stat1c long-run results 
Independent Predicted Dependent Variables: 1969-2000 Dependent Variables: 1983-200 0 
Variables Sign BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK-
TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 
MATURITYi.t - -0.7319*** - - -0.3424*** - -
(0.1175) 
- -
(0.1037) 
- -
LEVERAGE1,t +I- -0.2270* 0.0292 -0.4292 -0.0257 0.0689 -0.0760 
(0.1379) (0.0729) (0.3112) (0.0723) (0.0995) (0.0756) 
MKT-TO-BOOK 1,1 - 0.0056 -0.1120*** 0.0007 -0.0497* -0.0371 -0.0224 
(0.0281) (0.0239) (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0245) (0.0213) 
MKT-TO-BOOK2 i,t + -0.0003 0.0016*** -0.0009 0.0007* 0.0005 0.0004 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
SIZE1,t - -0.0096 -0.0938*** 0.1219*** -0.0043 -0.0646*** 0.0529*** 
(0.0212) (0.0153) (0.0389) (0.0211) (0.0216) (0.0199) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +I- -0.2108*** -0.0820* -0.3062** -0.0319 -0.0103 0.0163 
(0.0693) (0.0444) (0.1206) (0.0469) (0.0520) (0.0403) 
QUALITYi,t + 0.3909* 0.0143 0.3276* 0.0382 -0.0075 0.1431 
(0.2333) (0.0766) (0.2000) (0.0693) (0.0679) (0.1256) 
DIVIDEND1,t - -0.0049 0.0027 0.0022 0.0014 0.0158 0.0018 
(0.0122) (0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0078) (0.0118) (0.0056) 
PROFITABILITY1,t +I- -0.3024 0.2677 -0.6450** -0.1998 -0.1882 -0.0748 
(0.2287) (0.2667) (0.3146) (0.2152) (0.2444) (0.1583) 
FIXED ASSETS1,t +I- -0.1163 -0.2912** 0.2136 -0.0439 0.0266 -0.0073 
(0.2132) (0.1431) (0.3228) (0.1848) (0.1840) (0.1738) 
COVERAGE1,t - -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
EARNINGS VOL1,t + -0.0023 0.0021 0.0031 -0.0056 0.0067 0.0066 
(0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0058) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0088) 
RETURN VOL + -1.0811 -0.7396 -0.0041 -1.8881*** -1.7170** 0.6489 
(0.8879) (0.6366) (0.5943) (0.6400) (0.7228) (0.6513) 
SHARE PERFORM - 0.0249 -0.0785*** 0.0648*** -0.0133 0.0591 -0.0117 
(0.0367) (0.0288) (0.0237) (0.0396) (0.0388) (0.0406) 
TERM +I- -0.0142*** -0.0030 -0.0059** -0.0096*** -0.0087*** -0.0050* 
(0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0029) 
.. See notes m Table 7.1 for vanable defimttons. Industry dummtes are mcluded m all models. Correlatton 1 and 2 are first and 
second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as r(df) under the null of 
instruments' validity. Wald Tests 1 and 2 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, and of industry dummies, 
respectively; asymptotically distributed as r(df) under the null of no relationship.(*),(**) and(***) indicates that coefficients 
are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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7.4.2.2. Maturity Structure of Bank Debt 
This section examines whether using short-term or long-term bank debt ratio as 
dependent variables instead of total bank-debt ratio changes the estimation results190• In 
France, the main concern is to see whether 'bank-total' and 'bank-proxy' have different 
implications. With respect to long-run results, GMM-SYS estimator (Table 7.7a) 
performs better than GMM-DIF estimator (Table 7.5a) as it produces more significant 
variables. In many cases, these two dependent variables do not have the same 
relationships between the explanatory variables. The main reason for the inconsistency 
could be that they have significantly different sample sizes. The second reason maybe the 
weak proxy case. 
In Germany, the long-run results (tables 7.5b and 7.7.b) show that the choice of 
dependent variable does matter. The models using the dependent variables 'bank-short' 
and 'bank-long> 1' have much stronger explanatory power of debt ownership structure of 
corporations in Germany. However, the signs of the estimated coefficients under these 
two dependent variables are reverse to each other. For instance, while the coefficients on 
liquidity, fixed-assets ratio and quality variables are significantly negative under 'bank-
short', they are significantly positive under 'bank-long>1'. Furthermore, while the 
coefficients on coverage and earnings volatility variables are significantly positive under 
'bank-short', they are significantly negative under 'bank-long>1'. The positive quality 
coefficient and negative earnings volatility coefficient are predicted by the theory. 
Another notable finding is that the coefficient on share performance is significantly 
positive under 'bank-long>1' and "bank-long>5', which is not predicted by the theory. As 
predicted by the theory, the coefficient on coverage is significantly negative under 'bank-
long>1' and 'bank-long>5' (Table 7.7b). 
Static long-run findings in tables 7.6b and 7.8b for the UK reveal that the results are less 
sensitive to the choice of dependent variable as compared to the results in France and 
Germany. The irrelevance of dependent variables choice is especially noticeable in Table 
7.8b (period 1983-2000). The expected negative relation between bank-debt ratio and 
share price change can be seen under 'bank-short' for the period 1969-2000. In addition, 
the theory's prediction of positive correlation between bank-debt ratio and earnings 
volatility is found in Table 7.6b for the period 1983-2000. Finally, term structure of 
interest rates, leverage, coverage, liquidity, payout ratio and firm size are the variables 
which tend to have similar implications across different dependent variables. 
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7.4.2.3. Static Debt Ownership Structure 
In this section, the findings for a static debt ownership structure model are presented in 
tables 7.9 and 7.11 (for France and Germany) and tables 7.10 and 7.12 (for the UK) 
assuming that target debt ownership structure is instantaneously adjusted as a reaction to 
random changes in the macroeconomic environment and conditions of corporation. In 
other words, we stipulate that there is no lag in adjustment process toward an optimal 
debt ownership structure. 
7.4.2.3.1. GMM Estimates 
Static GMM-SYS results will be compared with the long-run GMM-SYS results in tables 
7.7b and 7.8b. In France, the coefficients on maturity and coverage in Table 7.9 under 
'bank-total' are significantly negative and thus are consistent with the theory. These 
coefficients were insignificant in the dynamic model. Another difference is due to 
liquidity and share price performance variables, for which the estimated coefficients in 
the static models are now insignificant. For the remaining variables, static and dynamic 
models have similar results. With respect to the dependent variable 'bank-proxy', 
dynamic specification performs better than static one, as the significant coefficients on 
liquidity fixed-assets ratio and earnings volatility become insignificant for the latter case. 
In Germany, static and dynamic estimates have similar results under the dependent 
variable 'bank-total' except the coefficient on fixed-assets ratio which is significant in 
the static models. Under 'bank-short', however, the results for some variables are 
sensitive to whether the model is dynamic or not. The significant coefficients on liquidity 
and payout ratio tum out to be insignificant if static model is used. On the other hand, 
insignificant coefficients on stock return volatility and share price performance become 
significant and consistent with what the theories predict in static models. Under 'bank-
long> 1', the dynamic model performs better than the static model as all the significant 
variables in the static model are also significant in the dynamic model except the stock 
return volatility variable. Under 'bank-long>S', the static model seems to perform better 
with liquidity and stock return volatility variables becoming significant but coverage 
ratio variable becoming insignificant. 
In the UK, it is apparent that the number of significant variables in the static model is 
more than that of in the dynamic model. We detect an interesting finding in the static 
models under the dependent variables 'bank-total' and 'bank-long> 1 for the period 1969-
190 In this case, one should remove maturity variable from the model. 
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2000: There is an inverse-U relation between growth opportunities and bank-debt ratio 
while previously found U-relation under 'bank-short' remains to be the case. In the static 
model for the period 1983-2000, the coefficient on leverage is significantly positive 
under 'bank-total' and 'bank-long>1'. More importantly, the theory's prediction of the 
positive relationship between stock return volatility and bank debt use is confirmed under 
'bank-total (1969-2000)' and 'bank-long>l (1983-2000)'. Another finding consistent with 
the theory is the significantly positive coefficient on earnings volatility under 'bank-
long> (1969-2000). However, the same coefficient has the unpredicted sign for the 1983-
2000 period. With respect to the share price performance variable in the static models, 
the results are sensitive to the dependent variable choice and time period. 
In general, the findings based on static and dynamic models in France and Germany tend 
not to conflict each other and the implications seem to be similar. However, one should 
be cautious about the results for the UK as there are substantial differences between the 
implications of static and dynamic models especially in terms of the number of the 
significant variables. Overall, it seems that dynamic models have more explanatory 
power than do static models as R2 and Wald Statistics of joint significance of variables 
are higher in dynamic models than in static models. 
7.4.2.3.2. Fixed-effects Estimates (WG) 
The most appropriate way to compare GMM and WG estimates using the dependent 
variable 'bank-total' is to examine static GMM-SYS and fixed-effects results191 • The 
GMM results for France in Table 7.9 are different from WG results in Table 7.11. The 
significantly negative association of 'bank-total' with payout ratio and share price 
performance using WG estimator is predicted by the theory while the significantly 
positive coefficient on coverage ratio is unpredicted. In Germany, the results are similar 
except the WG estimate of significantly negative quality coefficient, which is not 
consistent with the theory. In the UK, the results of both estimation procedures with 
respect to the variables 'maturity, firm size, profitability, fixed-assets ratio, coverage 
ratio, and term structure of interest rates' are the same. In each case, however, WG 
estimator produces more significant variables than does GMM estimator. These findings 
can highlight the importance of controlling for endogeneity as the results are sensitive to 
econometric specification. 
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Table 7.9: Static corporate debt ownership structure in France and Germany: system-GMM 
Independent Predicted FRANCE 
Variables Sign BANK- BANK-
TOTAL PROXY 
MATURITYi.t - -0.3365** -
(0.1427) -
LEVERAGE~,~ +I- 0.0084 -0.3832*** 
(0.2836) (0.1322) 
MKT-TO-BOO~.t +I- 0.0204 -0.0049 
{0.0275) (0.0149) 
SIZEi,t - -0.0905*** -0.0104 
{0.035) (0.0165) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +I- 0.0270 -0.0616 
{0.0417) (0.0553) 
QUALITYi,t + -0.0546 -0.0197** 
{0. 1575) {0.0082) 
DIVIDENDi,t - 0.0072 0.0016 
{0.0158) {0.0030) 
PROFITABILITYi,t +I- 0.0942 -0.4230** 
(0.3369) (0.1662) 
FIXED ASSETSi,t +I- 0.1756 -0.0793 
(0.2998) (0.1494) 
COVERAGEi,t - -0.0006** 0.0002 
(0.0003) (0.0005) 
EARNINGS VOLi.t + -0.0119 -0.0005 
(0.0147) (0.0003) 
RETURN VOL + -0.6652 -0.2452 
(0.6914) (0.3654) 
SHARE PERFORM - -0.0268 -0.0192* 
(0.0318) (0.0113) 
TERM +I- 0.0007 0.0011 
(0.0142) (0.0037) 
Constant 1.7971*** 0.9137*** 
(0.6677) (0.2921) 
Correlation 1 -2.413** -4.693*** 
Correlation2 -0.0110 0.1481 
Sargan Test (df) 76.24 (230) 234.1 (275) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 52.51 (14)*** 34.36 (13)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 51.45 (14)*** 38.45 (15)*** 
R2 0.0760 0.1270 
Firms I Observations 200/682 275/2118 
Estimation Period 1993-1999 1985-1999 
GERMANY 
BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK-
TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 LONG> 5 
-0.0479*** - - -
(0.0169) 
- -
-
-0.0142 0.0292 -0.0311 0.0500 
(0.0266) (0.1019) (0.0910) (0.0600) 
-0.0022 -0.0104 0.0026 -0.0075 
{0.0028) {0.0160) {0.0149) (0.0112) 
-0.0076** 0.0024 -0.0162 -0.0043 
(0.0037) {0.0125) {0.0116) (0.0064) 
0.0002 -0.0025 0.0028 0.0023** * 
(0.0003) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0009) 
0.0030 0.0072 -0.0025 -0.0020 
{0.0028) {0.0072) (0.0093) (0.0032) 
0.0006 0.0007 0.0005 0.0001 
{0.0011) {0.0018) {0.0023) (0.0022) 
-0.0092 -0.0976 0.0801 0.0129 
(0.0206) (0.1196) (0.1152) (0.0719) 
0.0536** -0.3239** 0.3700*** 0.2740* -
{0.0267) (0.1340) (0.1362) (0.1074) 
0.0000 0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
-0.0001 0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0007 
{0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0006) 
-0.0291 0.5246** -0.5131** -0.3706** 
{0.0564) (0.2467) (0.2497) (0.1621) 
-0.0004 -0.0255** 0.0251** 0.0211* ** 
{0.0033) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0069) 
-0.0002 0.0034 -0.0026 -0.0021 
(0.0007) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0018) 
1.0452*** 0.5287*** 0.5332*** 0.0875 
(0.0460) (0.1866) (0.1714) (0.1007) 
-2.325** -7.805*** -7.668*** -5.719*** 
-1 .781* -3.13*** -3.241*** -2.347** 
201.9 (252) 213.8 (229) 228 (229) 230.3 (22 9 
16.76 (14) 41.58 (13)*** 40.59 (13)*** 47 (13)*** 
1043 (14)*** 41.02 (14)*** 56.02 (14)*** 33 (14)*** 
0.1329 0.1166 
457/3955 457/3955 
1989-1999 1989-1999 
0.1502 
457/3955 
1989-1999 
0.1692 
457/395 
1989-199 
5 
9 
.. See notes m Table 7.1 for vanable defmittons. Industry dummies are mcluded m all models. Correlation l and 2 
are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O, l) 
under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as x2(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests l and 2 test the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients, and of industry dummies, respectively; asymptotically distributed as i< df) under the null of 
no relationship.(*),(**) and(***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 
and l percent level, respectively. 
191 The interested reader may also compare the results based on the other dependent variables. 
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Table 7.10: Static corporate debt ownership structure in the UK: system-GMM 
Independent Predicted Dependent Variables: 1969-2000 Dependent Variables: 1983-200 
Variables Sign BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK-
0 
TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 
MATURITY1.t - -0.7173*** - - -0.3004*** - -
(0.0460) - - (0.0492) - -
LEVERAGE1,t +I- 0.1055 -0.0331 0.1524 0.0856* -0.0042 0.0699** 
(0.0672) (0.0390) (0.1375) (0.0449) (0.0387) (0.0284) 
MKT-TO-BOOK1,t - 0.0243** -0.0611*** 0.0632*** -0.0366*** -0.0346*** -0.0068** * 
(0.0117) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0023) 
2 
-0.0003** 0.0009*** -0.0009*** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0000 MKT-TO-BOOK 1.1 + 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
SIZE1,t - 0.0171* -0.0832*** 0.0528*** -0.0105 -0.0688*** 0.0413*** 
(0.0092) (0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0085) 
LIQUIDITYi,t +/- -0.1265*** -0.0743*** -0.1038*** -0.0253 -0.0396* -0.0048 
(0.0283) (0.0262) (0.0275) (0.0169) (0.0231) (0.0147) 
QUALITYI,t + 0.1167 0.0188 0.1118 0.0281 0.0094 0.0500 
(0.0760) (0.0245) (0.0866) (0.0480) (0.0262) (0.0358) 
DIVIDEND1,t - 0.0046 -0.0028 0.0023 0.0017 0.0032 0.0004 
(0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0020) 
PROFITABILITY1.t +I- 0.0021 0.2270* -0.1940 0.0977 -0.0307 0.0576 
(0.1282) (0.1219) (0.1590) (0.0948) (0.1271) (0.0667) 
FIXED ASSETS1,t +I- -0.0441 -0.2338*** -0.0783 0.0977 -0.1019 0.1328* 
(0.0832) (0.0831) (0.0931) (0.0945) (0.0915) (0.0704) 
COVERAGE1.t - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
EARNINGS VOL1.t + -0.0002 -0.0026 0.0066* -0.0095*** -0.0044 -0.0055** 
(0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0025) 
RETURN VOL + 0.4779** 0.2897 0.0347 0.0216 -0.3582 0.3556* 
(0.2498) (0.2580) (0.2101) (0.2968) (0.2854) (0.2194) 
SHARE PERFORM - 0.0374*** -0.0074 0.0240*** 0.0134 0.0534*** -0.0229** 
(0.0108) (0.0115) (0.0094) (0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0093) 
TERM +I- -0.0063*** -0.0026*** -0.0057*** -0.0042*** -0.0053*** 0.0004 
(0.0011) (0.001 0) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
Constant 0.8235*** 1.4240*** -0.3127*** 0.8700*** 1.2744*** -0.3469* 
-(0.1225) (0.1135) (0.1051) (0.1476) (0.1590) (0.1111) 
Correlation 1 -6.528*** -16.7*** -5.073*** -7.638*** -14.06*** -11.33*** 
Correlation2 -5.903*** -7.461*** -5.371*** -5.755*** -6.089*** -6.895*** 
Sargan Test (df) 442.2 {433) 442.4 {434) 320.1 {294) 349.8 {354) 324.5 {314) 329.4 (314) 
Wald Test-1 (df) 685.6 {15)*** 154.3 {14)*** 248.2 {14)*** 105.1 {15)*** 83.7{14)*** 111.6 (14)** 
Wald Test-2 (df) 133.6 {15)*** 328.6 {15)*** 22.7 {15)* 242.5 {15)*** 308.3 {15)*** 37.61 (15)** 
R2 0.1869 0.1258 0.1892 0.1000 0.0932 0.0941 
Firms I Observations 2126/27310 2126/27310 2131/27761 2101/17957 2101/17957 2106/1840 8 
Estimation Period 1971-1999 1971-1999 1971-1999 1984-1999 1984-1999 1984-1999 
.. See notes m Table 7.1 for vanable defmitiOns. Industry dummies are mcluded m all models. Correlation I and 2 
are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(O, I) 
under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is test of the overidentizying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as x2(dt) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Tests I and 2 test the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients, and of industry dummies, respectively; asymptotically distributed as x2( dt) under the null of 
no relationship.(*),(**) and(***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at IO, 5 
and I percent level, respectively. 
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Table 7.11: Corporate debt ownership structure in France and Germany: Fixed-effects estimation 
FRANCE 
Independent Predicted Dependent Variables 
Variables Sign BANK- BANK-
TOTAL PROXY 
MATURITY - -0.0546 -
(0.0744) -
LEVERAGE +I- -0.0838 -0.3603*** 
(0.2118) (0.1048) 
MKT-TO-BOOK +I- 0.0147 -0.0173* 
(0.0183) (0.0096) 
SIZE - -0.0612 -0.0113 
(0.0496) (0.0132) 
LIQUIDITY +I- 0.0045 -0.2247*** 
(0.0282) (0.0274) 
QUALITY + 0.0073 -0.0142*** 
(0.0507) (0.0048) 
DIVIDEND - -0.0027** 0.0005 
(0.0013) (0.0017) 
PROFITABILITY +I- 0.1881 -0.1436 
(0.2169) (0.1221) 
FIXED ASSETS +I- -0.3034 -0.4087*** 
(0.2940) (0.1167) 
COVERAGE - 0.0004*** 0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0002) 
EARNINGS VOL + -0.0081 0.0000 
(0.0065) (0.0002) 
RETURN VOL + -0.5642 -0.3648* 
(0.6369) (0.2201) 
SHARE PERFORM - -0.0615** -0.0129 
(0.0255) (0.0096) 
TERM +I- -0.0049 0.0021 
(0.0159) (0.0028) 
Wald Test (df) 27.91 (14)** 118.2 (13)*** 
R2 0.0600 0.1736 
Firms I Observations 200/682 275/2118 
Estimation Period 1992-1999 1984-1999 
. . See notes m Table 7.1 for vanable defmttiOns . 
BANK-
TOTAL 
-0.0525*** 
(0.0145) 
-0.0260 
(0.0349) 
0.0036 
(0.0061) 
-0.0135* 
(0.0071) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0113 
(0.0146) 
0.0654** 
(0.0258) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0797 
(0.0927) 
-0.0019 
(0.0046) 
-0.0009 
(0.0010) 
19 (14) 
0.0300 
457/3955 
1988-1999 
GERMANY 
Dependent Variables 
BANK- BANK- BANK-
SHORT LONG>1 LONG> 5 
- - -
- - -
-0.0534 0.0251 0.0757* 
(0.0574) (0.0572) (0.0402) 
-0.0007 0.0042 -0.0011 
(0.0104) (0.0116) (0.0062) 
0.0020 -0.0153 -0.0057 
(0.0116) {0:0107) (0.0086) 
-0.0044*** 0.0040*** 0.0018 
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0015) 
0.0043*** -0.0048*** -0.0103** 
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0023) 
0.0000 0.0001 -0.0004 
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
-0.0407 0.0270 0.0273 
(0.0463) (0.0443) (0.0343) 
-0.3473*** 0.3928*** 0.1536** 
(0.0708) (0.0703) (0.0616) 
0.0001 -0.0001 0.00004* 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.00002 
-0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
0.2363 -0.2989 -0.3460* 
(0.2634) (0.2669) (0.1806) 
-0.0342*** 0.0305*** 0.0178* 
(0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0069) 
0.0020 -0.0027 -0.0016 
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0020) 
82.73 (13)*** 114.2 (13)*** 55 (13)*** 
0.0315 
457/3955 
1988-1999 
0.0346 0.0318 
457/3955 457/395 
1988-1999 1988-199 
5 
9 
Wa1d statistics tests the joint significance of estimated coefficient; asymptotically distributed as i(dt) under the 
null of no relationship. 
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Table 7.12: Corporate debt ownership structure in the UK: Fixed-effects estimations 
1969-2000 1983-2000 
Independent Predicted Dependent Variables Dependent Variables 
Variables Sign BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK- BANK-
TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 TOTAL SHORT LONG>1 
MATURITY - -0.5441*** - - -0.3459*** - -
(0.0136) - - (0.0161) - -
LEVERAGE +I- 0.1061*** -0.0753*** 0.0929*** 0.1131*** -0.0449** 0.1137*** 
(0.0359) (0.0232) (0.0240) (0.0389) (0.0221) (0.0267) 
MKT-TO-BOOK - -0.0079* -0.0213*** 0.0146*** -0.0251*** -0.0158*** -0.0078** * 
(0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0030) 
MKT-TO-BOOK2 + 0.0000 0.0003*** -0.0003** 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0001** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
SIZE - 0.0431*** -0.0775*** 0.0795*** -0.0002 -0.0830*** 0.0533*** 
(0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0056) (0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0066) 
LIQUIDITY +I- -0.0197*** -0.1012*** 0.0245*** -0.0175*** -0.0789*** 0.0340*** 
(0.0060) (0.0172) (0.0049) (0.0061) (0.0174) (0.0076) 
QUALITY + -0.0071* -0.0025 -0.0047** -0.0065 0.0000 -0.0058* 
(0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0044) (0.0025) (0.0034) 
DIVIDEND - -0.0004 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0012** -0.0012** -0.0001 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
PROFITABILITY +I- -0.0567 -0.0751** -0.0549* 0.0407 -0.0414 0.0554** 
(0.0399) (0.0375) (0.0285) (0.0415) (0.0384) (0.0284) 
FIXED ASSETS +I- 0.0867** -0.2898*** 0.1719*** 0.1022** -0.231 0*** 0.2099*** 
(0.0396) (0.0437) (0.0325) (0.0423) (0.0475) (0.0380) 
COVERAGE - 0.0000 0.00003*** 0.00002** 0.0000 0.00002*** 0.00001 ** 
(0.0000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0000) (0.000004) (0.000005 
EARNINGS VOL + 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
RETURN VOL + -0.1689* 0.1878* -0.2689*** -0.0183 0.2939** -0.2130** 
(0.0986) (0.1045) (0.0788) (0.1085) (0.1171) (0.0884) 
SHARE PERFORM - 0.0046 -0.0171*** 0.0088*** 0.0005 -0.0076 0.0017 
(0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0030) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0040) 
TERM +I- -0.0075*** -0.0024*** -0.0071*** -0.0030*** -0.0058*** 0.0012 
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.001 0) (0.001 0) (0.0009) 
Wald Test (df) 2210 (15)*** 329.7 (14)*** 450.9 (14)*** 624.7 (15)*** 236.3 (14)*** 153.6 (14)** 
R2 0.2561 0.0792 0.0764 0.1208 0.0704 0.0359 
Firms I Observations 2126/27310 2126/27310 2131/27761 2101/17957 2101/17957 2106/1840 8 
. . See notes m Table 7.1 for variable defmitions . 
Wald statistics tests the joint significance of estimated coefficient; asymptotically distributed as iC df) under the 
null of no relationship. 
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7.5. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this chapter has been to examine the variations in corporations' debt 
ownership decisions across European countries. The empirical evidence with respect to the 
GMM results reveals that the degree and type of association of debt ownership structure 
with market-specific and firms-specific factors are not independent from firms' financial 
and economic environment in which they are operating. The findings in all countries with 
respect to the dynamics in firms' debt composition decisions indicate that there is an 
adjustment process towards the desired debt ownership structure. The significantly 
positive coefficient estimates on lagged dependent variables suggest that this adjustment 
process is costly and the adjustment speed is highest in France in terms of responding to 
the new circumstances. 
This study identifies several market-related and firm-related factors responsible for 
the use of bank debt in the framework of country specific differences. First, maturity of 
debt and leverage ratio inversely affect the use of bank debt in Germany and the UK while 
they have no significant impact in France. These results seem to imply the liquidation 
concerns of firms in Germany and the UK, where bankruptcy rules emphasise this option 
unlike the firm-friendly French bankruptcy laws. Second, our study detects a U-shaped 
relation between bank-debt use and market-to-book ratio in the UK such that only low-
growth and high-growth firms tend to borrow from banks. Hence, it seems that bank 
information monopolies (holdup problems) are present in the UK. In other countries, a 
non-monotonous relation of that type does not exist. In France, there is some evidence that 
French firms with investment opportunities tend to borrow from banks possibly because of 
information asymmetries or high disclosure costs. In Germany, such problems and costs 
do not seem to be substantial, which may be attributed to German corporate governance 
system. Third, smaller firms tend to borrow from banks in all countries. This confirms the 
common finding in the literature and the related arguments that small firms are riskier, 
immature and benefit more from monitored debt. Fourth, as a common finding, liquidity 
exerts negative influence on bank-debt use in all countries. Fifth, firm quality and bank-
debt use are positively correlated in France and the UK while this association is 
insignificant in Germany. Hence, the concerns about obtaining a better-informed lender to 
mitigate adverse selection problems are not of importance for German firms possibly due 
to close and long run relations between firms and banks. Sixth, French and UK firms tend 
to use bank debt when they cut their dividend payout ratios, which is consistent with the 
hidden-information hypothesis that non-dividend paying firms avoid issuing public debt as 
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paying dividends signals firms' future prospects. However, German firms resort to banks 
when they pay less dividends, which may again be due to their different corporate 
governance mechanism. Seventh, firms' profitability does not affect their debt ownership 
decisions in Germany and the UK while profitable firms tend to avoid borrowing from 
banks in France. Although there are some temporary effects of asset collateral, we could 
not detect any significant impact in the long-run for our sample countries. Furthermore, 
interest coverage ratio has no significant effect on debt ownership structure of UK and 
German firms while it directly affects the amount of bank debt used by French firms. 
Another country-dependent pattern is due to the earnings volatility variable, which does 
not affect debt replacement decisions of French and German firms but it inversely affects 
bank-debt ratio of UK firms. 
This study also finds some factors with respect to the macroeconomic and stock 
market indicators that are related to corporate debt ownership structure. First, stock return 
volatility seems to reduce the amount of bank debt use by UK firms while not affecting 
bank-debt ratio of French and German firms, which is inconsistent with the theory. 
Second, only share price performance of French firms seems to be effective in debtholders 
selection as more use of bank debt follows share price runup. Regarding the implications 
of term structure of interest rates, relatively high (low) long-term interest rates cause 
German (British) managers to borrow from bank. However, the slope of yield curve does 
not seem to affect French managers' decisions in this respect. 
In conclusion, the firm-specific and market-specific factors reveal that the debt 
ownership decisions of listed corporations is not only the result of their own characteristics 
but also the outcome of environment and tradition in which they operate. 
It is argued that the development in banking and stock market may be complementary as 
each supplies and demands better information. Hence the econometrics results for the UK 
and Germany related to agency costs and asymmetric information should be similar, 
according to this argument. However, our study shows that this does not seem to be the 
case. 
One limitation of our study in this chapter is due to the absence of detailed data 
about firm's debt composition, e.g., non-bank private debt, public debt. One could also 
extend the number of countries to enrich the analysis using some corporate governance 
factors. This is left to the future research. 
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7.6. APPENDIX 
Table 7.Al: Panel Data Structure: a) Number of firms having 'n' continuous observations 
during the period; b) number of observations in each year; c) number of firms in each 
industry class; and d) number of observations in each industry class. 
a) Number of firms b) Number of observations c) Number of firms 
n (years) France Germany UK Years France Germany 
3 59 21 211 1969 - -
4 50 31 218 1970 - -
5 32 31 199 1971 - -
6 10 26 131 1972 - -
7 17 9 103 1973 - -
8 17 8 63 1974 - -
9 17 7 52 1975 - -
10 13 8 51 1976 - -
11 3 12 89 1977 - -
12 11 26 90 1978 - -
13 8 52 83 1979 - -
14 13 350 88 1980 - -
15 29 - 89 1981 - -
16 4 - 66 1982 - -
17 8 - 76 1983 75 -
18 68 - 66 1984 83 -
19 - - 67 1985 87 -
20 - - 49 1986 120 -
21 - - 34 1987 132 399 
22 
- -
23 1988 139 417 
23 - - 25 1989 148 438 
24 - - 20 1990 151 447 
25 - - 24 1991 162 454 
26 - - 21 1992 177 456 
27 - - 45 1993 188 465 
28 - - 41 1994 204 473 
29 - - 169 1995 211 499 
30 - - 29 1996 245 535 
31 - - 36 1997 293 557 
32 - - 183 1998 347 572 
1999 346 564 
2000 337 512 
Total 359 581 2441 Total 3445 6788 
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UK 
466 
481 
489 
870 
908 
933 
938 
943 
952 
964 
980 
1002 
1031 
1071 
1130 
1210 
1267 
1310 
1318 
1330 
1322 
1300 
1262 
1222 
1225 
1277 
1329 
1417 
1502 
1497 
1365 
1199 
35510 
Industry France German. UK 
1 23 49 165 
2 10 44 31 
3 19 56 201 
4 31 37 164 
5 48 59 263 
6 16 35 28 
7 41 89 316 
8 22 16 88 
9 25 21 197 
10 1 0 56 
11 20 22 148 
12 31 23 254 
13 46 33 321 
14 17 64 142 
15 9 33 67 
d) No. of observations 
Industry France German. 
1 283 574 
2 107 567 
3 242 688 
4 302 462 
5 406 588 
6 161 436 
7 441 1117 
8 199 198 
9 232 237 
10 4 0 
11 160 270 
12 319 274 
13 376 221 
14 152 757 
15 61 399 
UK 
258 9 
611 
3617 
235 0 
3262 
477 
541 
137 
4 
6 
2431 
591 
216 
395 
342 
9 
2 
8 
2701 
542 
Table 7. A2: Mean values of Bank-Debt ratios. 
FRANCE GERMANY UK 
YEAR BANK SHORT BANK BANK-S BANK-L1 BANK-L5 BANK BANK-S BANK-l 
1969 - - - - - - 0.4542 0.4542 0 
1970 - - - - - - 0.4598 0.4598 0 
1971 - - - - - - 0.4277 0.4277 0 
1972 - - - - - - 0.5013 0.5013 0 
1973 - - - - - - 0.5246 0.5246 0 
1974 - - - - - - 0.5775 0.5775 0 
1975 - - - - - - 0.5416 0.5416 0 
1976 - - - - - - 0.5062 0.5062 0 
1977 - - - - - - 0.5100 0.5100 0 
1978 - - - - - - 0.4945 0.4945 0 
1979 - - - - - - 0.5207 0.5206 0.0001 
1980 - - - - - - 0.5303 0.5260 0.0043 
1981 - - - - - - 0.5110 0.5071 0.0039 
1982 - - - - - - 0.5205 0.5127 0.0078 
1983 - 0.2744 - - - - 0.6515 0.5326 0.1189 
1984 - 0.3070 - - - - 0.7330 0.5627 0.1703 
1985 - 0.3078 - - - - 0.7458 0.5533 0.1925 
1986 - 0.3338 - - - - 0.7241 0.5303 0.1938 
1987 - 0.3528 0.9548 0.3206 0.6342 0.1849 0.6855 0.4944 0.1911 
1988 - 0.3739 0.9476 0.3858 0.5618 0.1901 0.6623 0.4731 0.1892 
1989 - 0.3800 0.9419 0.4186 0.5233 0.1685 0.6687 0.4666 0.2021 
1990 - 0.3998 0.9472 0.4533 0.4939 0.1628 0.6810 0.4596 0.2214 
1991 - 0.3960 0.9520 0.4638 0.4882 0.1626 0.6739 0.4504 0.2235 
1992 - 0.4105 0.9490 0.4713 0.4776 0.1593 0.6440 0.4153 0.2287 
1993 - 0.3971 0.9500 0.4410 0.5090 0.1550 0.6263 0.3870 0.2393 
1994 - 0.4059 0.9542 0.4570 0.4972 0.1604 0.5978 0.3649 0.2329 
1995 0.4254 0.4298 0.9506 0.4949 0.4557 0.1422 0.6190 0.3677 0.2513 
1996 0.3940 0.4393 0.9619 0.4837 0.4782 0.1511 0.6083 0.3451 0.2632 
1997 0.4051 0.4368 0.9466 0.4992 0.4474 0.1498 0.5980 0.3309 0.2671 
1998 0.3975 0.4295 0.9456 0.4841 0.4615 0.1517 0.6039 0.3393 0.2646 
1999 0.4259 0.4391 0.9322 0.4856 0.4466 0.1485 0.6088 0.3354 0.2734 
2000 0.4132 0.4547 0.9013 0.4680 0.4333 0.1464 0.5983 0.3334 0.2649 
.. See Table 7.1 for defmttiOns. 
320 
Figure 7.Al: Plots of bank-debt ratios for France. 
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Figure 7.A2: Plots of bank-debt ratios for Germany. 
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Figure 7.A3: Plots of bank-debt ratios for the UK. 
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"The fairest thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the fundamental emotion 
that lies at the cradle of true art and true science. He who knows it not, who can no 
longer feel amazement, is as good as dead, a snuffed out candle. " 
Albert Einstein, 1879-1955 
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Since the celebrated paper of Modigliani and Miller [1958], capital structure puzzle has 
remained to be unresolved and Myers' eighteen-year old question "How do firms choose 
their capital structures" is still unanswered. Subsequent to this theory, fmance academics 
have relaxed the unrealistic assumptions of the M-M theory and considered the presence 
of market imperfections, and then developed new theories. According to the tradeoff 
theory, capital structure has an impact on firm value. An optimal capital structure is 
attained by trading off the benefits of debt financing (tax deductibility of interest 
payments) with its costs (agency, bankruptcy and transaction costs). Pecking Order 
theory, on the other hand, argues that there is a financial hierarchy in which firms first 
use internal cash to finance their investment, then debt and lastly equity financing. 
Apart from capital structure puzzle, corporate finance has also questioned other 
unclear topics of financing decisions of firms. For instance, some papers attempted to 
explain why firms have different debt maturities. The literature advises the use of short-
term debt as it is contended to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems and to 
signal firms' high quality to the market. The proponents of long-term debt use, however, 
argue that it can decrease firm's tax liabilities and hence increases firm value; and 
minimises security undervaluation problem. Other studies shed light on the association 
between capital structure and the source of debt. The models propose strong relationships 
between source of financing, and debt restructurings of financially distressed firms in line 
with mitigating information asymmetries and avoiding premature liquidations. The 
implications of these models are as follows. First, small firms prefer bank debt since they 
are more flexible in renegotiations; and their usage avoids disclosure costs of investment 
opportunities. Second, high-credit risk firms issue private debt to benefit from low 
interest rates. Furthermore, firms with more intangible assets prefer private debt to avoid 
liquidation. Large firms issue public debt to benefit from economies of scale du to 
flotation costs. Firm-specific characteristics may stipulate the combination of public and 
private debt against financial distress and thus lead to optimal debt-mix policy. Last, 
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small firms first use bank debt to get a reputation by regular repayments and then issue 
public debt for lower interest burdens. 
On the other hand, bargaining-based theories of capital structure work on the 
strategic advantage of debt to shareholders. They have several implications: The 
anticipation of potential future negotiations is likely to influence the optimal capital 
structure choice. Firms' opportunistic behaviour may put an upper limit on debt capacity. 
Finally, strategic debt use has also benefits aside from tax advantages, such as deterring 
new entrant in the market; forcing concessions from debtholders and changing the 
seniority of claims on firms. 
The objective ofthis thesis is to test the conflicting implications of the theories of 
corporate capital structure, debt maturity structure and debt ownership structure. In doing 
so, we have contributed to the literature by providing empirical evidence from European 
countries. At the end of the comparative discussion of country-specific institutional 
factors in Chapter 2, it seems we have come to the point to assert that, apart from firm-
specific factors, corporate policies are also influenced by domestic institutional 
environments in which firms operate. The review in Chapter 2 reveals that France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom have specific financial and economic structures 
markedly differing from each other. For instance, French bankruptcy procedures mostly 
emphasise to safeguard the failing firm. In the UK, the direct bankruptcy costs tend to be 
lower and the design of insolvency procedures might cause premature liquidations. In 
Germany, it is difficult to rehabilitate the failing firm due to strong protection of 
collateral. Furthermore, due to the two-tiered corporate governance system in Germany, 
labour management representation is strongest in this country. In the shareholder-based 
British corporate governance system, potential agency costs are higher than in Germany 
and France where there is a stakeholder approach. Although market for corporate control 
is important in the UK, there is a lack of long-term and close relationship between firms 
and their creditors. To highlight another difference, ownership concentration is much 
higher in Germany than in the UK where there are large institutional investors. On the 
other hand, the family and state control over the firms is highest in France. 
This thesis also provides some contributions to the literature in terms of the 
econometric methodologies used, which is discussed in Chapter 3: The coefficient 
estimates on Fixed-effects models are imprecise as such models cause substantial loss in 
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variability and also the variables lacking any change overtime cannot be precisely 
estimated. The OLS procedure is relatively weak in panel data estimations due to 
heterogeneity problem and estimated parameters are assumed to be stable over the period. 
Fixed-effects and GLS estimators are consistent only if the model contains neither lagged 
dependent variables nor endogenous independent variables, and the number of 
observations tend to infinity with fixed time period. Consequently, considering the 
problems of measurement errors, simultaneity bias and endogeneity, it appears that GMM 
estimation technique can be regarded as the most appropriate methodology of our interest 
for the dynamic panel data models. The common practice in dynamic panel data models' 
estimations is to use GMM-DIF estimator in which the first-differences are taken to 
eliminate the time-invariant unobservable individual effects. Recent developments 
indicate that using system GMM approach that combines the differenced equation with 
the level equation will result in more efficient estimates than does GMM-DIF. It is 
because GMM-SYS estimator overcomes the problem of weak instruments while under 
GMM-DIF estimator the information of the instruments decreases as the series become 
more persistent. GMM-SYS approach controls for the presence of unobservable firm-
specific effects and the endogeneity of explanatory variables without eliminating valuable 
information. In our empirical analysis we test the validity of these econometric arguments 
and confirm the problems associated with alternative estimation procedures explained in 
Chapter 3. 
In the empirical analysis, we attempted to provide some important contributions to 
the literature, which are largely ignored by the existing studies: First, three distinct 
economies, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, have been chosen to investigate 
whether different institutional factors across countries have different influence upon the 
financing decisions of firms. The findings in three empirical chapters reveal that financing 
decisions of corporations are not independent from country-specific institutional factors as 
the association of the financing mix with firm-specific and market-specific factors varies 
across countries. Second, large panel data set was utilised to study dynamic financing 
policies of firms. We believe its necessity because it is obvious that factors influencing 
firms' financing mix change overtime and thus time-varying observed difference in firms' 
financing structure should also be investigated. Moreover, we use the GMM estimation 
methodology due to its superiority in overcoming common econometric problems, 
especially in controlling for the endogeneity problem by using efficient instrumental 
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variables. Using panel data together with GMM procedure, one is also able to control for 
unobservable and fixed firm-specific effects, which might potentially influence corporate 
financing decisions. Another important finding of this research is related to the presence of 
optimal financing policies in a dynamic framework, as proposed by the static-tradeoff 
theory. Our results suggest that firms appear to adjust their financing mix to achieve their 
optimal level. With respect to the estimated coefficients of lagged dependent variable, this 
adjustment process in France seems quickest in terms of responding to the new 
circumstances. This is consistent with the idea that time dimension constructs a very 
important variable explaining the evolution of firms' financing ratios in France (Kremp et 
al. [1999]). It may be possible that transaction (adjustment) costs are relatively low in 
France or disequilibrium costs of being off-target are substantial. 
In Chapter 4, as the first empirical study, we attempt to explain why there have 
been substantial variations in debt-equity ratios of listed corporations across European 
countries. Apart from commonly used firm-specific factors in the literature, this capital 
structure study considers some market-related factors and controls for dividend policy to 
see their interaction with debt-equity ratio. The main fmdings and related implications of 
this chapter are as follows: There is a significantly negative association between 
profitability and leverage in all countries. However, adverse selection problems between 
managers and outside investors (pecking order theory) seem most severe in France as the 
highest profitability coefficient pertains to this country. This may also be due to the lowest 
shareholder protection in France. The relationship between market-leverage and tax rate is 
insignificant in France and Germany, which is inconsistent with the theory. The results are 
not surprising for France due to French tax system's emphasis to promote the retentions of 
profits with lower corporate tax rates. Market-leverage and tax rate are significantly 
positively correlated in the UK, which may be due to firms' attempt to benefit from tax 
advantage of debt. 
Resolving agency problems and related costs tend to vary across different legal systems as 
the association of book-leverage with market-to-book ratio (proxy for growth 
opportunities) is different across countries: The correlation is significantly positive in 
France, insignificant in the UK and significantly negative in Germany. The finding in the 
UK is not expected since the dispersed corporate ownership and ineffective monitoring of 
management are argued to cause severe agency problems in British firms. The low 
shareholder protection in France might force firms to use debt over equity and therefore 
causes a strongly positive estimate of market-to-book ratio coefficient. 
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The relationship between fixed-assets ratio and leverage is significantly positive in all 
sample countries, which is in line with the theory that collateral tangible assets are useful 
to prevent risk-shifting problems. This finding indicates the presence of motivations for 
shareholders to shift to riskier projects at the expense of bondholders due to their limited 
liability as explained by Jensen and Meckling [1976] and Myers [1977]. 
Controlling for dividend policy also reveals some differences across countries: The 
association of market-leverage with payout ratio is insignificant in Germany, significantly 
positive in France and significantly negative in the UK. It is likely that the differences of 
taxation systems and corporate governance in these countries account for this variation. 
Moreover, firm size, inverse proxy for bankruptcy probability, seems to be a strongly 
positive determinant of debt financing in all countries under market-leverage. This finding 
highlights the importance of expected bankruptcy costs in financial distress. The 
irrelevance of firm size with book-leverage in Germany could be due to the effective role 
of banks in controlling the incumbent management and in supporting firms in bad 
conditions. Close and long-term relationship between firms and banks in Germany may 
also alleviate the cost of financial distress. However, strongly negative association of 
leverage with profitability and market-to-book ratio; significantly positive relationship 
between size and market-leverage, and significantly positive of fixed-assets ratio on debt-
ratios in Germany imply something important. Also found by Edwards and Fischer [1994], 
our results imply that allegedly efficient and strong characteristics of German corporate 
governance system seems to fail in mitigating agency, financial distress and asymmetric 
information problems with concentrated share ownership, and banks' close control and 
monitoring of the management. 
This chapter also provides empirical evidence with respect to the market-related factors. 
The inverse relation between term structure of interest rates and leverage in all countries 
confirms that firms are reluctant to issue debt while the long term-rate of interest is high. 
Beside this, the negative impact of share price performance on leverage in all countries 
suggests that firms issue equity after share price increase. It emerges that the impact of 
equity premium on leverage is country dependent: German firms do not seem to consider 
the market equity premium when deciding their financing mix; French firms tend to issue 
debt when equity premium is high. UK firms tend to issue equity when equity premium is 
high. This can be good evidence as to how differently managers in these countries react to 
the changes in the capital markets. 
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The primary objective of Chapter 5 is to investigate the variations in debt maturity 
decisions of firms across European countries. This chapter detects several firm-specific 
and market-related factors responsible for corporate debt maturity decisions. First, a 
significantly positive relationship between leverage and maturity is found in all countries. 
This strong finding may stem from liquidation concerns of firms such that firms with 
profitable growth opportunities would avoid borrowing short-term debt. 
As in capital structure decisions, different taxation systems appear to be effective 
in debt maturity decisions. We find that taxes have no significant impact on debt maturity 
decisions of UK firms. However, the tax clientele hypothesis is confmned in Germany 
with the significantly positive effect of tax rate on debt maturity, i.e., firms with high 
marginal tax rates construct a natural clientele of cheap long-term debt which yields higher 
tax shield. In addition, the negative but insignificant tax rate coefficient in France partially 
supports the trade-off hypothesis that firms increase their debt maturity as the tax 
advantage of debt decreases. 
Firm growth proxied by market-to-book ratio is found to be significantly positively 
correlated with debt maturity in the UK, as predicted by liquidity risk hypothesis. Hence, 
UK firms with long-term investment opportunities requiring ongoing managerial 
discretion prefer to hedge themselves against liquidity risk by issuing long-term debt. This 
variable does not exert any significant effect on debt maturity in France and Germany. 
Thus, the contracting-cost hypothesis is rejected as it predicts negative relationship 
between debt maturity and market-to-book ratio due to agency conflicts. The fmding in 
Germany supports the idea that bank-based systems may curtail underinvestment 
problems. 
Firm stze and debt maturity have different interactions across countries. The 
relationship is insignificant in France and Germany but significantly positively in the UK. 
This may imply that indirect bankruptcy costs, incentive problems and information 
asymmetries are less in Germanic and Latinic economies than in Anglo-Saxon economies 
due to corporate ownership structure and long-run relationship between firms and external 
fmanciers. 
As being another country-dependent relation, there is no significant relation between 
liquidity and debt maturity in France and the UK while the same association is 
significantly positive in Germany. It may be that French firms do not take positions to be 
liquid when they borrow long-term as French bankruptcy rules favour the saving of ailing 
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firms. However, it is not the case for German firms since bankruptcy procedures m 
Germany favour the liquidation of insolvent firms. 
What is more, the relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity is significantly 
positive in the UK. It confirms the maturity-matching hypothesis that firms pursue a 
hedging policy to control agency and bankruptcy problems, i.e., maturity of liabilities and 
assets are matched. However, it seems that German firms do not apply this matching 
principle and the situation is marginal in France. One explanation to the violation of this 
principle is that concentrated corporate ownership, long and close relationship between 
firms and investors in civil-law countries may mitigate the problems which necessitates 
the application of maturity matching principle. 
Furthermore, we find little support for the signalling hypothesis in Germany and 
the UK that high-quality firms prefer short-term debt as the coefficients on firm-quality 
variable are insignificantly negative. In France, firm-quality has direct but insignificant 
impact on debt maturity. On the other hand, Diamond's hypothesis arguing that there is a 
non-linear relationship between maturity and quality is not supported in any of sample 
countries. 
Volatility in earnings has significantly positive impact on debt maturity only in France. 
This is not predicted by the theory which argues that low variability in firm value causes 
firms to avoid rebalancing their capital structure frequently due to the concerns about 
expected bankruptcy costs. The same factor seems to be irrelevant to debt maturity 
decisions of German and UK firms. 
Apart from firm-specific variables, this chapter also provides the relevance of 
market-specific factors to corporate debt maturity policies. The results indicate that debt 
markets and equity markets tend to be integrated only in the UK, which one can expect 
from a market-oriented economy. This inference is due to the highly significant coefficient 
of equity premium variable, which is insignificant in other countries. The second market-
related factor is the term structure of interest rates, which is only significant again in the 
UK. The significantly positive coefficient on term-structure confirms Brick and Ravid's 
tax-hypothesis that firms lengthen their debt maturity if the term-premium is high in order 
to accelerate the tax benefits of debt. Share price performance is another market-based 
variable which can be used to test the signalling hypothesis that firms issue long-term debt 
after an increase in their share price. Because it is assumed that long-term debt is an 
informationally disadvantaged (likely to be mispriced) security. This hypothesis is 
marginally validated only in Germany and the UK. Lastly, the findings in terms of the 
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interest rate volatility do not confirm the theory which contends that firm lengthens debt 
maturity as interest rate volatility increases. Its association with debt maturity is 
significantly negative in the UK and insignificant in France and Germany. 
In brief, capital structure, corporate effective tax rate, firm quality, firm size, 
growth opportunities, asset maturity and liquidity seem to play significant role in shaping 
corporate debt maturity decisions. Apart from these firm-specific factors, we obtain in this 
chapter some market-specific factors that have substantial impact on debt maturity 
strategies of corporations especially in the UK. However, the nature and the dominance of 
the influence of these factors depend on the financial environment and tradition of the 
specific country as their effects vary across countries. 
The objective of Chapter 6 is to examine the variations in corporations' debt ownership 
decisions across European countries. This chapter identifies several market-specific and 
firm-related factors responsible for the use of bank debt in the framework of country 
specific differences. First, debt maturity and leverage ratio negatively affect the bank debt 
use in Germany- and the UK while they are irrelevant in French firms debt-mix decisions. 
These findings may refer to the liquidation concerns of Germany and British firms as 
bankruptcy rules in these countries favour the liquidation option. Hence Diamond's [1993] 
hypothesis that firms with higher debt ratios may restrict their bank borrowings in order to 
avoid frequent liquidations is supported. On the other hand, firm-friendly French 
bankruptcy laws are likely to be responsible for the irrelevance of these variables. 
Our study finds a U-shaped relation between bank-debt use and market-to-book 
ratio in the UK such that only low-growth and high-growth firms tend to borrow from 
banks. Hence, it seems that bank information monopolies (holdup problems) explained by 
Rajan [1992], among others, are present in the UK. In other countries, such a non-linear 
relation does not seem to be prevalent. There is some evidence that French firms with 
investment opportunities tend to borrow from banks possibly because of information 
asymmetries or high disclosure costs. However, in Germany, such problems and costs do 
not seem to be substantial, which may again be attributed to the nature of German 
corporate governance system. 
As a common finding for all countries, smaller firms tend to borrow from banks. This 
confirms the literature and the related arguments that small firms are riskier, immature and 
benefit more from monitored debt. Another common finding is related to the liquidity 
variable which affects the use of bank debt inversely for all companies. 
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Moreover, firm quality and bank-debt use are positively correlated in France and the UK 
while this association is insignificant in Germany. Consequently, the concerns about 
obtaining a better-informed lender to reduce adverse selection problems could be relevant 
for French and British firms. This is not the case for German firms possibly due to close 
and long run relations between firms and banks. 
We find that French and British firms seem to issue bank debt when they cut their 
dividend payout ratios. This is consistent with MacKie-Mason' [1990b] hidden-
information hypothesis that non-dividend paying firms avoid issuing public debt as paying 
dividends signals firms' future prospects. However, managers of German firms prefer to 
use bank debt when they pay less dividends, which may again be because of their different 
corporate governance mechanism. 
It seems firm profitability does not affect their debt- replacement decisions in Germany 
and the UK while profitable French firms tend to avoid borrowing from banks. 
Although there are some temporary effects of asset collateral, we could not detect any 
significant impact in the long-run for our sample countries. Thus our results contrast with 
Edwards and Fischer' s [1994] statement that collateral seems to be one of the 
requirements for majority of bank loans in Germany and the UK. 
Besides, interest coverage ratio has no significant impact on debt composition of UK and 
German firms while it has positive effect on the use of bank debt by French firms. Another 
country-oriented pattern comes from the earnings volatility variable. Volatility in earnings 
does not affect debt-mix decisions of French and German firms but it has a negative 
impact for British firms. 
In this chapter we also obtain some influence of macroeconomic and stock market 
indicators associated with corporate debt ownership structure. For instance, stock return 
volatility seems to decrease relatively the amount of bank debt used by British firms while 
it does not affect the debt-mix decisions of French and German firms. Moreover, only 
share price performance of French firms seems to be relevant in choosing different debt 
sources since share price runup tends to increase the use of bank debt in France. Finally, 
the results based on the term structure of interest rates differ across countries: It appears 
that relatively high long-term interest rates cause German managers to borrow from bank. 
Contrarily, relatively low long-term interest rates cause British managers to use bank debt. 
On the other hand, French managers do not seem to look at the shape of the yield curve 
while deciding their debt ownership structure. 
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In this chapter we provide indirectly a test for the following idea: It is argued 
mainly by World Bank researchers that the development in banking and stock market 
may be complementary as each supplies and demands better information. However, our 
results for the UK and Germany related to agency costs and information asymmetries 
show that this does not seem to be the case. 
The discussion above shows that our empirical evidence has some implications 
related to corporate governance systems of these countries. But can we conclude which 
corporate governance system is better? Hardly can one give an exact answer as there 
seems no absolute advantage overall of a specific corporate governance mechanism. In 
fact, if one is to emphasise the benefits of long-term and close relations between firms 
and their financiers in Continental Europe, the costs associated with the conflict of 
interest between large and minority shareholders should also be mentioned. Likewise, if 
one is to refer to the shareholder-manager conflicts typical to Anglo-American countries, 
the existence of active markets for corporate control due to atomised corporate ownership 
structure in these countries should also be given credit. Each system has its own 
comparative advantage, as Colin Mayer [1998,1999] states. This study favours neither of 
these governance mechanisms but suggests a mixture of both by discarding negative 
characteristics of each type. Surely, this is something to be initiated and performed by 
policy makers. 
With respect to the future research, this thesis suggests the following possible areas: First, 
it is apparent that finance theories are designed according to market-based economies. 
Hence, especially the impact of corporate governance systems differing across countries 
on firms' financing decisions can theoretically be examined. Second, to our knowledge, 
there exist no empirical tests of bargaining-based theories of capital structure. This gap 
may well be filled in as it is also important to look into the relationship between strategic 
use of debt and financing mix. Third, it seems we still need further empirical and 
theoretical research on capital structure, especially, across countries as there remain to be 
some ambiguous points waiting for investigation in this puzzling issue of corporate 
finance. Future research may also examine the interaction of debt maturity with source of 
financing using rich data (use of commercial paper, bank relationship, distinguishing 
between public debt, private debt and non-bank private debt). In conclusion, this thesis 
basically shows that the research in corporate finance is far from being complete. 
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9.APPENDIX 
9.1. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
( [ ] shows Datastream code for the item) 
• LEVERAGE!: [1301] I [392]. 
• LEVERAGE2: [1301] I {[1301]+[MV]}. 
• PROFITABILITY: {[137]+[136]} I [392]; or {[993+136]} I [392]. 
• NON-DEBT TAX SHIELDS: [136] I [392]. 
• EFFECTIVE TAX RATE: [761]=[203] I [154]. 
• MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO: {[MV]-[307]+[392]} I [392] 
• FIXED ASSETS RATIO: [339] I [392] or [2005] I [392]. 
• SIZE: LOG{[104])} or LOG{[392]}. 
• MATURITY-SHORT: [309] I [1301]. 
• MATURITY-LONG: [321] I [1301]. 
• MATURITY-SHORT2: [309] I [392]. 
• MATURITY-LONG2: [321] I [392]. 
• ASSET MATURITY: [339] I [136]. 
• DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO: [POUT]. 
• COVERAGE RATIO: {[136]+[137]} I [153] 
• FIRM QUALITY: {[211]t+l-[21l]t} I [P]t 
• LIQUIDITY-I: [376] I [389]. 
• LIQUIDITY-2: Z-Score = 
0.012{[376]-[389]} I [392]+0.014[196] I [392]+0.033[1300] I [392]+ 
0.006[MV] I [392]+0.999[104] I [392]. 
• BANK-DEBT RATIO-TOTAL: {[275]+[387]} I [1301]:UK, France 
[2029] I [1301]:Germany 
• BANK-DEBT RATIO-SHORT: [387] I [1301]: UK, France 
[20651 [1301] :Germany 
• BANK-DEBT RATIO-LONG: [275] I [1301]: UK, France 
[2066] I [1301]: Germany 
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9.2. THE DETAILED COMPONENTS OF DATASTREAM ITEMS: 
MARKET VALUE (MV): Market value on Datastream is the share price multiplied by 
the number of ordinary shares in issue. The amount in issue is updated whenever new 
tranches of stock are issued or after a capital change. For companies with more 
than one class of equity capital, the market value is expressed according to the individual 
ISSUe. 
SHARE PRICE (P): The 'current' prices taken at the close of market for each day. These 
prices are adjusted for subsequent capital actions, and this adjusted figure then becomes 
the default price offered. 
SHARE PRICE (UP): This is the closing price which has not been historically adjusted 
for bonus and rights issues. This figure therefore represents actual or 'raw' prices as 
recorded on the day. 
PAYOUT RATIO [POUT]: It is the ratio of dividends per share divided by the net 
earnings per share (adjusted) for the last financial period. 
TOTAL SALES (1 04): 
It is the amount of sales of goods and services to third parties, relating to the normal 
activities of the company. This amount usually does not include VAT or any other taxes 
relating directly to turnover, and will be net of trade discounts. For brewing and tobacco 
companies, values are gross of duties. 
General: Total Sales = [Domestic sales + Exports + Overseas sales]-[Inter 
company sales + Associate company sales + VAT (gross) + Other duties and taxes]. 
[104] =(101 + 102+ 103)-(108+ 109+ 123+ 125) 
For United Kingdom: Total Sales = [Sales-continuing operations + Sales-
acquisitions + Sales-discounted operations]- [Sales-associate cost etc]. 
[1 04] =(1 070+ 1071 + 1 072)-(1 073). 
COST OF SALES (129): 
All costs directly allocated to production for those companies which follow the 'Cost of 
sales' method of disclosure. Many companies in Europe still follow the total cost method 
and as such a cost of goods sold is not available. Datastream does not estimate the cost of 
goods sold but provides a breakdown of costs in accordance with format 1 and format 2. 
DEPRECIATION (136): 
It represents provisions for amounts written off-A WO and depreciation of fixed assets 
and assets leased in. For industrials in Germany the figure includes AWO intangibles. 
OPERATING PROFITS -ADIDSTED (137): 
This is net profit derived from normal activities of the company after depreciation and 
operating provisions. [137] = [993] +[981]. 
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TOTAL INTEREST CHARGES (153): This shows interest on bank, convertible and 
other loans, bonds and debentures, leasing finance and hire purchase minus interest 
capitalised. The figure also includes dividends/interest payments of redeemable 
preference shares described as participative loans. 
PRE-TAX PROFIT (154): 
In general, this is pre-tax profit as disclosed by the company; no adjustments are made to 
exclude items of an exceptional/extraordinary nature. Repositioning of items may be 
necessary for certain countries and companies: 
Pre-tax profit is stated before deducting/adding minority interest. 
Pre-tax profit is stated after transfer to untaxed reserves (also called tax-
exempt reserves, tax regulated provisions and special reserves). 
For France; pre-tax profit is stated before the normal write off of goodwill. For Germany; 
pre-tax profit is stated after deducting taxes other than income taxes. 
For United Kingdom: Pre-tax Profit = [Operating profit + Total special items + Total 
non-operating income] - [Total interest charges + Other financial expenses] -
[Associates' pre-tax profits]. 
RETENTIONS (196): 
These are profits after tax, minority interest, dividends, post-tax extraordinary items, 
directors bonuses and allocations to untaxed reserves. (Retained earnings). 
TOTAL TAX CHARGE (203): 
In general, this is the company's published total charge for taxation. 
For United Kingdom: Total Tax Charge = [Total domestic tax + Total overseas tax + 
Associates total tax]-[Prior year tax]. 
[203] = (166+169+170)-(199) 
[166] = (160+161+164+173)-(162) 
= [Corporation tax+ Tax equalisation+ Irrecoverable advance corporation 
tax+ Franked income tax] -[Double-tax relief]. 
[169] = 167+ 168 = [Overseas tax]+ [Overseas tax equalisation]. 
[170] = 171 +204 = [Associates domestic tax]+ [Associates overseas tax]. 
For German companies, taxes other than income taxes are excluded and shown as 
operating expenses. 
EARNED FOR ORDINARY (210): 
Net profit after tax, minority interests and preference dividends. This is the adjusted 
earnings using the adjusted pre-tax profit and taxation charge, i.e., excluding pre-tax 
extraordinary items, non-operating provisions and transfers to tax-exempt reserves, 
exchange gains/losses and any other items not relating to the normal trading activities of 
the company. For Germany: This is the total earnings figure as calculated according to 
the Deutsche Vereinigung Fur Finanzanalyse Und Anlageberatung (DVFA). 
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NET EARNINGS PER SHARE (211): 
This is the adjusted earned for ordinary (item 210) divided by the year end number of 
shares. The average number of shares is used for UK where the figure is available for all 
companies. This item is adjusted for subsequent rights and scrip issues. For Germany: 
This is the per share earnings figure per share as calculated according to the Deutsche 
Vereinigung Fur Finanzanalyse Und Anlageberatung (DVFA). 
NET EARNINGS PER SHARE (254): 
The published earned for ordinary divided by the average number of shares in issue 
during the period. It is adjusted for subsequent rights and scrip issues. Year-end number 
of shares is used for France where the average number of shares is not consistently 
available. 
For Germany: This is defined as the company's published earnings after minorities 
divided by the average number of shares in issue during the year. This item is adjusted for 
scrip and rights, subsequent to the year-end. 
LOAN CAPITAL REPAY ABLE 1-2 YEARS (263): 
This shows all loans (except those which are convertible, leasing finance and hire 
purchase), due between 1 and 2 years. 
LOAN CAPITAL REPAY ABLE 2-5 YEARS (264): 
This shows all loans (except those which are convertible, leasing finance and hire 
purchase), due between 2 and 5 years. 
BANK BORROWING (275): 
This shows bank borrowings due after one year. 
TOTAL SHARE CAPITAL AND RESERVES (307): 
In general, it shows the total share capital and reserves, including preference capital. 
(Book value of equity). 
[307] = (305 +306) =[Equity capital and reserves]+ [Preference capital]. 
[305] = (30 1 + 302+ 303+ 304+589) 
= [Ordinary share capital + Other equity capital + Share- premium account 
+ Reserves + Total untaxed reserves]. 
Standard adjustments include:- goodwill shown against reserves is transferred to total 
intangibles.- capital and other grants shown elsewhere are transferred to reserves.-
proposed dividends are deducted if reserves are shown before appropriations.- hybrid 
capital and other non-equity capital may have been excluded and shown at item [321] if 
perceived as a financial instrument.- for Europe and Japan, treasury stock is shown as an 
asset rather than as a deduction from equity. 
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BORROWING REPAY ABLE <1 YEAR (309): 
It shows bank overdrafts, loans and other short-term borrowing. The current portion of 
long-term loans is included. 
SHORT-TERM LOANS (318): 
This shows all loans (except those which are convertible, leasing finance and hire 
purchase) which are due for repayment within 5 years. [318] = [263] + [264]. 
LONG-TERM LOANS (319): 
This shows loans (other than convertibles, leasing finance and hire purchase) which are 
repayable in more than five years. 
TOTAL LOAN CAPITAL (321): 
In general, it relates to all loans repayable in more than one year. Loans from group 
companies and associates are included. 
[321] = (318+319+320+267) 
= [Short-term loans+ Long-term loans+ Convertible loans+ Leasing finance and 
HP]. 
NET TOTAL FIXED ASSETS (339): 
In general, it shows the net total of land and buildings, plant and machinery, construction 
in progress and any other fixed assets. Assets leased out here are excluded. 
[339] = (330-338) = [Total fixed assets-gross]-[Total fixed assets-depreciation]. 
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS (376): 
It includes stocks, work in progress, trade and other debtors, cash and equivalent, and any 
other current assets. Trade accounts receivable after 1-year are included. For Europe, 
common adjustments to the as reported figure are; to exclude treasury stock if shown as 
part of current assets; to exclude long term loans and receivables not directly related to 
the trading activities of the company; to reposition deferred tax asset to net deferred tax 
liabilities. 
BANK BORROWING (387): 
It shows the bank borrowings repayable within one year (part of Borrowings repayable 
within 1 year (item 309)). 
OTHER SHORT-TERM BORROWING (388): 
It shows the non-bank borrowings repayable within one year. [388] = [309]- [387]. 
337 
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES (389): 
In general, it includes current provisions, creditors, borrowing repayable within one year 
and any other current liabilities. It also includes trade accounts payable after one year. 
[389] = (379+380+381 +382+385+309) 
= [Other current liabilities + Provisions due in less than one year + Current taxation 
+Dividends payable+ Total creditors and equivalent+ Borrowings repayable within one 
year]. 
TOTAL ASSETS EMPLOYED (391): 
It shows the sum of all assets less all current liabilities. 
[391] = (339+344+356+359+390) 
= [Net total fixed assets+ Total intangibles+ Total investment including associates 
+ Other assets + Net current assets]. 
TOTAL ASSETS (392): 
It shows the sum of tangible fixed assets, intangible assets, investments (including 
associates), other assets, total stocks & WIP, total debtors & equivalent and cash & cash 
equivalents. Common adjustments: deferred tax, if shown as an asset, is offset against 
any deferred tax liability; goodwill carried in reserves is transferred to intangible assets; 
treasury stock is shown as an asset rather than deducted from share capital and reserves.; 
advances on work in progress if disclosed as a liability by the company has been offset 
against stocks and work in progress. 
ADJUSTMENTS TO OPERATING PROFIT (981 ): 
This shows the total of all items that have been excluded from the published operating 
profit. This will include items of an exceptional nature, which do not form part of a 
company's normal trading activities. 
OPERATING PROFIT (993): 
This is the profit derived from operating activities i.e., before the inclusion of financial 
income /expense, financial and extraordinary provisions and extraordinary profits I 
losses. The most common adjustments made by Datastream to the published figure are 
as follows: 
i) Capital grants/investment credits when disclosed as operating income by the company 
is excluded from operating profit and repositioned to non-operating income. 
ii) For the French companies, profit sharing (participation des salaries aux fruits de 
I' expansion) and the normal write off of goodwill is included in operating profit. iii) For 
German companies, taxes other than income taxes are included. iv) Profits from 
associates/joint ventures and investment income when shown by the company as part of 
operating profit is excluded. 
EBIT (1300): 
It shows Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT). All industry groups The earnings of a 
company before interest expense and income taxes. Calculated by taking the pre-tax 
income and adding back only the total interest expense on debt. 
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TOTAL DEBT (1301): 
It is the total of all long and short-term borrowings, including any subordinate debt and 
'debt like' hybrid finance instruments. 
EBITDA (1502): 
It is the earnings of a company before total interest expense, depreciation, amortisation 
and provisions. 
BANK LOANS AND OVERDRAFTS (2029) 
German Industrials (Hoppenstedt): Amounts payable in less than 1-year are highlighted at 
item [2065] and greater than 5-years at item [2066]. 
9.3. INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
9.3.1. DAT ASTREAM SECTOR CODES [DIS] 
030 Building & Construction Materials 
031 Gas Distribution 
032 Builders Merchants 
033 Chemicals, Speciality 
034 Computer Hardware 
035 Farming & Fishing 
036 House Building 
037 Electrical Equipment 
038 Forestry 
039 Other Construction 
040 Distributors - Other 
041 Media Agencies 
043 Engineering- Contractors 
044 Defence 
045 Health Maintenance Organisations 
046 Distributors of Industrial Components & Equipment 
04 7 Environmental Control 
048 Personal Products 
049 Hospital Management & Long Term Care 
050 Oil & Gas - Exploration & Production 
051 Oil - Services 
052 Home Entertainment 
053 Tyres & Rubber 
054 Non-Ferrous Metals 
055 Leisure Facilities 
056 Steel 
057 Electronic Equipment 
058 Software 
059 Household Appliances & Housewares 
060 Furnishings & Floor Coverings 
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061 Leisure Equipment 
062 Household Products 
063 Auto Parts 
064 Vehicle Distribution 
065 Automobiles 
066 Retailers - Soft Goods 
067 Beverages - Brewers 
068 Beverages - Distillers & Vintners 
069 Clothing & Footwear 
070 Other Health Care 
071 Food Processors 
072 Restaurants & Pubs 
07 4 Engineering - General 
07 5 Packaging 
078 Other Textiles & Leather Goods 
079 Tobacco 
080 Hotels 
081 Security & Alarm Services 
082 Paper 
083 Food & Drug Retailers 
084 Publishing & Printing 
085 Discount & Super Stores and Warehouses 
086 Business Support Services 
087 Retailers - Multi Department 
090 Retailers - Hardlines 
091 Laundries & Cleaners 
092 Chemicals, Commodity 
093 Chemicals, Advanced Materials 
094 Broadcasting Contractors 
095 Pharmaceuticals 
097 Oil - Integrated 
098 Aerospace 
099 Shipping & Ports 
100 Gaming 
1 01 Diversified Industrials 
114 Soft Drinks 
115 Cable & Satellite 
116 Other Business 
117 Commercial Vehicles & Trucks 
119 Gold Mining 
120 Engineering Fabricators 
122 Other Mineral Extractors & Mines 
126 Telecommunications Equipment 
129 Airlines & Airports 
130 Semiconductors 
131 Rail, Road & Freight 
132 Medical Equipment & Supplies 
134 Education, Business Training & Employment Agencies 
140 Electricity 
142 Fixed-Line Telecommunication Services 
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143 Wireless Telecommunication Services 
144 Water 
150 Computer Services 
151 Internet 
155 Photography 
156 Retailers e-commerce 
9.3.2. DATASTREAM SECTOR DEFINITIONS, SORTED BY SECTOR NAME: 
Aerospace (098): Manufacturers and assemblers of aircraft and aircraft parts primarily 
used in commercial or private transport. 
Airlines & Airports (129): Air transport companies and operators of airports and related 
facilities and Services. 
Automobiles (065): Companies which manufacture and assemble passenger automobiles 
and motor Cycles. 
Auto Parts (063): Manufacturers of auto parts other than those classified elsewhere (e.g. 
in Tyres & Rubber). 
Beverages - Brewers (067): Manufacturers and shippers of malt and malt liquors such 
as beers, ales and stout. 
Beverages - Distillers & Vintners (068): Distillers, blenders and shippers of alcoholic 
beverages such as whisky, brandy, rum, gin or liquors. Also producers of wine and cider. 
Broadcasting Contractors (094): Independent radio and television contractors, not 
classified elsewhere (e.g., 'Cable & Satellite'). Companies providing facilities and/or 
programmes for contractors. Film production. 
Builders Merchants (032): Wholesalers of building materials and timber importers. 
Building & Construction Materials (030): Producers of materials used in the 
construction and refurbishment of buildings and structures (e.g. cement, glass and 
flooring materials other than carpets - not classified in 'Furnishings & Floor Coverings') 
and refractory materials. 
Business Support Services (086): Providers of non-financial services to organisations 
which could have been provided "in-house" excluding those activities classified 
elsewhere. 
Cable & Satellite (115): Providers of television, media services and programming 
facilities driven by Subscriptions. 
Chemicals, Advanced Materials (093): Producers of cellular polymers and specialist 
plastics. 
Chemicals, Commodity (092): Producers of commodity and industrial chemicals, 
industrial gases, coatings and paints, fibres and films. 
Chemicals, Speciality (033): Producers of fine chemicals, dyestuffs and chemicals for 
specialised applications. Biotechnology products not classified elsewhere. 
Clothing & Footwear (069): Manufacturers of all types of clothing and footwear, 
including those for Sportswear. 
Commercial Vehicles & Trucks (117): Manufacturers of commercial vehicles, railway 
rolling stock and heavy agricultural and construction machinery. 
Computer Hardware (034): Manufacturers of computers and associated electronic data 
processing equipment and accessories. 
Computer Services (150): Providers of computer services. Consultants for information 
technology not classified elsewhere (e.g. Education, Business Training & Employment 
Agencies). 
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Defence (044): Producers of components and equipment for the defence industry. 
Discount & Super Stores and Warehouses (085): Shops concentrating on mass 
distribution of both hardlines and soft goods at discounted prices due to volume. 
Distributors of Industrial Components & Equipment (046): Distributors, wholesalers 
and/or stockists of electrical, electronic, engineering equipment and supplies. 
Distributors-other (040): Distributors, wholesalers and/or stockists other than those 
classified elsewhere. 
Diversified Industrials (101): Industrial companies engaged in three, or more, classes of 
business that differ substantially from each other, no one of which contributes 50%, or 
more, of pre-tax profit, nor less than 10%. 
Education, Business Training & Employment Agencies (134): Providers of education, 
business and management training courses and employment services. 
Electrical Equipment (037): Producers of electrical components and equipment. 
Electricity (140): Generators and distributors of electricity. 
Electronic Equipment (057): Producers of electronic components and equipment not 
classified elsewhere (e.g. in 'Aerospace & Defence', 'Household Appliances & 
Housewares' or 'Hardware'). 
Engineering - Contractors (043): Designers, manufacturers and installers of industrial 
plant and pollution control equipment. 
Engineering Fabricators (120): Producers of castings, pressings, welded shapes; 
fabricators and erectors of structural steelwork. 
Engineering- General (074): Engineering companies not classified elsewhere, making a 
variety of Products. 
Environmental Control (047): Providers of solid and hazardous waste management, 
recovery and disposal Services. 
Farming & Fishing (035): Crop growers excluding forestry. Companies which raise 
livestock, commercial fishers, manufacturers of livestock feeds. Owners of plantations. 
Fixed-Line Telecommunication Services (142): Operators of fixed-line 
telecommunications networks. 
Food Processors (071): Processors and wholesalers of food 
Food & Drug Retailers (083): Retailers of food and drug products. 
Forestry (038): Owners and operators of timber tracts, forest tree nurseries, sawmills. 
Furnishings & Floor Coverings (060): Manufacturers of furniture (including office 
furniture) and furnishings, carpets and other materials for covering floors. 
Gaming (100): Providers of gaming and casino facilities. 
Gas Distribution (031): Distributors of natural and manufactured gas. 
Gold Mining (119): Prospectors for, extractors and refiners of gold bearing ores 
Health Maintenance Organisations (045): Owners and operators of health maintenance 
organisations. 
Home Entertainment (052): Providers of products and of entertainment services, 
generally enjoyed at home, other than those classified in the 'Media & Photography' 
sector. 
Hospital Management & Long Term Care (049): Owners and operators of hospitals, 
clinics, nursing homes, rehabilitation and retirement centres. 
Hotels (080): Hoteliers 
House Building (036): Constructors of residential buildings. 
Household Appliances & Housewares (059): Manufacturers of consumer electronic and 
electrical equipment, domestic appliances, lighting, tools for use in the home, hardware, 
cutlery, tableware, giftware and watches. 
Household Products (062): Producers of detergents, soaps and polishes. 
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Internet (151): Access providers, Internet software, on-line service providers. 
Laundries & Cleaners (091): Launderers and dry cleaners. 
Leisure Equipment (061): Manufacturers of leisure equipment not classified under 
'Clothing & Footwear' or 'Home Entertainment'. 
Leisure Facilities (055): Providers of leisure facilities. 
Media Agencies (041): Advertising, marketing and public relations agenctes and 
consultants. 
Medical Equipment & Supplies (132): Manufacturers of medical equipment, devices 
and eye care products. 
Non-Ferrous Metals (054): Producers of primary non-ferrous metal products, 
encompassing all processes from smelting to alloying, rolling and drawing. 
Oil & Gas-Exploration & Production (050): Companies engaged in exploration for, 
and production of, mineral oil and gas. 
Oil - Services (051): Providers of services, including drilling, for oil and natural gas 
exploration and production. (NB: Distinguish Gas distribution in the Utilities Economic 
Group). 
Oil-Integrated (097): Companies engaged in the exploration for, production, refining, 
distribution and supply of mineral oil and gas products. Companies providing services to 
oil companies, other than those specified elsewhere (e.g. Oil- Services). 
Other Business (116): Industrial companies not classified elsewhere. 
Other Construction (039): Constructors of non-residential buildings. Civil engineering 
and infrastructure contractors. 
Other Health Care (070): Diversified and other health care companies not classified 
elsewhere (e.g., Education, Business Training & Employment Agencies). 
Other Mineral Extractors & Mines (122): Companies engaged in the extraction and/or 
refining of minerals other than Gold. 
Other Textiles & Leather Goods (078): Manufacturers of textile materials and goods 
other than clothing, and of leather goods other than footwear. Processors of hides and 
skins. 
Packaging (075): Manufacturers of containers from paper, board, plastic, film, glass 
and/or metal. 
Paper (082): Producers, converters and merchants of all grades ofpaper. 
Personal Products (048): Producers of toiletries, cosmetics and hygiene products. 
Pharmaceuticals (095): Biotechnology and drug research and development and/or 
exploitation. 
Photography (155): Manufacturers of photographic equipment for use by the general 
public. Operators of photographic studios and film development companies. 
Publishing & Printing (084): Publishing, newspapers and printers of documents. 
Rail, Road & Freight (131): Land transport and related facilities and services, including 
road and tunnel operators and vehicle rental, and agencies which undertake the 
transportation of goods from shippers to receivers. 
Restaurants & Pubs (072): Operators of restaurants and pubs, including integrated 
brewery companies. 
Retailers e-commerce (156): Retailers conducting the majority of their business on the 
Internet or other electronic systems (e.g. digital TV). Retailers also conducting business 
by traditional means will be classified under other retailing sub sectors until published 
figures reveal that over 50% of their business, as measured by profit or turnover, is 
derived from e-commerce-related activities. 
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Retailers - Hardlines (090): Shops concentrating on the sale of a single class of goods, 
not classified elsewhere (e.g., food and drugs; soft goods or vehicles), such as auto parts 
or home and office products. 
Retailers - Multi Department (087): Retail outlets with more than one department, 
selling a varied range of goods not classified elsewhere (e.g. 'Discount & Super Stores 
and Warehouses'). 
Retailers - Soft Goods (066): Shops concentrating on the sale of a single class of soft 
goods - clothing, etc. 
Security & Alarm Services (081): Companies installing, servicing and monitoring alarm 
systems and those providing security services. 
Semiconductors (130): Semiconductor capital equipment, wafer and chip manufacturers. 
Shipping & Ports (099): Water-borne transport and related services and terminal 
facilities 
Soft Drinks (114): Manufacturers of non-alcoholic beverages including carbonated 
mineral waters 
Software (058): Producers of computer software. 
Steel (056): Manufacturers of primary iron and steel products, encompassing all 
processes from smelting in blast furnaces to rolling mills and foundries. 
Telecom Equipment (126): Manufacturers of digital equipment used in 
telecommunications, including mobile telephones, switchboards, exchanges and 
microwave systems. 
Tobacco (079): Cigarette and tobacco manufacturers. 
Tyres & Rubber (053): Tyre manufacturers and tyre treaders for automobiles, trucks, 
tractors and aircraft. 
Vehicle Distribution (064): Distributors, sellers and/or servicers of vehicles and 
distributors of vehicle parts and components. 
Water (144): Companies responsible for the provision of water and the removal of 
sewage. 
Wireless Telecommunication Services (143): Operators of mobile (cellular and satellite 
broadcast) telecommunications Networks. 
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Table A.l: Classification of fifteen industries. 
NO INDUSTRY NAME DS SECTOR CODES 
1 AUTOMOTIVE, AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION 53,63,64,65,98,99, 
117, 129, 131 
2 BEVERAGES, TOBACCO 67,68, 79,114 
3 BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION 30,32, 36,39 
4 CHEMICALS, HEAL THCARE AND PHARMACEUTICALS 33,48,62, 70, 92,93, 
95, 132 
5 COMPUTER, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 34,37, 57,58, 59,126 
6 DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRY 101 
7 ENGINEERING, MINING, METALLURGY AND 43,44,50, 51,54,56, 
OIL-GAS EXPLORATION 74,97, 119,120,122, 
130 
8 FOOD PRODUCER &PROCESSORS AND FARMING &FISHING 35, 71 
9 LEISURE, HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND PUBS 52,55,61, 72,80,100 
10 OTHER BUSINESS 116 
11 PAPER, FORESTRY, PACKAGING, PRINTING &PUBLISHING 38, 75,82,84,155 
PHOTOGRAPHY 
12 RETAILERS, WHOLESALERS AND DISTRIBUTORS 40, 46, 66, 83, 85, 87 90, 
156 
13 SERVICES 41,45,47,49,81,86, 
91,94, 115,134,150, 
151, 
14 TEXTILE, LEATHER, CLOTHING &FOOTWEAR AND 60,69, 78 
FURNITURE 
15 UTILITIES 31, 140, 142, 143, 144 
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